ML20084C718

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Part 21 Rept Re Matl Defects Discovered During 820819 Receipt Insp of Four Crane Co 10-inch Gate Valve Replacement Discs.Delivery of Subj Items Refused & Items Returned to Vendor.Evaluation Encl
ML20084C718
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  
Issue date: 04/13/1984
From: Gucwa L
GEORGIA POWER CO.
To: Deyoung R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
References
REF-PT21-84-221-000 NED-84-189, PT21-84-221, PT21-84-221-000, NUDOCS 8404300185
Download: ML20084C718 (3)


Text

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' Georgia Power Company 333 Piedrnont Avenue Atlan'a. Geo g'a 30308

- Telephone 404 526-6526

.,k MJuhng Address

.4 3

.' Pest Off.ce Box 4545 Planta, ceorg<a 30302 t

i Georgia Power L T. Gucwa t% southern ciectre system Manager Nuclear Engineenng and chief Nuclear Engrneer NED-84-189 April 13,1984 a

4 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Consission

REFERENCE:

c' 1

Office of Inspection and Enforcement Wash.: RCD Washington, D. C.

20555 50-321, 50-366 Crane Valve Disc Defect

' ATTENTION: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung i-GBGLEMEN:

On August 19, 1982, while performing an initial receipt inspection at Plant Hatch on four Crane Company 10-inch gate valve replacement discs, several material defects were discovered.

In

addition, several discrepancies 'were identified in the documentation which accompanied this shipment.

Consequently, Georgia Power Company (GPC) refused to take delivery of these items and all four were returned to the vendor (Crane Company).

Crane allegedly attempted to ~ repair -the defective discs and reshipped them to Plant Hatch. These allegedly repaired parts were rejected again by the subsequent receipt inspection performed by the GPC on February I'

.10, 1983,- and were again returned to Crane.

GPC conducted an evaluation to determine if these defects were

- reportable under 10 CFR 21.

An " Evaluation of a Substantial Safety Hazard" is enclosed with this submittal.

It was determined that had the defective discs been installed in their intended locations at Plant Hatch, they could have - created a substantial safety hazard.

However, since the deficiencies were discovered durirs the receipt inspections and the valve discs were.then returned promptly to the vendor, " delivery" did not occur per NUREG 0302.

'Iherefore, NRC notification. by GPC under the requirements of 10 CFR 21 is not : required.

GPC informed the vendor of these determinations, in a letter dated March-10, 1983, ard recommended.that. Crane notify the NRC of these defects._ On

- March 23,1984, Crane informed GPC that they did not consider the defects to be a potential substantial safety hazarti, and that they would not: be-notifying the NRC. GPC has therefore decided to report these events so that-other NRC licensees might be informed'of these problems, as appropriate.

[

-Sincerely yours,

/47 C'4 L. T. Gucwa

..o g

! Enclosure xc: -J.

P. O'Reilly' j

H. C. Nix, Jr.-

1P. : D. RiC' 8404300185 840413

,c PDR ADOCK 05000321 s

PDR

EVALUATION OF A SUBSTANTIAL SAFETY HAZARD DEFECTIVE CRANE GATE VALVE DISCS April 13,1984

Background:

On August 19, 1982, the Quality Control (QC) Department at Plant Hatch issued a Nonconformance Report (82-118) regarding material defects in a shipment of 10" gate valve discs from the Crane Company.

These defects were discovered during an initial receipt inspection.

Georgia Power Company (GPC) had ordered these four (4) replacement valve discs f rom Crane.

Upon their arrival at Plant Hatch they were inspected by site QC.

Visual inspection, per plant procedure HNP-822, revealed unacceptable cracking in the stellite surface on the seat area of two of these discs.

In addition, there were three discrepancies noted in the documentation package supplied by the vendor.

All four discs were returned to the vendor for repair or replacement, along with a letter requesting that the documentation discrepancies be corrected.

Repairs and corrections were allegedly effected by Crane and these four discs were reshipped to Plant Hatch where they were again subjected to a visual receipt inspection.

This inspection rejected the valves for cracking similar to that found during the first inspection.

Engineering Evaluation:

These valves were ordered as replacements and were intended for use in two specific gate valves on each unit.

One such disc is used in the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) inboard steamline isolation valve inside the drywell and one is used in the outboard HPCI steamline isolation valve.

The valve discs had stellite hard surfacing in the seating area.

Hard surfacing is used to prevent the steam flow from cutting into the base metal and wearing away the seat.

The hard surfacing contained cracks on two of the four valve discs.

Several of these cracks had penetrated the surfacing and had extended into the base metal of the disc.

With these discs installed, steam would follow these cracks and, over a period of time, cut channels into the disc seat area.

As seating surfaces become worn, the valve could not seal properly upon closure. This would allow steam to escape around the disc.

If both HPCI steamline isolation valves were to seal improperly in conjuction with a downstream pipe break, then this could constitute an unanalyzed and uncontrollable pathway for a loss of coolant accident outside of the primary containment.

Evaluation of Breakdown in Quality Program:

The condition in which these four discs arrived at GPC represents a disregard of quality control.

Crane's internal welding procedure states, "No cracks, lack of fusion, or any other linear defects will be allowed in the deposit or base metal." Also, ASME hard surfacing specifications for safety classes 1, 2, and 3 state that any linear indications greater than 1/16 inch long are unacceptable.

Two of-these discs had cracks significantly lorger than 1/16 inch. One disc had four cracks that involved the base metal, with one of these cracks extending across the full width of the seat area.

y Evaluation of a Substantial Safety Hazard April 13,1984 Page Two During the course of the first receipt inspection, three discrepancies were noted in the documentation package which accompanied the shipment.

While these discrepancies appear to be more typographical and bookkeeping-related than anything else, they do indicate that perhaps enough care was not taken in certifying the acceptability of these parts for service in a nuclear plant.

==

Conclusions:==

The stellite cracking and the documentation deficiencies associated with the four gate valve discs were discovered during receipt inspections at Plant Hatch.

However, the defects were of such magnitude that they should have been discovered before they were shipped by the Crane Company.

If two of the defective discs had been installed in the HPCI steamline isolation valves, steam flow would have eroded the cracked seats over a period of time.

Following the postulated occurrence of a HPCI steamline bmak outside the drywell, these two valves would have been called upon to close.

With defective seats, the valves might have been unable to seal properly, thus allowing high pmssum steam from the mactor to leak out of the break.

This scenario would constitute "a deficiency which seriously compromised the ability of a confinement system to perfom its designated function."

According to NUREG-0302, Rev.

1, this would be considered a

" major mduction in the degree of -protection provided to public health and safety," and would therefore be defined as a substantial safety hazard and should be reported _ by GPC or the vendor.

But since these parts were rejected and returned to Crane upon completion of the receipt inspection, delivery did not occur (per NUREG-0302, Section 21.3(d),. question 1), and, therefon, no notification of the NRC by the licensee is required. - This situation does require that the vendor evaluate the deviation and report this issue to the NRC if similar components with similar defects had been delivered to any other facilities subject to the mquirements of 10 CFR 21.

GPC has fulfilled its obligations as an NRC licensee with regard to this issue by promptly rejecting the defective components and returning them to

~

Crane with a mport on the deficiencies found.

However, GPC is reporting the problem to the NRC, since the vendor has declined. to do so, so that other nuclear plant operators can be appropriately informed about these

. defects.