ML20084F883
| ML20084F883 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1973 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20084F870 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8304210305 | |
| Download: ML20084F883 (47) | |
Text
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. O O DRESDEN STATION SPECIAL REPORT NO. 33 Final Flood Protection Measures (Permanent Flood Protection of the Containment Coolina Service Water Pumps and Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pumps)
Dresden Units 2 and 3 AEC Dockets 50-237 50-249 Commonwealth Edison Company August, 1973 1
l D 050 27 i PDR
CAMGENT Q LUNDY .
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a TABLE OF CONTENTS i
1.0 Introduction 1
2.0 Design Details 2.1 Isolation of the Condenser Pit from the Condensate Pump Room
- 2.1.1 Determination of Maximum Flood Level
! 2.1.2 Design Modification of Condenser Pit 4 2.1.3 Testing i 2.2 Separation of the Containment Cooling Service Water Pumps 2.2.1 Determination of Maximum Flood Level 2.2.2 Design Modifications 2.2.3 Testing 2.3 Protection of the Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pumps
! 2.3.1 Determination of Maximum Flood Level 2.3.2 Design Modifications 2.3 3 Testing 3.0 Safety Evaluation 11 . 0 Conclusion
1 CARCENT Q LUNLY ENGINEEh3 i t ) Ci;lCAGO LIST OF FIGURES Fig. No.
1 Layout CCSW Flood Protection, Elevation 469'6" - Unit 2 1A. Layout CCSW Flood Protection, Elevation 495'0" - Unit 2
- 2. Layout CCSW Flood Protection, Elevation 469'6" - Unit 3 2A. Layout CCSW Flood Protection, Elevation 495'0" - Unit 3
- 3. Section CCSW Flood Protection
- 4. Vault Wall Section Details 5 Vault Wall Section Details
- 6. Ventilation Cover Plate
- 7. Multi-Cable Transit Seal 8+
l Multi-Cable Transit Seal - Detail 9 Bed Plate Drains - Diagram 10 Vault Cooler Scheme
- 11. Watertight Seal Detail Test (Multi-Cable Transit)
- 12. Submersible Pump - Detail
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SARCENT O LUNDY ,
9 ENGIN EcDo "
, CHICAGO t t l.0 Introduction On June 7, 1972, while the Quad-Cities - Unit 1 was in the cold shutdown condition, an operator was performing maintenance and scheduled modification on the circulating water system when the air was vented from the hydraulic system on one of the 120" circulating water butterfly valves at the condenser. The resultant sudden butterfly valve closure caused a water hammer in the system.
The water hammer effect led to a failure of a rubber expansion joint in the 120" circulating water line and the subsequent fl'ooding of the condenser pit (where the expansion joint is located) and the condensate pump room.
The water flowed from the condenser pit to the condensate pump room by way of a doorway and two large ventilation openings between the two areas. The water rose to a height of approx-imately 16 feet in the condensate pump room and flooded all the pumps in that room some of which are Class I safety related equipment normally required to bring the unit to a cold shutdown. As the plant was already in the cold shutdown condition this damage did not present a problem for plant safety or operation. Plans were implemented immediately to remove the water and place the equipment back into service.
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O CARCENT Q LUNDY p j
d ENGINEcRo CHicAeo As a result of this flooding at quad-Cities Station, modifi-cations will be made both at the Quad-Cities Station and at the Dresden Station. The remainder of this report discusses those modifications to be made at the Dresden Station.
WEusically three design modifications will be made at Dresden:
.a 1 The paths that flood water could follow from the condenser pit to the condensate pump room will be permanently sealed.
This isolates the condenser pit and prevents any source of flood water in the condenser pit from becoming a source of flood water to the condensate pump room (floor elevation 469'6") and consequently to the containment cooling service water pumps (CCSW) located one floor above the condensate pump room (at floor elevation 495'0").
