ML20083L998

Corrected Tech Spec Pp B 3/4 1-1 & B 3/4 2-2 Erroneously Printed in Amend 61 to License DPR-69,authorizing Operation During Cycle 5 at Rated Thermal Power of 2,700 Mwt

ML20083L998
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	01/18/1983
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20083M000	List: ML20083L998
References
NUDOCS 8301310029
Download: ML20083L998 (4)

Text

.

.m....

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that 1) the reactor can be made suberitical from all operating conditions, 2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated' accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and 3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration and RCS T The minimum available SHUTDOWNMARGINfornoloadoperatingconditions$E9beginning of life is 4.5%

t.k/k and at end of life is 5.2% t.k/k. The SHUTDOWN MARGIN is based on the safety analyses performed for a steam line rupture event initiated at no load conditions. The most restrictive steam line rupture event occurs at E0C conditions.

For the steam line rupture event at beginning of cycle conditions, a minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN of less than 4.5% Ak/k is required to control the j

reactivity transient, and end of cycle conditions require 5.2% ak/k. Accordingly, theSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementisbaseduponthislimitingconditfonandis i

200 F, the consistent with FSAR safety analysis assumptions. With T reactivity transients resulting from any postulated accid 8M are minimal and a 3% tk/k shutdown margin provides adequate protection. With the pressurizer level less than 90 inchM, the sources of -norr-boratM water are restricted to increase the time to cri,;icality during a boron dilution event.

3/4.1.1.3 BORON DILUTION A minimum flow rate of at least 3000 GPM provides adequate mixing, i

prevents stratification and ensures that reactivity changes will be gradual during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. A flow rate of at least 3000 GPM will circulate an equivalent i

Reactor Coolant System volume of 9,601 cubic feet in approximately 24 minutes. The reactivity change rate associated with boron concen-tration reductions will therefore be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

3/4.1.1.4 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (MTC)

The limitations on MTC are provided to ensure.tfiat the assumptions used in the accident and transient analyses remain valid through each i

fuel cycle. The surveillance requirements for measurement of the MTC J

during each fuel cycle are adequate to confirm the MTC value since this I

lcoefficientchangesslowlydueprincipallytothereductioninRCSboron

! concentration associated with fuel burnup. The confirmation that the measured MTC value is within its limit provides assurances that the 3

{

coefficient will be maintained within acceptable values throughout each fuel cycle.

3 B 3/4 1-1 Amendment No. IS, 3Z,61 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 8301310029 830118 PDR ADOCK 05000318

-E p

PDR

.-m y,

'~

L.

. n....nb ^ r s.

.~h*,

. Lu

,s__.n. _..... ;e _ _...a.e s.

1 1

lt REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS f

BASES 3 /4.1.1. 5 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will' not be made -

crifical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 515 F.

This limitation is required to ensure 1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, 2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and 4) the reactor pres:ure vessel is above its minimum RT temperature.

NDT 3 /4.1. 2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS The baron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include 1) borated water sources, 2) charging pumps, 3) separate flow paths, 4) boric acid pumps, 5) associated heat tracing systems, and 6) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 200 F, a minimum of two separate and redundant boron injection systems are provided to ensure single functional capability in the event sn assumeMailure renders one of the systems inoperable. Allowable out-of-service periods ensure that minor component repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period.

The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from all gperating conditions of 3.0% ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200 F.

The maximum boration capability requirement occurs at EOL from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires 6500 gallons of 7.25% boric acid solution from the boric acid tanks or 55,627 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water

, tank. However, to be consistent with the ECCS requirements, the RWT is l

required to have a minimum contained volume of 400,000 gallons during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

The maximum boron concentration of the refueling water tank shall be limited to 2700 ppm and the maximum boron concentra-tion of the boric acid storage tanks shall be limited to 8% to preclude the possibility of boron precipitation in the core during long term ECCS cooling.

With the RCS temperature below 200 F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of th.e stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restric-tions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

4 j

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/41-2 Amendment No. 31 l*

I r

i i.._.._ _. _

_ ~. _ _. _ _. _ _

~ ---

... =.

o

\\

i 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES 3/4.2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE

~

The limitation on linear heat rate ensures that in the event of a LOCA, the peak temperature of the fuel cladding will not exceed 2200'F.

