ML20086G940
| ML20086G940 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 04/21/1975 |
| From: | Cooney M PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Anthony Giambusso US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| AO-75-21, NUDOCS 8401130014 | |
| Download: ML20086G940 (2) | |
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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY o.
2301 MARKET STREET
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PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101
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,' A Q(6Vh Mr. A. Giambusso i '
Division of Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations
- United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
Washington, DC 20555 l'
Dear Mr. Giambusso:
Subject:
Abnormal Occurrence The following occurrence was reported to Mr. Tom Shediowsky, Region 1, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, United States Nuclear j
Regulatory Commission on April 11, 1975 Written notification was
-a made to Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Region 1, Office of Inspection and Er.forcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Conmission on April 11, 1975 In accordance with Section 6.7.2.A of the Technical Snecifi-cations, Appendix A of DPR-56 f or Unit 3 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, the following report is being submitted to the Directorate of Reactor Licensing as an Abnormal Occurrence.
Reference:
License Number DPR-56 Technical Specification Reference 3 2.D Report No. :
50-278-75-21 Report Date:
April 21, 1975 Occurrence Date: April 11, 1975 Facility:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station R.D. 1, Delta, Pennsylvania Identification of Occurrence:
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Failure of Hi Radiation PCIS trip relay in HIS-3-17-458D to operate.
Conditions Prior to Occurrence:
Unit 3 at 73% power, g3 t^ Y]
Description of Occurrence:
During a routine functional surveillance test, it was found that the high radiation trip relay failed to operate.
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Mr. A. Giambusso
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50-278-75-21 April 21, 1975 Page 2 Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:
i Failure of hermetically scaled relay.
Analysis of Occurrence:
I Because this device is one of four arranaed in a one-out-of-I two twice logic (which initiates a secondary containment ventilation i
system isolation on refueling floor exhaust high radiation) such that the loss of any one device will not defeat the logic, the safety implications are minimal.
' Corrective Action:
The channel was placed in tne trip condition until the problem was investigated and the failed relay replaced. The radiation monitor hi gh radiation trip was then retested in accordance with the applicable surveillance test.
Failure Data:
Previous failures, reported as 50-277-75-20 and 50-278-74-2.
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Cooney Aso't Gen'1 Superi tendent Generation Division r.c :
Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director Region 1 Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 l
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