ML20082R076
| ML20082R076 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 05/31/1983 |
| From: | Ridenhour R GAMBIT PUBLICATIONS, INC., NEW ORLEANS, LA |
| To: | Joosten J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20079F211 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-83-508 NUDOCS 8312130034 | |
| Download: ML20082R076 (38) | |
Text
_
,.hGAMBIT PUBLICATIONS INCORPORATED GAMBIT a The Newspaper
- THE CITY a New Orleans for Visitors RINAISSANCE a New Orleans Fashion 840 N. Rampart St. NewOrleans,La.70116 (504)525-5900 f'
May 31, 1983 Mr. Jim Joosten Office of Commissioner Victor Gilinski U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Jim:
Enclosed are copies o,f everything I have written dealing specifically with quality assurance problems at Waterford. Also enclosed are copies of most of the documents that.we have detailing the problems with the cracks in the common foundation mat out there.
The article dealing with the contract disputes between Combustion Engineering and includes much of the'information that we have. I am also including a copy of a letter we wrote to LPSL regarding that problem and asking them to provide us with a list of documents, which are named by number and company code. That should put you on the right track there. My understanding of this dispute and its implications is that (one) there should be a long history of correspondence between these firms, including minutes of many meetings, etc., and (two) it is a very serious problem that LPSL really doesn't know the answer to. Did CE maintain an adequate QA/QC program on its Waterford project? LPSL doesn't know, but wants desperately to believe that the answer is yes. Based on what these documents show, an ambiguous picture at best, plus the assessment of LPSL's own QA auditor, it is hard for me to believe that CE did maintain the program.
My guess is that they maintained the contracted for program, one that was far below NRC-mandated standards until the dispute was' finally resolved -- a process that took over five years.
All of this points towards the contention raised in the first piece we did on LPSL's QA program out there: it was inadequate for a very, very long time. LPSL may or may not have a safe plant at Waterford. The problem is that even they don't know, couldn't know now even if they have a desperate desire to. The discovery of the most recent cracks in the foundation, we believe, punctuates this point. We,believe the problems out there are very, very serious. I've been doing research in the PDR and I think I can show that that is the case and has been the case since the mid-70's. It is, based on the record, a problem the NRC seems to be unfortunately complicit in.
I hope this material will help you. If there is anything further that I can do, lease let me know.
8312130034 830922 PDR FOIA Sirrfdrely LYON83-508 PDR
?
' ( Ov' %
3()-$81 Ron Ridenhour, Reporter c
GAMBIT PUBLICATIONS -
. INCORPORATED CAMBIT e The Newspaper THE CITY a New Orleans for Visitors RENAISSANCE a New Orleans Fashion 840 N. Rampart St. New Orleans, La.70116 (504] 525 5900 April 4,1983 Mr. Jim Forte Louisiana Power and Light Company 142 Delaronde New Orleans, Louisiana
Dear Jin:
According to your request during our telephone conversation last week, I am submitting.to you the following material, requests and questions in writing. Our deadline is Thursday at noon, by which tine I must have my piece written and completed. If I am to include your responses in the piece I will write this week, I'll need then no -later than Wednesday evening. I hope this schedule will not be too difficult for you.
Anon 6 the docunents that have recently come into our possession are a series of letters exchanged between LP&L, E3ASCO, and Combustion Engineering concerning what quality assurance (QA) standards,. if any,
~
had and would naintain during the engineering and canufacture' of the reactor and its critical safety-related conponents for the Waterford III nuclear steam electric station.
At specific dispute in the letters in our possession is the question of l
who will pay for the costs incurred by Combustion Encineering, according to their assertions, in bringing their quality assurance program up to l
the 130 mandated standards to which LP&L is comnitted. In one letter, dated Fay 31, 1977, CE's Vaterford III Project linacer, U.r.1 awhinney, l
complains about the high costs of meeting the 13C's " newly" required quality assurance standards and threatens not to neet then unless LP&L agrees.to their terms for additional paynent by a certain date, casting doubt throughout the letter that CE has in fact ever lived up to the IGC l
nandates bccause of the unresolved dispute over their costs.
l If LP&L does not meet Combustion Engineerin5's denands, lhwhinney warns R.K. Stanpley, the !!ew York-based Project l'.anaSer of Vaterford III for EMSCO Services, Inc., then CE will " curtail a considerable amount of the quality assurance effort for engineering" on the renainder of the project.
Instead of meeting the 130-required standards to which LPLL is committed on Waterford III, Combustion Engineering threatens to return to what it calls " contractual quality requirements" by June 30, 1977, unless LP&L l
accepts their clains for additional compencation. Ihuhinney leaves no l
l i
e
$INCORPORATEDGAMBIT PUBLICATIONS
>a2 GAMBIT a The Newspaper THE CITY a New Orleans for Visitors RENAISSANCE a New Orleans Fashion 840 N. Rampart St. New Orleans, l.a. 70116 [504) 525 5900 doubt that those " contractual quality requirements" Eall far short of the standards der 2nded by the 13C.
Earlier in the sane letter l'2whinney asserts that "when this contract was signed, CE was almost the sole judge of what constituted an adequate quality progran." CE's Vaterford Project l'ana6er also asserts that CE
" believes that the products and systens we delivered at that time indicated that our judgenent was adequate, in that plants which were designed and built under the self-imposed quality requirements have operated quite
~
satisfactorily."
We have a nunber of questions re5arding the above nentioned disputes, the docanents our. knowledge of then is derived from, and the assertions made in then by various parties.
- 1. What were CE's clains for additional compensation referenced in the docunent code numbered L*d3-775-7 and discussed in the meeting en this subject that occurred on 4-19-77, the ninutes for which were dated 4-22-77?
- 2. How was this dispute finally resolved, if it in fact was finally resolved?
- 3. Assuming that LF&L acquiesced to Combustion EnEineering's denands for the additional compensation CE clains it is due because of the added costs of neeting the 12C-nandated quality assurance standards, what specifically were the terns of the a5reement?
- 4. How nuch extra did LFaL pay Ccnbustion Engineering as a result of this dispute and CE's threat to return to the original " contractual quality requirenents"?
- 5. When was this contract supplement agreed to? On what date did it becone a legally bindins agreenent?
- 6. ilhen did LP&L nahe actual payment? Vas core than one payment nade? If so, how nany payments have been nade and for what anounts?
- 7. If there was more than one paynent, on what dates were they nade?
- 8. If L?&L and CE reached their agreement on a supplenent to the original contract after June 30, 1977, CE's deadline, what assurance does LP&L have, indeed, what ansurance does the public have, that CE not the 13C-nandated quality assurance standards throughout the contract period?
