ML20085N154
| ML20085N154 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 10/25/1991 |
| From: | Jamison J Battelle Memorial Institute, PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATION |
| To: | Bernard Thomas Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-L-1753 NUDOCS 9111140154 | |
| Download: ML20085N154 (10) | |
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Paota vaihaesi taboratones nanae novin,,a P O 0o. W9 R 4 hldnd, M ashmpton 99 M2 l ek.rone iw" October 25,'1991 375-3782 Mr, Brian E. Thomas Planning, Program, and Management Support Branch Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wc.shington, DC 20555
Dear Mr. Thomas:
4 FIN Ll753 - HATCH EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE - OCTOBER 2, 1991 (Inspection Report #50-321 & 50466/91-24) j Enclosed is the final report of observations made by the Pacific Northwest Laboratory staff during the subject exercise.
Only minor changes have been made to the draft provided to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission team leader at i
the site.
If you have any questiens regarding this report, please contact me on (509) 375-3782.
Sincerely O
O J. D. Jamison, Project Manager Operational Health Physics Group HEALTH PHYSICS DEPARTMENT JDJ: del In triplicate Enclosure cc w/ encl:
RA Erickson JL Kreh
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4 HATCH EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCLSI (Inspection Report #50-321 & 50-366/91-24)
OCTOBER 2, 1991 A.
lign:
John M. Will B.
Assianment:
Control Room (CR) (Simulator) then the Technical Support Center (TSC) when activated.
Ivoe of Hours Number of Hours On-site 29 Travel & Preparation 11 Total 45 C.
Site Personnel Contacted: Ben Smith, CR Cantroller; Tim Bienke, Superintendent of Shift (SOS)/ Emergency Director (ED); Charles Tyre, Shift Supervisor; Carl James, Shift Technical Advisor; Mike McLeod, Reactor Operator; Mike Ban, Reactor Operator; Glenn Dunham, Reactor Operator; Curtis Coggin, TSC Controller; Dennis Read, TSC Manager /ED; Dorsey Smith, Health Physics (HP)/ Chemistry Supervisor; Pierre Fornell, Maintenance Supervisor; Karl Breitenbach, Engineering Supervisor; John Lewis, Operations Supervisor; Eddie Gibson, Reactor Engineering Supervisor.
D.
Positive Findinos The setting of priorities in the TSC was very effective.
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The face-to-face discussion of priorities (when conditions permitted) between the TSC Maintenance Supervisor and the Operational Support Center (OSC) Coordinator was very effective in resolving questions.
The Emergency Response facility (ERF) Communications form was a very effective means of communicating OSC actions desired by the TSC.
(Comment: The process takes longer than a telephone call, but reduces the chance for error by requiring the various TSC supervisors to initial before transmittal. A fax transmittal system might make up some of that lost time. Also see the negative comment below.)
The TSC Manager displayed excellent command and control while ED and TSC Mcnager.
(Comment:
He clearly announced when he had taken and relinquished ED responsibilities.
He provided timely status updates to the TSC staff.
He held timely and effective meetings of his key supervisors to discuss problems and priorities.)
Use of a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) qualified as a Plant Parameter and
-Key Event status board keeper provides the TSC Manager with another knowledgeable communications link with the CR, (Comment:
By being constantly on the phones to the CR, he is the-first to intercept word of problems or casualties and can alert the TSC Manager.)'
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i The TSC personnel showed concern for the path to be taken by the OSC -
i teams _in execution of tasks required by the TSC.
(Comment: The TSC personnel would consult plant layout charts showing contamination levels )
The TSC personnel made excellent use of system schematics in diagnosing casualties and problems.
E.- Neoative Findinas
-The SOS had difficulty in deciding which emergency level was appropriate based on the seismic indication.
(Comment:
It was difficult to determine if_ this was caused by exercise artificiality or a lack of training.)
Initial notifications from the CR were within the allotted time, however,
' difficulties encountered by the communicator indicated a training problem.
(Comment: The communicator tried to feed all--three sheets of the _ message-form through the f ax at once, plus placing the sheet in the machine upside down.
If she had done that evolution _before, it was not obvious.
The problem might-have been recognized had the communicator's procedure required the communicator to ask if the Counties had received their copy of the fax before starting'to read the message.)
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On the notification form, there are blanks to record acknowledgement of the message by the Counties. The blanks are for date and time of acknowledgement, but no indication of who acknowledged for each County.
To avoid possible future controversy over acknowledgement of messages, part of the communicator's procedure should be to note the name of the person acknowledging for each County.
(Comment:
In the exercise, one of the Counties acknowledged the messaga, then called back later to ask for clarification.
If this had been cause of a late notification controversy, the utility would have been in a better legal position if it had the name of the person who originally acknowledged receipt of the message.
The 505, on becoming the ED, could have shown more command and control.
(Comment: There was no innouncement that he was the ED, no status reports,etc.)
The TSC was-activated expeditiously,- however some personnel apparently believe-that having the requisite personnel arrive in an ERF is all that-is necessary to activate the ERF-(i.e., one can then declare-activation and stop the activation stopwatch).
