ML20086H934
| ML20086H934 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 12/04/1991 |
| From: | Mcmeekin T DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9112100188 | |
| Download: ML20086H934 (5) | |
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Duke 1% rr Company T c Al stum AlcGiure Swlear Generation Department lice hesident 12700 Hagers Ferry Road (LIGolA)
(*01)Si54&M]
- Ilantennile. AC2807b-8953 (104MI5409 f:n DUKE POWER December 4, 1991 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attna Document Control Desk j
-Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
McGuire Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-369, -370 Inspection Report No. 50-369, -370/91-21 Gentlemen:
Please find attached the response to violation 370/91-21-01 and the second example of this violation given in Inspection Report No. 50-369, -370/91-22.
If there are any questions, call Larry Kunka at (704)875-4032.
-Very truly yours,
')%.2. 0]tGAf /b~
T. C. McMeekin LJK/cb1 Attachment xc:
Mr.
S. D.
Ebneter Administrator,-Region 11 U.S.~ Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta ST., NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30323
'Mr. Tim Road U.S. Nuclear Regulatory. Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l
Washington, D.C.
20555 i
Mr. P. K. Van Doorn l
NRC Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station
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Inspection Report No. 50-369, ~370/91-21 December 4, 1991 Page 3 McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION RESPONSE TO VIOLATION Violation 370/91-21-01 Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires written procedures to be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978, which includes equipment control procedures.
Station Directive 4.2.2, Independent Verification, requires, in part, that independent verification be performed for the removal from operability and restoration to operability of all systems or components which affect the ability of a system to perform a safety related function.
Contrary to the above, on August 14, 1991, following maintenance on the Unit 2 annulus doors, independent verification was not performed on the closure of the doors, which remained in an open configuration.
This configuration resulted in both trains of annulus ventilation being inoperable for approximately six hours.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I) and applies to Unit 2 only.
Response to First Example of Violation 370/91-21-01 1.
Reason for violation:
On August 14, 1991, Construction and Maintenance Department (CMD) personnel were performing a modification on the Unit 2 annulus enclosure door.
This modification required Control Access Door (CAD) hardware to be removed and the door modified to extend the security boundary.
Bofore beginning work, a direct line of communication with the responsible Senior Reactor Operator was estaolished.
One person was posted at the door in case the Control Room called and the door had to be closed immediately.
A temporary nuclear station procedure was in place to control this portion of the modification.
l After work was completed on August 14, 1991, at 4:30 p.m.,
the craft personnel removed the fire tag from the annulus door and proceeded to the Control Room to clear the fire l
tag.
Due to inattention to detail, the CMD craft personnel failed to close the door per Technical Specifications and l
Inspection Report No. 50-369, -370/91-21 December 4, 1991 Page 4 procedural requirements.
Therefore the VE system was j
2.
Corrective actions taken and results achieved:
The annulus door was closed.
A communication package was issued by Station Management to l
reemphasize the importance of attention to detail to all station personnel.
I Training on the importance of attention to detail has been conducted with all Operations personnel in shift meetings.
Meetings were held with appropriate CMD employees to heighten awart..ess and describe various events that have occurred during the year.
l 3.
Corrective actions to be taken to avoid further violations:
Operations management will incorporate Independent l
Verification provisions into the Fire Watch Barrier Tag l
Program.
4.
Date when full compliance will be achieved:
McGuire is in full compliance.
l I
Second example of Violation 370/91-21-01 l
On September 21, 1991, Security notified Operations at 8:15 a.m.,
that a guard stationed at the lower containment access door had found the annulus access door open approximately four inches.
At i
the time the unit was in Mode 4, in the process of shutting down for the refueling outage.
Evaluatjon by Operations determined the door being ajar had rendered the VE system inoperable.
Response to Second Example of Violation 370/91-21-01 i
i 1.
Reason for violation:
On September 20, 1991, a security guard was posted at the path to Unit 1 Annulus Ventilation bypass door, AD3311, for security badge and access control.
Door AD3311 is a Selected Licensee Commitment Fire Door.
Because the door also serves as a security boundary, it sends an alarm to the Security Alarm Stations when opened.
To eliminate excessive alarms due to traffic through the door, security personnel
Inspection Report No. 50-369, -370/91-21 December 4, 1991 Page 5 placed the "open" alarm "in access" since the alarm was not required at that time due to the guard being stationed at the door.
At 0530 on September 21, 1991, the door was opened for four janitorial contract (K-Mac) and two Radiation Protection (RP) personnel.
All personnel had exited prior to 0600.
Security personnel in the area after this time stated that the door appeared to be closed.
There was no other personnel traffic through the door at that time.
At 0810 the oncoming Security Officer noticed the door was opened approximately four inchos.
Further investigation showed the door had been pushed closed but not latched for prolonged periods of time from 0904 on September 20, 1991 until 0834 on September 21, 1991.
2.
Corrective actions taken and results achieved:
A.
Door AD3311 was closed by the Security Officer who discovered it open.
B.
The door was taken out of the "in access" mode to enable Security personnel to monitor status of the door continuously by receiving an alarm each time the door was opened.
C.
The event was discussed with all appropriate K-Mac employees and the need to close and latch the VE system doors was emphasized.
D.
A meeting was held between Operations (OPS), Security, Project Services and MSRG personnel to discuss actions needed to prevent recurrence of similar events.
3.
Corrective actions to be taken to avoid further violations:
A.
OPS management personnel will implement appropriate procedure changes to ensure that whenever the VE system doors are opened, appropriate compensatory measures are implemented and fire barrier watches are established.
B.
OPS management personnel will implement appropriate training for OPS and Security personnel on the proper procedure for maintaining control of VE system doors.
C.
OPS and Project Services personnel will examine signs and paint colors currently on the VE system doors and make appropriate changes to alert personnel accessing the doors of the need to close and latch them after each entry.
_s, Inspection Report No. 50-369, -370/91 21 December 4, 1991 Page 6 4..
Date when full compliance.will be achieved:
McGuire is in full. compliance.
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