0 1: hat accurance does LILL or the public have that Ccatustion Engineering not the OA ctandards at any tine during the contract's duration?
gINCORPORARD
" 3 GAMBIT PUBLICATIONS
. GAMBIT e The Newspaper THE CITY s New Orleans for Visitors RENAISSANCE a New Orleans Fashion 840 N. Rampart St. New Orleans, La.70116 (504) 525 5900
- 10. Since "CE was almost the sole judse of what constituted an adequate quality procran" when the contract was si6ned, who else, if anyone, assessed CE's quality progran to ensure that both LP&L's interests and the interests of the public were protected?
- 11. What nessures w'ere taken by LP&L to ensure that the liRC-mandated quality assurance standards to which the company was sonnitted (docketed PSAR, Farch,1972 and LP&L letters LPL 2615 and LPL 2616 and L'!3-727-73 and Amendment M),were beins complied with by Combustion Engineering?
nuclear steam supply systems, or whatever
,12. Please provide a list of the,Ensineering is referring to in its the projects are that Conbustion assertion, quoted above, that their "self-inposed quality requirements have operated quite satisfactorily" in other plants desi6ned and nanufactured by then?
- 13. What is the operating efficiency percentage of each of those plants?
- 14. What was LP&L's evaluation of CE's clain that its "self-inposed quality requirenents" have been satisfactory in the past?
- 15. Were these contract disputes reported to the 13C? If not, why n' t?
o l
- 16. Was CE's threat to refuse to meet the 12C-mandated QA standards reported to the IGC? If not, why not?
- 17. Ras CE's assertion, contained in other documents involved in these exchances, that CE could not allow LP&L to take credit for meeting the IGC-nanda.ted QA standards, the same standards to which LPLL was legally l
bound, reported to the 12C as a "significant construction deficiency" or as a " potential significant deficiency"? If not, uhy not?
- 18. Please provide us with copies of the follouing documents:
- a. Letter IE3-727-73, dated 11-30-73
- b. Letter: LFL 2615
- c. Letter: LPL 2616
- d. PSAR, dated Earch, 1972
- e. Anendnent M to PSAR
- f. Letter: L'!3-401-74, dated. 7-2-74
- c. Letter: C-CE-1900, dated 9-20-74
- h. Letter: C-CE-3725, dated 11-10-76
- 1. Letter: C-CE-3803, dated 12-7-76
- j. Letter: IU3-2101-76, dated 11-2-76
- h. F.enorandant dated 12-28-76, to LP&L's A.E, Henderson, Jr. fron LFLL's R.E. Eastings.Subj/LPbLrecordsauditatCE-Chattanooa.
ect: Iroblems encountered during the Eecenter 15-17, 1976, EIASCC
,r m
hINCORPORATED GAMBIT PUBLICATIONS-GAMBIT e The Newspaper THE CITY a New Orleans for Visitors RENAISSANCE = New Orleans Fashion 840 N. Rampart St. New Orleans, La. 70116 (504) 525-5900
- 1. Letter c-CE-4319, dated l'ay 31, 1977
- n. Meeting minutes: LU3-775-77, dated b22-77, of neeting held on bi9-77
- n. Letter: IH3-2354-76, dated 12-13-76 o Quotation: P.WK-5276, dated 11-29-76
- p. Letters number unspecified, dated 10-8-76. Sujects delays on Vaterford project and project paynent.
- q. Eenoranduns dated 6-8-77, to L?hL's A.E. Henderson, Jr., fron LP&L's R.E. Hastings. Subjects connents on CE quality assurance claims, reference C-C2-4319.
- r. Letter: RKS-W77-079, dated Jttne 29, 1977
- s. Kinutes of necting scheduled for 8-b77 in CE's Windsor offices in attendance; U.D. l'awhinney, R.K. Stanpley, A.E. Henderson, 3."
I' azo, D.N. Gallisan and top CE QA' personnel.
- t. Miates of meeting scheduled for 8-3-77 in E3ASCO's New York offices, attended by LP&L and E?ASCO QA personnel.
- u. Letter: C-CE-4609, dated 9-16-77
- v. Letter: IL'3-1907-77 We believe that these documents, among others not yet specified, are in or oucht to be in the public donain. According to docunents and other infornation now in our possecsion, the abcVe listed letters and nenoranda are naterial to critical questions concerning the adequacy of the quality assurance prograns naintained by LP&L and its contractors on the Waterford III project, questions dealinc directly with the public's real and continuing concern about whether or not the public's safety and uell being have been adequately guaranteed by LP&L and its contractors during the design and manufacture of the Uaterford III reactor and its conponents.
For exanple, In C-C3-3803, dated Decenber 7,1976, Conbustion Engineering's W.D. I~auhinney tells E3ASCO's R.K. Stanpley that CE is " unable to take credit at this time for a quality assurance progran which is responsive to these documents." The docunents liuhinney refers to are specified as "the 18 Criteria of 10CFR50, A endix 3, as well as the cuidance provided in WASH 1283 (the ' Grey 3ook')
In that regard, we have sone additional questions.
- 19. Uhat was L?bL's response to the news that CE had not been inplenenting the 13C-nandated QA standards in the design engineerins and nanufacture of the components for Waterford III?
- 20. Did LFbL audit CE's records in an attenpt to deter 61ne how far from conpliance CE, and therefore LP&L, was?
F
. f._. GAMBIT PUBLICATIONS.
"* 5 INCO'RPORATED
- GAMBrf a The Newspaper THE CITY a New Orleans for Visitors RENAISSANCE a New Orleans Fashion 840 N. Rampart SL New Orleans, La.70116 (504) 525 5900 t-
- 21. If there was an audit, what was the result of that. audit?
- 22. Assuning that an audit was performed and that CE was sincere in its assertion that they had not perforned according to the 130 requirements relative to QA, uhat affect has CE's failure to co'aply with those standards had on the ulticate safety of the reactor?
- 23. What elonents of the Waterford III reactor were under design and or nanufacture by CE and its contractors during the period of dispute (which we reckon to have been at least 65 n'onths) in which CE inforned L?bL that it and its agents were not meeting the federall,y established QA standards?
- 24. Uhat is L?bL's legal oblication to report CE's failure to comply with the 1810C250 QA criteria to the EC7
- 25. uhat are the legal penalties, if any, for the failure to make those reports?