(Comment: This fails to take into account that the individuals have to determine if they have requisite materials to do their job; have, in some cases, need to get a turnover fr.;m someone else; etc.)
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- Personnel are using the ERF communications forms as directed in the Hatch Communications Plan (Revision 8), however, there needs to be a more formal control of the TSC originals.
(Comment: The TSC Manager's Clerk who is responsible for numbering, distributing, and keeping track of the TSC originals, keeps the message forms loose in the back of the TSC Manager's Log.
As these forms are a valuable source of information regarding OSC teams and actions, various people, including the NRC Representative, picked up the forms and went through them. At one point, the clerk could not locate her file copy of one of the numbered forms (#011). During a longer emergency with many more messages, there is a good chance of losing some of the messages.)
Use of the status boards in the TSC was generally effective except for g
the Radiological Emergency Team Data board which was updated infrequently, displayed erroneous information, and was not complete wtan updated.
(Comment:
For four hours, the_ board showed a team that had never been
-sent out by the OSC. The board never showed return times for teams as the space on-the board would call for. The board never accurately reflected the actual teams or status for the teams in the field.)
s Coordination between the TSC and the CR to get out timely public address (PA) system announcements was lacking.
(Comment:
It took about 17 minutes from the declaration of the Site Area Emergency [SAE] (and evacusticn] until the PA announcement.
It took 5
about 13 minutes to get the announcement af ter dociaration of the General Emergency (GE),)
c After initial activation, there appeared to be little concern about tne radiological hazards of entry and exit to and from the TSC.
(Comment: The explanation given was that the wind was blowing the o'.her The TSC door guard, when queried long after the release had way.
started, was unaware that a release was in progress.)
There was confusion regarding the injured man's contamination levels -
whether it was in counts per minute or disintegrations per minute, The problem was never resolved by the end of the exercise.
(Comment: What was originally reported as 3000 cpm, by the end of the exercise, became on one status board 30,000 dpm and on another 300 cpm.)
From what was heard in the TSC, it appeared the OSC lost control of one of its teams (Medical Response Team?) while it was out in a high radiation area.
(Comment: This was apparently due to lack of walkie talkies or something.)
F. Chronoloav Time Observation 0740 Initial briefing.
0806 Plant Manager gives permission to proceed with the drill, 6
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4 Time
-Observation 0830 Seismic alarm.
0834 Controller provides the SOS with message pertaining to the al arm.
(This should have helped the SOS declare the emergency.)
0837 The 505 decides to declare an Alert.
(Messcge states time of declaration as 0940.)
0840 The PA announcement - Alert.
0845 Startup Transformer 2C circuit failure.
- 0852 Delivery of notification message to Counties and State completed. Departed simulator.
0906 The TSC is activated.
'0907 The OSC is activated.
0915-Arrived in TSC.
0919 The TSC Manager assumes responsibility of ED.
0923 Corporate management. informed.
0929 The ED holds caucus with supervisors and determines action priorities.
0940 Follow-up message transmitted. Maintenance Supervisor departs for the OSC.
1000 Maintenance Supervisor returns to give ED first-hand update.
-1003 The OSC requested to dispatch Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) team.
10.8 Torus data looks peculiar and ED orders walkdown.
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c Observation ling 1029 Reactor scram. Turbine trip.
Emergency diesel picked up.
One High Pressure Coolant injection (HPCI) valve did not operate.
The "B" emergency diesel tripped.
Loss of "D" startup transfer.
1031 The ED recognizes loss of coolant accident.
1041 The ED tells the SOS that they need to upgrade to an SAE.
1047 The ED declares an SAE stating that there is too much going on, including an off-site release.
1058 The SAE notification message is being de' livered.
1100 ED holds caucus with supervisors
1117 Plant Manager.in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) assumes responsibility of ED.=
1120 There-is discussion of upgrading to a GE.
1126 Conference call - 18% hydrogen, 28% clad damage, 3% (1%
corrected) oxygen with concerns for higher concentration in pockets.
1132 The TSC manager would upgrade based on oxygen' concentration, torus leak, and shaky electrical status due to earthquake.
1137 The ED states that due to.the release of radioactivity, they ought to upgrade.
1140-
1144
- The CR reports that the drywell 18 inch valves are open.
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Time Observation 1235 High temperature in standby gas treatment system (SBGT).
Fan will not shut down.
1245 Controller injects contingency message to have the TSC Manager send the fire brigade to deluge the SBGT (required to set up the medical scenario).
1246 Fire alarm from "A" SBGT.
1320' Report of injury to one of the fire brigade members; request for a paramedic and assistance in evacuating.
1328 Fire brigade needs additional assistance.
1331 Injured man-reported as Wendell Beckworth with contamination of 3000 cps, being questioned whether 3000 dps.
1341 Fire Emergency Support Team has been called out.
1424 The TSC Manager holds caucus regarding drywell temperature and pressure (may be a simulator glitch).
Isotopes from PASS sample indicate 3% core melt down.
1442 Exercise terminated.
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