ML20084U152
| ML20084U152 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 06/06/1995 |
| From: | Rehn D DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9506130105 | |
| Download: ML20084U152 (5) | |
Text
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- Catauta Nuclear Genention Department thePresident i
' 4800ConcordRoad (803M13205OfSce i
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t DUKEPOWER
' June 6,1995.
t U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
ATTN:~ Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 -
1 1
Subject:
Catawba Nuclear Station Dockets 50-413 and 50-414 Reply to Notice of Violation Inspection Report 50-413,414/95-10 1
Attached is Duke Power Company's response to the one (1) level IV violation cited in Inspection Report 50-413,414/95-10,. dated May 5,1995. This violation.was j
identified during the Resident's Monthly Inspection conducted Marth 5,1995 through April 8,1995.
i This response has been delayed beyond the 30 day requirement to allow a more '
l indepth review of this response and subsequent approval.
This delay. was discussed with R. J. Freudenberger, Senior Resident Inspector, on June 6,1995.
If there are any questions concerning this response, please contact Kay Nicholson at
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(803) 831-3237.
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Sincerely, D.L.Rehn
\\ KEN: RESP 95.10 I
' S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator xc:
R. E. Martin, ONRR R. J. Freudenberger, SRI
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i DUKE POWER COMPANY j
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION l
REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION 413,41$95-10-01 l
Technical Specification 6.8.1, Procedures and Prograins, requires, in part, that written l
procedures le established, inoplernented and snaintained cotering the activities referenced in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978, which includes specific proceduresfor tests.
Prowdure PTjo/A/4150/11B, Control Rod Worth Measurernent By Rod Swap, Section l
6.0, Lhnits and Precautions, Sicp 6.8 requires that reactivity be kept beturen 40 pcni (percent niillirho) during rod swaps.
Contrary to the abote, on March 23, 1995, during the perfortnance of Control Rod Worth oneasurensents, the requirentents of procedure PTjD/A/4150/11B uere not adequately isnplemented.
Specifically, reactivity exceeded +40 pcru during the perforniance of Control Rod Worth Measurernent By Rod Swap which resulted in over-ranging the reactivity instruntentation and anisleading indication of actual reactivity.
Misleading indication of reactivity contributed to actions which caused an inadvertent reactor pauvr increase.
This is a Seterity Irvel IV Violation (Supplernent 1).
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7 DUKE POWER COMPANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION 413, 414/95-10-01 i
RESPONSE
1.
Reason for Violation This violation is attributed to inadequate planning, preparation, and job briefing, and inadequate work practices by the control room operator.
On March 23, 1995, Zero Power Physics Testing (ZPI7T) was being conducted on the Catawba Unit 1 reactor. The rod swap test was in progress, with the reference bank measurement successfully completed and the rod swap measurements beginning. The test coordinator was conducting the test from the horseshoe area in the control room, using a digital volt meter (DVM) to monitor core reactivity. The test coordinator was located in this area of the control room to enhance the communications between the test coordinator and the control operator.
The test coordinator understood the reactivity strip chart recorder, which is located outside the control room horseshoe, was being monitored by the reactor engineering supervisor.
Due to miscommunication between the reactor engineering supervisor and the test coordinator, the strip chart recorder was left unattended.
Three rod swaps were successfully performed. During the fourth rod swap, problems with reactivity indications on the DVM led to the inappropriate withdrawal of control rods by the control room operator which exceeded the procedure limits and precautions ~ on positive reactivity addition. The startup rate approached 3 decades per minute and reactor power peaked at approximately 3.5% full power. The reactor operator and test coordinator responded to the event and inserted control rods to their previous configuration, returning the reactor to a critical, hot zero power (HZP) condition.
Better planning and preparation for this test would have resulted in the strip chart recorder being monitored, such that reactivity could have been kept within the 40 pcm limit.
Better job briefings and work practices by the control room operator would have resulted in startup rate and power being monitored more closely, which could have prevented the power increase. The monitoring of the startup rate and power had not been included in the pre-job briefing to remind the control operator to pay special attlention to this.
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DUKE POWER COMPANY a
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION 413,414/95-10-01 2.
Corrective Actions Taken and Results Achieved After this event, with the reactor stable and critical at zero power, a i
meeting was held between personnel involved with the test and the shift work manager and other management personnel to discuss the event.
As a result of this meeting and conference calls, it was determined that the following actions would be taken prior to resuming testing:
Pull or insert rods no more than 10 steps at a time during the test a.
and determine the desired effect has occurred before proceeding.
b.
Reactor engineering personnel will be monitoring the reactivity computer chart recorder anytime rods are being moved during the test.
c.
Control Room SRO will be more involved in the test.
d.
Limit the intermediate range power to no more than 1E-7 amps The ZPN was sucessfully completed using the actions listed above with no procedure limits and precautions exceeded.
A team comprised of General Office and Oconee Nuclear Site personnel performed an assessment of the implementation of corrective actions in response to the recent INPO finding regarding reactivny management to assure the corrective actions were effective.
This assessment was completed in May,1995; a report will be issued to detail their conclusion.
' A Duke Power Significant Event Investigation Team (SEIT) reviewed this event and has made recommendations to improve the ZPPT program and Reactivity Management at the sites.
These I
recommendations are listed in Section 3 as corrective actions to be taken.
3.
Corrective Action to be Taken to Avoid Future Violations j
i System Engineering will incorporate short term corrective actions into permanent station procedures as necessary to improve rod swap testing as a result of this event prior to the next Catawba ZPI'r.
Oversight of ZPPT by the control room senior reactor operator will be enhanced prior to the next Catawba ZPPT.
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DUKE POWER COMPANY l
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L CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION l
. REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION.
m 413,41495 10 01 Operations Training.will provide operator. proficiency training to:
operating crews to emphasize the msponsibilites of the reactor operator
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to monitor and control reactivity prior to the next Catawba ZPPT.
'A department quality improvement team (QIT) has beem initiated to -
c strengthen the ZPPT program and to promote excellence and consistency between Duke nuclear sites.'. Lessons learned from this event 'will bei considered by the QIT and implemented as necessary to promote-excellence. Prior to the next Catawba ZPPT, sufficient implementation' of.this work will be completed such that similar events will be prevented. The following specific issues will. be considered and/or implemented.
j a.
The reactivity computer setup during physics testing will be 1
systematically evaluated to determine the best options.
The interface between the reactor operator and the test coordinator during rod swap will be improved.
i b.
Determine if it is possible to install an annunciator or alarm on the reactivity computer, or temporary OAC alarm, to warn the operator if reactivity or flux exceeds the test band.
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l Provide training to reactor engineering personnel involved with ~
c.
ZPFr to ensure they understand the operational characteristics of l
the reactivity computer if it is over ranged.
i d.
Briefings for ZPPT and other startup physics testing will be evaluated for possible improvements with respect to standards expressed in SOER 91-01.
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All procedures used during startup physics testing will be e.
upgraded to include guidelines of NSD 304, " Corporate Reactivity Management Directive".
f.
Coramunication techniques between the ZPFT test coordinator l
nnd reactor operator will be evaulated for enhancement.
Management will review their actions of this event as a case study to reinforce the principles of conservative decision making.
j 4.
' Date of Full Compliance Duke Power Company is now in full compliance.
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