- 26. Does there now or did there exist during the aforenentioned 65 nonth (atleast)periodofnon-compliancearealpossibilityofacrippledand/or ineffective quality assurance program within CE and its fabrication sub-sidiaries or subcontractors which were providin6 safety-related itens for "aterford III?
- 27. What affect does CE's failure to comply with the QA standards have on the safety of the reactor and its safety-related components?
- 28. Is there or was there a potential si6nificant deficiency in the final design of the Eaterford III nuclear stean supply systen? How can L?bL be sure? How can the public be sure?
20 How thorouchly did IFbL and/or E3ASCO investigate and/or analy::e the CE desi5n engineering and quality assurance related activities at '.!indsor and its fabrication subsidiaries in order to deternine whether or not an incident or an SCD should have been reported to the GC7
- 30. Assuning that L?bL and/or E3ASCO did take some follow up investigative actionafterreceivingC-CE-3303,whatconclusionsand/orreconnendations were nade by the auditors who undertook those investications or audits?
- 31. Uhat is/are the nane(s) of the auditor (s) involved?
- 32. What was the response of L?bL's top level nanasonent to those conclusions and/orreconnendations?
e
l O
gGAMBIT PUBLICATIONS.
INCO'RPORATED
' GAMBIT s The Newspaper -
THE CITY a New Orleans for Visitors RENAISSANCE = New Orleans Fashion 840 N. Rampart St. New Orleans, La. 70116 (504) 525 5900 r-
- 33. Assunin6 that CE was ultimately paid the several nillion dollars demanded of LP&L, could they prove to LFLL that CE's connitte. ants were, fromthebeginningoftheproject,addressedinand/orinplenentedin gecordance with the l'RC's 10CD50.55(e) QA criteria? If so, how?
3I4 How would CE's personnel working under the CE QA program, providing that there indeed was one, have then Imoun which QA requirenents applied to the t*aterford III project?
. 35. How could or did CE prove that t'o L?&L's (and the public's) satisfaction?
Jin, I appreciate the energy and patience I know you vill tring to bear in providing us nith answers to these questions as well as the docunents that are requested here. Thanks in advance.
Sincerely, ha E6
- t l%
Ron Ridenhour
l s
l
> /*
u't.L O A W "** A n9 Ar. tion lufo
) f-r.'E H
/
bOU!3IdEdN b4 P O W E R & L f G H T! P O 00X 6008
- NEW OALEANS. LOutStAriA:70 142 CCLARONO: STA[ET m *b, '-
174. (SQ4J 2pfL21 naumm
'~
\\
August 1, 1977
_l Suspa. Item l
Ren 3:A35;07 o,
\\'
Mr. R. K. Stampley
'N s
Eb2sco Services, Inc.
e Twa Rector Street
[_
N:w York, N. Y.
10006
[f.
SUBJECT:
Waterford SES Unit No. 3 f
Potential Significant' Deficiency Incident No. 8
{
Radial Cracks - Common Foundation Mat -
- 5 Inside Ring Wall i
D2nr Mr. Stampley:
j Att:ched, for your information, is a documentation of a telephone communication.
Y:urs very truly, p
I D. L. Aswell Vico President-Power Production u
DLA:AER:jhl Attrcirnent
(
cc: Ebasco (2), J. M Brooks, J. O. Booth (2), D. L. Asuell, L. V. Maurin, A. E. Henderson, D. B. Lester, P. V. Prasankumar, C. J. Decarcuax, T. F. Cerrets, J. A. Reine, H. W. Otillio, C. G. Chezem, S. A. Allcman, D. N. Galligani L. Biondolillo, W. Fadden.
l l
l l
l l
I
-l l
_.:'a
TELt..
fATION OF DATE:
- MUNICATIONS 8-1-77 TIME. _
8:00 FARTY CALLING: _A. E. IIenderson, Jr.
_ g,g,,
3pegge (Naine)
~
~
'Ly&L PARTY ANSWERING:
(Company)
~
_V.
C. Hubacek (Name)
~
NRC - Region IV (Company)
SUBJECT:
Potencial Sinnificane Deff ei enev - Inci-FILE:
dent No. 8. Radial Cracks - Comon F 3-A1.04.01 ounda-tion Mat - Inside Rinit Wall Q-3-A35.07
...................i.........'.......
SUMMARY
R3 parted the following to Mr. Hubacek(INCLUDING DECISIONS AND i
will require evaluation.C:mnon Foundation Mat within the ring w ll h" W l
a as been detected.
This was reported as a potential sig ifiA nonconformance has be This condition ocndition."
i e
escribin cant deficiency.g this n
g }
l
~
ACTION REQUIRED:
nearin report due August 30, 1977, if incid is evaluated as reportable.
ent IIBUTION: _
@re, 2
~e
...... u QU/.LITY ASSURANC(,f?fQRT LOU-/294 l 3,.;:7,7 l :,[o W3QA-25t9 1
,, e p,,,,,,,
i i
- i. C
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ^
--2
,, i.a.. r. c...b.,
Waterford SES - Unit No 3
M i
.1i3T..
. w r.ci ve.ca on s o i n.c ro,.
.annsu g
. ' ' ~.
~
I.
l i
. I l
Su
-..c.a iuin It.:r :rn D..e rc. i.,.ii., r __
ge 2'J33Jf.
Renwil s:
<[,N,
k I
To:
J Moaba
,tf K
Frorn:
R A Hartnet 3
C b 8 Date:
July 29, 1977 oe c D/a og9'M
Subject:
' PurENTIAL REPORTABLE INCIDENT NUMBER 8 i
(NOTIFICATION) -
j Enclosed herewith is the cover sheet to Attachment 2 of Company Procedurc 21 cntitled " Construction Deficiency - Incident Re-porting" describing Potential Incident Report No 8.
Please pro-cess this report and proceed as described in CP-21.
This notific.. tion follow: verbal telecon notification on July 29, 1977 wiLis the liau York Iicansing Depur-ascat.
RAll bl Enclosures cc:
(w/cncl) j J 0 Hooth B D Fowicr F Rose B R Mazo C V Diz' D N Calligan E J Callagher P Crossman A 11 Wern J M Brooks A E llenderson T F Cerrets D B Lester P V Prasankumar M Renfree i
Power Production File (3)
W3QA File QAS File
- 1..
, f Dr.:,sGH ANu Cordsinut.%,.
l $ ',','...
