ML20085J390
| ML20085J390 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 06/07/1995 |
| From: | Pearce L COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| LWP-95-055, LWP-95-55, NUDOCS 9506220148 | |
| Download: ML20085J390 (34) | |
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- Quad Cities Genenting Station 22710 2(6th Avenue Nortit Q>rdova. ll. 61212-97 )O -
Tcl.4VMd b22 il LWP-95-055 June 7, 1995 U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 r
SUBJECT:
Quad Cities Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Changes, Tests, and Experiments Completed NRC Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265 i
Enclosed please find a listing of those facility and procedure i
changes, tests, and experiments requiring safety evaluations completed during the month of April, 1995, for Quad-Cities Station Units 1 and 2, DPR-29 and DPR-30.
A summary of the safety evaluations are being reported in compliance with 10CFR50.59 and 10CFR50.71(e).
j Respectfully, Comed Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
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L. W.
Pearce Station Manager LWP/dak Enclos'are cc:
J. Martin, Regional Administrator C. Miller, Senior Resident Inspector STMGR\\0$$95.L47 54 PR AD CK O O 3
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3 Q eQL shnc ORIGINATOR DATE DEV clk TENT {UPEfUNTENDENT OR DESIGNE8 'DATE DEPA d-//- 96 REGUC TORY ASSURANCE DATE
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SITE VICE PRESfDENT/ STATION MANAGER DATe /
l RETURN FORM TO REGULATORY ASSURANCE, RON BAUMER FOR FILING
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1 SE-95-029 QCAP 1100-4 Rev. 10 l
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DESCRIPTION:
Added the following procedures to QCAP 1100-4, Att. B
" Procedure Review Matrix, for requiring On-Site Review QGA (all), QCAP 230-4, QAP 2000-1, QAP 1170-4, 17.
Also added guidance for performance of Technical Reviews and l
revised the cross Discipline Review Guidelines.
j SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the r
UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the i
UFSAR analysis.
i The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the UFSAR basically defaults to the Technical Specification for the subject of procedures and their revision, review, and approval.
There is not a correlation in the UFSAR from the topic of procedures and any accident or malfunction.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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SE-95-030 Procedure QCOP 1600-6 DESCRIPTION:
The procedure change provided the steps necessary to bypass i
the Drywell High Radiation trip signal to (1) Group II Isolation, (2) Standby Gas Treatment Auto start, (3) Reactor 1
Building Ventilation Isolation, and (4) Control Room Ventilation Isolation.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Control Rod Drop Accident UFSAR SECTION 15.4.10 DBA LOCA UFSAR SECTION 15.6.5 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because High Radiation in the Drywell indicates an abnormal situation due to a line break or other abnormal occurrence.
To preclude the release of potentially highly contaminated material from the containment, the DW Radiation Monitors provide an isolation signal to automatically close Group II isolation valves.
The function of the Containment Atmosphere Monitoring (CAM) and Atmosphere Containment Atmosphere Dilution (ACAD)
Systems is to control the hydrogen concentration in Containment to below 4% by volume.
The Drywell Radiation Monitors initiate a Group II Isolation at 100 R/hr.
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4 SE-95-030 CONTD This procedure will bypass the DW Rad Monitor trip signal only during Unit Outages when Primary Containment is not required.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because cold r
shutdown means Reactor Coolant temperature < 212*F with the Reactor mode switch in the shutdown position and no core alterations are being performed.
The DW Rad Monitors are Post-Accident Monitoring instrumentation which are required during power operation to monitor post accident conditions.
This procedure will be used only during unit outages with the Reactor not critical, Reactor coolant temperature < 212'F, and Primary Containment not required.
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SE-95-032 QCTP 130-7, Parts Evaluation Request #95-015-00.
DESCRIPTION:
Pressure Switch 2-1467, 2A C.S. Discharge Pressure Switch was a Static-O-Ring, model #6N-L3.
The previous installed switch was determined to be the cause of a U2 D.C.
- Ground, and had to be replaced.
The 6N-L3 switch is obsolete.
The switch was replaced by a Static-O-Ring model # 6NN-L3-F1A pressure switch.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
LOCA UFSAR SECTION 15.6 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the l
change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this is essentially a like-for-like replacement switch.
The new switch has all of the same operating characteristics as the old switch.
No new functions will be created or performed by the new switch.
