ML20084U257
| ML20084U257 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 12/11/1972 |
| From: | Sewell R CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | Cleary J, Grier B US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8306280327 | |
| Download: ML20084U257 (3) | |
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e BIRECTORATE OF LICENSING UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION O
O WASHINGTON, DC 20545 RE-90CxET 50-255, LICENSE SPR-20 O
g DEAR MR O' LEARY O ON SATURDAY, DECEMER 9,1972 THE PALISADES PLANT WAS SHUT 90WN FOR O
A SHORT SCHEDULD OUTAGE TO CONSUCT MAINTENANCE IN SEVERAL AREAS.
DURING THE SHUT 90WN, TWO UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS WERE EXPERIENCEB.
A O VERY SMALL LEAX WAS DISCOVERED ON THE "C" REACTOR RECIRCUL', TING WATER O
PUMP SEAL CARTRID8E CONTROLLED LEAX0FF LINE.
THE LEAX WAS IN A SOCXET WELD AND IT WAS NECESSARY TO COOL THE PLANT TO A COLD SHUTDOWN O
CONDITION TO PERFORM REPAIRS.
THE OTHER PROBLEM INVOLVES THE FAILURE O
0F ONE OF THE TWO STARTUP CHANNELS OF NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION.
O TROUBLESHOOTING 0F THE STARTUP CHANNEL REVEALED THE CAUSE OF THE O
FAILURE To DE INTERNAL 70 THE BETECTOR, UNICH IS DEYONS THE PLANT ON SITE REPAIR CAPADILITIES.
THE PLANT NORMALLY MAINTAINS A SPARE DE-O TECTOR, HOWEVER, THE SPARE HAD DEEN SENT TO THE MANUFACTURER FOR RE-0 l
PAIRS AND IS NOT SCHDULD FOR RETURN TO THE PLANT UNTIL FDRUARY 1973 ATTEMPTS TO LOCATE A SIMILAR UNIT FOR TEMPORARY SERVICE AT O
PALISABES WERE FRUITLESS.
O THE FAILURE OF THE STARTUP CHANNEL WAS DETECTD FOLLOWING SHUTDOWN O AND PRIOR TO THE C00L90WN TO REPAIR THE SEAL CARTRIDGE CONTROLLED O
LEAK 0FF LINE.
AT THIS TIME, BOTH CHANNELS OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION, WHICH PROVISES C0VERAGE FROM 19 TO THE O
O MINUS STM POWER PERCENT TO 150 PERCENT REACTOR PMWER WAS READING ON SCALE BY ABOUT 2 DECASES.
BURINGTHEC00L90WN,INEINTERMEDIATE RANGE INSTRUMENTATION DECREASED, AS WOULD DE EXPECTED, TO ABOUT O 2 OR s x le To THE MINUS STH POWER PERCENT POWER.
THE REMAINING O
STARTUP CHANNEL ALSO SHOWEB A SIMILAR DECREASE.
ON SATURBAY, l
BECEMER 9, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERA-O TIONS WERE INFORMED OF THE PROBLEM.
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PAGE 2 M8M Mailgram O
O A SAFETY AUDIT AND REVIEW BOARD (SARB)
MEETING WAS HELD DECEMBER 19, 1972 TO CONSIDER THE STARTUP CHANNEL FAILURE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF O RETURNING THE PLANT TO SERVICE WITHOUT I 0F THE 2 STARTUP CHANNELS O
IN SERVICE.
TABLE 3.17.4 0F THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REGUIRES THAT BOTH STARTUP CHANNELS BE IN SERVICE WHENEVER REACTOR POWER IS O BELOW 19 TO THE MINUS 4TH POWER PERCENT POWER.
SARB CONCLUBES THAT O
SINCE BOTH INTERMEDIATE RANGE CHANNELS WERE OPERATING NORMALLY AND INDICATING THE SHUTDOWN NEUTRON POWER LEVEL, THE INTENT OF THE TECH-O NICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF PROVIDING REDUNDANT CHANNELS OF VISIBILITY O
FOR NEUTRON POWER LEVEL DURING STARTUP WAS BEING MET.