- 2. Two of the four containment cooling service water pumps (i.e., the B and C pumps) per unit will be enclosed in a watertight vault. These vaults are designed to ensure that a postulated rupture in the containment cooling service water system will not result in loss.of all four pumps due to flooding, i
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- 3. The diesel generator cooling water pumps, which are located in the crib house pit, will be replaced with special submersible type pumps and motor drives. In the event that the crib house pit is flooded the pumps i
can operate while submerged.
The complete design details of these three modifications are discussed in the following section.
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, , ENOINEEOo e cwicAeo 2.0 Design Details 2.1 Isolation of the Condenser Pit from the Condensate Pump Room 2.1.1 _ Determination of Maximum Flood Level
- There are three possible sources of flood water 1
in the condenser pit. They are:
Case 1. A break in an expansion joint (as happened at the Quad-Cities Station) after which the circulating water pumps continued to fill the condenser pit until they are shut off.
Case 2. A break in an expansion joint after which the circulating water pumps are shut off, but the condenser pit is flooded by backflow from the riven i
i Case 3. A failure of the hotwell.
The maximum flood level inside the condenser pit from the above sources is the 508'0" elevation l (2780" above the condenser pit floor elevation l 481'0"). This maximum flood level was arrived at in the following manner:
-4
j 2.1.1.1 In Case 1 above the expansion joint' break l was analyzed for the worst condition in
, which the entire expansion joint material is blown out leaving a 6" circumferential gap around the pipe for water to escape.
In order to calculate t'he maximum flow of water from the break it was assumed that the gap would act as an orifice of area equal to the area of the gap. Using the circulating water pump head and system friction loss curves, it was calculated that a maximum of 250,000 gpm coul'd be pumped through the opening in the pipe.
If this 250,000 gpm were allowed to con-tinue being pumped the condenser-pit would be filled to the 517'0". elevation (ground level) in approximately 1 5 ,
minutes. At this point, the water would begin to flow throughout the 517'0" elevation of the turbine cavity and the ~
plant. In order to prevent this occurrence, a system of level switches will be -installed in the condenser pit to indicate and control flooding of the condenser area. The following switches
. CARGENT O LUNDY g ENCINEERO n ..
caucaso will be installed:
Level Function
- a. l'0" (1 switch) Alarm on main control room panel "Hi Water Condenser Pit"
- b. 3'0" (1 switch) Alarm on main control room panel "Hi Cire.
Water Condenser Pit"
- c. 5'0" (2 redun- Alarm on main control dant switches) room panel end circ.
water pump trip Level (a) indicates water in the condenser pit from either the hotwell or the circu-lating water system. Level (b) is above the hotwell capacity and indicates a probable circulating water failure. At the level (b) alarm the operator in the control room shall manually trip the circulating water pumps for the affected unit thereby preventing the flooding to continue due to operation of the pumps.
Should the switches at level (a) and (b) fail or the: operator fail to trip the.
circulating water. pumps on. alarm at level (b), the actuation of either level. switch CARIENT O LUNDY ~
' ' e ENGINEEQO l , . CMICASO i
at level (c) shall trip the circulating water pumps automatically and alarm in the control room. These redundant level I switches at level (c) will be designed and installed to IEEE 279, " criteria ~for Nuclear Power Plant Prote'ction Systems."
As the circulating water pumps are tripped, either manually or automatically at level (c) of 5'o", the maximum water level reached in the condenser pit due to pumping will be at the 491'0" elevation (10' above condenser pit floor elevation 481'o", 5' plus an additional 5i attributed to pump coast down).
I 2.1.1.2 Once the circulating water pumps have been shut'off the condenser pit'will continue
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to' fill up due to backflow from the . river.
Theoretically', this backflow 'will continue -
until the level-inside'the condenser pit is-equal to the elevation of the river. Then
, the maximum theoretical' flood elevation in
- j. the condenser ' pit is '508(o'L (maximum historical flood level).
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CARG!NT O LUN!Y
.' oNolNGEQo cuicAeo i
For design purposes, the maximum flood elevation contributible to backflow was taken as 508 o".