No new system or components interactions will be created.
All seismic mounting will remain unchanged cnd the weights of the two switches are within several ounces of each other.
Based on this, the change does not adversely impact systems or functions so as to create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type different from those evaluated in the UFSAR.
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SE-95-032 CONTD 3.
.The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis.for any Technical specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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Procedure QCTS 340-4 DESCRIPTION:
Two changes were made in the procedure in addition to upgrading the procedure to a "QC" format.
The first change placed the control switch in PTL for bus 19 to MCC 18/19-5.
This is done for the duration of installing a test switch in bus 19 feed cubicle at MCC 18/19-5.
The second change increased the time requirement for the Reactor Recirculation pump discharge valve stroke time from 58 to 65 seconds.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
LOCA UFSAR SECTION Table 6.3-3 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this procedure change reflects the l
change made to the analysis of record.
The analysis of record increased the allowable LPCI injection time to 75 j
seconds minimum.
This change only effects the time at which i
LPCI may inject, it does not change the function of the j
plant equipment.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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SE-95-034 Procedure QCTS 340-5 DESCRIPTION:
Two changes were made in the procedure in addition to upgrading the procedure to a "QC" format.
The first change placed the control switch in PTL for bus 29 to MCC 28/29-5.
This is done for the duration of installing a test switch in bus 29 feed cubicle at MCC 28/29-5.
The second change increased the time requirement for the Reactor Recirculation pump discharge valve stroke time from 58 to 65 seconds.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
LOCA UFSAR SECTION Table 6.3-3 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this procedure change reflects the change made to the analysis of record.
The analysis of record increased the allowable LPCI injection time to 75 i
seconds minimum.
This change only effects the time at which LPCI may inject, it does not change the function of the plant equipment.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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e SE-95-035 Procedure Revision to CCOP 020-3 DESCRIPTION:
Deleted the requirement to have personnel in attendance when 1/2 Trackway is sealed by only one door vs by 2 doors.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
i The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the j
change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the function of Secondary Containment is to provide a barrier against a radioactive release to the environment.
The criteria establishing what this barrier consists of is essentially established by the testing performed to verify that the barrier will function as intended.
The testing verifies that the barrier will function as intended.
The testing verifies that the barrier is intact with one of the two interlock doors open.
This procedure change does not alter the requirement to maintain at least 1 door closed and therefore the administrative control described in the UFSAR is net by the revised procedure.
One element of the procedure was changed.
The requirement to be in attendance while one door is open.
Besides the procedural administrative control on the interlock doors, other administrative controls such as signs and use of security to open the outer door also help insure that the intent of the UFSAR requirement is met.
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5 SE-95-35 CONTD Based on these thoughts, the function of Secondary Containment is not impacted and therefore it cannot impact systems or functions to create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type different from those evaluated in the UFSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any l
Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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SE-95-036 QCTS 920-2 Rev. 1 l
Initial In-Sequence Criticality Estimate Evaluation i
DESCRIPTION:
The calculation for evaluation of critical estimate has been corrected.
Previously, the actual critical eigne value was compared to 1.000.
Now the critical eigne value is compared to the estimated eigen value (NFS value).
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because no systems or functions are affected in any way by the performance of the calculation.
The NFS reports are consulted fer the actual and predicted eigne values following the initial critical, and the reactivity difference is calculated.
By correcting the calculation to be based on the estimated eigne value (not 1.000) no systems / functions are adversely impacted.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the acceptance limit is 1% AK (actual vs expected critical rod patterns).
The procedure change will result in a more accurate calculation to verify compliance with 3.3E.
As a result, there will be no reduction in the margin of safety by correcting this calculation.
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4 SE-95-037 QCOADP 200-51 DESCkIPTION:
Changed Bus 23-1 and Bus 24-1 degraded voltage relay setpoint.
BAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
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Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Loop /LOCA UFSAR SECTION 15.6 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the new setpoint of 111.03 volts is correct per EDSFI calculations and will not cause an accident / malfunction not evaluated in the UFSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because although the new setpoint is slightly less than the old one, it still falls within the acceptable range in the Tech Spec Table 3.2.2.
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'4 SE-95-038 QCOADP 200-65 DESCRIPTION:
l This new procedure allows OAD to calibrate'and functionally test Bus 21 and 22 undervoltage relays.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is.true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Single / Multiple Recire Pump Trips UFSAR SECTION 15.3 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
i 2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because during the relay routines,.the equipment is DOS.