(
J a8' tan n V 20,3177 ret?,tu ic;cE ce NCR No W3-535 AlRit.11,1975 AT'rActf. TENT 1 - RtM1RT FORhMT AND CON 1r.NT (COvtRsittt.T - r>RST t'Ac t)
DE.SICH QR CO.'f5TRUCT10N INCIDENT REFORT j
s s
Incid<nt Rcport #
8 GE!iERAl.
gg, Louisiana Power & Light C'ompany rnojr.CT:
Waterford SES - Unit No 3 INCIDEhTTITLE:
Concrete Foundation Mat Cracking Beneath the Containment Date of D!,comyi 7-26-77 Date Considered g
Potential.ly Reportabic:
7-29-71' tienned to C21ent:
ny 7-29-77 (2:30 p.m.)
Repeted to NRC
,By*
Date I
Rcrert dae Ni!Q laterim dw i
N M "'
i e
TXf3Dr.NT EVAL.UA~ TION
~
.t. X*L*NJI!!G 1.
DrJ10D CY ADVF.P.SE!.Y ArFECTS S/.EETY OF TLANT IF 17.FT VIICOM.P.EC'12, /d'n_
B D
2,. REIRCCNTS, a) 11REAlf.DOTAf OF QA TROCP.AM,OR O
O.
b)
DEFICIENCY OF FINAL DESIGN, o3 O
O
- 3 c)
DEFICE!JCY IN CONSTRUCT 10!t,o3 0,i O.
~
~
d)
DEV1 AT10H IN PEnft)RatMCE G
O "C D m tE N m Due to ti.tter teceoine from the radial cracks in the mar, niacoment o#
concretc over t.nese cracas could possibly allou ground watcr to find a leal: p.t c h through to the containment vessel, raisine cuestions as to the intceritu ot,the vo s.s ci. Tnc 12 fooc thick cc:::non roundation mat is considered thick enough to not recuire unternrcofine to nrovent l ealen e c, therefore. this dernce
!=
,c
-f-Wru4 ~ to n ava Sossi htycons2dered a's gnificant erset artected tne sata oucraticn et the niant and is auhcviac[en trom pertornance $;)cca tications which ut1T l
require extensive repairs,to establish the adequacy of the structure...,
l REPORT PRETARATION O#CINEER ritEPARD4G DRAFT:
I LIC.DiC.REYlEWING DRAI-T: -
kntt\\ $@t[Q3lk p
1975 1.
.Unatcu i u,. a,,,,, :
W3-535 (JU ALITY A550HANCC
. l'OA E e, i.e. 0 A !
u...,
,.or H0HCONFORMANCiiHEPORT Y'"*'" O 9" ' a' ' *a '" *-.-<.a <
aut:'noNs: ts.
1,.:s.1 c..
I
, p.-..
u,...,.,._,---.._.--
.6sts# T Ort N GJi:CT.
a'"*'""'"
est Waterford SES Unit #3 C, R a pp lN G No./888EC No. taf i,,
.c., c on s r =w e r.o oc on c ou r-A c t on.
Construction a.o. = o.....
PSAR Section 5.2.2.10 a c.c nec y.o= o r c oGTo..
- v.... r on s v e r au m Common Foundation Mat r
im.w.._..s u.___
DCSCitli'Tnce4 OY uuNCONFORW.ANCE '" tieems involved, Specilisation s,
Submit Skerele if App,'ical,l.)
Code or Standard to Which Isems Do Neo Comply
- The too of the mac beneath the containment structure contairs a numbe which ucre discovered to be uceping vatar.
of cracks the crack and to moisten the surrounding concreto.The rate of weeping is genera T v-m n c-c.3st+1e d ^ < -
< anc.wuhape-chi.ch. thelmacer-taL-hae-assumed-due. to tiiffer
__o M MY
,aL 0$'Y)
/
/
'..agtu f. or unsou =c onv.=c no couromo.n=c m y
f/[
I_t.A.
Ha r t;.n p_t t o. i c..,
ri v i,c REcouMENDCD DISPOSITION "*'
O. A. Sito Su rvisor 7-28-77 (Sul, mas Shesch if Applicoble)
OtTd A *)~7"/1Cs/Eb
- 1"H2 2 '7~.
c anc, sicwaiva s or penson.ccoms.uteenc us. position n u riv6s
"'S.I_G G_S' f.. *,
bw yk-
- u. Ys. ~,,
EVAL.UATION OF D15PO51T10N QYffAs ASCO, RE ASON FOR Dl5PO5tTION "**k
..f - --. _, }
tf
' aY.c 2.k etk.
L C
e CAV alk AG;ALks ed n n
,_-l p
z D ~ & & 2 t n h_
o.,,gS, e
L lac k
_ /
/r_
0 ig/1 Ae ~1/A g 2'
e44.' m 2 148_
M sl/L..
a Ai 1
n
.y 7
[ ENGINEERING
- /=2 9 9 9 QU ALITY ASSURANCE egg Gaq A T ufegl CoNSTRUCTtoH CoTHER AUTHOR 47EoPCR*oNNEt N&MC 090GM4 TWRE3
- A M E 138CM A 1UR E 8
- ,.,, N N A M t.
e.a c,. A T WM E B g
onit uAft osTc
.CCPTCD j RCJCC1CO
[,ACCCPTCD C REJCCTCo
] A C C C H T E D C NCJCCTED CCP.T CO stTH CCuwCNTS ACCCPTf*D wffM C3wuCNTS
- ~I ACCE PTE D we TH
] ACCEPTEQ
[*jkrJCCTED e
CCuwCMTS
' ' A C C E P Tr 0 v.t f ee (C a*,u N 1 -
VERIFICATIQH OF DISPOSITION
((RCousato C woY Re ou REo tie.
......,u,.,,.. n....
s' C N A T o =
- DA11
l 5
DISPOSIT sg NONCONFOM!ANCE 113-535 In order to establish a method of repnir, perform the following eptrations and resubmfc the nonconformance with results.
A.
Drill and grout
?
in place three 1/8" pipe nipples to a ' depth of two-three inches.
The above to be performed Pipe nipples to be approximately 8" pn at least two cracks.
-2" c.c.
B.
Seni the surface of the crack using a quick setting epoxy.
window may be provided bor. ween selected nipples in order cc monitor A
the flow of epoxy which is to be injected as follows.
C.
Pressure inject Concrossive 1380 epoxy as manufactured by Adhesive I
t Engineering into the middle pipe nipple.
'Crouting pressure to be
(
increased gradual 3y as required to make the epoxy flow.
Maximum pressure to be used is 180 PSI.
New York' Engineering (ESSE) to witness the grouting op,eration and provide final disposition of E
nonconformance.
E 4
/J P
k ne b.
N.
$., f IP.
s i
=g ma Y5 M
=L 52 s
7<.
