ML20086K374
| ML20086K374 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1995 |
| From: | Lyons D, Reddemann M Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9507200121 | |
| Download: ML20086K374 (13) | |
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O PSEG Pyblic Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit July 11,1995 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir:
MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT HOPE CREEK GENERATION STATION UNIT I DOCKET NO. 50-354 In compliance with Section 6.9, Reporting Requirements for the Hope Creek Technical Specifications, the operating statistics for June 1995 are being forwarded to you with the summary of changes, tests, and experiments that were implemented during June 1995 pursuant to the requirements of10CFR50.59(b).
Sincerely yours, h,f M hMM Mark Reddemann General Manager-Hope Creek Operations DL:RS:JC Attachments C Distribution 2000.;u 9507200121 950630 PDR ADDCK 05000354 R
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1 INDEX 1
WhBR j
SECTION OF PAGES J
Average Daily Unit Power Level............................................................ 1 Operating Data Report.................................................................2
- Refueling Information........................................................................... 1 Monthly Operating Summary....
.......................................................1 Summary of Changes, Tests, and Experiments......................................... 6 l
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DOCKET NO.: 50-354 UNIT: Hooc Creek DATE: July 10.1995 -
COMPLETED BY: D. W. Lvopj TELEPHONE: (609)339-3517 AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL MONTH JUNE 1995 l
DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)
(MWe-Net) 1 1038 17 194_2 J_01Q 2
1032 18 0
3 1032 19 1039 j
4 1031 20 1024 5
1031 21 1028 6
LQ32 22 1034 7
1028 23 1030 8
1024 24 1028 9
1Q32 25 10JJ 10 1038 26 9_9_8 11 1018 27 1Q22 j
12 1036 28 1065 13 1040 29 1036 14 1038 30 1Q35 4
15 1036 31 n/_a 16 1034 i
DOCKET NO.: 50-354 UNIT: Hooe Creek DATE: July 10.1995 COMPLETED BY: D. W. Lyon_g TELEPIlONE: (609) 339-3517 OPERATING DATA REPORT OPERATING STATUS 1.
Reporting Period June 1995 Gross Hours in Report Period 229 2.
Currently Authorized Power Level (MWt) 3291 Max. Depend. Capacity (MWe-Net)
IQ31 Design Electrical Rating (MWe-Net) 1067 3.
Power Level to which restricted (if any) (MWe-Net)
No.n.s 4.
Reasons for restriction (if any)
This Month Yr To Date Cumulative 5.
No. of hours reactor was critical 720.0 4183.6 64119.5 6.
Reactor reserve shutdown hours 00 00 M
7.
Hours generator on line 720,0 4162.0 63165.4 8.
Unit reserve shutdown hours M
Q0 M
9.
Gross thermal energy generated (MWH) 2_366114 13529926 201944272-10.
Gross electrical energy generated (MWH) 775347 4504330 669319.26 11.
Net electrical energy generated (MWH) 742345 4316622 63970013 12.
Reactor service factor 100.0 96.3 85.8 13.
Reactor availability factor 100.0 96.3 85.8 14.
Unit service factor 100.0 95.8 84.5 15.
Unit availability factor 100.0 918 84.5 16.
Unit capacity factor (using MDC) 100.0 96.4 8_30 3
17.
Unit capacity factor (using Design MWe) 96.6 93.2 8LO2 18.
Unit forced outage rate M
42 42 19.
Shutdowns scheduled over next 6 months (type, date, & duration):
Refueling Outage, November 11,1995,30 days 20.
If shutdown at end of report period, estimated date of start-up:
N/A
4 DOCKET NO.: 50-354 UNIT: Hope Creek DATE: July 10.1995 COMPLETED BY: D. W. Lyons TELEPHONE: (609) 339-3517 OPERATING DATA REPORT UNIT SIIUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS MONTH JUNE 1995 METIIOD OF SHUTIING DOWN THE TYPE REACTOR OR F= FORCED DURATION REASON REDUCING CORRECTIVE NO.
DATE S= SCHEDULE (IiOURS)
(1)
POWER (2)
ACTION / COMMENTS 1.