The relays are calibrated using an on-site reviewed OADMP-1 procedure, which verifies that the information from the Relay Setting Orders (RSO) are correctly implemented onto the relays.
f Also, the only loads on Bus 21(22) are 2A Recirc pump and 2A, 2C RFP (2B Recirc Pump, 2B, 2C RFPs).
The UFSAR has addressed the loss of the equipment should the buses be i
lost.
l 3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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SE-94-066 Setpoint change 94024I DESCRIPTION:
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l This change raised the LPRM Hi setpoint from 90 Metered l
Units (MUs) to 100 MUs.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
a 1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the i
UFSAR where any of the following is true:
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The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
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Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Rod Withdrawal Error UFSAR SECTION 15.4.2 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of l
an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because raising the LPRM high alarm setpoint will have no affect on the APRM'and RBM systems because those uystems rely on change in magnitude and not on the absolute values of the LPRMs.
The change will have no impact on the monitoring of the thermal limits.
Therefore raising the LPRM high alarm setpoint to 100 meter units does not change any systems or functions described in the UFSAR.
There is therefore no possibility of an accident of a type 4
different from those evaluated in the UFSAR.
3.
The margin of safety is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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M04-0-88-022 UPS System and Computer Room HVAC System DESCRIPTIONr.
1 To provide for a HVAC System or the new U.P.S. When installed and upgraded the existing _ computer room HVAC.
BAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because neither computer operation nor computer HVAC availability are evaluated in the FSAR.
Neither is required for the operation of plant safety system.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the HVAC System as designed will be a isolated system and will not create any possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously 4
evaluated.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because computer availability is not a basis for any tech spec safety margins.
However, the addition of the UPS HVAC System and the upgraded computer room HVAC System will increase the availability of the station process computer.
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i M04-1-87-0003B Reactor Building Sample Panel Replacement DESCRIPTION:
This modification installed a sample panel at the 647'-6" level of the Reactor Building.
This panel monitors Reactor Recirculation Water, Reactor Water Clean-up, CRD Cooling Water and Fuel Pool Water.
Individual modules connected to these streams allow for sensing conductivity, corrosion products and dissolved oxygen.
Signal generated from the sensors are sent to the Control Room to recorders on the 901-4 panel and to the Chemistry Hot Lab.
Services supplied to the panel include instrument air, demineralized water and Reactor Building equipment drains.
Power to the panel is supplied from MCC 18-3 (480 VAC) and MCC 18-3-1 (120/208 VAC).
Sample tubing was installed or modified as necessary to facilitate installation.
BAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because separation and isolation of safety and non-safety systems is maintained and the modification will not affect any design basis accident or single failure event scenarios previously analyzed in the FASR or UFSAR.
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2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a l
different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because failure modes and effects analysis demonstrates no new accidents or malfunctions are created by this modification.
Seismic mounting of the panels will assure adjacent safety related equipment is protected from damage during a seismic event.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because all conditions applicable to this modification have been previcusly addressed in the basis for the existing equipment i
to be replaced.
The margin of safety is not reduced.
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E04-0-94-207 EDG Neutral Grounding Transformer Replacement DESCRIPTION:
The Emergency Diesel Generator Neutral Grounding Transformer was replaced by General Electric (GE) Model 9T28Y5601 transformer as part of the PCB reduction program.
General Electric supplied the original transformer with the neutral grounding cabinet.
The new transformer was mounted in the existing neutral grounding cabinet.
GE recommended this transformer as an acceptable replacement for the previous transformer.
The transformer meets the seismic and environmental requirements to be mounted in the neutral grounding cabinet.
It is a dry type transformer with the same electrical characteristics as the previous transformer.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
[
The change alters the initial conditions used in the L
UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system,
)
or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Loss of Offsite AC Power UFSAR SECTION 8.3 Decrease in Reactor Coolant UFSAR SECTION 15.6 i
Inventory (LOCA) 1 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the 1
change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
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E04-0-94-207 CONTD 2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the existing neutral grounding transformer is being replaced as part of the PCB reduction program.
The original supplier, General Electric, has recommended the model of the replacement transformer and provides the assurance that it is an acceptable replacement.
