ML20083D006

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Proposed Tech Spec 2.10.2 Re Reactivity Control Sys & Core Physics Parameter Limits
ML20083D006
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 09/20/1991
From:
OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML20083C989 List:
References
NUDOCS 9109300025
Download: ML20083D006 (13)


Text

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2.0 1.lMITING CONill110NS FOlt OPliRAll0N 2.10 Reactor Core (Continued) 2.10.2 Reactivity Control Syllems and Corellty11cs l'arameters 1,imill (Continued)

(5) Een-trippable CIIA Position During PowcLOpcmtion All nan-trippable CilA's (NTCIIA) shall be withdrawn to at least i14 inches (actual position). If one or more NTCllA's becomes misaligned from other NTCl!A's by more than 12 inches (actual position) cither:

a, ltestore the NTCllA to within the specified alignment requirements within one hour, or b.

lie in at least hot shutdown within an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

(6)

Shutdown GA_InscIlliHLijmit Dttting Power _OperaliDD All shutdown CliA's shall be withdrawn io at lea:.t 114 inches as a condition for reactor criticality, or with one or more shutdown CilA's inserted to more than 114 inches withdrawn, except for surveillance testing, within one hour, either:

a.

Witharaw the CIIA's to at least 114 inches, or b.

Declare the ClIA's inopeiable and apply Specification 7.10.2(4).

(7) Regulating CIIA lasertion LirDits During20t Standby and Power OpcIation The regulating Cl!A groups shall be limited to the insertion sequence and to the insertion limits shown on Figure 2-4 cxcept during CIIA exercises above 114 inches. With all CliA's operable, CliA insertion beyond the Long Term insertion Limits are restricted to:

1.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> interval, 2.

4 I!FPD per 30 liFPD interval, and 3.

1411FPD per fucLcJde calendar-year, a.

When the regulating CliA groups are inserted beyond the Transient Insertion Limits, within two hours, either:

(i)

Itestore the regulating CliA groups to above the Transient insertion Limits, or (ii)

Iteduce reactor power to the allowed power of Figure 2-4 which permits continued operation above the Transient insertion Limit using the existing CliA group position.

2-50c Amendment No. 32,109

4 2.0 LIM 111NG_CONDlIlONS_EO R_Ol'E RNH ON 2.10 Reacl0LCele (Continued) 2.10.2 RfRC.llYily_COnliedyllCmunid_Cu1ClhyliCdniMutitufunits (Continued) b.

When the regulating Cl!A groups are inserted beyond the Long Term insertion Limit for a time interval in excess of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> interval, operation may Inoceed deleting this daily restriction, provided either:

(i) llegulating Cl!A groups are not inserted below the Short Term insertion 1.imit, or (ii) llegulating Ci!A groups are not inserted below the Transient Ins:rtion Limit and rates of power increases initiated when the regulating Cl!A's are inserted below the Short Term Insertion Limit are less than 5%/ hour.

c.

When the regulating CliA groups are inserted below the long Term Insertion Limit for thne intervals in excess of 4 !!FPD per 30 liFPD interval and 14 I!Fl'D pei fueLrysic calendar-year, either:

(i)

'Itestore the regulating groups to within the long Term Ins:rtion Limit within two hours, or (ii) lie in hot shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

(8) CI!A Dren Tilne The individual full length (shutdown and regulating) Cl!A drop time, from a fully withdrawn position, shall bc.52.5 seconds from the time the clutch coil is de-energized until the CllA reaches its 90 percent insertion position with:

a.'

T

.>_515'F, and b.

All reactor coolant pumps operating.

With the drop time of any full length CliA determined to exceed the above limit, restore the CIIA drop time to within the above limit prior to proceeding to hot standby or power operation.

(9) InLilicauplien a.

