ML20084T959

LER BFRO-50-259/764W:on 760411,insp Revealed Large Number of Cam Followers W/Crazed Appearance on Switches Mfg Outside Dates of Mfg.All Crazed Switches Will Be Replaced W/Switches Conforming to Appearance Stds

ML20084T959
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry, 05000359
Issue date:	04/26/1976
From:	Fox H TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	Moseley N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20084T956	List: ML20084T953 ML20084T957 ML20084T959
References
LER-BFRO-50-259-764, NUDOCS 8306240332
Download: ML20084T959 (7)

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'. ' , UCENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTOOL 8 LOCK:l l l l l l l [ptaAss psteNT ALL IsadaueRED INFORMATION) 1 6 NAM LCENSE NUMBER tv o I ..I d al a l e l 11 l ol 01-10 l o I o l o l 01-lo lo l l 4 l 1 11 l 1 l 1 l l 01 Il

/ 11 9 14 15 25 26 30 31 32 i An ama '," $)"sN tasexET NouetR EvtN1 DaTE us Mins oAn

@]mert l_ [* l [T J W l0 _l 5l 01 -l 0 l 2 l 5 l 969l l 0l 4l 1l 1l 7l 68 74 6l75l l l l l l l 00

/ l- b/ 50 69 60 61 t VI NT Di'icniPTION g Durin.. the perfornance ut the unit i RCIC cystem retest, the RCIC pump discharge 80 l

7 6u 03 l valve would not operate. (BFAO-50-259/764W) l 7  : !,

80 EE ! 80 7 H9 I

EE i 80 7 89 l

El 80 7 89 m Y $0[ coupONENT CODE MANuFAcnMR YOLATON O lC l d l @ l Cl Kl Tl 3 l P,l Kl d43 l Gl0 l8 l0 l lNl 7 09 10 11 12 17 44 47 48 CAUSE DESCRIPTON O8 l The valve would not operate because of the failure of a CE tvoe SBM model l 80 7 89 3E l 205A8774DD switch used for the normni-omraancv ennevnt a evnnefar cui er h I 80 7 89 DE l The switch was replaced. l

% POWER OTHER STATUS O ERY DISCOVERY DESCRipTON STA 1

W l010 l 120 13 l (Shtdnafterfire l45d lPreoperational retest after fire l 7 8 9 10 44 46 80 it S OF E ASE AMOUNT OF ACTNff Y LOCATON OF RREASE i2 9

LzJ Iz_I 10 I NA l 44 l

45 NA 80 l

7 8 11 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES r.UMsFH T ypE DESCRPTON 13 l 0l 0 l o12l Jl13 7 89 11 NA 80 l

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBile DELCRpTON ,

14 I clo j al I NA l 7 b9 11 1P 80 OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES DE I NA l 7 89 80 LOSS OR OAMAGE TO FACluTY TVM DESCRpTON D2 lzj l NA l

' "' 0 80 B306240332 760730 PUGLICITY PDR ADOCK 05000359 S PDR Ql 7 % 9 NA 80 l

ADDITONAL FACTORS  :

10 l 53E ATTACHMJNT l 7 8 'l 80 1

19 l l 7 89 80 NAME. PHONE:

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This is an interim report. As part of the investigative action of this event,

t. witches of this model were inspected throughout the plant. This inspection has revealed a large number of cam followers with a crazed appearance similar to the condition described in the attached vendor's service letter, we have found craced ccnditions e::isting on switches which were manufactured outsido the date of cianufacture specified in the service letter. This condition has been found on switchas installed in each of the 3 Browns Ferry units. The itivestigation continues, and interim plans include replacement of all switches installed in safeguards systems which demonstrate crazing as well as switches L.anufactured during the period described in the vendor's service letter, f

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MAR 2E 1976 March 19,1.976 File Tab A STARTUPTEST DES!GN & ANALYSIS SIL No. 155

. Category 1 POSSIBLE FAILURES OF TYPE SBM CONTROL SWITCHES Recent failures of General Electric Type SBN Control Switches have been reported by the original component manufacturer. The application of these switches is widespread throughout operating fossil and nuclear (both BWR and PWR) plants. The reported failures, however, have been limited to SBM switches installed at fossil plants. It should be noted that, to date, the reported number of failed SBM switches is extremely low, (i.e., approximately 0.03 percent for the quantityof switches manufactured and shipped during the period of concern) and that none of the switch failures have occurred in essential circuits. The purpose of this Service Information Letter (SIL)

• is to list the affected BWR operating plants, to define the conditions causing the problem and to present corrective action recomendations for nucle:r application of SBM switches.

DISCUSSION ,

The reported failures of GE Type SBN Control Switches have been diagnosed as fracture of the Lexan cam followers (an integral part of the switch).

The failures have been attributed to exposure of some Lexan cam followers to hydrocarbons.

of the Lexan material. Contamination by hydrocarbons contributes to degradation This degradation could eventually progress to a fracture in any of of thethe cam follower following resulting in failure of the switch assembly three modes:

1. Failure of the switch to open.

2. Failure of the switch to close.

3. Jaming of the switch mechanism which would prevent any further action. '

Cam followers in question which have been exposed to the hydrocarbon are a part 1975.