,(
.h&
(
6 i
- ,c
.M S
P y.,
VG 2
B
l GtA6
..s.i...e urA T E D
~
QU Al.lTY
' ENCINEERING 4
QUAUTi C.
LDEPORT-ioff-4294 g7 inn i Info necoar o.
V3QA-2627 -Supp #1
.1 an na sc a tio g) g a.og o.
Vaterford SES - Unit No 3
.7 l
I (H, asas.w F a G T w A E A G 84 GGeTRAGTOR 4007 E46
.- =. - -
f 0?P l I
I
.EO:'
Suspon:o item
,f." '
g P.eturn Date 2*
4 To:
J 0 Booth /L M Elliott
,,vitow up By f/
.gf s\\
Frca:
R A Hartnetc
- 3 I
Date:
August 2, 1977
",,,y je k,
'V
' Subj ect:
COMMON. FOUNDATION MAT RADIAL CRACKING VITHIN THE CONTAINMENT RING VALL Radial concrete cracking of tha common foundation mat within the ring vall has been detected during a walk-thru surveillance of the subject
}
area.
It is necessary that the above identified cracks be documented in the following manner. The cracks should be superimposed on a "G" size scaled plan of the subject crea with the following information included:
- 1) Length and path of the cracks,
- 2) Orientation of the cracks by indicating the coordinates (not azi-muths) of the ends of the cracks and points where the cracks change direction,
- 3) Width of the cracks in millimeters.
It is required that Concrete Hydraulics Engineering evaluate the pre-sence and significance of these crack formations in the affected area prior to any further placements in the area. All concrete placements on the subject area is suspended as per attached Stop Work Order until Concrete Hydraulics Engineering completes an evaluation of the affected
. Quality Assurance Engineering will then evaluate the actions area.
taken and determine when concrete placements may resume.
e j
RAH /JG bl Attachment l..
, cc:
(w/ attach)
I B P Mazo D L Aswell C V Liz L V Maurin D N Galligan A E Henderson f
F Rose T F Gerrets W3QA File ICAS File I
E J Gallagher
'(
+
l___
__ 1 _
)**
..)
EDASCO SERVICF.S QUA!.1TY ASSURAUCE*nMCIllEERINC e W
, ATERFORD SES - UNIT NO 3 l
t STCP WORK ORDF.R
^
e.
Date:
r7-26-77
, Reference Prucedure Time:
1:00 p.m.
10 CFR 50.Appeqdix B e
Criteria XVI Affected Activity - Concrete Placement and related work within the ring wall area underneath the steel containment
(
acructure.
Reason for Stop & Exceptions -
'l Formation of cracks with apparent seepage (weeping) on the Consoon Foundatibn Mat surface within the
,I ring wall area.
The intent of the Stop Work Order issued with Re-port W3QA;2627 was to prevent any installation which would make the cracks inaccessible.,
' Action Required - Mappitig of the cracks with an evaluation by Concrete l'
Sydraulics Engineering and subsequent repair if r.equired.
F NCR No'-.None generated i
Reference Re' port No W3QA-2627 requiring engineering evaluation of the affected area.
l i
i
/,/
l
,f l
xex s//
1 Q A' Site Supefvisor r
1 e
s STOP WORX RE1. EASE 2
Date:
Time:
3 Q"
a g
Action,taken to lift Stop Work Order -
t t
3
~
I :
i
,m
'e sl.
-'4, r.
Q A Site Supervisor Y
k
3 a..
I.
.m =
EBASCO SERVICES!
W "'"
f"'iu I M C o n P o !} A T E D
^
q 4
i I
i I
12.i Y CONSULTANTS E N GINEE R S - C O N S hggpC T O R S l v
m s
i P'.
O'. Box 70
}.
g 1
, 2
. ),
Killona, Louisiana 70066
__,1 I
ik con m itm 4sgpf
$1 5,T977 F-16923 ---
Ream..y3,yy_y Mr. D. L. Asve11 L
Vice President a Power Production Louisiana Power and Light Company 142 Delaronde. Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70174 LOUISIANA POWER AND LICHT COMPA!E I
WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION 1980 - 1165 MW INSTALLATION - UNIT NO. 3 MODIFICATIONS TO. EXISTING PUMPED RELIEF WELL SYSTDi i
Ref:
Ebasco letter LW3-811 dated May 5, 1977
Dear Mr. Aswell:
As you know, control of heave and settlement of the common mat foundation during construction'is of primary consideration. This control is obtained in pat-through control of the piezometric pressures beneath the. nuclear plant island.
f As construction progresses, the site dewatering system will be released in a controlled manner to balance piezometric pressures in such a manner as to main-tain foundation soil stresses in excess of the original overburden stress but 4
' ~
- within the maximum allowable stress of 4500 pounds per square foot.
As explained in the A11cuabla Mat Bearing Pressure Report (Ebasco letter L"3 811, dated May 5,1977), this is done to recompress the heave which occurred during the plant island excavation and to induce any additional minor settlements which may occur prior to the installation of piping and equipment sensitive to differential settlement.
Based on our continuing review of the excavation instrumentation (particularly piezometric levels and heave points), suf ficient means no longer exists to support a rigidly controlled recharge program.
I In the past 2 months, piezometric levels have fluctuated videly.
Water levels in the Elevation -85 aquifer have risen so:ce 20 to 25 feet to just below the base of the common mat.
The main reason for the rise in piezometri: pressure is that the existing pumped relief wells which surround the common mat have been overpowered by water used to compact the sand backfill.
A large amount of.
[
water (20 to 25 percent saturation) is required to attain compaction of the fill.
This water remains perched in the backfill by the underlying and surrounding i
clays. As the pumped relief wells were extended through the backfill, they were extended using slotted' casing in an effort to control the water levels in the backfill.
The amount of water required for compaction of the fill is l
-much greater than anticipated, however, and is infiltrating the pumped relief wells at such a rate that the existing pumps are overpowered from above and no longer of fer pressure relief ~ to th'e -85 aquifer.
?
s
ERASCU SEltVICES
- =cearenAsse To: NW. D. L. Aswell July 6, 1977 Two main alternatives have been investigated to regain sufficient control of piesometric pressures in order to support the Recharge ?,rogram. One' alternative investigated involves sealing off the lower aquifer from above through the use of expandable pneumatic packers inserted into the pumped relief well casing.
This would have the effect of returning the pumped relief wells to the same relative. condition they were in before slotted dasing.was'used'to extend the wells through the backfill. The second alternative was to install larger pumps and motors in the existing well casings.