2.1.1.3 The hotwell contains 10,200 cubic feet of water at its normal overflow level.
Should the hotwell rupture (catastmphi-cally) this water would be dumped into the condenser pit (as this happens, loss of condenser vacuum will trip the turbine and the bypass valves so that flow to the condenser will cease). The maximum flood level due to this water would be approximately 3 feet to the 484'0" elevation.
2.1.1.4 In reviewing paragraphs 2.1.1.1 - 2.1.1.3 it can be seen that if any one or all three of the above cases occur, the maxi-mum flood level in'the" condenser pit wiil be be 508'0". Therefore, in the design modification to isolate the condenser pit from the condensate pump room a maximum flood to the 508:o" elevation in the condenser ' pit was used. This overall height of 27.08 (elevations 508: 0" less
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' 481'0") was used, plus 10 % margin to come up with a maximum flood depth of 30 feet.
2.1.2 Design Modification of Condenser Pit During a postulated flooding incident, water would pass from the condenser pit to the condensate pump room through two vent openings, a doorway, pipe penetrations, and several floor and equipment drains.
The following modifications will be made to isolate the condenser pit from the condensate pump room in the event of a flood to the 508'o" elevation:
2.1.2.1 The two ventilation openings between the condenser pit and the condensate pump pit will be permanently sealed by means of a 1" steel plate to which 8" channels will be attached on the upper side for support (see Fig.1, 2 and 6 ).
This entire assembly will be anchored into the concrete with 1/2" diameter cinch anchors on 6" centers on all four sides.
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, cwicAeo The ventilation closures have been analyzed and found acceptable to withstand a 30' head of water in addition to a 0.12 r, (DBE earthquake load value) vertical accelera-tion as applied to the mass of water.
Because of the small mass of the plate, the horizontal seismic forces are negligible.
The plate and structural members providing these closures undergo stresses which do not exceed 1-1/3 times the working allow-able stresses for the materials.
2.1.2.2 The doorway between the condenser pit and the condensate pump room will be sealed by a watertight door. The wa'tertight door will be designed
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to withstand a 30' head of water plus the effects of a 0.18 g (DBE earthquake load value) horizontal seismic occurrence (this includes the " sloshing effect" of the 30' head of water as analyzed using TID-7024, Nuclear Reactors and Earthquakes.
Because of the small mass of the door the vertical seismic forces are negligible. i l
The door materials undergo stresses which do not exceed 1 1/3 times the working 1
. allowable stresses of the materials.
SARG2NT Q LUNDY
- ' GNOINGGQo cum.o 2.1.2.3 The piping and electrical penetrations between the condenser pit and the con-densate pump room will be permanently sealed with concrete, RTV silicone sealant, or rubber boot type seals (designed by Brand Industrial Services) to prevent leakage between the condenser pit and the condensate pump room in the event of a flood. These seals. Will be designed for
, the maximum flood condition in relation to the elevation where each is located.
2.1.2.4 The wall between the condenser pit and the condensate pump room (approximntely 4
Column "E" on Figs. 1 and 2) provides a watertight seal with the addition of the seals specified in paragraphs 2.1.2.2 and 2.1.2.3 above. This wall has been analyzed and found capable of withstand-ing a head of 30' of water acting on the condenser side of the wall plus the effects of a O.18g horizontal and a 0.12 g vertical seismic occurrence (this includes " sloshing" as in paragraph 2.1.2.2). The construction
SARG~jNT Q LUNDY
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of the existing wall is more than adequate to contain the water pressure and the effects of the seismic occurrence with stresses in the concrete and reinforcing steel not exceeding 1 1/3 times the' allow-able working stresses.
It is recognized that the flooding of the condenser pit is an additional load onto 1
j the foundation of the structure The added weight is more than adequately supported directly on the founding rock through the concrete mat on which the structure rests.
2.1.2.5 The floor and equipment drains which run from the condenser pit to the sumps in the condensate pump room will be perman-ently sealed or sealed with removable i
plugs where periodic drainage is necessary.
4 The seals and plugs are designed to with-stand the maximum flood level.
4 2.1.2.6 Included in the design modifications are the level switches as discussed in para-graph 2.1.1.1.
