ML20085M612
| ML20085M612 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 09/05/1975 |
| From: | Brey H, Hillyard H, Swart F PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO |
| To: | Howard E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| References | |
| AO-50-267-75-20, NUDOCS 8311090052 | |
| Download: ML20085M612 (7) | |
Text
_ __________ __________-__ - _
O O
P. O. Box 361, Platteville, Colorado 80651 s
,i Septembe gi 4 s*[Q '
Mr. E. Morris Howard, Director
', / B 7 (*
- Huclear Regulatory Commission
)N NfD sp k~
J Region IV
' 'C Q$
office of Inspection and Enforcement D
~ Nh. M Suito 1000 8
Alington, Texas 76012 l
Ref: Facility Operating Licenso No. DPR-34
(
Docket No. 50-267 Dear Mr. Howards Enclosed please find a copy of Abnornal Occurrence Report !;o. 50-267/75/20, Final, submitted per the requirements of the Technical Specifications.
Very truly yours, j
Frederic E. Swart Superintendent, Nuclear Production Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Statibn FES/alk cc - Mr. Angelo Giambusso W
D
~
8311090052 750905 PDR ADOCK 05000267 g
?&to
[
(-)
(,).
v
(
l ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE 75/20 REPORT DATE:
September'2, 1975 Page 1 of 4 OCCURRENCE DATE:
August 26, 1975 FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO P. O. BOX 361 PLATTEVILLE, COLORADO 80651 REPORT No. 50-267/75/20 Final
, IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
Twelve cord sets connecting process controllers at the 1-05 and I-06 control board to the cable rack in the auxiliary cicetric equipment room were switched.
This is identified as an Abnormal Occurrence under item 2.1 (h) of the Tech-nical, Specifications.
CONDITIONS PRIOR Routine Shutdown TO OCCURRENCE:
Steady State Power Not Shutdown Routine Load Change X
Cold Shutdown Other (specifv)
Refueling Shutdown t
Routine Startup The major plant parameters at the time of the,cVent were as follows:
RTR 0
MWth Power ELECT 0
MWe-Secondary Coolant Pressure N/A psig i
Temperature N/A
'F Flow N/A f/hr.
Primary Coolant Prcosure O
psig
--Temperature 120
'F Core Inlet l
t 120
'F Core Outlet Flow 1 circulator at'4,000 RPM
- /hr.
i
,P~
i n
n L)
%_l}
ABNORMAL OCCURRE?!CE 75/20 Page 2 of 4 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRE!!CE :
the control roon operators received an alarm.
In At approximately 10:30 am, checking the equipment it was found that the cord sets to the pH (XR-3390-1)
The situation and the conductivity (CR-3390-2) recorders had been switched.
the reason for the switching and who was responsibic were was corrected, but not established. The Superintendent of Operations was informed of the probica.
at 11:30 am the Assistant Reactor Operator received another alarm and checked the back of the control boards.
The Superintendent of Operations was informed that a check of cord sets behind the.I-05 and 1-06 boards indicated a number of controller cord set reversals including XR-3390-1 and CR-3390-2.
Working in the plant for General Atomic Company were electricians and "cabic tracers" employed by Kennedy Electric Company. They were suspect because they had been in the vicinity of the occurrences.
APPARENT CAUSE Unusual Service Cond.
OF OCCURRENCE:
Design Including Environ.
Component Failure Manufacture Installation /Const.
X Other (specify)
Malicious mischief.
Operator Procedure ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
conducted an extensive audit of The Public Service Company Results Department all recorder / controller cord sets to determine which -controller cord sets had-been swapped. A total of twelve cord sets were found reversed, as follows:
Cord Set Reversed With_
XR-3390-1 CR-3390-2
)
Cause of incident CR-3390-2 XR-3390-1
)
SC-2116 TC-22122 TC-2244 SC-2112 SC-2112 TC-2244 PC-22130-1 TC-2226 TC-2226 PC-22130-1 SC-2111 SC-2105 SC-2105 SC-2111 TC-22322 SC-2116 FC-2205 Sparc FR-2205 FC-2205 j
Spare.