May of SBM switches manufactured during the period from July 1972 through SBN switches manufactured during this time period may be l

.3 NUCLEAR ENERGY DIVISION

• OPERATING PLANT SERVICES

• SAN JOSE, CAllFORNIA 95125 s

I NO WARRANTY OR PEPRESENTATION EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED IS MADE WITH RESPECT TO THE ACCURACY, COMPLETENESS OR USEFULNESS OF THIS INFoR.

I MATION. GENEnAL ELECTRIC COMPANY ASSUMES NO AESPoNSIBILITY FOR LIA.

BILITY OR DAMAGE WHICH MAY RESULT FROM THE USE OF THIS INFORMATION. GENERAL ELECTRIC r--

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. l March 19,197d SIL No. 155 identified by a small sticker label affixed to the back end or side of each switch having a number less than 50 and two letters in the following series:

AJ DJ GJ KJ AK DK GK KK AL DL IN LH t BJ EJ HJ LJ BK EK HK LK BL EL JH MH CJ FJ JJ MJ CK FK JK MK CL GH KH o

Examples would be: "14GH" and "16HJ"

' Appendix A lists the results of a records search conducted by General Electric-Nuclear Energy Division of the known application of Class IE SBM switches in operating BWRs, including the specific location of the SBN switches that are identifiable to the A through M series discussed above. The records review uns limited to operating BWRs original equipment hardware as well as hardware in support of Field Disposition Instructions (FDIs) shipped to BWR operating plants after June 30, 1972.

RECOPMENDED ACTION

. ' General Electric reconmends the following action: "

1. Replace any SBM Control Switch currently installed in a BWR plant which is identified in the A through M series listed above and used in Class IE appitcation as indicated in Appendix A.

2. Order SBN switch replacements by the Panel Parts List General Electric Part Number to assure that such replacements will be to their original configuration requirements.

3. For switches identifiable in the A through M series and having a number less than 50 as described above, and with applications other than Class IE, the cam followers can be inspected for cracks with an auxiliary light source of adequate intensity through the opening near the terminals of each switch deck. It is advisable to refrain from switch dissessembly for purposes of this inspection.

4. The switch application and its frequency of use as well as the '

results of the visual inspection should determine if immediate replacement would be in the b',est interest.

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March 19,1976 SIL No. 155 4

! Contact your local GE service representative for additional information and j for assistance in ordering replacement parts.

i

. Prepared by: M.J. Sierra /L.A. Gonzalez .

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1 Approved by: g /tp[M it 7_- Issued by: b 4

h)L.Laytyn.

D. Manager D.L. L ton, Acting Manager Product Service Perfo nce Analysis and Servi Conmunicatfor.s i

i Product

Reference:

e i A71 - Plant Recommendations l

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s APPENDIX A '

LOCATION AND DATE CODES OF GE TYPE SBM CONTROL SWITCHES IN ESSENTIAL (CLASS IE) APPL.ICATIONS .

BWR PLANT PANEL QTY DEVICE LOCATION ORAWING # DATE CODE Fitzpatrick 9-3 1 23A-S20 234A9327P002 14AJ' 9-8 3 328, 32E, 32F 248A9615P001 Please check dlII No cert, avail ,

able

• 9-21 2 32, 33, 41, 42 234A9327P002 14AJ 9-3 9-75 1 9-G75-000 235A1127P002 14HH

, 9-75 2 15-MOV-102 248A9117P001 14JH 15-MOV-103 Peach' Bottom II 9-4 2 16A-18B 234A9329P003 14MH 9-41 16A-198 14LH 9-4A 1 32, 39 ,

- 234A9327P002 Cert. dated S

10/13/75.

No Date Code Could be KL-a Peach Bottom III 9-4B 'l 32, 39 234A9327P002 Cert. dated 17 10 10/13/75. lir-No Date Code ELEF 9-4 2 Could be KL 57 '

16A-188 234A9329P003 9-41 16A-198 14MH, 14LH 3.!:

Brunswick II (Carolina I) H12-P601 1 E51AS15 234A9330P002 14HH

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WA TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY M CH ATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 374ot i

l April 26, 1976

~l i Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 230 Peachtree Street, NW., 8th Floor Atlanta, Georgia 30303 j

Dear Mr. Moseley:

TENNESSEE AVIHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PIANT UNIT 1 -

DOCKET NO. 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR ABNORMAL i

OCCURRENCE BFAO-50-259/764W 4 The enclosed report is to provide details concerning an RCIC pump discharge valve which would not operate during the performance of the unit 1 RCIC system retest and is submitted in accordance with Appendix E to Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 4, August 1975.

This event occurred on Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 1.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY /. ' +>i 7' S b

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/f)'  :.f,)' ~/ $bi2 3 ,MI C' Q H. S. Fox Acting Director of Power Production

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Enclosure (3)

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Director (3)

Office of Management Information and Program Control U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Director (40)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 COPY SENT REGION. //k i

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