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(3 SARIENT O LUNDY pg e e U ENotNEcRO CMICAGO V
1 2.1.3 Testing i
, 2.1.3.1 There will be no testing required for the bulkhead door or penetration seals in the condenser pit wall. These seals will be designed for maximum flood level therefore no catastrophic failure of the seals will occur. Testing the seals would only assure that no small leaks are present. Since the CCSW pumps are located on the floor approximately 25' above the condensate pump room, small leakage flow will in no way endanger the CCSW pumps. Therefore, testing of the seals would be an unnecessary expense without any benefit to plant safety.
2.1.3.2 The IEEE-279 design switches discussed in paragraph 2.1.1.1 will be testable with the plant in operation.
2.2. Separation of the Containment Cooling Service Water Pumps
- 2.2.1 Determination of Maximum Flood Level l
m . __ _ ._ _ _ . _ . _ _
- . CARZENT Q LUNDY
) ENGINEERo
, CMICA40 There are three other possible sources of flood water in the condensate pump room. They are:
- 1. The three contaminated condensate storage tanks.
- 2. The condenser hotwell and condensate piping to the condensate pumps.
, 3. The CCSW system piping to the CCSW pumps.
2.2.1.1 The three contaminated condensate storage tanks hold a combined storage of 700,000 gallons of water. Of this 700,000 gallons, 520,000 gallons could flow into the condensate pump room upon failure of contaminated condensate line in the room (180,000 gallons is held for the HPCI and LPCI systems).
2.2.1.2 <The hotwell and condensate piping to the condensate pumps contain approximately 85,000 gallons of water. In the event of a postulated condensate line break this volume of water would flow into the conden-sate pump room. At the time of the pipe break the condenser would lose its vacuum, and consequently, the turbine would trip and the main steam bypass valves would trip closed essentially stopping any additional flow into the condenser. Therefore, the volume available to flood the condensate p g room would be 85,000 gallons.
CARGENT O LUNDY rm ENOINEEDO CMICA40 The floor area of each condensate pump room is approximately 3,465 sq.ft. (free
, floor area minus pump base plates).
Therefore, the 605,000 gallons (520,000 plus 85,000 gallons equals 80,872 cu.ft.)
available would flood the condensate pump room to a height of 23.3 feet. (This is a conservative estimate as the pump base plate dimensions were projected upward and subtracted from the total volume available as an estimate of the volume of the pumps and piping that would be under water).
2.2.1.3 The other possible source of flooding in the condensate pump room is a postulated rupture in the CCSW system piping. If such a postulated accident occurred outside the CCSW vault, water would backflow from the river and fill the condensate pump room and CCSW pump room until water reached river level of 508'o".
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inside the CCSU vault- will recult in watey;l i'
'Q l backflowing and fil,lin6'the CCSW vault to ~
+: , w river level of 508'0" (13'o" above the vault floor elevation 495'o").
2.2.1.5 In reviewing paragraphs 2.2.1.1 - 2.2.1.4 it can be seen that if any'one of the above cases occurs, the maximdn flood ,leyel (
3 will be 508'o". Therefore, pn.tha dectgd _ 's O g \
modification to protect the_CCSW pumpu a maximum flood to the 508'o" eliiRiition was used. This height, of- 13(elevationc\ ti. '. /.
508'o" less 495'o") was used as the ,
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mum CCSW flood depth.
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2.2.2 Design Modifications of 'CCSW Pupp Room ,
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2.2.2.1 Each unit at the Dresden St,'aticn has four i s f
, i containment cooling service water pumps, D
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f any t wo of which will provide the required 1
containment cooling. Each unit will have* ~ j, two of the above pumps in an isoldtied
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- vault. The pumps are enclosed in the ;-
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following manner, using Unit 2 as an
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example (See Fig lA): Containment Cooling Service Water pumps 2B-1501-44 and 2C-1501-S4 are in a vault. Unit 3 pumps are enclosed in a like manner (See Fig. 2A).
g 2.2.2.2 The following piping will remain in the vaults because of the complexity of its removal and its necessity to the operation
, of the CCSW pumps:
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Hypochlorite Injection Piping
. .\ Service Water Injection Piping
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Two ventilation Ducts Penetrations for all of the above piping J , through the watertight vaults will be properly sealed as discussed in paragraph N '
,' 2.2.2 5.