The larger pumps would triple the capacity of 'the existing pumps (40 spa vs. between 10 and 15 gpm) and be of sufficient size to handle all water infiltrating the slotted casing from the backfill as well as to offer pressure relief to the -85 aquifer.
Installation of larger pumps and' motors has~s'everal advantages over the packers.
First, the larger pumps will take care of the immediate problem of lowering the piesometric levels in the -85 aquifer while at the same time helping to control the perched water table in the sand backfill.
Second, larger pumps will pro-vide better control of water levels during the recharging effort. Third, installation of larger pumps and motors is less expensive than installation of the packers.
We have received estimates' from Bob Brothers construction Company for each alternative.
The estimated cost to. install the larger pumps and motors is
$24685.10, broken down as follows:
(1) Mobilization (Materials and Labor)
$ 1294.70 1.s.
(2) Furnish and install Pumps (Materials and
$23390.40 1.s.
Labor) - $1949.20/ pump x 12 pumps Total
$24685.10 Additional maintenance and operation costs for larger pumps and motors are also required as follows,:
(1) Maintain and operate larger pumps (in addition to current rates)
.$25.76/ pump x 12 pumps
$ 303.60/ month The estimated cost of installing expandable pneumatic packers in the existing pumped relief wells is $39,403.10, b:oken down as follows:
(1) Mobilization (Materials and' Labor)
$ 1294.70 1.s.
, '(2) Furnish and install packers (Materials
~
and Labor) - $3175.70/ packer x.12 packers
$38108.40 1.s.
Total
$39403.10 The packers would also-require expensive additional maintenance and operation costs as follows:
(1) Maintain packers (in addition to current rates) -
$533.50/ packer x 12
$ 6402/ month
l I-CIIAScil SI:RVICES
.e n n a r e a u c e To: Mr D. L. Aswell July 6, 1977 Installation of larger pumps vill enable control of the permitting the required recompression described above, a, vater levels', thereby nd shortening the.cotal period of time the dewatering system vill be in use.
Shortening the period of dewatering vill also ultimately reduce the costs involved in maintenance of the devacering system, which presently runs $29,830.00 per month. Your inanediate approval is requested to install the larger pumps and motors in order to avoid possible delays to construction and/or to the recharge program.
Yours very truly, O fch J.
O'. Booth Project Superintendent GFG/jah cc:
L. Maurin A. Henderson V D. Lester Power Production. Department (3)
.P. Prasankumar T. Gerrets C. Chezum H. Oti13io F. Shaughnessy
~ ~ ~ ~
~
- A. A. Ferlito A. H. k'ern R. Stampley J. Cianci D. Galligan J. Brooks E. Henderson J. Ehasz G. Goodheart e
i i
o
y.
?l,
g i H E LO U I S ! A N A[ P. o. sox soo8
- NEW CRLEANS, Louts!,NA 70174 saca4RoNoesracer da POWER & LIGHT (5043 366 2345 e
!#alifsy#:
~
Harch 25, 1977 LPL 6639 Q-3-A28.14
/
Response Req'd:
Yes By: April 11, 1977 Mr. R. K. Stampley Ebasco Services, Inc.
Two Rector Street New York, New York 100,06 SUBJECI: Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Allowable Soil Bearing Pressure Limit
REFERENCE:
(1) Letter LW3-452-77 dated March 15, 1977 (2) Letter LPL 6635 dated March 23, 1977 (3) Letter LPL 6640 dated March 24, 1977
Dear Mr. Stampley:
We have reviewed reference 1 and concur with Ebasco's recommendation that the soil bearing pressure limit prior to recharging be increased from 4,000 to 4,500 pounds per sq,uare foot. We understand that the factor of' safety against any bearing failure under this increased loading is still in excess of 3, based on the maximum allowable soil bearing pressure of 15,000 pounds per square foot. This change should be appropriately documented and in-cluded in the Waterford 3 Final Safety Analysis Report.
Reference 2 forwarded a documentation of a telephone coe:munication between LP&L ard the NRC on March 23, 1977.
In this communication LP&L reported as a Potentiel Significant Deficiency that the soil bearing pressure prior to recharging will execed the 4,000 pounds per square foot as stated in the Waterford 3 Preliminary Safety Analysis Report.
This information was also communicated by telephonc to the NRC Licensing Branch by LP&L.
In this re-gard we ask Ebasco to prepare a report detailing the reason why the Soil Bearing Pressure Limit of 4,000 pounds per square foot will be exceeded and justifying the recommended change in the Soil Bearing Pressure Limit to 4,500 pounds per square foot.
This report should be provided in a suit-abic format for submission to the NRC.
,i.
- e, Mr. R. K. Stampicy P:go 2 March 25, 1977 handling this L of Dasco's reconsnendations for deficiency or Should it be treated as a reportableeport for informatio
- Wa request that you advise LP&
potential deficiency.should the NRC be provided a written r hich was forward as an item of con-50-382/77-03 w Design Changeeference prior to responding IE Inspection Report No.
i 3 cddresses the Turbine Building Foundat onWe recoassend t i
i cy above requests.
the Potentially Reportable Defic en ecen.
to the Please note that LP&L must respond to with thirty (30) days.
Yours very truly,
?
D. L. Aswell Manager,of Power Production
.DLA/FJD/dd h (2), D. L. Aswell, L. V. Maurin, H. W. Otillio, Ebasco (2), J. M. Brooks, J. O. Boot nkumar A. E. Henderson, D. B. Lester, P. V. PrasaG. Cheze
,.T. F. Gerrets, cc:
F. X. Shaughnessy, L. Biondolillo, C.
d J. Drumm D. N. Galligan, C., J. Decareaux, F.
e
A
% c'!an i info DOCUMENTATION OF '
{
TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIQNS
'~
i
-by g g:
9/22/77 TIME:
9:57
, A,d,,_xgxg I
_8_ _
i PARTY CAI.IING:
- J.G. Hubacek USNRC' "N-(Name)
(Company),-
PARTY ANSWERING: T.F. Cerrets*J b
'f LP&L (Name)
(C mpany) m #1 g M g atus of Low Strength Concrete D
/
3 FILE:
Q.3-A35.02.01 k
~[.4
,. M.
V\\
3-A1.04.02.02 h0h N
gg 7'.....................................................................
SUMMARY
{ INCLUDING DECISIONS AND OR COMMDITS)
Mr. Hubacek called to -inquire about the status of our low strength concrete problems.
He wanted t.o know if any further developments had taken place.
I told him that we had received some further information from the Portland Cemest Association.
They
.had identified three areas regarding the concrete that should be changed.
