ML20084B646

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Forwards Updated Status of Backup Power Supply Sys to Emergency Operations Facility & Communications Sys & Summary of Sea Breeze Study
ML20084B646
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 01/20/1984
From: Fiedler P
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To: Martin T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20084B637 List:
References
RTR-NUREG-0696, RTR-NUREG-696 NUDOCS 8404260284
Download: ML20084B646 (5)


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M a ee Nuclear OPU

= = = Nuclear Corpora 388 Forked River,New Jersey 08731-0388 609 971-4000 "1 1/

Writer's Direct Dial Number:

January 20, 1984 /2$4 Mr. %omas T. Martin, Director O

Division of Engineering and Technical Programs U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Sir:

Subject:

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Emergency Preparedness Items Sea Breeze Summary, Backup Power Supply me purpose of this letter is to update you on the status of two Emergency Preparedness items. Attachment one provides you with the summary of our Sea Breeze Study. We complete report including tables and figures is available at your request.

Se second item concerns the backup power supply system to our Emergency Operations Facility and our Emergency Comunications System. We have determined that a backup power supply system is not required to achieve the overall system availability requirements stated in NUREG 0696. Attachment two provides the justification for this decision.

Should you require additional information or have any questions, please contact me or Mr. Michael Laggart at (609)971-4643.

Very truly yours, Petef B. Fiedler Vice President and Director Oyster Creek PBF:BH: dam Enclosures 840426 PDR 49 F

4 840439 05000g3y PDR g GPU Nuclear Corporat.on is a subsidiary of the General Public Utilities Corporation

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1

. Attachment 1

SEA BREEZE SIUDY

, ne purpose of this study was to investigate the sea breeze at Oyster i

Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) and to analyze its effects on gaseous plume transport and diffusion.

h e study focused on answering four questions:

1. How often does the sea breeze occur at OCNGS? I
2. Ent representative is the OCNGS on-site wind direction monitoring during a sea breeze?

i l 3. What are the inplications of the answers to questions (1) and (2) above on gaseous effluent plume transport?

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4. Is a supplementary meteorological monitoring tower needed to further i provide data for predicting sea breeze occurrence and for determining the effect on plant gaseous plume transport.

2 Based on analyses of hourly meteorological data for the five-year period 1977-1981, the results of the study showed that:

1. During the months of May through August, the sea breeze at OCNGS occured one day in four, or an average of about 30 days. On these sea breeze ,

cays, the sea breeze persisted for an average of about 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> with a range of 4 to 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. f

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2. On days when OCNGS had sea breezes, the Atlantic City (National Weatner Service Station) wind direction was within 45' of the OCNGS Wind cirection over one-half tne time. In contrast, the Lakehurst (Naval Air Station) wind direction was within 45* of the OCNGS Wind direction only about one-tnird of tne time.
3. Meteorological conditions conducive to sea breeze fumigation at OCNGS

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occured on 1/3 of the OCNGS sea breeze days, or an average of about 10 days between May and August.

4. Se OCNGS sea breeze seems to have penetrated to 16 km inland and occasionally to 21 km. -AA4-Mgh69 y. -

From these results it can be concluded that:

1. S e sea breeze at OCNGS is a significant local climatological effect._ t
2. Se on-site meteorological monitoring system alone would not be adequate to predict the effect of the sea breeze on gaseous plume transport and diffusion.

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3. In about one of every three sea breeze days, (May through August) sea breeze conditions would bring the radiological effluents in the plume centerline down to the ground.
4. Se usefulness of a supplementary meteorological tower to predict the effects of the sea breeze on gaseous plume transport and diffusion is questionable. Whether such a tower is useful depends on the answers to several questions:

(a) Can the supplementary meteorological tower data be used to predict the inland penetration distance of the sea breeze? Or will the data indicate only where the sea breeze is, and not where it is going?

(b) Can the supplementary meteorological tower data be used to realistically simulate the sea breeze in the Class A model?

4 Se answers to these questions are being investigated. In the interim, a plan will be developed for compensating actions to be taken during sea breeze regimes.

The analysis deceribed in this report required the processing of 900,000 pieces of meteorological data. n e data processing and analysis culminated in the generation of 425 tables and figures, which, in part, consisted of 1590 daily time series plots of meteorological parameters.

All tables, figures and tine series plots were included in this report.

n e report is available upon request.

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Attachment 2 BACKUP POWER SUPPLY TO OYSTER CREEK EOF TELEPHONE SYSTEM 2 e unavailability of the power supply to the ERF system is 6.54 x 10-4 This unavailability meets the requirement of NRC-NUREG-0696 which states that "the Emergency Response Facilities EOF shall be designed to achieve an unavailability goal of 0.01 during all plant operating conditions above cold shutdown".

To analyze this unavailability, the fault tree logic of Figure 1 was enployed. S e top event of this logic is " power supply to emergency response phone system is unavailable". Bere are three ways in which this event can occur:

1. Ims of offsite power (230 lines). S e unavailability for this event is 3 x 10-5 W e probability of losing the 34.5 KV given the simultaneous loss of the 230 KV circuits is close to 1. Ris means that the unavailability of 34.5 KV = unavailability of 230 KV =

3 x 10-5,

2. We event " power distribution from Q-121 to emergency phone system, building #12 is unavailable" = 5.35 x 10-4 m is event considers the unavailabilities of the conponents shown on Figure 2. Wese conponents are transformers and circuit breakers.
3. We event "Line Q-121 is unavailable" = 8.93 x 10-5, m e evaluation of the unavailability is based on the computer output of JCP&L Listing of Selected Disturbances. his output reported that Line Q-121 was unavailable for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 48 minutes during the time period of 5/81 to 9/83. The unavailability is equal to 108 minutes = 8.93 x 10-5, (28)(30)(24)(60)

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I I i 1 5000 EVA Transf. 1500 EVA. 4160V 480-120/208 - Circuit Breaker Circuit Brenher Penets E. D and Substation #1 Trensformer 6.5 Ev4 Trans. 43 0 V Trans- 4SOV Trans- Subranet Circuit Unevellable PAD-l?98 former Unevell- lets Open il fere Open #2 Breakers 170/208 themallable able Transfer _Onen Cd C1 C2 C 3

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8.77 a 10' I.77 a 10' l.7F u 10' l.01 s 10 1.01 s 10 N) (5.53 s to #)

F1 CURE 2: FAULT TREE IfCIC IVR Tite FOWER Stirl'tY TO DtERCDCY RESIONSE ril0NE STSTEM: FORKED RIVER - BUILDING #12 i e