ML20083A390

Corrected Amend 96 to License NPF-30.Amends Replace TS Pages That Did Not Include Overleaf Pages

ML20083A390
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	05/03/1995
From:	NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20083A392	List: ML20083A390 ML20083B900
References
NUDOCS 9505100227
Download: ML20083A390 (7)

Text

,

Reissued by NRC Letter dated:

May 3, 1995 I

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RECIRCULATION FLUID oH CONTROL (RFPC) SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.2 The RFPC System shall be OPERABLE with each of the two storage baskets (one within the confines of each of the two containment recirculation sumps) containing a minimum of 30", but not to exceed 36.8" (uniform depth),

of granular trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP-C).

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 ACTION:

With the RFPC System inoperable, restore the system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HO? STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the RFPC System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.2 The RFPC System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by verifying that:

a.

One TSP-C storage basket is in place in the confines of each containment recirculation sump, and t

b.

Both baskets show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion, and c.

Each basket contains between 30" and 36.8" (uniform depth) of granular TSP-C.

9505100227 950503 PDR ADOCK 05000483 P

PDR CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-14 Amendment No.db&,96

Reissued by NRC Letter dated:

May 3, 1995 I

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES i

B0 RATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

With the RCS temperature below 200*F, one Boration System is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single Boron Injection System becomes inoperable.

i The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be i

OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable in MODES 4, 5, and 6 provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV or an RHR suction relief valve.

The boron capability required below 200*F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1% ok/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 140*F.

This condition requires either 2968 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 14,076 gallons of 2350 ppm borated water from the RWST.

The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a minimum equilibrium sump pH of 7.1 for the solution recirculated within Containment after a LOCA.

This pH level minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and compenents.

The OPERABILITY of one Borr. ion System during REFUELING ensures that this i

system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

i 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLlES i

This specifications of this section ensure that:

(1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is main-tained, and (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated acci-dent analyses are limited. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

Verification that the Digital Rod Position indicator agrees with the demanded position within i 12 steps at 24, 48, 120 and 228 steps withdrawn for the Control Banks and 18, 210 and 228 steps withdrawn for the Shutdown Banks provides assurance that the Digital Rod Position Indicator is operating correctly over the full range of indication.

Since the Digital Rod Position System does not indicate the I

actual shutdown rod position between 18 steps and 210 steps, only points in the indicated ranges are picked for verification of agreement with demanded position.

Shutdown and control rods are positioned at 225 steps or higher for fully withdrawn.

i CALLAWAY - UNIT I B 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. 4G 44,96 7

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

For purposes of detemining compliance with Specification 3.1.3.1 any innovability of a control rod initially invokes ACTION statement 3.1.3.1.a.

Subsequently, ACTION statement 3.1.3.1.a may be exited and ACTION statement 3.1.3.1.d invoked if either the rod control urgent failure slann is illuminated or an electrical problem is detected in the rod control system.

The rod is considered trippable if the rod was demonstrated OPERABLE during.

the last perfonnance of Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.1.2 and met the rod i

drop time criteria of Specification 3.1.3.4 during the last performance of l

Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.4.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that'the original design criteria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of. peaking factors and a restriction in THERMAL POWER. These restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation.

In addition. I those safety analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation.

The power reduction and shutdown time limits given in ACTION statements 3.1.3.2.a.2. 3.1.3.2.b.2, and 3.1.3.2.c.2. respectively, are initiated at the time of discovery that the compensatory actions required for POWER OPERATION can no longer be met.

The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with T greater than or equal to 551*F and with all reactor coolant pumps operatinfEnsures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a Reactor trip at operating conditions.

Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCOs are satisfied.

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-4 Amendment No. 51,61

-.. - ~ -.

.. ~ -

?

1 w,...

.I'_*

s i

i q

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS l

BASES i

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued).

-1 l,

The centrifugal charging pump maximum total pump flow Surveillance-Requirement ensures the maximum injection flow limit of 550 gpm is not i

exceeded.

This value of flow is comprised of.the total: flow to the four branch lines of 469 gpm and a seal injection flow of 79 gpm plus 2 gpm for instrument uncertainties.

The. safety injection pump maximum total pump flow Surveillance Require-

.nent ensures the maximum injection flow limit of 675 gpm is not exceeded.

This value of flow includes a riominal 30 gpm of mini-flow.

Tne test procedure. places requirements on instrument. accuracy.(20 inches of water column for the charging branch lines and 10. inches of water column-i for the safety injection branch lines) and-setting tolerance (30 inches of

{

water column for both the charging and safety injection. branch lines) such that branch line-flow imbalance remains within the assumptions of the safety analyses.

