ML20085A876

Summarizes Function of NRC Research Review Group & 780110 Meeting.Review Group Will Develop Plan for Projects for Development of New or Improved Nuclear Power Plant Sys.Draft Rept to Congress Encl.Rept Will Be Reviewed on 780210

ML20085A876
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	01/20/1978
From:	Roy D BABCOCK & WILCOX CO.
To:	Taylor J BABCOCK & WILCOX CO.
References
TASK-*, TASK-GB GPU-0457, GPU-457, NUDOCS 8307070357
Download: ML20085A876 (13)

Text

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THE' 8ABC0CX & WILCOX COMPANY -

POWER GENERATION GROUP To l J. H. Taylor, Manager, Licensing Free D. H. Roy, Manager, Planc. Design (2315) m .. u

.Cust. File No.

or Ret.

Subj. Date

"*' '- cerch R=ic Croup Meeting January'20, 1973 ln , .. . . - .

A research review group has been established by the NRC to implement the requirements of an amendment to the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 which-directs the Commission to:

. . . develop a long-term plan for proj ects for the .

development of new or improved systems' for nuclear power plants."

This amendment resulted from criticism raised in the Ford Foundacien-sponsored report, " Nuclear Power Issues and Choices", that the current safety research program was deficient in research leading to new and

, improved safety components and systems. The review group is headed by Saul Levine, Director of Nuclear Regulatory Research, and is com-prised of the members shown in Attachment 1. Members of industry, including utilities, various national laboratories, EPRI, consulting firms, intervenor organizacions, other NRC and DOE organizations, etc.,

have been asked to serve as consultants to the review group.

The first meeting of the research review group was held on January 10, 1978, with Saul Levine prea.iding. Attendees are shown in Attachment 2.

Saul Levine opened the meeting with an explanation of the purpose of the review group and a brief description of what he hoped to acco=plish at this first meeting. The first report to Congress is due to be submitted on April 1,1978, with subsequent reports to be filed anntr.Ily

, thereafter in February. The purpose of the review group is to prepare the plan called for by the Congressional amendment to the Energy

..t-. . . . - . . ..~. . Reorganization Act of 1974 and to report progress against the plan in subsequent annual reports. Saul stated that at the first meeting he hoped to generate a list of projects for consideration for inclusion in the report by way of informal dialogue acong the review group =e bers and its consultanta. He stated it 'as not the intention of the Nuclear Regulatory Research office to perform de alled design of ayste=s which might improve reactor safecy, but to perform confirmatory research in advance of design submittals and to perform research which could lead to generacien of conceptual designs for improved safety systems.

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the Nuclear Regulatory Research office would submit th.a t If necesscry, concepts for improved safety systems to DOE with the request detailed designs be developed by that agency and be recuened to theObviously, this NRC for further review NRCand research.

the charter of the research organiz'acion could contribute to ,

even greater instability in the regulatoryThe arena and decrease evenfurt NRC has never and .ather competing power generation systems.

really viewed themselves as simply an agency which promulgatescrit against these er teria; this amendment of systems submitted to itthe wider view that th. NRC would like to se(ms to me to formalize take with respect to its regulatory responsibilities.

l As would be expected, the need for improved ECCS systems was discussed by several NRC personnel and by Dr. Spencer Bush acting consultant. such as a PNLJ of check valves in the' cold legs. Improved containment systems, as vented systems, were mentioned. Identification of innovative means to make

• nuclear power plants less susceptible to sabotage and to mitigate damage which may result frors an act of sabotage were Research into means for understanding systems mentioned by Dr. Bush. interactions and for identifying particularly sensitive or vulnerable

' interfaces was also suggested for inclusion in the report.

There was much discussion, led principally by Steve Hanauer, of work needed to help eliminate Control operatorroom errordesign, prior, during, pattern and after an recognition, i

upset or accident event.

alarm display simplification, automation of actions required toetc., were dis mitigate the event, Engineering Research Program. Dr. Hanauer stated that the most significant finding of the WASH 1400' afterstudy was that greater attention need be paid to operator error as related to reactor safety.

The principal itet.s I emphasited during the discussion were:

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1. Development of criteria and is methods for determining and what incremental

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Just what an " improvement" benefit to reactor safety any given improvement wou make. In my opinion, this should be a principal item of regulatory research,~since it (a) provides a system-

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a' tic basis for cost benefit analysis, and (b) is manda-tory before a quantification of acceptable risks can be - --

made. Without these two items, the nuclear power industry will continue to be at the mercy of the regulatory agency, wherein almost any means for improving reactor safety can be mandated without the agency being held accountable '

for its impact.