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s 2.2.2.3 Each of the vaults will be constructed by
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s building a new flood protection wall s.
, _N , around the B and C CCSW pumps in each unit, s
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These new walls are keyed into the existing walls and slabs and anchored with drilled in anchors (see Figs. lA '2A, 3, 4 & 5).
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The walls are designed and will be con-l structed to withstand a 13' head (see paragraph 2.2.1.5, Determination of Maxi-mum Flood Level) of water on either side of the wall in addition to the combined I
horizontal effect of a 0.18 g (DBE earth-quake loading) seismic occurrence, vertical ofrect of a 0.12 g (DBE earthquake loading) aeismic occurrence and including a sloshing effect of the water per Nuclear Reactors l and Earthquakes TID-7024 The walls are capable of withstanding the above mentioned combined loads with stresses not exceeding 1 1/3 times the allowable working stresses for the materials.
Stresses in these reinforced walls are such that no cracking is expected to occur which would cause flooding of the pump vaults.
2.2.2.4 Access into the pump vaults will be by means of either watertight, steel, bulkhead or submarine type doors. ::The'se IC. .
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doors will be designed and constructed to the same flood.and seismic criteria as the walls.
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) 2.2.2 5. Pipe penetrations through the vault walls Will be sealed with grout cement.
Electrical cables supplying power to the l
CCSW pumps will be sealed in the vault walls using s Nelson-Multi-Cable Transit l
l fitting (see Figs. 9 and 10). The fitting consists of a box frame which is cast into the vault wall. Inside this frame are rubber blocks which are pre-cut to accept the exact cables that are routed through the opening. The rubber blocks are then compressed within the frame to form a seal.
These seals are designed to witbatand a head of Sor of water. Small conduit penetrations are sealed with grout cement in a manner similar to the pipes discussed above.
Junction boxes connected to conduit which penetrates the vault walls 'will be sealed with RTV (silicone rubber sealant) to provent leakage into the vaults.
SARGZNT Q LUN~Y s
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. cmcaso 2.2.2.6 Electrical instrumentation, controls nnd other components which are susceptibic to water damage will be located at an elevation above the flood alevation of Se8'o". _
2.2.2 7 2here are provisions for two types of drains from the flood protection vaults:
(1) floor drainage and (2) equipment drainage via the containment coolin6 earvice water pump bed plate drains.
Floor drainage of each vault is accomp)1shed through a carbon steel pipe which penetrates the new vault wall. When open this pipe will drain the vault floor to a floor drain outside the vault. Under normal conditions the pipe will be closed off by a standard, screwed pipe cap good for 125 '
psi. When it is desired that the vault floor be drained, the cap is removed manually.
Equipment drainage from the vaults will be via the CCSW pump bed plate drains (see Fig.11). The following equipment in the vault will drain to the above bed plates:
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l 1. CCSW pumps l
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- 2. Vault coolers for each of the above pumps l
Each bed plate drain enters the floor slab where it is tied into other bed plate drain piping which runs through the slab to the equipment drain sump (located outside the vaults) (See Fig. 9 ).
As a means of preventing backflow from outside the vaults in the event of a flood, a check valve and an air operated valve are installed in each bed plate drain line above the point where it enters the floor slab. The check valve is a 2" Crane swing check No. 34 designed for 125 psig service. The air operated valve is a Fisher control valve designed for a 15 psi l
differential pressure. The control valve
! will be in the normally open position in the energized condition and will close upon any one of the following:
- 1. Loss of air or power
- 2. High. level in the equipment drain sump (signalling a possible flood)
- 3. H16h level in-the vault t
SARGENT Q LUN3Y
, , ENGINCCQo
- CMICA40 Closure of the control valve on high water level in the vault is affected by use of a level switch set at a water level of 6" inside the vault. Upon actuation of the switch, it will close the control valve and alarm in the control room to notify the operator of trouble in the vault. The operator will also be aware of problems in the condensate pump rcosa if the high level alarm on the equipment drain sump is not terminated in a-reasonable amount of time.