CliA Insertion Limits and Misalignment (i)

The i1sertion limits of Specification 2.10.2 may be suspended during the performance of physics tests provided:

2-50d Amendment No. 32

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPElWUDE 2.10 Reactor Core (Continued) 2.10.2 Reactivity ContreLSy3tems.and_ Core Physics Parameteri. Limits (Continued) 1.

The power is restricted to the test power plateau which shall not exceed (85%) of rated power, and 2.

The power shall be determined at least once per hour during physics tests.

3.

The linear heat rate shall be determined to be within the limits of Specincation 2.10.4(1) by monitoring it continuously with the incore Detector Monitoring System during physics tests above 5% of rated power.

(ii)

The alignment requirements of Specincation 2,10.2(4) and insertion limits of Specification 2.10.2(7) may be suspended during the performance of physics tests to determine the isothermal temperature coefficient and power coef0cient provided:

1.

Only the center Cl!A (CEA 4-1) is misaligned, and 2.

The acar heat rate shall be determined to be within the lim. 4 of Speci0 cation 2.10.4(1) by monitoring it continuously with the incore Detector Monitoring System during physics test t4bove 5% of rated power.

(iii)

With any of the limits of Speci0 cation 2.10.4(1) being exceeded while the requirements of Specification 2.10.2(4), (5), (6), and (7) are suspended, either:

1.

Reduce power suf0ciently to satisfy the requirements of Specincation 2.10.4(1), or 2.

Ile in hot shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, b.

Shutdown Margin (i)

The shutdown margin required by -2,10.2(1) may be reduced during physics testing at power levels less than 104% of rated power in-the-following-casest for measurement of CliA worth and shutdown margin provided reactivity _cquivalent to at least the highest estimated CIM worth is available for trip insertion from operable CEAfst i

2-50e Amendment No. 32 l

2.0 14MITJKG10NDlHOESlOILOJ!EIMllDN 2.10 IkacleIZute (Continued) 2.10.2 IkacliyitylentiplSyhtenisluid_ Cole _l'hyAlcihtatnric13 (Continued) h--- --The total availal>leshutdown margin mnyhe inh >eed to-2 4

  • k/k during the-nasurementof the+hutdownGIA group-reuelivitiesc r o

2.-------The totni nvnilable shutdown nmrgin may-be veduced-to the-worthef the worst stuckGiA's< luring the-measurement of-the+ tuck CHA-renelivilyr-(ii)

If the shutdown margin specified in part (i) above, including.an allowanceleLibeanustacac1helEAletthe_Etuups_withdrawi0 bride._.Aluc}L_hL1ht_fuliylithdlawttimilien, is not available, immediately initiate and continue horation until the requirements of 2.10.2(1) are met.

(iii)

The shutdown margin specified in part (i) above shall be verified every 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> shift.

c.

Moderator Temperature Coefficient (i)

The moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) requirements of 2.10.2(3) may be suspended during physics tests at less than 10'%

of rated power.

(ii)

If power exceeds 10'% of rated power, either:

1.

Reduce Imwer to less than 10'</v of rated power within 15 minutes, or 2.

lie in hot shutdown in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

Basis ShutdOEILhiaIEin A sufficient shutdown margin ensures that (1) the reactor can be made suberitical from all operating conditions, (2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and (3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently suberitical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

Shutdown margin requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS T.,,.

The most restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with T,,, at no load operating temperature, and is associated with a postulated steam line break accident and resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown. In the analysis l

of this accident, a minimum shutdown margin ot 4.0% A k/k is initially adequate to control the reactivity transient. Accordingly, 2-50f Amendment No. 32,43,47,70

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.10 haetor Cors (Continued) 2.10.2 & activity Control Systems and Core Physics Parameters Limits (Continued)

(5)

Non-trippahJr_CEA Position During]myer Ooerauen All non-trippable CEA's (NTLEA) shall be withdrawn to at least 114 inches (actual position). If one or more NTCEA's becomes misaligned from other NTCEA's by more than 12 inches (actual position) either:

a.