Either of the two core power distribution monitoring systems, the Excere Detector Monitoring System and the Incore Detector Monitoring System, provide adequate monitoring of the core power distribution and are capable of verifying that the linear heat rate does not exceed its limits.

The Excore Detector Monitoring System performs this function by continu-ously monitoring the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX with the OPERABLE quadrant symmetric excore neutron flux detectors and verifying that the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX is maintained within the allowable limits of Figure 3.2-2.

In conjunction with the use of the excore monitoring system and in establishing the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX limits, the following assumptions are made: 1) the CEA insertion limits of Specifications 3.1.3.5 and 3.1.3.6 are satisfied, 2).

the flux peaking augmentation factors are as shown in Figure 4.2-1, 31 the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT r estrictions of Specification 3.2.4 are satisfied, and

4) the TOTAL PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR does not exceed the limits of Specification 3.2.2.

The Incore Detector Monitoring System continuously provides a direct measure of the peaking factors and the alarms which have been established for the individual incore detector segments ensure that the peak linear lt heat rates will be maintained within the allowable limits of Figure 3.2-1.

The setpoints for these alarms include allowances, set in the conservative r

directions, for 1) flux peaking augmentation factors as shown in Figure 4.2-1, 2) a measurement-calculational uncertainty factor of 1.070, 3) an l

engineering uncertainty factor of 1.03, 4) an allowance of 1.01 for axial fuel densification and themal expansion, and 5) a THERMAL POWER measurement uncertainty factor of 1.02.

I Ll' 3/4.2.2, 3/4.2.3 and 3/4.2.4 TOTAL PLANAR AND INTEGRATED RADIAL PEAXING FACTORS-FhANDF T AND AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - T r

q l

T

'l The limitations on F and T are provided to ensure that the assump-7 tions used in the analysis for es@ablishing the Linear Heat Rate and Local

i Power Density - High LCOs and LSSS setpoints remain valid during operation

'l ay the various allowable CEA group insertion limits. The limitatio'ns on

and T are provided to ensure that the assumptions used in r

q i

j t

i!

B 3/4 2-1

[

ALVERT CLIFFS - U.';IT 2

.uc.1dment..o.

78, 24 ap k

... -. ~

J.

x. -.w a w _... w..

1

\\

l '

~

k POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES the analysis establishing the DNB Margin LCO, and Thermal Margin / Low Pressure LSSS setpoints remain valid duringToperation at the various allowable CEA group insertion limits.

If F F' or T exceed their basic limitations, operation may continue uENr Ehe ad81tional restric-tions imposed by the ACTION statements since these additional restric-tions provide adequate provisions to assure that the assumptions used in establishing the Linear Heat Rate, Thermal Margin / Low Pressure and Local Power Density - High LCOs and LSSS setpoints remain valid. An AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT > 0.10 is not expected.and if it should occur, sub-sequent operation would be restricted to only those operations required to identify the cause of this unexpected tilt.

j T

JhevalueofT that must be used in the equation F*7 = F*Y (1 + T )

9 r (1+T ) is the measured tilt.

and F

=F q

r T

T The surveillance requirements for verifying that F p and T t

Tq aye within their limits provide assurance that the actual vMues f7 p

T and T do not exceed the assumed values. Verifying F and F afNr y each 9uel loading prior to exceeding 75% of. RATED THEMAL POWER provides additional assurance that the core was properly loaded.

\\

3/4.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS t

The limits on the DNB related parameters assure that each of the parameters are maintained within the nomal steady state envelope of operation assumed in the transient and accident analyses. The limits are consistent with the safety analyses assumptions and have been analytically demonstrated adequate to maintain a minimum DNBR of 1.23 throughout each l

analyzed transient.

l The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> periodic surveillance of these parameters through instru-ment readout is sufficient to ensur.e that the parameters are restored within their limits following load changes and other expected transient i

operation. The 18 month periodic measurement of the RCS total flow rate is adequate to detect flow degradation and ensure correlation of the flow indication channels with measured flow such that the indicated percent flow will provide sufficient verification of flow rate on a i

12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> basis.

i j

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 2-2 Amendment No. 18, 3I, 38,61

~,----...m

,e,-.