It must be pointed out that these alarms provide information to the operator but that operator action upon the above alarms is not a necessity since the automatic provisions provide adequate protection.
2.2.2.8 In order to prevent the CCSW pump motors from overheating two vault coolers are supplied for each pump. The vault coolers are designed to maintain the vault at a maximum loS*F temperaturs during operation of a respective pump and provide humidification.
SARGENi' O LUNOV GNolWGGRO
.' twemme For example, if CCSW pump 2B-1601-44 starts, its coolers' also start and 4
maintain. tha vault at 105'F by removing heat supplied. by the pump motor of 2B-1501-44 If, at the same tims pump 2B-1501-44 is in operation, CCSW pump 2C-1501-44 starts, its coolers will also start and compensate for the added heat supplied to the vault by the 20 pump motor keeping the vault at lo5*F.
Each of the coolers is supplied with ceol-ing water from its respective pump's dis-charge line (see Fig. 10). After the water has been passed through the cooler it returns to its respective pump's suction line. In th3s-way the vault coolers are supplied with conlingsater totally inside the vault. The cooling water quantity needed for each cooler is approximately 1% to 5% of the design flow of the pumps so that'the recircula-tion of this small amount of heated
. water will not affect pump or cooler operation.
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. '.* SARGENT O LUN3Y ENGINEERS emem The cooling water piping and vault coolers are designed and constructed for seismic Class I conditions. The coolers are similar in design and construction to coolers which have been specified and installed at the Zion Station (Docket No.
- 50-295). The coolers are manufactured by
. The Buffalo Forge Company.
Electrical supply to the fan motors of the vault coolers is supplied in the same manner and off the same bus as that of their respective pumps, thereby upholding the Class I integrity of these systems and assuring cooler operation concurrent with pump operation.
2.2.3 Testing The watertight bulkhead door and the penetration seals for cables penetrating the vault walls and ceilings will be designed to eithstand the maxi-mum flood conditions. However, in order to assure that their installation is adequate for maximum flood conditions a method of testing each seal has been devised.
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- d ENoeNEEQo l cuuso 2.2.3.1 In order to test the watertight doors, a test frame will be installed on the conden-ser side of the condenser pit wall door and both sides of the CCSW vault door.
At the time of the tm.:
reinforced rubber diaphrams as manufactured by the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company will be clamped into test frames.
Water will then be pumped into the rubber diaphragms to the design pressure of 13' and 30' respectively and i held for several minutes to insure a watertight seal around the door.
2.2.3.2 In order to test an electrical penetration sealed with the Nelson Multi-Cable Transit fitting an identical fitting is permanently installed on the opposite side of the penetration (see Fig.11). Compressed air is supplied to a test connection on the second fitting and the space between the fitting is pressurized to approximately 15 psig. The outer face /s of Nelson fitting /s is/are then tested for' leaks using a soap bubble solution. Any leaks noted can be stopped by a readjustment of the seal.
CAR 2ENT O LUNDY
, . ENGINc3Ro cuscAeo i
2.2.3.3. No test will be made on the total vault walls themselves as the only reliable method to do this is to flood either the vault or the condensate pump room, neither of which is feasible.
2.3 Protection of the Diesel Generator Cooling Watar Pumps 2.3.1 Determination of Maximum Flood Level 2.3.1.1 The three diesel generator cooling water pumps are located in the crib house pit (elevation 490'8").
There is only one source of flood water in the crib house pit. Flood water would enter the pit if a rubber expansion joint on one of the six circulating water pumps failed. If this occurred and the circulat-ing water pumps continued to run, the crib 1 house pit would fill with water
- and.,would be filled to the 517'0" elevation (ground level). At this point, the flood water would spill back to the river.
