ML20084J557
| ML20084J557 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1973 |
| From: | Ross D JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Kruesi F US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19289B367 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8305180201 | |
| Download: ML20084J557 (3) | |
Text
e
(
O O
p h
Jersey Central Pow'
& Light Company
(%-y?a
/
M ADISoN AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL Ro AD e MoRRISToWN, N.J. 07960 e 539 6111 June 5, 1973 Mr. Frank E. Kruesi, Director
[
Directorate of Regulatory Operations United States Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545
Dear Mr. Krucsi:
Subject:
Oyster Creek Station Docket No. 50-219 Personnel Exposure The purpose of this letter is to advise you that during the performance of control rod drive modification and replacement, an individual, under the employ of an outside contractor, received a whole body exposure in excess of 3.0 rems. This exposure is in excess of the applicable limits as set forth in 10 CAR 20.101.B.1 and, as such, is being reported per 10CFR20.405.
The individual of concern was assigned to a work crew performing the modification and replacement of the control rod drives, and received the increment of excessive exposure, while engaged in the removal of a drive under the reactor -
vessel.
In the performance of this specific job, the man was exposed to levels of radiation which ranged from 60 mr/hr to 800 mr/hr.
The following controls were in effect at the time of the incident:
The area was restricted, a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) had been issued and the job was being supervised.
In retracing the incident to determine the cause of the exposure, the following information was determined:
1.
The individual, employed by the contractor, arrived at Oyster Creek on Friday, April 27, 1973, was issued a film badge and attended an orientation course in Radiation Protection.
2.
lie was assigned to a crew scheduled to perform work within the scope of the control rod drive modification and replacement program. The work was conducted under the supervision of contractor personnel.
3.
Ilis total accumulated exposure through May 5, 1973 was 1210 mr as determined from film badge results.
At this time, after re-viewing his exposure, the individual was given permission to accumulato additional exposure to a level of 1700 mr, which was according to established guidelines.
DRh fI Q
~
I n
PDR L
n O
O Mr. Kruesi June 5,.1973 4.
His total exposure on May 7,1973 was 1615 mr (1210 mr film badge and 405 mr self-reading dosimeter) as recorded on the daily log sheet. At this time, the individual was assigned to a work crew scheduled to remove a-control rod drive. The area in which the work was performed was adequately surveyed and the crew was under contractor supervision.
5.
After performing the necessary drive work, the individual discovered that his self-reading dosimeters (200 mr, 500 mr and 1R) had all pegged upscale indicating an exposure in excess of I rem. The job had been performedLin a high radiation area located under the reactor vessel.
6.
His film badge was immediately processed and the results indicated 1810 mr for the period May 6 through May 8, 1973 inclusive, indica-ting the individual received approximately 1400 mr while performing the work.
After evaluation of the above information, the conclusion was reached that the cause of the overexposure was twofold; firstly, the failure of the individual of concern to periodically check his self-reading dosimeters to determine the amount of exposure he was receiving and, secondly, the failure of the contractor supervisor to, (being aware of the allowable exposure limits) periodically check the individual's exposure and to use more care in the assignment of work considering the man's previous accumulated exposure.
Immediately upon discovering that the overexposure had occurred, a meeting was conducted between the contractor and Jersey Central Power 6 Light Company's staff to determine corrective action needed and to initiate measures.of control to prevent recurrence of similar incidents.
Corrective action taken involved the use of health physics personnel to more closely observe exposure of individuals engaged in work in Radiation Work Permit (RWP) areas. This was accomplished by having the health physics personnel perform the following:
1.
Be aware of exposure limits for all contractor personnel request-ing entrance to RWP areas prior to admittance.
2.
Assure that all contractor personnel are. informed as_to the RWP.
requirements, are properly clothed, protected, monitored and record allowable exposure.
3.
Monitor and record exposures of contractor personnel at least hourly, more frequently.if required, and remove any individual' from the' area who reaches his allowable limit.
In addition, more stringent administrative requirements have been-imposed on all contractor personnel to preclude the. recurrence.of this event.
These requirements include daily meetings to discuss work to be-performed in light of necessary radiation protection, the restriction from work in~ high radiation
~
areas of all contractor personnel who receive an accumulated exposure.of 2.0 reas, and the processing of-film badges daily for all contractor personnel who are a-LA _
'Y
O O
Mr. Krucsi June 5, 1973 engaged in work in high radiation areas.
It is felt that the above actions will assure Jersey Central Power G Light Company's management that a recurrence will not be experienced.
Jersey Central Power G Light Company had prepared and implemented radiological control of personnel engaged in work during the outage, through the establishment of administrative guidelines, the maintaining and reporting of all personnel exposure on a daily basis, and the orientation of all personnel in radiation protection.
In addition, a supplemental system of memorandum writing was instituted to alert the contractor supervisors of personnel who were approach-ing pre-established limits.
It is the feeling that Jersey Central Power G Light Company had maintained proper administrative control to prevent an occurrence of this nature and the reason for the incident was the failure of the contractor personnel involved to observe the rules and follow the proper safety practices.
We are enclosing forty (40) copies of this letter.
Very truly yours, l
Donald A. Ross Manager, Nuc1 car Generating Stations DAR:cs Attachment cc:
Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I 1
L.
-