ML20084E115

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RO 50-219/75-18:on 750623,two 8-1/2 Inch Handhole Covers in Standby Gas Treatment Filter Train Not in Place.Cause Unknown.Handhole Covers Repositioned & Secured
ML20084E115
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 07/01/1975
From: Ross D
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Anthony Giambusso
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RO-50-219-75-18, NUDOCS 8304140112
Download: ML20084E115 (3)


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Jersey Central Power & Light Company b',

MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD e MORRISTOWN, N. J.07%0

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[f".i'* punne utaii.es corporation Generai July 1, 1975 o

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h dlJ{ty Mr. A. Giambusso Director, Division of Reactor Licensing 975 x Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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9 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 0, 3.f '

Washington, D. C. 20555

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Dear Mr. Giambusso:

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Subject:

Oyster Creek Station bri nna be cc Report No. 50-219/75-18 rr The purpose of this letter is to forward to you the attached abnormal occurrence report in compliance with paragraph 6.6.2.a of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours, Mu" -

Donald A..Ross, Manager Generating Stations-Nuclear cs Enclosures cc:

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region 1

.L o k nLW pp 8304140112 750701

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I-PDR ADOCK 05000219 S

PDR Cf)PY bENf REGION 2

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i-c Jersey Central Power & Light Company j

MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD e MORRISTOWN, N.J.07960

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Forked River, New Jersey 08731 i

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Abnormal Occurrence i

Report No. 50-219/75-18 I

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Report Date 1

July 1, 1975 5

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Occurrence Date i

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l June 23, 1975 i

Identification of Occurrence i

Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.B.2, when it was 1

discovered that two (2) handhole covers in the 1-1 Standby Gas Treatment j

System filter train were not in place. This event is considered to be an i

abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph j

1.15.B.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence i

The plant was at steady state power with the following major parameters:

i Power:

Rx Thermal, 1635 MWt 4

Electric, 532 MWe 6

l Flow:

Recirculation, 51 x 10 lb/hr 6

i Feedwater, 6 x 10 lb/hr l

Stack Gas: 9,300 pei/sec l

Description of Occurrence j

On Monday, June 23, 1975, at 2000, it was discovered that two (2) eight and one half inch (8-1/2") handhole covers in the Standby Gas Treatment filter train were not in place. The handhole covers were found inside the exhaust j

j duct, one located upstream of the first absolute filter and one located downstream of the second absolute filter. The handhole covers were immediately repositioned and secured in place.

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e Alnormal Occurrence lleport No. 50-219/75-18 Page 2 Apparent Cause of Occurrence The cause of the occurrence could not be determined. The handhole cover latches were inspected and found to operate satisfactorily.

Following discussions with the Instrument Department, it was determined that the hand-hole covers were reinstalled after the last ilEPA filter test prior to the refueling outage and a satisfactory reactor building leak rate test was conducted.

Analysis of Occurrence The Standhy Gas Treatment System filters and exhausts the reactor building atmosphere to the stack during secondary containment isolation conditions, thereby minimizing the release of radioactive materials from the reactor building to the environs. The open handhole covers reduced the ability of the system to perform this function since Standby Gas Treatment System filter train 1-1 was selected for operation at the time of the occurrence.

If Standby Gas Treatment System filter train 1-2 had been selected for operation, it would have performed its intended function.

Corrective Action I

The handhole covers were repositioned and secured.

During the investigation of the cause of the event, it was found that a formal procedure was not used for the lil!PA filter testing which was completed before the refueling outage.

A procedure for this testing has been generated and is in the process of approval.

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