NONE h
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y DOCKET NO.: 50-354 UNIT: Hone Creek DATE: July 10.1995 COMPLETED BY: D. W. Lvons TELEPHONE: (609) 339-3517 REFUELING INFORMATION MONTH JUNE 1995 1.
Refueling information has changed from last month:
Yes No X
2.
Scheduled date for next refueling:
11/11/95 3.
Scheduled date for restart following refueling:
12/10/91 l
4A. Will Technical Specification changes or other license amendments be required?
J Yes No X
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B.
Has the Safety Evaluation covering the COLR been reviewed by the Station Operating
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Review Committee (SORC)?
l Yes No X
If no, when is it scheduled? October 25.1995 5.
Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action:
Moiteguiast 6.
Important licensing ccasiderations associated with refueling:
N/A 7.
Number of Fuel Assemblies:
A. Incore 764 B. In Spent Fuel Storage (prior to refueling) 1240 C. In Spent Fuel Storage (after refueling)
B22 8.
Present licensed spent fuel storage capacity:
4006 Future spent fuel storage capacity:
4006 9.
Date oflast refueling that can be discharged 5/3/2006 to spent fuel pool assuming the present hcensed capacity:
(EOCl3)
(Dpm allow for full-core off-load)
(Assumes 244 bundle reloads every 18 months until then) 1 (Does nel allow for smaller reloads due to improved fuel) l l
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I DOCKET NO.: 50-354 UNIT: Hope Crgsk DATE: July 10.1995 COMPLETED BY: D. W. Lyons TELEPHONE: (609) 339-3517 MONTIILY OPERATING
SUMMARY
MONTH JUNE 1995 The Hope Creek Generating Station remained on-line for the entire month and operated at essentially 100% power for the month of June 1995. At the end of the month the unit had been on-line for 95 days. During June 1995 there were four times power was reduced from 100%. These were planned events for turbine valve surveillances. Motor Generator Brush maintenance occurred coincidence with the June 11,1995 turbine valve surveillance.
l-DOCKET NO.: 50-354 UNIT: Hooe Creek DATE: July 10.1995 COMPLETED BY: D. W. Lyons TELEPHONE: (609)339-351
SUMMARY
OF CHANGES. TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS FOR THE HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION MONTH 1995 The following items have been evaluated to determine:
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If the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report may be increased; or
- 2. If a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report may be created; or
- 3. If the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is reduced.
The 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations showed that these items did not create a new safety hazard to the plant nor did they affect the safe shutdown of the reactor. These items did not change the plant effluent releases and did not alter the existing environmental impact. The 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations determined that no unreviewed safety or environmental questions are involved.
Desien Change Summary gf Safety Evaluation 4HE-00197 - IBGPV-3964 CHANGES In order to enable IBGPV-3964 to operate in e
automatic several changes were made. One of these changes was relocation of the instrument tap from IBGV-9948 as shown on UFSAR Figure 5.4 - 19, to IBGV-9982.
The other changes, bypassing the positioner for the valve operator and having the valve shut during regenerations are not changes to the plant as described in the UFSAR. None of the changes involve safety related equi 3 ment or affect systems required for safe shutdown of the plant. These changes are a:1 in the non-Q portion of the Reactor water Clean Up System (RWCU).
Since RWCU is isolated during the accidents evaluated in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR, and since this change does not impact the ability of RWCU to isolate, this change does not affect either the probability or consequences of accidents previously evaluated in the UFSAR and does not involve any Unreviewed Safety Question.
c Procedures Summarv.q.f Safety Evaluations IC.OP-SO.HG-0001(O). Revision 0 OPERATION OF THE UNIT 2 CMERGENCY SUMP This procedure changes the facility as described in the UFSAR' because it allows the pumping of the Unit 2 Emergency Sump to the Regenerant Waste Tank as an alternate flow path. UFSAR Section 9.3.3.1.14 states that the Turbine Building Emergency Sump is routed to the Low Volume & Oily Waste (LVOW) system.
UFSAR Figure 11.5 - 2 shows an input from the Unit 2 Emergency Sump to the LVOW.
