ML20083E383

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 70 to License NPF-38
ML20083E383
Person / Time
Site: Waterford 
Issue date: 09/16/1991
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20083E378 List:
References
NUDOCS 9110020339
Download: ML20083E383 (3)


Text

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UNITED STATES I

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AM,ENDPENT NO. 70 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-38 ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 DOCKET NO. 50-382 l

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated November 9, 1990, and March 5, 1991, Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, Technical Specifications (TS).

The reauested changes would delete the reference to the movable incore detector system (MICDS) and remove requirements for the associated containment penet ration conductor over current protection devices.

The fixed incore detector system will remain and the containment penetrations will continue to be protected for over-current when in use.

2.0 EVALUATION Neutron flux data is necessary for reactor control and incore detectors are required to obtain this data.

At Waterford, the incore detector system consists of the Movable Incore Detector System (MICDS) and the Fixed Incore Detector System (FICDS).

However, the Technical Specifications allow either of these systems to meet the requirements for incore flux mapping and the MICOS has proven to be unreliable.

The licensee has removed the MICDS, closed the remaining penetration tubes for the system, and has removed part of the control cables and fuses.

This latter action on control cables is to protect the containment penetration against overcurrent accidents.

The proposed license amendment is to remove reference to the MICDS and delete the requirement to test the associated over-c.urrent protective device on the containment penetration.

The MICDS at Waterford developed hardware problems early in plant life and reactor system leakage during late 1989 and early 1990.

The licensee determined that the benefits of having two independent systems to perform flux mapping was outweighed by the repairs to the hardware and the potential for recurring leakage from the reactor coolant system.

The movable incore detectors were removed in January 1990, and the MICDS tubes were pressure capped as a temporary alteration.

During the outage in 1991, the temporary alteration was made permanent and the leakage paths were isolated.

Since the FICDS is capable of meeting the requirements for flux mapping and the Technical Specifications are satisfied by either system, removal of the MICDS is acceptable.

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alteration to remove the software control >, remove a section of each guide tube and cap each calibration tube to eliminate potential leakage paths is acceptable.

With removal of the MICDS, the licensee also requested the deletion of the requirement te periodically test the associated over-current protective device on the cables to the MICDS.

The licensee has removed a section of the cables to the drive machines inside containment to prevent the inadvertent reconnection and has removed the fuses outside containment at the power source.

The licensee has also disconnected the cables at the power source outside containment, coiled the cables, labeled them as " spare", and secured them in the Motor Control Center cable tray.

This will eliminate any source of current on the cables and supports the licensees request to delete the overcurrent protection device tests for these cables in this penetration.

The e licensee will use plant configuration control (i.e., the design change process) to control and ensure that any modification to the cable penetrations will include overcurrent devices and testing of the devices.

Any permanent use of these cables in the penetration will require a license amendment to restore the overcurrent protection device testing to the Technical Specifications.

The actions by the licensee and any that may be required for permanent use of the cables in the containment penetration are acceptable for removal of the overcurrent protective device testing at this time.

On the basis of the licensee's actions and the above evaluation the proposed license amendment and changes tc the Technical Specifications are acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Ccmmission's regulations, the Louisiana State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment.

The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CON 51); RATION l

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillance requirements.

The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, ar" no l

significant change in the types, of any ef fluents that may be released of f site, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative l

occupational radiation exposure.

The Commission has previously issued a pro-l posed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration l

and there has been no public commt. on such finding (56 FR 27044).

i Accordingly, the amendment meets tne eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9),

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no l

environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in l

connection with the issuance of the amendment.

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,, 5.0 CONCLU$10N The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed raanner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with tht-Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contribu'or:

D. Wigginton c

Date: September 16, 1991

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