2. I stated that many of the elements related to determina-tion of sub-cooled blowdown loads and otherrealistic loads associ-ated with the LOCA areIinstated need of a more that this was particularly research f ndation.

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f true of j et plume definition, discharge of fluids at high pressure from large diameter pipes, and struc-tural/ fluid interaction. I also mentioned research into means for reducing occupational exposure thru

' innovative design and maintenance features and re-search into the development.of better incore instru-mentation for defining more precisely the nuclear, thermal, and hydraulic state of the core at any given time.

At one point during the discussion, one member of the NRC stated that the review group would be reviewing very carefully and with great interest the safety systems cad criteria that are in use or being considered for use in Germany. With flushed face and rapidly accelerating heartbeat, I rose to my feet to caution those who viewed the German situation with great envy to make certain that they fully understood how and why the German approach to teactor safety had developed as it has. I mentioned that popula . ion < rnsity differences, the different relationship between the licensing t, view body and government, differences in federal versus state licensing responsi-bilities, the lack of any suitable alternative to nuclear power, ,

etc., as important considerations in viewing current Carman safety systems and regulatory practices. Many NRC voices were raised in

' support of German safety requirements and review procedures, and I ,

continued to iterate my view that the approach here in the U.S.

could be and should be conducted in an entirely independent way reactor safety arising from whatever and source, thatforeign ideas or fordomestic, improving 'should be reviewed quantitatively and systematically for benefic versus cost impact using the methods i

and' criteria which I believe the regulatory authority is obligated to generate.

l One gentleman member of the consulting staff stated that a small, but highly influential elem'ent of the anti-nuclear group cannot or will not consider the probabilistic aspects of any given event.

He termed this element the catastrophic group in contrast to the i

' actuarial group. It was his opinion that we should spend rdsearch dollars to design and implement systems which would satisfy this extremist grou With Warren Owen of Duke Power Company,p of nuclear Romano opponents.

Salvatori of Westinghouse, and Bill Corcoran

'of Combustion Engineering nodding in agreement, I stated that "if

_,_. the* viability of this industry depends upon the quieting of _the [

catastrophe-minded anti-nuclear group, I believe I can speak for the Babcock & Wilcox Company in voicing the opinion that we would rather abandon the industr7' than spend one dollar of public money to assuage the extremists. ,

t In su= mary, there were very few innovative ideas not already contained in ERDA, EPRI, or NRC research programs or contained in the list of ACRS generic concerns or already part of the NUREC 0138 listing brought forward at this first meeting of the review group and its consultants. I stated during the meeting that it seemed l co me that there is a conflict of interest in Congress' assigning this task to the NRC. It appears to me that to provide an avenue CONFlDENTIAL

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.6 9 f rather well-defined ll-specified methods in by systems which the NRC or require the use can of force rather we the inclusion in an of inde-nuclear power the design and construction o tems and method:omulgated by the agency the task of reviewing these same sys the U.S. tax pendent way against the safety criteria prIt seems to me 21so that'cou is a conflictCongress payer,with of interest. acting as his agent, h projects with h hile. little Ior of money on nuclear regulatory researcthe improvee:ent in safety is wort w no assurance strongly recocznend that that we aa. through the AIF and through theInsular Af Congressional Cocuaittee on Interior i and to obtain theirpriority researchl tions other appropriate Congressional for our position that one of the highest organ za long the lines of support incremental contribution WASH 1400, for quantitatively k t;o reactorassessing safety. theitems any system modification or addition ma esh duled for February 10, t will be available The second meeting of the review group is sc e19 for review. .

.DHR/ebf \,,

Attachmente cc: (V/ att)

Ja H. Taylor G. E. Kulynych ,

File

. (w/o act) .

R. M. Ball C. W. Pryor C. D. Morgan J. S. Tulenko K. E. Suhrke k' I,. J. Stanek i T. M. Schuler

! J. C. Deddens CONFIDENTIAL qm. G O

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DUTLINE OF REPORT TO U.S. CONGRESS 04 1

STUDY OF LONG-RANGE PLM ON IMPROVED SAFETY SYSTEMS I

1. INTRODUCTION Objectives ,

i The FY 1978 Authorization Bill for the U.S. Nuclear Re.gulatory Cocaission includes an amendment to the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5875) by adding a new subsection (f) to

. ,f; Sectfon 205:

I "The Coamission shall develop a long-term plan for

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,jI; projects for the development of new or improved safety il systems for nuclear power plants."