- First, our present type II cement has approximately 50% plaster and 50% anhydrides which preclude false set.
Tne Portland Ce=ent Association recommends that this be changed to 75% plaster.and 25% anhydrides.
Secondly, the Portland Ceme u Association recommends a higher burning temperature for the cement and a faster rate of cooling.
Thirdly, the Portland Cement Association recommends that we change from our present ligtiin base admixture to a hydroxylated carboxylic acid base.
I told Mr. Hubacek that I had been informed by Ebasco that the chemist at the cement plant basically agrees with the recommendations regarding the cement.
However, we have not nade eny deter =inations regarding changing admixtures.
I told Mr. Hubacek that the strength test that Portland Cement Associatian had run on the cores from the affected slabs showcd lower strength than the tests which were run by Peabody.
There is no current explanation as to why these differences occurred.
I also told him that we had not yet run strength tests on cores from wall 15A4.
ACIlON REQUIRED:
7 DISTRIBUTION:
D.L. Awell. L.V. Maurin. A.E. He erson. T. F. Correts. Power Production File (2)
d L t t l k h
, p p,d I.
r.p s...
pa qy R
pim 4
i
,i.dj.dL L L] jj
- f___
l i
> a h dl
< L jk t L j.d..L i. i.i. L L b li.L j.L JJ I i
i U i
i i
m-r u
I j
! i a
I s
4 l
i 5
.L: J.
d2 iMQDATEUNE;.bMfMM1MTMhk&f@
\\.
h w
1 Cracking Foundations At Waterford ill K
q
. t.
l Bp RON RIDENHOUR a 5 ort of"memous wncrete and sacei boat into the problem by Gambit. Other eracks quality assurance engineers issued a stop i-g floating on the water <harged sands com-and water seepage have been discovered in work order on July 26th,1977, the day the i
H ouisiana Power and Light posists what many people here call the jelly-the floor of the nuclear island from time to problem mas discovered, a move designed id i i ground cmnnum to land adjaant to the time in the intervening years, according to to prevent the cracks from becoming inac-l
_. L ComPallY's troubled Wa.
Mississippi River. waierrord's nuclear Tom e,crrets, LP&L's Quality Assurance cessible. The stop work order also called j
. i' g
terford 111 nuclear power island, undergirded by the common foun-Manager at Waterford.
for a mapping of the cracks with an evalua-plant, beset by yet another dation mat that measures 270 fect ia width.
tion..."and subseq= cat repair if i
i n delay in its scheduled start-up 3so feet in length and 12 Icet in steel rein-hen Gambit first interviewed required."
l P
l forced thickness, began to spring leaks not Gerrets and EDASCO civil ensi-Two days later, July 28, 1977, l:
.- date and even more cost over-long aner it was finished-
,,,, n,ian Grant abouuhe prob.
EDASCO's quahty assurance supervisor l
1 runs, the amounts of which
. cr=cks, accompanied by seeping water, i,,,,ie e,,cki,, i, w,t,, ford *s founda-for waterrord, a man named R. A. Ilart-ji were not announcedlast week when LP&L began appearing in the common founda-tion, both discounted the seriousness of the nett, wrote a report detailing the founda-
-* g'i 8
told the public that Waterford would not tion mat in July,1977.The first cracks were situation. Concrete does that, Grant told tion's failure to conform to engineering ex-l be ready to operate next January has prob.
discovered on July 26 in the area directly Gambit. It's not necessarily anything to pectations and his assessment of the reason jg I
l k
_. lems far larger and more serious than the beneath where the reactor itself was sup-worry about.
why. "TSc top of the mat beneath the con-4f
, company has.thus far been willing to ad-posed to go, according to LPAL internal "You see," Grant said, "whe=i concrete tainment structure contains a number of ji I
'[If -
r mit. Among them, apparently,is a serious is loaded, it bends in order to accept the crack s which were discovered to be sceping "l des!gn flaw that could affect the plant's
/
load. The part that's in tension does crack water," llartnett wrote. "He rate of scep-
{p.[N.
p
_mt scfe operation and may threaten the in-
.[fke an enormous and reinforcing bars pick up the tension ing is generally enough to show the cracks
],.,Ig a
. tegrity of the nucl:ar reactor itself.
load. In order for them to do that the con-and moisten the smrounding concrete, it
=
I, 1
Symptoms of a se design flaw began to COnCrele SHd Sfeel DO8f,
- l ) j. "
8 crete has to crack. nat's the way concrete appears that these radial cracks are the appear as far back as the middle of 1977 flO8fing on Sand nqrmally acts. De cracks are hairline result of the concave shape which the
+
i 4P when cracks started appearing in the cracks. Very often you don't even see material has assumed due to differential
. (,-
? (',,
=
. massive foundation of what is called the them, but we know they're there."
settlemer.t."
l-nuclear island. Waterford Ill has four documents Gambit has recently obtained.
Grant acknowledged, however, that the Cracking in the foundation was main buildings.Three of them,the nuclear That was not supposed to happen. Water-
' water seepage through the cracks was an therefore the symptom of differential set-d.
c a
q " reactor. containment building, the fuel ford's nuclear " boat" was designed to be unexpected development. "De fact that tiernent, in llarinett's estimation, a process pb ;
8 [ }l i
handling building and the reactor auxiliary watertight. Although the mat was under:
there was a crack path all the waythrough which is very much like it sounds: some g
..
- t a""
E. building all sit on a single, enormous slab lain with no waterproofing material, the (the foundation mat)," he said, speaking parts of the foundation man were seitline
. g'hg
+:,,,J, 2
of concrete called the common foundation engineering theory of LPalfs archi-of the cracks discovered in July,1977, more than others. The next day, July 29,
.i.
'E mat. Taken together, the three buildings, sect / engineer for Waterford, EDASCO "was the part that was unanticipated."
another report on the problem. a " design 5
all of whkh are directly involved in the Services Inc., hypothesized that no water EDASCO's first reaction to the "scep.
or construction incident report" was writ-handling and processing of nuclear
- could penetrate the foundation's 12 foot ir g"in the fournlation beneath what would ten by EllASCO's quakey assurance materials, and the common foundation thickness.
eventualry be the nucleas reactor was one of engineers, this one describing not only the
- fn r..
T mat upon which they are built, compose New fissures,,also accompanied by alarm, according to the documents now in characteristics of the problem, tmt its c s'
~'
the nuclear Islaruf.,
water seepage, were discovered in the floor Gambit's possession, despite the sanguine potential implications as well. Accordmg Q"
],'4, '.
.g.