- ' CARCENT O LUNDY ENGINCCMO
, . cMicaoo
- 2.3.1.2 The flood elevation of 517'0" for the diesel generator cooling water pumps yields a flood depth of 26'4" (elevations 517'0" less 490'8"), plus a 10% margin to come up 2 with a maximum flood depth of 30 feet.
I 2.3.2 Design Modifications 2.3.2.1 The three diesel generator cooling water pumps have been replaced with watertight, submersible " canned" type pumps and motor drives, as manufactured by Crane Chempump Division, with capacity and head equal to the original pumps (see Fig. 12).
2.3.2.2. The electrical feed conduit to these pumps is furnished with the replacement pumps and is also of watertight design. The electrical motor control center for these pumps is located at elevation 517'0" in the turbine building and is not susceptible
, to flood damage as it is above flood level.
2.3.3 Testing 2.3.3.1 The replacement pumps will be factory tested and certified to operate while submerged under 30 feet of water. The diesel generator system will be given a preoperational test after the cooling water pumps have been installed to confirm proper. starting _and
, , SACCON1 O LUN3Y
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. cnica.o 4
3.0 safety Evaluation 3.1 If a rubber expansion joint ruptures at the Dresden Station, as it did at the Quad-Cities Station, the resultant flood water will be isolated in the condenser pit and no Class I equipment will be affected. Design modifications have been made to protect flooding of the areas of the plant by the installation of IEEE-279 standard circulating water pump trip and by sealing off of the condenser pit. The condenser pit has been analyzed to be able to withstand the maximum flooding condition of all the postulated floods combined with the plant design basis earthquake including a sloshing effect of the flood water.
3.2 As described in the " Design Details" of this report:
- 1. Two of the four containment cooling service water pumps per unit will be enclosed in a watertight vault which will withstand the maximum flooding (total of all potential floods) of the condensate pump room.
There is no other Class I equipment in the conden-sate pump room ti t would be affected by such a flood.
- 2. The diesel generator cooling water pumps will be replaced with watertight, submersible type pumps which will withstand the maximum flooding of the i
crib house pit. There is no other Class I equipment in the crib house pit that would be affected by such a flood.
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CARCENT Q LUNDY ENolNEECO 'v(]
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- CHICAGO 4.0 Conclusion When the design modifications discussed in this report are completed, Class I equipment - the contalment cooling service water pumps and diesel generator cooling water pumps in particular - will not be degraded by flooding such as occurred at the Quad-Cities Station or any other postulated flooding.
Therefore, the containment cooling service water pumps and diesel generator cooling water pumps and associated Class I equipment in both Dresden - Units 2 and 3 will meet all engineering safe guards and seismic Class I criteria to ensure their availability and plant reactor safety.
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Muni-Cable Transit Complies with .
Government Spec. .mcations a U. S. Military Specifications MIL-P 16685C PERFORMANCE TEST (Thermocycling)
- a U. S. Military Standard 167 VIBRATION TEST m U. S. Military Specification MIL-S-901C SHOCK TEST a U. S. Military Standard MIL-STD-108D WATERTIGHT TEST a International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea FIRE TEST (STANDARD) m ASTM E119-61 e FIRE TEST Nom an uuriccable Transit t,se un,ts contair.ed an assortment or pisin and a,mo.ed marine cabies.
dompone9as of the MultibableTransit l 0 TRANSIT FRAMES l
Available in 3 sizes and a number of different types to fit any appli- j cation. (See pace 8 for specific O =
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- rRONT VIEW COMPONENT MATERIALS Transit Frames are fabritated either of steel, aluminum, or steel alloys.
O END PACKING-STANDARD Compression Plates are steel or aluminum castings. Compression Bolts are -
Compresses to seal off frame area available in stainless steel or galvanized. Stay Plates are made of steel or above compression plate. (One size aluminum. Insert Blocks and End Packings are made from a specially formu-only, ore required) lated fire-proof elastomer.
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O END PACKING-SPECIAL . . ,
Used when a transit frame can be packed from one side only. (One O GROOVED INSERT BLOCKS Q SPARE INSERT BLOCKS site only, one required) See page 6 for information. See page 6 for information.
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