Restore the NTCEA to within the specified alignment requirements within one hour, or b.

Be in at least hot shutdown within an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

(6) Shutdown CEA Insertion Limit During Power OEnttiOR All shutdown CEA's shall be withdrawn to at least 114 inches as a condition for reactor criticality, or with one or more shutdown CEA's inserted to more than 114 inches withdrawn, except for surveillance testing, within one hour, either:

a.

Withdraw the CEA's to at least 114 inches, or b.

Declare the CEA's inoperable and apply Specification 2.10.2(4).

(7)

Regulating CEA Insertion Limits During Hot Standby and Power Ooeration The regulating CEA groups shall be limited to the insertion sequence and to the insertion limits shown on Figure 2-4 except during CEA exercises above 114 inches. With all CEA's operable, CEA insertion beyond the Long Term Insertion Limits are restricted to:

1.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> interval, 2.

4 EFPD per 30 EFPD interval, and 3.

14 EFPD per fuel cycle.

l a.

When the regulating CEA groups are inserted beyond the Transient lasertion Limits, within two hours, either:

(i)

Restore the regulating CEA groups to above the Transient insertion Limits, or (ii)

Reduce reactor power to the allowed power of Figure 2-4 which permits continued operation above the Transient Insertion Limit using the existing CEA group position.

2-50c Amendment No. 32,109

2.0 LIAllllNG CONDD10NS FDILOPERKl10N 2.10 Reactor Core (Continued) 2.10.2 ReattiYity_Cun!IulSystems and cure _l'hynicilaranittetLLintils (Continued) b.

When the regulating Cl?.A groups are inserted beyond the long Term Insertion 1.imit for a time interval in excess of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 1

interval, operation may proceed deleting this daily restriction, provided either:

(i) llegulating Cl!A groups are not inserted below the Short Term insertion Limit, or (ii) llegulating CIIA groups are not inserted below the Transient insertion Limit and rates of power increases initiated when the regulating Cl!A's are inserted below the Short Term insertion 1.imit are less than 5%/ hour.

c.

When the regulating CliA groups are...serted below the 1.ong Term insertion Limit for time intervals in excess of 4 lil:PD per 30 liFPD interval and 14 liFI'D per fuel cycle, either:

l (i)

Itestore the regulating groups to within the long Term insertion 1.imit within two hours, or (ii) lle in hot shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

(8)

CJ!A Drop Titne The individual full length (shutdown and regulating) Ci!A drop time, from a fully withdrawn position, shall be _<_2.5 seconds from the time the clutch coil is de-energized until the CilA reaches its 90 percent insertion position with:

a.

T.a _>_515"F, and o

b.

All reactor coolant pumps operating.

With th' drop time of any full length CliA determined to exceed the above limit, restore the CIIA drop time to within the above limit prior to proceeding to hot standby or power operation.

(9) Test lisnuntion a.

CilA Insertion 1.imits and Misalignment (i)

The insertion limits of Specification 2.10.2 may be suspended during the performance of physics tests provided:

2-50d Amendment No. 32 l

l i

2.0 1.IMITING CONDITIONS FOlt OPERATION 2.10 Reactor Core (Continued) 2.10.2 1(cactivity Control Systems and Core Physics Parmnciers 1imits (Continued) 1.

The power is restricted to the test power plateau which shall not exceed (85%) of rated power, and 2.

The power shall be determined at least once per hour during physics tests.

3.

The linear heat rate shall be determined to be within the limits of Specification 2.10.4(1) by monitoring it continuously with the incore Detector Monitoring System during physics tests above 5% of rated power.

(ii)

The alignment requirements of SpeciGcation 2.10.2(4) and insertion limits of Specification 2.10.2(7) may be suspended during the performance of physics tests to determine the isothermal temperature coefGeient and power coefGeient provided:

1.

Only the center CEA (CEA 4-1) is misaligned, and 2.