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The Conference Kepcrt (involving the House Comittee on Interior and

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I' Insular Affairs and Senats Comittee on Envlionment and Public Werts amplifies the meaning of the legislation change by identifying the j,

I need for the NRC to take the 'inttf ative in the development of i

. improved safety for nuclear power plants and by stating "that l-the basic purpose of this research is the improvement of reactor safety and not the enhancement of the economic attractiveness of

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nuclear power versus alternat'ive energy sources." It also calls for an annual report from NRC to the Congress by February 1 of i

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! each year, with the first report due an April 12. 1978.

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d brief The Conference Report notes that the dplan for each should inclu e description of the projects which are proposed, c!.e nee h project, and project, e timetable for icplecentation of eac the cost of the project.

Coor .ination with other involved

' acencies such as COE is encouraged.

i dful In preparing the long-range plan, the Cocnission is als ted f:RC and

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of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, ThewhichEnergy crea t

the background leading to the passage of thisl ac .

s, Reorganization Act specifically created f r research an Office of Nu i

J. Regulatory Research to (1) develop reco::cendat licensing ons o deetoed.necessary for perfqr ance by ntract the Cocnission for N

and related regulatoy functions and (2) engage f mance in or co I

}; research which the Cccuission deems necessary for th i

l-i of its ifcensing and related regulatory funct ons.

HRC's research charter as estabitshed under the Energy i

f Reorganization Act of 1974 encoepasses ' confirm I h rosearch as distinct from "developcental* safety ~

h researc Confirmatory safety research is taken to ifiedmean that res deemed necessary to,provido NRC with an objectively l tory _ , , , v basis for evaluatica of an application cade'to t or it for re judgeent, or to provide a basisjdfor enal a regulatory re policy, or to provide NRC with the' physical t ials.or u gm capability to regulate the use of nuclear pcteer and 9

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i Ir. centrast, developeental safety research is research conducted to evaluate the safety of materials, processes, equipment, etc..

I that would or might be' prnposed by an appifcant for an NRC ifcense, or a possessor of such a Ifce.nse, in support of an

appitcation for a favorable regulatory judgment.

WIthin these guidelines fiRC has the charter to tfevelop general i -

analytical methods to assess the i.erforance capabf11ty of -

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, , systems that are related to the safety,of nuclear power plants, reccgnizing that data obtained to verify these methods could also be used in

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{ the design of improved safety systems. Against this background,

[ the new Congressional requiremnt for the " development of new

, or' improved safety systems" for fiuclear power plants could give rise

,; to some difficulty if the f4RC were to develop design

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fcprovements in sufficient detail so they could be incorporated f into plants by designers. Such a course would place the NRC in the difficult position of reviewing and approving as part of its licensing process designs that it trad developed. A simple way td I

solve this problem is for flRC not to create detaffed designs,

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but rather to gather physical data and create analytical models - - -

k I i for the analysis needed as part of the approval of improved I i safety concepts (such a,s vented containment). Such an approach would enable the MRC to evaluate the safety significance of feprovecents without performing the detailed designs. Of course.

in some areas where it might be espe.:f ally useful to have detaffed design perforced, this could be worked out in, coordination with 00E.

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e n Peactor Safety The principal- aim in reactor safety is to prevent undue risk to

the health and safety of the public from the operation of nuclear I. power facilities. The basic trpreach used to ensure the safety E

of nuclear power plants is to design the plants according to a Il defense-in-depth philosophy, that is, to butid in three levels I

of nuclear safety: (1) design and fabricate the plant for .

i j maxis:uct safety. (2) pmvfde protective systems to monitor and correct off-nor=al conditions, and (3) install engineered safeguard features to mitigate accident consequences. This philosophy is reflected in the design of three separate barriers y

j to contain racioactive caterial

(1) fuel cladding, (2) pressuru vessel and piping, and (3) reactor containment, il

!.  ; The designs of engineered safeguard features used in the defense-i i j i in-depth philosophy are based primarily on the calculated 4  :

j l consequences of a series of design basis accidents. In its

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l l 1fcensing process, NRC evaluates the safety of nuclear plants s

against these design basis ace' ants, including various system transients and cocponent' failures. The singleifailure criterion ~ ' ' ~

[ is also applied to assure adequate reif ability is achieved for I

L systems 'and components icportant to safety.

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The defense-in-depth concept is embedded in the fiRC regulations 9

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(see. for example. Appendices A. " General Design Criteria for i.