The transformer meets the environmental and seismic requirements to be mounted in the neutral grounding cabinet.
It provides the same function and has the same design requirements as the original transformer.
Thus this change doesn't create a new accident or malfunction.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specificetion, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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E04-1-94-114 Removal of Plant Steam Area Heater DESCRIPTION:
Exempt Change E04-1-94-114 removed one of the Turbine Buildings plant steam area heaters.
This heater was labeled (1-RR-5750) and located at column 15-H on elev.
655'-6".
This heater interfered with the installation of cable tray for the Station Blackout (SBO) project.
Engineering (with System Engineer's concurrence) has determined that removal of this heater does not impact area temperatures nor the plant steam heating system.
There is enough energized equipment and heaters in the immediate vicinity to maintain adequate heating for the area the heater was removed from.
There is no interface or impact with any other equipment or systems as a result of this Exempt Change.
No changes to Station procedures, training requirements, UFSAR or the Technical Specifications are required due to this design change.
Therefore, there is no Unreviewed Safety Question as a result of removing this plant steam area heater.
BAFETY EVALUATION BUMMARY:
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
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E04-1-94-114 CONTD 2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR'is not created because this exempt change removes a plant. steam area heater located in the Turbine Building.
Due to the insignificance of the plant steam heating system in regards
'to plant safety, no accident analysis has been performed as a result of'a failure to this system.-
There is no other i
failure which could occur that would result in an accident i
of a different type not previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any j
Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not j
reduced.
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E04-2-95-012 l
DESCRIPTION:
This exempt change provided for installation of a heat sink at the affected area.
It removes the heat produced in the flange area by the flux.
The fin has been designed to radiate 400 Watts.
This is 60 Watts greater than the amount estimated by ABB, the transformer manufacturer.
The heat sink is made out of aluminum components which are welded together and anodized black.
It is field located over the affected area such that the coupling between the heat sink assembly and transformer mounting surfaces is maximized.
The assembly was attached by the minimum of four i
1/2" bolts and nuts.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Generator Load Reject SAR SECTION 15.2.2 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because there is no change to the severity of a MPT transformer failure following installation of this exempt change.
The probability of a failure of the MPT due to overheating in the bus duct area is reduced.
The probability of Load Reject event and the subsequent challenge to Safety Related SSCs is also reduced. Failure of other SSC are not affected.
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E04-2-95-012 CONTD 4
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any i
Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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E04-2-95-010 U2 Main Power Transformer DESCRIPTION:
This exempt change provided for installation of a flux shield over the affected area.
The flux shield reduces the localized heating by reducing the flux concentration.
The conceptual design for this shield was produced by ABB, the manufacture of the transformer.
The detailed design has been reviewed and approved by NETS technical experts.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
Generator Load Reject SAR Section 15.2.2 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because there is no change to the severity of a MPT transformer failure following installation of this exempt change.
The probability of a failure of the MPT due to overheating in the bus duct area is reduced.
The probability of a Load Reject event and the subsequent challenge to Safety Related SSCs is also reduced.
Failures t
of other SSCs are not affected.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
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E04-1-23-333 Reduc' tion of Cut-Water DESCRIPTION:
The scope of work for Exempt Change E04-1-93-333 installed seven different design changes to the 1C Condensate Pump and the Condensate Booster Pump (1-3302C and 1-3401C respectively).
These changes are listed as:
1.
Reduction in the gap between the pump casing cut-water and the pump impeller.
This modification is to help reduce the pump vibration seen at vane-passing frequency of the Condensate Pump and the Condensate Booster Pump.
2.
Changed out of the inboard and the outboard bearings with that of a different type.
This work was completed on both the Condensate and Condensate Booster Pump to increase the life of these bearings, thus enhancing pump reliability.
3.
Relocation of the inboard bearing thermocouples (two in all) on both the Condensate and the Condensate Booster Pump.
This scope of work was required to accommodate the new style bearing so that temperature is properly monitored.
4.
Drilling of a new internal passage for the inboard and outboard bearing oil sump.
This was completed to both the Condensate Pump and Condensate Booster Pump.
The new internal passage improves oil flow through the bearings and allowes complete drainage of all oil in the bearing housing.
5.
Installation of oversize pump casing wear rings and an 0-ring between the pump casing and casing ring nut on both the Condensate Pump and Condensate Booster Pump.