The linear heat rate shall be determined to be within the limits of Specification 2.10.4(1) by monitorin, it continuously with the incore Detector Monitoring System during physics test above 5% of rated power.

(iii)

With any of the limits of Specification 2.10.4(1) being exceeded while the requirements of SpeciGcation 2.10.2(4), (5), (6), and (7) are suspended, either:

1.

iteduce power sufficiently to satisfy the requirements of Specification 2.10.4(1), or 2.

Be in hot shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, b.

Shutdown Margin (i)

The shutdown margin required by 2.10.2(1) may oc reduced during physics testing at power levels less than 10% of rated power for measurement of CEA worth and shutdown margin provided reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated CEA worth is available for trip insertion from operable CEA(s).

2-50e Amendment No. 32

l 2.0 LibilTING CONDITIONS F0lt OPlilM110N i

2.10 hattor Ct.re (Continued) 2.10.2 hactivity ControLSnlents and Core Physics Paramelers (Continued)

(ii)

If the shutdown margin specified in part (i) above, including an allowance for the most reactive CEA (of the groups withdrawn) being stuck in the fully withdrawn position, is not available, immediately initiate and continue boration until the requirements of 2.10.2(1) are met.

(iii)

The shutdown margin specified in part (i) above shall be verified every 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> shift.

c.

Moderator Temperature Coefficient (i)

The moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) requirements of 2.10.2(3) may be suspended during physics tests at less than 10'%

of rated power.

8 (ii)

If power exceeds 10 % of rated power, either:

1.

lleduce power to less than 10 % of rated power within 15 minutes, or 2.

11e in hot shutdown in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

Ha5L5 Shutdown Margin A sufficient shutdown margin ensures that (1) the reactor can be made suberitical from all operating conditions, (2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and (3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

Shutdown margin requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration, and ItCS T,s,.

The most restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with T.,, at no load operating temperature, and is associated with a postulated steam line break accident and resulting uncontrolled ItCS cooldown. In the analysis of this accident, a minimum shutdown margin ot 4.0% A k/k is initially adequate to control the reactivity transient. Accordingly, 2-50f Amendment No. 32,43,47,70

I N

ATTACHMENT B 1

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Description of AmendmenLitcQuest for CliA Insertion Duratinni This proposed amendment will change the limitations associated with Regulating CilA insertion limits during hot standby and power operation for Technical Specincation 2.10.2(7) and 2.10.2(7)c. from "14 IIFpD per calendar year" to "14 liFPD per fuel cycle." The proposed change is conservative with respect to limits on control rod msertien times and consistent with OPFD's operation with minimired rod insertion times. The existing specification originated in a timeframe in which Fort Calhoun Station operated on annual fuel cycles.

With the implementation of 18 month fuel cycles, it is appropriat: to revise Specification 2.10.2.(7) and 2.10.2(7)c. to reference " fuel cycle" rather than " calendar year."

llasis for No Signincant lla7ards DeltuninaliDB The proposed amendment does not involve a signi0 cant harards consideration because the operation of Fort Calhoun Station in accordance with this amendment would not:

(1)

Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed amendment changes the CliA long term insertion limits in the third (or longest time interval) category from "14 liFPD per calendar year" to "14 liFPD per fuel cycle." Since a fuel cycle is greater than a calendar year, the prolmsed changes-are more conservative. livaluation of the impact of CIIA insertions on the fuel resicting in the core for a given fuel cycle is also more appropriate than evaluating the insertions on a calendar year basis, which may impact two fuel cycles.

(2)

Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident. It has been determined that a new or different type of accident is not created because no new or different modes of operation result from this change.

(3)

Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The Cl!A insertion duration limits proposed by this change are more conservative than the current Technical Speci0 cations. Therefore, the margin of safety remains unchanged.

Ilased on the above considerations, it is OPPD's position that this proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideratien as denned by 10 CFR 50.92.

