ML20086J208
| ML20086J208 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 11/29/1974 |
| From: | Cooney M PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Anthony Giambusso US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| AO-74-26, NUDOCS 8401230316 | |
| Download: ML20086J208 (2) | |
Text
)
(V3 O
G PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 MARKET STREET PHILADELPHI A, PA.19101 1215) 841-4ooo November 29, 1974 s
N, Mr. A. Giambusso N
Deputy Director of Reactor Projects t 'il0;-
United States Atomic Energy Commission
~~
Directorate of Licensing Washington, D.C.
20545
Dear Mr. Giambusso:
Subject:
Abnormal Occurrence The following occurrence was reported to Mr. Walt Baunack, A.E.C. Region 1 Regulatory Opera tions Office on November 20, 1974.
Written notification was made to Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Region 1 Regulatory Operations Office on November 20, 1974.
In accordance with Section 6.7.2.A of the Technical Specifications, Appendix A of DPR-56 for Unit 3 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, the following report is being submitted to the Directorate of Licensing as an Abnormal Occurrence.
Reference:
License Number DPR-56 Technical Specification Reference 3.7.0 Report No.:
50-278-74-26 Report Date:
November 29, 1974 Occurrence Date:
November 19, 1974 Facility:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station R.D.1, Del ta, Pennsylvania 17314 9
Identification of Occurrence:
Drywell floor drain sump isolation valve A0-3-20-83 failed to close on a PCIS isolation.
Conditions Prior to Occurrence:
Unit 3 operating at 3083 MWt and 1028 Mwe. A startup test causing _ MSIV full isolation had just been performed causing reactor scram and PCIS isolation.
7y 1224S DN. /4 f[d h
8401230316 741129 g/
PDR ADOCK 05000278
,p S
PDR COPY SENT REGION f
2
O O
~'
Mr. A. Giambusso November 29, 1974 Page 2 Description of Occurrence:
During the PCIS isolation, A0-3-20-83 failed to isolate.
Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:
The solenoid valve, which de-energizes to bleed the air off the diaphragm, stuck in the energized position preventing valve closure.
Analysis of Occurrence:
The other isolation valve in this line, A0-3-20-82, did close to isolate the line. Therefore, there is mininal safety implications associated with this occurrence.
Corrective Action:
As required by Technical Specifications, a daily log of the operabic isolation valve position was immediately instituted in the form of an established surveillance test.which verified that the position of the operable isolation valve, in the same line, is in the isolated posi tion. Corrective maintenance was performed on the solenoid valve on 11/22/74. The solenoid valve was placed on a test stand and operated properly several times. The valve was reinstalled and A0-3-20-83 operated open and close satisfactorily.
e Failure Data:
None previous oh Unit 3 A similar occurrence was reported as A0-50-277-74-7.
4 Very truly yours,
/,.,f A
'g ;.-r>ui.
M J. Cooney y
Asst. Gen t. Superintendent.
Generation Division i'
cc:
Mr. J. P. O'Reilly Director, Region 1 United States Atomic Energy Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 f
I l
p.