'tuelear Power Plants" and 8. " Quality Assurance Criteria for  ;

I I:uclear Power Plants and Fu'el Reprocessing Plants" of 10 CFR i

Part 50) and in the guidance provided by flRC to the nuclear industrw Perhaps more than any other factors, the defense- i

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in-depth concept and the conservative approach taken in nuclear l i

power plant designs have been responsible for the good safety I:

record experienced to date. .

! Appveach to Study In approaching the question of how to fsprove ca existing safety. 's f

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a logic ~ structure is needed to allow the categortration and >

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!\ evaluation of suggested improvements. The structure indicated 4, - .?  !.

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. J' . .4 f below suggests itself in that (1) it is organized te identify areas of risk reduction into which specific suggestions can be

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placed and (2) it attempts to list all areas in which improvements '

sight reduce risk. frorovements_

_ategorizatien C of Succested Safety A. Reduce likelihood of accidents due to

1. Internal plant failures

a. ReIfuce likelihood of initiating events (1)Pipebreaks (2) Vessel breaks (3) Transients 4

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' b. Reduce likelihood __of failures of systems designed r

to cope with all above.

2. External events

a. Natural (earthq'akes, tornador., floods)

b. f!an-made (aircr' aft crashes, turbine missiles, i 1

explosions) j

/ 3. Sabotage f

d B. Reduce probability of large ons uence accidents by reducing j

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the likelihood of reTease of large amounts of airborne f

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( 2. '

SUF!!ARY OF CURRE.:T REACTOR SAFETY RESEARCH l

i l-Chapter 2 will be devoted principally to providing surrary j l background information on ongoing reactor safety research. It } [

will cover the principal areas of NRC research in the (feld of -

water reactor safety as well as summartes of research being I

conducted by reactor vendors (PR), 00E and foreign governments.

The principal topics to be covered will be: ,

1. Safety design and protection of the integrity of the reactor

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pressure vessel and piping. -

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2. Therr.al-hydraulic tests of hypothetical or design-basis accidents and the effectiveness of engineered safeguard features,  ;

3. Fuel-red behavicr in hypothetical accidents and associated

! failure limits, .

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4. Computer code deve60pment for accurate predictions of the consequences of hypothetical reactor accidents. .*

5. Operational safety studies of the adequacy of safety designs.

standards and criteria used in c,perating plants, such as fire protection crite:ria, qualiflcation testing standards and  !

reactor operator actions, -

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6. Assesscents of the potential effects of severe natural phenonena f

such as earthquakes, floods, ter idoes, and hurricanes on f

nuclear facilities to aid in determini .g facility safety -

design requirements in these areas, Application of risk assessment methodology to obtain an

'l i 4 improved understanding of 'the risks to the public free -

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potential accidents in light water reactor's and fuel cycle

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3. SUGGESTIONS 03 RESEARCH TO IMPROVE REACTOR SAFETY!

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Chapter 3 will te devoted to su::carizing a series of documents

• which over the years have recoc= ended various types of research t i

.s on improvements to reactor safety and will also sumarize the '

suggestions for research on improved safety to be made by The c: embers of and corrsultants to the.Research Review Group.

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following set of documents, and others as appropriate, will be l

reviewed to extract and Jumarize appropriate recomendations l .

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a. ACRS documents , ,

1. Letters on react:r safety research

2. List of generic items

3. Report to Congress on reactor safety research program  ;~

b. ECCS Acceptance Criteria and Heiring Record

c. Report to the American Physical Society by the Study Group .

on Light-Water Reactor Safety

d. A Review of Light-Water f!eactor Safety Studies (LSL-5286)

e. Environmental Quality Laboratory Report (EQL No. 9)

4. ASSESSME?iT OF SUGGESTIOf!S FOR RESEARCH Off !PtPROVED SAFETY , j Chapter 4 will contain an assessmant and priority listing of the - '

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suggestions for research on improved safety that are listed in j Chapter 3. Various techniques will be used to perfons these .

assessments. Where appropriate, the potential risk reductions i relative to risks predicted in WASH 1400 will be used. Of I i course, care will have to be taken to ensure the applicability  ; .

of. such comparisons and to take into account the uncertainties ,

, t in WASH 1400 modeling. An exam;1e of such coep .rison vould be { {

.. an analysis of risk reductions potentialTy achieveable by the - '

use of vented centainment. On the other hand some suggestions , ,

such as ones appilcable to improvedseismic design might be quite f f

difficult to quantify in terms of potential risk rehetion. Here.

• a rcre judgmental approacn will have to be used. Of course.  ;

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estimatesof changes in plant cost.will be made to help provide .

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5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMtENDATIONS ~

I This chapter will sumarize the final recomendations of the report g

on those research projects 'which should be undertaken. -

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