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Docrip110!L91AtnendutenLRequcLfulfihuldQWILMargUU This proposed amendment nulifies Technical Specification 2.10.2(9)b(i) to achieve consistency with the Cli Standard Technical Specifications (STS) as contained in NUld!G 0212, Itevision l

2. S;rcifically, the change defines exceptions to Technical Specification 2.10.2(1) for shutdown ma* gin requirements during physics testing for determining CliA worth and shutdown margin i

at less that 10'% of rated power. Specifications 2.10.2(9)h(i)! and 2.10.2(9)b(i)2 are deleted because the changes to specification 2.10.2(9)b(i) encompass and supercede these specifications.

Techn; cal Specification 2.10.2(9)b(ii)is modified to provide clarification that the most reactive CilA (of the gmups withdrawn) should be assumed to be stuck when verifying the available scram Worth.

The proposed revision to Technical Specification 2.10.2(9)b(i) adds wording to achieve consistency with the Standard Technical Specification 3/4.10.1. The objective of the proposed change is to permit full measurement of the sequential Cl!A Itegulating Group worth. The current Technical Specifications do not allow this complete measurement to be performed because the Specification 2.10.2(!) required shutdown margin of 4.0%6k/k (including an allowance for the most limiting stuck CliA) is lost during approximately the last half of llegulating Group 1 insertion (with Groups 4, 3, and 2 already fully inserted). The current Specification 2.10.2(9)h(i)l. allows a reduction to 2.0%6k/k provided shutdown group reactivities are being measured, but does not permit deviation from 4.0% 6k/k for total regulating group measurements. The proposed change will allow the shutdown margin to be reduced to the worth of the highest estimated CliA from the operable CliAs. Although these proposed changes allow a less conservative shutdown murgin (during part of Group 1 insertion for sequential CilA llegulating Group measurement) than the existing Technical Specifications, the overall impact remains acceptable because a sufficient shutdown margin (as defined in both the existing Specification 2.10.2.(9)b(i)2 and STS 3/4.10.1)is maintained at all times.

The purpose of the proposed revision to Technical Specification 2.10.2(9)b(ii) is to provide clarification during measurement of Cl!A worths that an allowance for the most reactive CllA (of the groups withdrawn) being stuck should be assumed when calculating shutdown margin.

Technical Specification 2.10.2.(9)b(ii) remains consistent with the STS 3/4.10.1 ACTIONS.

BasiLfpr No SignificanLUazatdLDeltuninatintu The proposed amendment does not involve a signiticant hazards consideration because the operation of Fort Calhoun Station in accordance with this amendment would not:

1)

Involve a significant increase in the probability or conscauences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed changes result in a consistency between the 1: ort Calhoun Station Technical Specifications and the NUld!G-0212 llevision 2 Cl! Standard Technical Specifications for the_ STS 3/4.10.1 exception on required shutdown margin during measurement of CilA worths. Maintaining an available shutdown margin equivalent to at least the highest estimated Cl!A worth during Cl!A worth measurement ensures the reactor can be adequately shut down if the need arises. Thus, th proposed change establishes a consistency with the STS while not significantly deviatu.g from the existing i

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Specincations 2.10.2(9)b(i)1 and 2.10.2(9)b(i)2 and does not increase the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident.

2)

Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. it has been determined that a ne v or different type of accident is not created because no new or difkment modes of operation are proposed for the plant. Maintenance of an adequate available shutdown margin, defined as the reactivity equivalent to the highest estimated CliA worth, prevents the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

3)

Involve a signincant reduction in a margin of safety. The available shutdown margin is allowed to be reduced for CliA measurements which confirm core design and further insure shutdown margin during Mode 1 operations. The brief time period the shutdown margin is reduced is deemed acceptable as con 0rmed by the current allowed reduction for shutdown CIIA worth measurements and also in the Cl! Standard Technical Specifications.

Ilased on the above considerations, it is OPPD's position that this proposed amendment does not involve a signincant haurds consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92.

_