IN ADDITION, AS NO REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM FUNCTIONS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE O STARTUP CHANNELS AND RESUNDANT CHANNELS OF INSTRUMENTATION ARE AVAIL-O ABLE AND INDICATING NEUTRON POWER LEVEL, SARB CONCLUDED THAT RETURN-ING THE PLANT TO SERVICE WOULD NOT INVOLVE SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CON-O SIDERATIONS NOT DESCRIBES OR IMPLICIT IN THE PALISADES PLANT FINAL O
SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT.
SARB RECOMMENDED THE FOLLOWING PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN:
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BOTH INTERMEDIATE RANGE CHANNELS AND ONE STARTUP RANGE CHANNEL BE OPERABLE.
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NEUTRON VISIBILITY BE CONFIRMED THROUGHOUT THE PLANT HEATUP, ROD BROP TESTS (WHEN IT WOULD BE EXPECTED) AND THE CRITICAL APPROACH
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(INVERSE COUNT RATE PLOT).
C.
COMPARE EVENTS OBSERVEB SURING THIS STARTUP TO A PREVIOUS START-O ALTHOUGH NO TWO STARTUPS ARE EXACTLY THE SAME, THE BIFFER-O UP.
ENCES SHOULD BE READILY EXPLAINABLE.
IF THEY ARE NOT, THE STAR M SHO ED BE HALTED UNTIL W E DIFFERENCES CAN BE EXPLAINED.
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9.
USE ESTABLISHED PROCEDURE FOR CRITICAL APPROACH.
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THE PLANT REACTOR ENGINEER SHOULD BE IN THE CONTROL ROOM TO OVER-O SEE THE CRITICAL APPROACH.
O WITH RESPECT TO ITEM 9, SARB DISCUSSED THE PROCEBURE THE PLANT IN-O TENDED TO USE FOR THE CRITICAL APPROACH.
THIS PROCEDURE INVOLVED PULLING CONTROL ROSS FIRST AND THEN DILUTING BORON (APPROXIMATELY O
B25 PERCENT REACTIVITY) TO ACHIEVE CRITICALITY.
SARB CONCLUBES THIS O
PROCEDURE WAS ACCEPTABLE.
lO FOLLoWING THE SARB MEETING, CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY MANAGEMENT CON-O CLUBED, BASES ON THE SARB REVIEW AND CONCLUSION THAHNO REACTOR SAFE 1T PROBLEM EXISTED, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO RETURN THE PLANT O TO SERVICE AS DUICXLY AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO MEET SYSTEM LOAD RE-O DUIREMENTS.
BASES ON THIS REDUIREMENT AND THE FOREGOING SAFETY REVIEW, I CONTACTE9 MR 3 M CRUTCHFIELD OF YOUR STAFF AND REQUESTED
' pJ A TEMPORARY WAIVER OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REGUIREMENT THAT O
TWO STARTUP CHANNELS BE IN SERVICE BELOW 19 TO THE MINUS 4TH POWER PERCENT POWER.
LATER IN THE DAY, MR CRUTCHFIELS GAVE VERBAL AUTHORI-O ZATION TO PROCEES WITH THE PLANT STARTUP, PROVIDED THE REDUIREMENTS O
DELINEATED IN ITEMS A THROUGH E WERE MET.
HE ALSO INFORMED ME THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS, REGION O III PLANNED TO TRAVEL TO THE PLANT SITE TO WITNESS THE STANTUP.
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MdI' Mailgram O
O O AT THIS WRITING, THE REACTOR IS CRITICAL AND THE TURBINE GENERATOR IS BEING STARTED UP IN ACCORBANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE TECH-0 NICAL SPECIFICATIONS.
WE APPRECIATE YOUR STAFF'S PROMPT ATTENTION T
THIS MATTER AND WILL XEEV THEM AS WELL AS DIRECTORATE OF REGULA-O TORY OPERATIONS PERSONNEL INFORMES WITH RESPECT TO THE STATUS OF OUR O'
STARTUP CHANNELS.
O O
YOURS VERY TRULY, RALPH B SEWELL O
O NUCLEAR LICENSING ADMINISTRATOR CONSUMERS PMWER COMPANY
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