~
FR-2205
)
1
O O
ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE 75/20 Page 3 of 4 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE (continued):
All remaining cord sets throughout the plant were determined to be correctly mated to their proper recepticles.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
The Superintendent of Operations ordered all construction electricians and "cabic tracers" out of the plant and called General Atomic Company to aid in determining how the problems in'the' control room were caused. All cord sets found to have bcen swapped were returned to their designated controller /re-corder and tested.
Correct cord set controller / recorder configuration was determined by voltage measurement across the 10 ohn test resistors in the appropriate circuits while varying controllers output and verifying voltage changes.
Security measures were implemented to limit access behin'd the control room boards to designated craft personnel and t.o either man or to lock the auxiliary electric equipment room and the 480 volt essential bus room to control access for all construction work in these areas.
Eight of the "cabic tracers" suspected of being involved in the occurrence were terminated from their jobs.
It was determined during subsequent investi-gation that three of the eight dismissed were directly involved. Precautions were taken to assure that those three will not be eligible for future re-employ-ment at the plant.
A completed investigation revealed that the occurrence was limit'ed to malicious mischief.
e See attached for security measures implemented.
FAILURE DATA /SIMILAR REPORTED OCCURRENCES:
None PROGRAMMATIC IMPACT:
None CODE IMPACT:
None e
e e
?W
A q
U V
AliN0PJfAL OCCllRREllCE 75/20 Page 4 of 4 ff81 SubmLLted Ily:
w 4
yliarvey W. }f/11ynrd,Y Technieni Bervices Supervisor
' MW1 A LA-Reviewed By:
- 11. I.nrry 1;r y
Superintendent, Operations s
/
' # DOd>
Approved liy: _- f,3dede44 & o--
1/rederic 1;. Svart Superintendent, !!ucicar Production O
e s
e t
9 9
l l
l 1
l s
m
I O
O
~~ '
,on
..wel...
INTER DEPARTMENT MEMO - PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO DATE August 27, 1975 yg-All Public Service Company Employees Fort St. Vrain cLPART ME NT oH DIV151oN FRN H. Larry Brey/ Frank Mathie, Superintendents Fort St. Vrain _.
oo%nWcNT_on olviseoN ATTN.
John Zanot/Ccorge Brown, Cencral Atomic Fort St. Vra_in SUBJ.
SECURITY l
The following security measures will be implemented as of 12:00 Noon August 27, 1975:
" Access to the Back of the Control Room Panels" The following four people are the only craft electricians allowed in back of the Control Room Panels:
(Four specific individuals were named here.)
All construction work by Stearns-Roger and Public Service Co.
is'to go through one of these four people.
PSC operating personnel are to monitor that these four are the only construction pcopic allowed in back of the panels.
" Auxiliary Equipment Room and 480 V Essential Bus Room" These rooms will be manned continuously with any of the three following CA QC personnel:
(Three specific individuals were named here.)
Their responsibility is to monitor all construction work by cither Stearns-Roger or Public Service Company in these electrical rooms.
They will securc keys to these room through the Lobby Guard and notify the Control Room Operators-when entering or leaving these areas.
At all times when these l
areas are not manned by the respective QC personnel the rooms will be kept locked.
"Your Responsibility" i
lbke it part of'your normal routine to be watchful of other personnel. It you notice anything suspicious notify your supervisor immediately. Whencver possible, secure hat numbers and names and pass this information along to your supervisor.
l This includes cach and every one of you.
t l
=
l l
a
>s OF COLORADO INTE' DEPARTMENT MEMO - PUBLIC SERVICE COMPA
.c.......:..
ATE -
DEPAHT MENT OH DIVISION
)
. oEPAnTurriT BTmwision ROM TTN.
UBJ. _
2-PSC c]cctricians and Results personnel are allowed continuous If the area is unmanned access to these cicctrical areas.
by the aforementioned QC person, you are responsibic for seeing the that no other persons are allowed in with you and that doors are locked upon entrance and exit.
i g,)g h__.
'I' % t}
u',c F. M. Mathic
- 11. Larry Brhy Superintendent-Maintenance Superintendent-Operations Fort St. Vrain Nucicar Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Cencrating Station Generating Station e
f e