'The maximum and minimum potential pump performance curves, in conjunc-t tion with the maximum and. minimum flow Surveillance Requirements, the maximumi l

l total system resistance, and the test procedure requirements, etnure that the' assumptions of the safety analyses remain valid.

The surveillance flow and differential pressure requirements are the a

Safety Analysis Limits and do not include instrument uncertainties..These-instrument uncertainties will be accounted for in the surveillance test procedure to assure that the Safety Analysis Limits are met.

The Surveillance Requirements for leakage' testing of ECCS' check valves ensure that a failure of one valve will not cause an inter-system LOCA.

The Surveillance Requirement to vent the ECCS pump casings and accessible, j

i.e., can be reached without personnel hazard or.high radiation dose, discharge piping ensures against inoperable: pumps caused by gas binding j

or water hammer in ECCS piping.

3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK J'

The OPERABILITY of the. refueling water storage tank (RWST) as part of'.

.i the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that:

(1) sufficient water is avail-i able within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, i

and (2) the reactor will remain suberitical in the cold condition following j

mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes assuming all the control rods are out of the core.

These assumotions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

.I CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-3 Amendment No.M. 68 -

J

m a

2

-a._m a-4 a

2.

t Revised by NRC Letter dated:

May 3,1995 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES I

REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (Continued) 5 The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical.

characteristics.

l The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a minimum equilibrium sump pH of 7.1 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH level minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

I i

t.

1

~

i I

i t

I I

i CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-4 Amendment No "2,"',96 i

--. i

Reissued by NRC Letter dated:

f I

May 3, 1995 j

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

. The 36-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be closed and blank flanged during plant operations since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line i

break accident. Maintaining these valves closed and blank flanged during plant j

operation ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive material will not be released via the Containment Purge System. To provide assurance that the 36-inch containment purge valves cannot be inadvertently opened, the valves are

-l blank flanged.

- i

?

The use of the containment mini-purge lines is restricted to the 18-inch

{

purge supply and exhaust isolation valves since, unlike the 36-inch valves, the l

18-inch valves are capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident. Therefore, the SITE B0UNDARY dose guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100 i

would not be exceeded in the event of an accident during containment purging j

operation. Operation will be limited to 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> during a calendar year. The total time the Containment Purge (vent) System isolation valves may be open l

during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 in a calendar year is a function of anticipated need and operating experience. Only safety-related reasons; e.g., containment pressure control or the reduction of airborne radioactivity to facilitate.

personnel access for surveillance and maintenance activities, should be used to support additional time requests.

Only safety-related reasons should be used to.

j justify the opening of these isolation valves during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 in any j

calendar year regardless of the allowable hours.

Leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves will provide early indication of resilient material seal degradation and will allow opportunity for i

repair before gross leakage failures could develop.

The 0.60 L leakage limit i

of Specification 3.6.1.2b. shall not be exceeded when the leaka,ge rates determined by the leakage integrity tests of these valves are added to the previously determined total for all valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests.

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTfB The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spray System ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA -

or steam line break. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

The Containment Spray System and the Containment' Cooling System are i

redundant to each other in providing post-accident cooling of the Containment atmosphere. However, the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere and therefore the time requirements for restoring an inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status have l

been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment.

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-3 Amendnent No. 96 i

Reissued by NRC Letter dated:

Nay 3, 1995 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.2.2 RECIRCULATION FLUID DH CONTROL (RFPC) SYSTEM The operability of the RFPC System ensures that there exists adequate TSP-C in the containment such that a post-LOCA equilibrium sump equal to 7.1 is maintained during the recirculation phase.pH of greater than or The minimum depth of 30" ensures that 9000 lbm of TSP-C is available for dissolution to yield a minimum equilibrium sump pH of 7.1.

This pH level minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The upper limit of 36.8" corresponds to the basket design capacity.

3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Containment Cooling System ensures that:

(1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and (2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the Containment Spray System during post-LOCA conditions.

The Containment Cooling System and the Containment Spray System are redundant to each other in providing post-accident cooling of the Containment atmosphere. As a result of this redundancy in cooling capability, the allowable out-of-service time requirements for the Containment Cooling System have been appropriately adjusted. However, the allowable out-of-service time requirements for the Containment Spray System have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment since the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 thru 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions.

Either recombiner unit (or the Purge System) is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with:

(1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. The Hydrogen Purge Subsystem discharges directly to the Emergency Exhaust System. Operation of the Emergency Exhaust System with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters.

These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, " Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containme.it Following a loss-of-Coolant Accident," Revision 2, November 1978.

CALLAWAY - UhlT I B 3/4 6-4 Amendment No. 96

.