These wear rings help minimize any pump casing erosion.
6.
Chamfering of the pump shaft sleeve on the inboard and outboard side of the Condensate Pump ONLY, to accept the installation of a new O-Ring.
This O-Ring is to stop leakage that is seen along the pump shaft.
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i E04-1-93-333 CONTD 7.
Installation of a check valve on the seal cooling line on the Condensate Pump only.
This check valve was original design on the pump and must be installed to return' pump to its original configuration.
The pump manufacture, Ingersoll-Dresser has reviewed and approved all work that was performed under the direction of this Exempt Change E04-1-93-333 which is being reviewed.
The design changes listed above improves the reliability of both the condensate and Condensate Booster Pump.
The work completed is classified as Non-Safety Related.
There are no Unreviewed Safety Questions associated with this Exempt-Change.
No are any revisions required to the UFSAR or the Technical Specifications as a result of this work.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine.
~
each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
l Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, l
or component could lead to the accident.
l The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of L
i an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or I
malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously l
evaluated in the UFSAR.
I l
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O E04-1-93-333 CONTD 2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this exempt change provides for several design changes to the condensate / Condensate Booster Pump.
The worst possible event this work could cause is a sudden failure on the Condensate / Condensate Booster pump, with a remote chance that this would trip the Reactor Feedwater Pumps.
Although this is considered an incredible event, the UFSAR has analyzed the transient of the loss of all three Reactor Feedwater Pumps and found it acceptable to loose all three simultaneously.
Since the Condensate pump and the Condensate Booster Pump are insignificant to plant safety, no Accident Analysis was required to be performed on their r21 function.
Therefore, it can be stated that there is no other malfunction or accident of a different type which could occar as a result of this Exempt Change.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
l 1
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1 4
M04-2-92-020 Permanent Repair to the Reactor Vessel Shroud Access Hole Cover DESCRIPTION:
This modification involved repairing the cracked AHCs.
There are two types of cracks this repair eliminated.
Circumferential crack which developed along the weld affected area and radial cracks which could propagate to the vessel or shroud wall.
The original plates and the weld affected area were Electric Discharged Machined out.
The new cover plates are designed in accordance with ASME Section III, Subsection NG.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
i LOCA UFSAR SECTION 14.2 FSAR SECTION 15.6.5 For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this repair will not create an accident or malfunction different than evaluated in the SAR.
ASME Section III Subsection NG vas used to assure reliability and adequate margins of safety in the design.
The materials of construction are compatible with the vessel internals for a 40 year life.
There has been no new malfunctions that have been associated with this repair.
UFSAR Section 6.3.3.1.2.2 will be revised to reflect the designed leakage rate of 78 gpm.
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M04-2-92-020 CONTD This will be added to the original 807 gpm total due to the jet pump slip joints and bolted joints.
The new total is 885 gpm.
The LPCI system capacity was seized to accommodate 3000 gpm leakage at these locations.
Therefore, this does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction different than previously evaluated in the FSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the current MCPR Safety Limit will remain valid and the basis for the Technical Specifications will not be affected as long as no more than one double tap per recirculation loop and two single tap jet pump flow instrumentation are out of service.
l 1
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E04-2-93-212 Flow Instrumentation DESCRIPTION:
Local flow instrumentetion, annular FE 2-3941-28 and flow indicator FI 2-3941-28, that measures Diesel Generator (DG) cooling water flow to the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) room coolers, was replaced with higher range models.
1 The previous flow instrumentation measured a maximum of 500 gpm.
The new instrumentation measures a maximum of 1000 gpm.
The previous flow instrumentation pegged out and flow could not be read.
UT measurements have shown the flow to be as high as 652 gpm under low back-pressure conditions.
Increasing the range of the flow instrumentation allowes for readings to be taken under higher flow conditions.
BAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
None For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the replacement ECCS flow instrumentation will perform the same function as the original flow instrumentation except that the range will be increased from 500 gpm to 1000 gpm.
Increasing the range will provide better monitoring of cooling water flow to the ECCS room coolers during testing.
The replacement of the flow instrumentation will not change the functional requirements of the DG Cooling Water System.
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E04-2-93-212 CONTD t
The replacement flow instrumentation is designed to preclude failure of the DG Cooling Water System, to preclude failure of any nearby safety-related squipment so that the change does not adversely impact systems or functions or create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type different from those evaluated in the UFSAR.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
i i
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?
