ML20084E315

Informs That Review of Fluid Sys Did Not Uncover Any Situation in Which Rupture Would Cause Flooding & Subsequent Deterioration of Engineered Safety Sys Performance

ML20084E315
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	10/09/1972
From:	Finfrock I JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Skovholt D US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
NUDOCS 8304150016
Download: ML20084E315 (2)

Text

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Jersey Central Power & Light Comimny

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M ADISON AVENU E AT PUNCH DoWL ROAD 0 Mo R RISToW N, N. J. 07900 e 5 39 - 6111 October 9, 1972 Mr. Der Jd J. Skovbolt i

Assistant Director for Operating Reactors

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Directorate of Licensing

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SUBJECT:

OYSTER CREEK UUCLEAR GENERATING STATION DOCKET 50-219 FLOODINC OF CRITICAL EQUIPMENT To recordaneo uim ~ ~ 1atter of Aunurt 3. 1972. the Oveter Creek Nuclear Generating Station has been reviewed to determine (1) whether failure of any equipment which does not meet the criteria of Class I seismic construe-tion, particularly the circulating water system, could cause flooding suf ficient to adversely af fect the performance of engineered safety systems, and (2) whether failure of any equipment could cause flooding such that common mode failure of redundant safety related equipment would result. The purpose of this letter is to report the results of that review.

Rupture of and subsequent flooding from the circulating water system would be annunciated and alarmed in the control room and the circulating water pumps could be secured and the condenser isolation valves could be shut. These valves do isolate the system expansion joints from both the inlet and discharge canal water sources. Even if a rupture were non-1solabic (i.e., a pipe rupture not within the confines of the condenser isolation valves) flooding through the f L, inlet piping is impossible once the pumps are secured because of the elevation of the piping.

Dackflooding through the circulating water discharge piping is possible but or.ly to the level of the discharge canal. Normal high water level a

d in the canal is l'6" MSL which is two feet below the lowest elevation in the I//

turbine building (3'6" level) where engineered safeguards equipment is located.

p Th e re fo re, performance of engineered safeguards systems would not be adversely bg affected by any rupture of the circulating water system.

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All other fluid systems in the plant which do not meet seismic Class I requirements have been reviewed to determine the potential for flooding and subsequcut deterioration of engineered safeguard system performance.

The rire Protection System is the only system with sufficient flow rate to ecuse flooding l

near engineered sa feguards systeas (in this case, vital power supplies) but the h',#")556

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-x Mr. Donald.I.

Skovholt October 9, 1972 Assistant Director for Operating Projects room in which this switchgear and piping are located has sufficient drainage through pipe chases to preclude flooding that could affect more than one of the redundant vital supplies.

Therefore, the review of fluid systems at the Oyster Creek Station did

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not uncover any situation in which a rupture would cause flooding which would l

adversely affect the performance of engineered safeguards systems to a point at which they would be unable to perform their Antended function.

We are enclosing forty copies of this letter.

Very truly yours, t?l ll;.'t:

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Ivan R. Finfrock, Jr.

Vice President uw Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director cc:

Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region 1 L