ML20082R837
| ML20082R837 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 09/06/1991 |
| From: | Labruna S Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20082R839 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-91-09, GL-91-9, LCR-91-07, LCR-91-7, NLR-N91130, NUDOCS 9109160270 | |
| Download: ML20082R837 (5) | |
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HLR-H93l19 LCR 91
'.7 United States Nuclear Regulatory CommissicM Document control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
LICENSE AMENDMENT APPLICATION CIIANGE TO SURVEILIANCE INTERVAL FOR EPAs - GENERIC Lif!"fER 91-09 Il0PZ CREEK GENERATING STATION FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-57 DOCKET NO. 50-354 This letter constitutes an application for amendment to Appendix A of Facility Operating License NPF-57 for the llope Creek Generating Station and is being filed in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.90.
This amendment application proposes changes to Technical Specification 3.8.4.4, " Reactor Protection System Electrical Power I;onitoring."
Specifically, the channel functional test surveillance interval for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electrical Protection Assemblies (EPAs) would be changed from "at least once per six months" to "each time the plant is in cold shutdown for a period of more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,
'anless performed in the previous 6 months. "
This change to the surveillance interval is in accordance with the guidance contained in Generic Letter 91-09.
In addition to the Technical Specification (TS) for the RPS EPAs, the Hope Creek TSs also contain a specification for the Power Range Neutron Monitoring System EPAs.
As a result, identical changes are being proposed to Technical Specification 3.8.4.6, "PoWor Range Neutron Monitoring System Electrical Power Monitoring." contains a detailed description of the proposed changes along with our 10CFR50.92 analysis of significant hazards.
included as Attachment 2. Marked up TS pages showing the proposed changes are In accordance with 10CFR50.91(b) (1),
been sent to the State of New Jersey as indicated below.a copy of this request has NRC approval, please issue a License Amendment which will beUpon effective upon issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of issuance.
This latitude permits appropriate procedural modifications necessary to implement the proposed changes.
91n9160270 910906 11{
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NLR-N91130 Should you have any questions or comments on this transmittal, do not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely,
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& Q N p/t v-t Affidavife AttachmeAte (2)
C - Mr. Stephen Dembek Licensing Project Manager Mr. T.
P. Johnson Senior Resident Inspector Mr. T. Martin, Administrator Region I Mr. Kent Tosch, Chief New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Division of Environmental Quality Bitreau of Nuclear Engineering Cn 415 Trenton, NJ 08625 l
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Ref NLR-N91130 LCR 91-07 STATE OF NEW JERSEY
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COUNTY OF SALEM
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S. La Bruna, being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayst I am Vice President - Nuclear-Operations of Public Service Electric and Gas Company, and as such, I find the matters set forth in our letter dated SEP c a 1991 concerning the llope Creek Generating Station, are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
J']k/
scrr ~ J Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 5
day of (AMm/W, 1991 V
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- II Nota ti o ew ersey NotaryP[dlicofkewJersey My Commission expires on y/ar/ff l
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4 AT!RO99WF 1 19010 SED OIANGES 10 %DMICAL SHICIFICATIGE IJOMSE AIG9BtWP AMLichTICM MIR-N91130 Ein SLEWEIIJANCE INItHVAL OIANGIE IG 91-07 IKH 052BC E905ETING FIATICM FACIIIIY m't3ETDC IlODGS NW-57 DOCEKr NO. 50-354 I.
near rittirin of charras this amardment applicaticri prtpnaan ctarges to Tectatical Specificaticri 3.8.4.4, "Heactor Protecticri Systan Electrical Iwer Monitorhy" ard Technical specificaticri 3.8.4.6, "IWer Harge Neutrtri Mcr11tority Systan Electrical power Monitorirs." Specifloally, the ctannel functicral test surveillance interval for the Reactor Protection Systan (RPG) ard Iwer Rarge Neutra) Monitority Systan (1996) Electrical Protection Assemblies (EPAs) would be darged frun "at least once per six months" to "ench time the plant is in cold shutdown for a pericd of moru than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, unless performed in tM previous 6 nonths."