UFSAR Figure 9.2 - 7 does not show the Unit 2 Emergency Sump as an input to the
. Regenerant Waste Tank. The connection will be made using a hose that will be installed anc removed in accordance with the procedure each time it is used.
The only credible failure mode is a failure of the hose causing a leak. Any leakage would consist of water which would drain to the floor drain system, as designed. Failure of the i
system will not interfere with the ability to perform a safe shutdown of the plant. If because of the additional inputs, the Regenerant Waste Tank cannot be discharged to Salem, the Make Up Demineralizer system can still perform its function. UFSAR Section 9.2.3.3 states the Makeup Demineralizer System has no safety related function and does not transport any radioactive fluids. Failure of the entire system does not compromise any safety related system or component or prevent a safe shutdown of the plant. The l
Regenerant Waste Tank portion of the system does not communicate with any equipment that is important to safety.
Therefore, this procedure does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the UFSAR and does not involve any Unreviewed. Safety Question.
- HC.OP-IS.KL-0102(O). Revision 10 PCIG SUBSYSTEM B VALVES -
INSERVICE TEST This procedure revision places two valves, KLHV-5160-A and KLHV-5160-B into the normal 92 day surveillance requirement of Hope Creek Technical Specification 4.0.5(b). In the IST program, the valves were originally specified as cold shutdown tested, but funher analysis no longer supports this relief request. Normal surveillance testing will have no effect on any of the Pnmary Containment Instrument Gas -
(PCIG) system parameters considering.the compressor train being tested is the train-currently out of service. In accordance with the latest NRC approved revision of the Inservice Test Program Submittal, Cold Shutdown Relief Request # 17, three valves in the PCIG, HV-5160A, HV-5160B, and HV-5148, cannot be tested while in operational modes 1,2, or 3 because the valves are ' interlocked and both trains of the system would be simultaneously removed from service." A review of the P&ID and logic diagrams revealed the valves are not interlocked to each other and can be tested in all operational modes with no adverse affects as long as the corresponding compressor train is out of service. Therefore, the Cold Shutdown Relief request is not required.
Hope Creek UFSAR Sections 7.3.1 and 9.3.6 state the function of the PCIG is to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The instrument gas system is fully testable dun,ng normal operation. Each instrument gas compressor is capable of sup) lying the entire load requirement. This allows securing one for testing. Single failure ana:ys,s is addressed and i
analyzed in UFSAR Section 9.3.6. UFSAR Section 7.3.1 permits a single train to be out of selvice for either maintenance or testing. Since the compressor train to be tested is already out of service, the stroking of this valve in the system cannot affect equipment important to safety or prevent safely shutting down the plant.
Therefore, this procedure revision does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the UFSAR and does not involve any Unreviewed Safety Question.
Temocrary Modifications Summary of Safety Evaluations95-033 - BYPASS OF PCIG COMPRESSOR SKID TRAPS This temporary e
modification establishes an off normal line-up for the PCIG Compressor traps. This line up has the trap inlet valve closed, the function of the PCIG compressor skid traps is replaced with a throttled bypass valve to provide a continuous drain for condensate until the traps are repaired or replaced. This is a change to the normal configuration described in UFS AR Figure 9.3-11.
The PCIG Compressor / Dryer skid will still function per its design except for a continual bleed off of gas to expel water instead of short bursts of high volume. The throttled valve will function as a flow restricting orifice. The bypass valves will be throttled to a rate that will ensure the PCIG Compressors can still dehver the 14.6 SCFM required in the worst case and allow the required 1.5 gallon / hour to drain from the compressor.
Therefore, this Temporary Modification does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the UFSAR and does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.
e 95-036. -037, and 038 - CIRC WATER MOTOR BEARING COOLING WATER DISCII ARGE LINE This temporary modification installs a nominal 1 inch diameter hose and associated fittings onto the cooling water discharge of the A, B, and C circulating water pump motor bearing cooling water discharge nozzles. The hoses will direct spent cooling water to existing floor drains within the circulating water ) ump house. This arrangement will allow for replacement of the existing cooling water ines with new lines while the pump remains in service. The UFSAR indicates that this line is con ~structed of HGD class pipe and therefore the installation of a hose and tubing is a change to this description.