E04-2-93-236 j
Unit 2 Refuel Bridge Upgrades DESCRIPTION:
This Exempt change upgraded equipment and controls on the l
refueling platform.
The work scope included replacement of l
the power centers, grapple head, auxiliary hoist hose reel and main hoist electrical cable reel.
A detailed j
I description of the specific changes are as follows:
l 1.
The power / control center enclosure was replaced with one of similar size and dimension using existing mountings.
l 1A.
A user programmable boundary zone protection system j
(PBZP) in the power center replaced the previous obsolete zone computer.
The new PBZP system has a j
bypass push button to allow operations outside the j
boundary regions.
The PBZP system also has provisions 1
I to slow the main hoist during hoisting and lowering when mast sections " drop-off" and " pick-up" to reduce shock to the platform.
A GE/FANUC PBZP controller i
replaced the previous controller and provides safety interlocks, fault lock-outs and boundary zone protection.
1B.
The resolver for bridge position was relocated.
1C.
The motors and drives for the main hoist, trolley and bridge were replaced.
These motors are a DC regenerative type.
They are interchangeable and provide redundant overload protection.
All existing operator controllers will remain the same.
2.
The new grapple head have a single actuator cylinder and sealed magnetic switches for grapple position indication open or closed.
A new, more reliable actuator switch and indicators for grapple open/ closed was installed.
The new grapple maintains the same
" double J-Hook" design as the present grapple.
3.
The auxiliary hoist (frame and mono-rail) had the reel spring packs replaced.
This change reduces the excessive force preFOntly exerted on the spring reels and increases the teliability of the air hoses and fittings.
4.
The main hoist electrical cable reel were replaced to reduce the force related failures of the bulkhead connector used on the maet.
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4 e
E04-2-93-236 CONTD 5.
The redundant slack cable limit switch on the main hoist was removed.
Slack cable indication is sensed j
from the electronic load cell.
l There are several reasons for the refuel bridge upgrade.
The bridge has affected critical path in refueling outages because of numerous equipment problems. These equipment problems were due in large part to the fact that the bridge components are over 20 years old.
This bridge upgrade replaced the main sources of unreliable controllers and hardware, thereby effectively eliminating any critical path breakdown.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The change described above has been analyzed to determine each accident or anticipated transient described in the UFSAR where any of the following is true:
The change alters the initial conditions used in the UFSAR analysis.
The changed structure, system or component is explicitly or implicitly assumed to function during or after the accident.
Operation or failure of the changed structure, system, or component could lead to the accident.
The accidents which meet these criteria are listed below:
DB Fuel Handling Accident SAR SECTION 15.7.2 (Bundle Drop)
For each of these accidents, it has been determined that the change described above will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of the accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because existing plant refuel bridge equipment will be replaced with new equipment.
The new equipment i
being installed is more reliable and accurate than the present equipment but provides the same function.
Therefore, the design changes do not introduce any new accident or malfunction.
3.
The margin of safety, is not defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, therefore, the safety margin is not reduced.
i TirHOP3\\$Af t:TY\\93APR.RIT
.o M04-la87-051A DCRDR - Annunciator Modification DESCRIPTION:
This partial modification installed the conduit, conduit supports, cable and piggyback terminal blocks with isolation diodes and jumper wires.
It also installed the SER equipment cabinet near Panel 901(2)-34, the SER peripherals and the dual electronic horns at the panel groups 901(2)-3 & 4, 901(2)-5, 901(2)-6, 7 & 8 and 912-1 & 5.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because-the annunciator system is not discussed in the accident analysis section of the FSAR.
This system is not required for accident mitigation.
The failure of the non-safety related annunciator system will not affect the operation of any of the plant's safety-related systems.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because no change has been made which affects any of the bounding conditions of the FSAR accident analysis.
All bounding conditions remain the same, no new accidents are introduced by this modification.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because when applicable,-the Limiting conditions for operation (LCO) 3.7.C for the Secondary Containment System's penetration seals and LCO 3.12.F and the Surveillance Requirements (SR) 4.12.F for the Fire Protection System's fire' barriers will be adhered to for the installation of cables.
No other LCOs, SR or their basis will be affected by the installation, operation or failure of the modified annunciator system.
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