L pr - in for CbEup The pr-3 diarnes are beirn sulsaitted to rutace the potential for inadvertant scrams ard group isolations thereby ruducity challenges to safety sywtans ard improvirg nuclear safety.
Testirg the RIS ard 1H46 EPAs requiria placity the plant in a half scram carditicri Wildt incrmaan the potential for an inadvertant scram. In addition, tastirg the RPS EPAs rupires placity the plant in a half isolaticri condition Wilch incr=aaaa the potential for inadvertant group isolations. 'IN prrW ciarges to the surveillarce interval would reduce the potential for those urdesirable events ard thereby ruluce challernos to safety syntans.
Tri. Justf rimtion for Omme Eliminating the need to test the EPAs durirq pcwor cperation reduces the possibility of inadvertant challernos to protection systans. 'Ihe benefit to safety due to the rwhm! cha11ernes to ptVtection systans more thvi offsets the the risk associated with relaxirn the surveillance interval and the cvarall effect is a net gain in plant safety.
Genaric IJetter 91-09 addresses 1S 3.8.4.4 however, we believe the justification applies equally to the 'IS 3.8.4.6.
Hope Creek differs frun the typical plant in that the IWW is not powered frun the RIG power supplies; instead, the IHM is equirped with separate power supplies ard separate EPAs.
The EPAs used for the IWM are ident.ical to the EPAs used for the RPS.
Like the RPS EPAs, the IWW EPAs place the plant in a half scram conditicri while bairy tested. - Although the IWW EPAs do rot create the potential for inadvertant group isolations, we believe that the benefit associated with the reductics) in safety systan challencyes caused by inadvertant scrams alone unze than offsets the risk associated with exterdirg the surveillance interval.
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At;tccit2:nt 1 EPA Starvoillenco Intervol ChongOc HLR-N91130 LCR 91-07 IV.
Sirrtiffmnt ita=* conshkutim Evaltntim The pixpomd darnos to the ikpo CrmX GemratlJe Staticn T d Spccificaticm3 o inical 1.
of an amirkut pwicmly waltuted.Ib rot irwolvo a nigrtificant ircruaan otrmrpn:m
'nm prtposcd sutveillarce ftwporry wll1 tuluco the time that th is in a half scram or in1f asolaticn cf.11 tion ard tMrthy e plant potential for irwivertant scrans or gruip isolaticm.
rutucotM ability of any safety systm to perform its internod sa In adiiticn, tim tMtufore oorcitoo tint the prtynood darno will tot signifi ircrease the prrimbility or cornoquarxxa of a prvvicmly n.
We cantly accident or malNrtion of equipnent imortant to nafety.
amlyzcd 2.
any amlet prwicmly waltated.Ib rxt cruate tM [xxmibil!ty of a txw or of acc1&nt frun
'Ibe prtpo&d dargo rupiros no plant txdificaticm, does not alt function of any affacted systms, ard crustes no now modos er the operaticn.
thent7y assurirg that the design capabilities of affcctedSystu of plait ected threforu ocncitdo that the propoo(d chvgo does rut cotxque nyutata ard Wo prvvicmly evaltuted. possibility of a ncv or difforent kird of accident irun ruate tM ent 3
Ib rot involve a significant rukotion in a margin of s f t a e y.
As stated by the NRC in Gcmric letter 91-09, the ircrua tk safety bonofits associatrd with the riduction in pint sed risk mn offset by dallergos. As a Itcult ective system darge would rtsult in a,not incruase in plant safety ardimplomonta ircruano in a nargin of safety.
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dago does rot involve a significant reducticn in a nargiWe thernforu n of narcty.
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Corrl m ig )
As discansed in Itm IV above, PSE&G has concitdcd tint tM to the 7bchnical Specificaticos do not involve a signific t h prrpoemd darncs omsideration since the dargos as azards the ptthbility or canaequences o(1) do not involve a significant inctuase in not creata the pocsibility of a rxM or differunt kird of accident ff an accid accident prwiously evaluated, ard (iii) do not involve a signifi nduction in a nargin of safety.
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