Failure of either the hose or the fittings would not com3romise the operation of the j
bearing cooler. However, it may be desirable to secure tie pump for personnel safety reasons. There is no safety related equipment in the circulating water house. Failure of the entire circulating water system does not compromise any safety related system or component or prevent a safe shutdown of the plant. This system has no safety related functions and is not required to be operable following a LOCA.
Therefore, this Temporary Modification does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the UFSAR and does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question. This Temporary Modification has already been removed.
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.T_gmocrary Modifications Summary gf Safety Evaluations (Continued) l e 95-039 - JUMPER IBK400 CONTROL ROOM CHILLER LOW REFRIG PRESSURE TRIP This temporary modification will permit the 'B" Control Room Chiller to be operated with a defective pressure switch until a replacement can be installed.
The Control Area Chiller is used to provide cooling for the mam control room, the EDG l
switchgear rooms, the SACS pum) rooms and various electrical and control equipment i
rooms. The affected switch is ic entified in UFSAR figure 9.2 - 15. This switch is intended to protect the chiller tubes from freezing due to low freon pressure or 3
temperature. The chiller refrigerant temperature is, also, monitored locally by equipment l
operators on rounds. The refngerant pressure is monitored by CRIDS utihzmg a different I
sensor. ' CRIDS can activate an alarm in the control room. The chiller can be secured by the operator should either a low temperature or pressure occur. The bypassed low l
nressure switch is intended for machine protection only and therefore does not affect the l
ability of the chiller to perform its intended function.
l The chiller is not specifically considered in any accident scenarios but it is assumed available in all scenanos for Control Room habitability and control equipment cooling.
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This modification does not increase the probability of a malfunction and does prevent spurious trips on low refrigerant pressure from occurring. Besides monitoring by the operators and CRIDS, the chillers have an auto-recycle switch which will stop the chillers if the leaving temperature is too low. The installed jumper does not affect any other i
i portion of the chiller logic, and will not result in any new chiller trips. Jumpering the low j
refrigerant pressure trip has no effect on either the consequences or probability of any i
accident. If the refrigerant presst're is low, the chiller will eventually fail which will result in the start of the redundant chiller. The UFSAR has already evaluated the consequences of a malfunction of one loop of chilled water.
l Therefore, this Temporary Modification does not increase the probability or consequences j
of an accident previously described in the UFSAR and does not involve an Unreviewed j
Safety Question. This Temporary Modification has already been removed.
Deficiency Report Summary of Safety Evaluation j
e 950111083 - USE-AS-IS DISPOSITION FOR DEGRADED ELECTRIC IIEATING l
COILS IN CERS SUPPLY FAN IB-VII407 This Deficiency Report involves disabling
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1/6th of the heating capacity of the IB-VH407 Control Equipment Room HVAC Supply System (CERS). The degradation was due to overheating. This fan supplies filtered and j
l tempered air to the Lower Relay Room, control equipment mezzanine, cable spreading room, inverter rooms and HVAC equipment rooms. A portion is, also, supplied to both Q and non-Q battery rooms through Battery Room Duct Reheat coils. The original capacity of the heaters was 100 Kw, the reduced capacity will be 83.3 Kw. UFSAR Table 9.4-1 lists the heating capacity of this system as 341,300 BTU /hr. The reduced capacity will be 284,300 BTU /hr. The system is designed to warm 5000 cfm of 5 F air to 60 F. The reduced capacity of the heaters will still provide sufficient heat inJut to warm the unheated outside air from 5 F air to 57.6 F. When mixed with the recircu ated 60 F air, the change in the fmal temperature will be less than 1 F. This is a negligible change. Of all the areas to which this system supplies air, only the battery electrolyte has a specified minimum temperature and it is 60 F. Because this temperature is critical the battery rooms have Duct Reheat coils designed to take the 60 F air and heat it to 77 F, well above the minimum temperature. Similar equipment rooms in other HVAC systems at Hope Creek have minimum temperatures specified at 40 F. The small potential change in capability l
will not encroach on this limit.
I Therefore, the disposition of this Deficiency Report does not increase the probability or conseguences of an accident previously described in the UFSAR and does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question l
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Q1hgr Summary 2[ Safety Evaluations e PROllLE.M REPORT 950508214 - UFSAR ' CHANGE - SECTION 11.2.3 RAD, OACTIVE RELEASES These changes modify the wording used in describing the amount of di:ution water used for radioactive releases and extends the acceptable pH range used when discharging liquid wastes. UFSAR page 11.2-14, changes from 'The minimum monthly average... the laundry drain waste streams." to 'The expected monthly average... the detergent drain waste streams." UFSAR Table 11.2-12, page 4 of 4 changes from 'hfier dilution by the minimum monthly flow" to " after dilution by the expected monthly flow " This will allow flexibility for those times when the cooling tower blowdown flow is below the expected value of 1.9E4 due to plant shutdowns, tower maintenance or other operating conditions. Radioactive releases will still be controlled with a radioactive release permit which calculates the flow using conservative numbers -
from the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). Changing ' laundry"to 'tletergent" is for clarification. UFSAR Page 11.2-14. changes from 'bnly neutral (pH 7 to 10) liquids" to 'bnly neutral (pH 6 to 9) liquids." This change will allow more operating flexibility for the release of radioactive wastes without affecting the corrosion rate of the piping. This change is consistent with the NJPDES limitations for this release pathway. These changes are administrative in nature and do not alter the original design or functional intent of the liquid radioactive waste system. Based on a review of NRC Circular 80-18 and NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0059(Q) this proposal does not constitute a major change to the liquid radioactive waste systems. The liquid waste management system is designed so that no potentially radioactive liquids can be discharged to the environment unless they have been processed, monitored, and diluted by mixing with the cooling tower blowdown release. This results in offsite radiation exposures on a an annual basis within the limits' of 10CFR20 and 10CFR50. The radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instmmentation alarm and trip setpoints, the release concentrations, resulting dose rates, and cumulative exposures are calculated in accordance with methodology described in the ODCM. The proposed changes do not deviate from this methodology.
The liquid waste management syst'em does not contain any safety related functions.
Failure of this system will not affect the ability of the plant to detect, respond to, or mitigate the consequences of any accidents. The proposed changes will not affect the origmal design intent or the design basis of the liquid waste management system. Liquid radioactive waste will continue to sampled, monitored and/or released in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications, the ODCM and the limits of 10CFR20 and 10CFR50. There are no safety systems affected by the proposed changes. The changes will not result in any modificat; ions to the plant or its systems.
Therefore, this UFSAR change does not. increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described m the UFSAR and does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.
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Other* Summary 2[ Safety Evaluations (Continued) i e ENGINEERING EVALUATION H-1-LE-MEE-0976 - DCP EXCLUSION ZONE FOR LOW VOLUME OILY WASTE The purpose of this safety evaluation is to identify systems, structures and components (SSC) of the Low Volume Oily Waste 1
(LVOW) System as being outside of the scope of nuclearjurisdiction and justify creation of a design change exclusion zone for these SSCs. The entire LVOW from the lift stations to the Cooling Tower Blowdown pipe is excluded except for buried piping and electrical tie-ins. The collection portion of the LVOW up to the lift station is not included. The Design Change Process (DCP) will no longer apply to modifications to these SSCs. This, also, removes Figure 11.5-2 from the UFSAR. (UFSAR Change 95-07)
No plant operating parameter will be affected by this proposal. Any' instrument signals leavmg the exclusion zone are for indication only. no control signals originating within this system leave the exclusion zone. None of the transients or accidents evaluated in the UFSAR are applicable to this exclusion zone. The LVOW has no safety related function, and failure will not compromise operation of safety related systems. Loss of the LVOW system is discussed in UFSAR Section 9.3.3.5. No work will be done within the exclusion zone that will have impact beyond the zone boundary unless it is under. control of the Design Change Process.
Therefore, implementation of this Engineering Evaluation and corresponding UFSAR change do not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously desenbed in the UFS AR and does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.
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