. ',h 4.,. -
. Duilt without pilings, the mat and the of the reactor auxiliary building earlier this attitudes of Gerrets and Grant before their to it, the eracking raised serious queuions
- 'N' e
2 buildings that sit on it can be thought of as month on May ll, the day afler an inquiry discovery of the latest crmks. I stA9 ON esm erning the i,ncr,sme nmicar twH.--
)
mweem.-
4 P
I
~
?
s I
is 4 o
i fp t
1y A
f ir
" N G.
l V
ment vessel, the safe operasion of the plant llefore the fill concrete was placed?
Grant.
the work proceeded, however, a comples
"] l' and was a significana deviation from per-That's right. The reactor contamment The epony solution apparently also arrangement of powerful water pumps was j
formance spccifications that would require ves*l might be hkened to a giant steel satisfied inspectors frein the Nuclear installed with Iwo purposes ii, mind. One catensive repairs.
pressure cooker.The containment buddmg itegulatory Commission. In late August, was to keep the hole day whde lhe wos k in-
"Due to water sceping from the raJial surrounds and encloses it and it in turn sur-1977, NRC inspector W.G. Ilubecek Gled side is procceded. The othu was 10 allow a cracks in the mat," the report reads, rounds and cucloses,the nuclear reactor a' report' describing the procedure controlled '*re<hargmg"of thc wates table
't**
f
" placement of concrete over these cracks and its essential working parts. The con-EllASCO used to seal the cracks in Water-arousJ the plant as it went up.
[
t could possibly allow grosmd water to find a sainment vessel, at its lowest poms in the ford's foundation mat, commented on it
ihere was a stage release of the ground
[1 h
leak path abrough so she con'ainment dead center of the containnient budding,is favorably and corwtuded that the signifi-water, as lisian Grant describes the pro-l
]
vessel, raising quesaions as to the integrity only 2% feet from top of th'c foundation cant construction deficiency involving the cess, **lt was designed to keep the load on of the vcwel. The 12 foot thick common mat. Once the vessel is in place un-cracks in the man was considered closed.
the foundation sods at a roughly constant s 4
f y[;'
foundarian mas is considered thick enough remforced " fill concrete"is poured ground
!!ut was it?
. Icvel durms the gwogress of the work. As h
to not require waterpsoofing to prevent it and up its sides for 33% feet.1hc entire la now seems not. The appearance of the foundation was loaded by the construc-c j
leakage, sherefore. alus defica is considered 33% lowesa cleva6iun feet of the contam, more cracks in the fousulation mat in the lion of the supersaructure above it, the k f
- 8 ta have possibly adversely affected the safe ment buildmg surroundmg the contain-intervening years, including those ground water would be allowed de r eturn eo operation of the plant and is considered a ment vessel, m other words, is filled witn discovered within the last few weeks. sug-a higher and higher level in stages in order q
i
's gesi that the problems they disclose are to keep the load on the sods roughly con-i sigmficans deviata.a from performarwe concreec.
specifications which wdl require extensive When the cracks in 80c foradalion mai
- n. ore fundamental. Waterfoed's nuclear stant."
repairs so establida tiie adequancy of she beneath the containment vessen were island was designed on the engineering I
g structure.
discovered, the beginnmg of this process assumption, according to E!!ASCO's j
was only a few days away. 'the only reason Brian Grant, that the hydaostatic pressures
]
f, ii cspite this anxious assessment of the cracks in the foundanon mas presented beneath the plant wouki remain constant the serioinness of the cracking a problem, according to G ans,is that they once the structure was completed. Things ometime in March,1977, however,
)
i l
l in Waterford's foundation, the might provide enough moi 9ure to weaken do not seem to have worked out according problems developed with the pump -
I
.i P & l/EllASCO resolution of the pro-the bond between the fillconcrete and the to plan.
ing process and EllASCO's i
blem hardly seems to address the concern Ioundation mat. That had to be prevented.
Dec'ause the water tabh, along the engineers were not able to maintam the q
,4..
o i
waier levels and the' coreesponding l
expressed ahove. After faihng in an at-So the cracks were chipped out, filled with Misssssippi itiver is so close so the surface j
tempt to pressure anject epony into the epony, painsed witti epony again until the.
and Waterford's common foundation mat hydrostatic pressures beneath the comnum
, )
,3, dl
- c. "
U 'I..i cracks, an eIfora apparemly designed to sceping Hopped, observed for one day and begins 48 feet below mean sea level, much foundation mat alwir engineering theory j
, [ )(j
]
hacrally glue them together, another, less then the pouring of the fillconcrete began.
of the plant's weight is displaced by she assumed they could. According to Grant, 8
?,
artful but simdat measure was taken. A EllASCO's engineers had two primary water surrounding is. Ahhough it is far that failure may have beca the causc of the tb h (M4, / g.g 0 t(
g one inch deep trench was chipped away concerns regarding the eracks, according to from a true " boat" the physics of the pro.
initial cracks in Waterford's foundation
+;!
ysp'Q.t3]Mp. T
]
- ;!] q-along the length of each crack which was both Grant and LP&Us Gerrets. One:
cess has many simdarisies, shus ale mat.
>'. ;', I
,^
would the seepage of water up through the '
" nuclear island" concept and the idea to "The l' kling of the foundation mat 1
MlI'-
then filled with epony. "A final surface l
7*
coat of epony was brushed on,"
cracks destroy the integrity of the bond be.
" float" Waterford's huge mass'without could havt reversed during that time," he e <
i' EBASCO's Brain Grant emplained to Gam-tween the fill concrete surrounding the con.
the benefit of pihngl. In order for shis told Gamust dunns the May 10 interview at Y
j h
bit, describing the process of repair sainment vessel and the nuclear island's engineering theory to hold, however, the Wates ford. 9his may be where some oi she lj )'i EllASCO turned to "to established the foundation? Two: coukt waier seeping hydrostatic pressures be6 cash and surroun.
cracks devcloped that subsequently sceped I!'
k,k k
,i adequacy" of the foundation's structure.
through the cracks reach the containment ding the plant must stay conssant, accor.
because the nature of the load on the mat j
i W
"This was repeated as accessary," Grant vessel esself and create corrosion, perhaps ding to Grant. 'that seems not to have hap.
"and the way it was (1 cains would have been
, lj
, l!
W said, "until the sceping stopped before the enough corrosion to weaken the vesself pened.
changed by the rise in the water table anJ i
When Wate: ford's construction liegas' a lhe creation of uphft underncash the niat 6' s
fill concscle was placed so there wouldn't The epony solusion and other ecchnical which was not there before."
S ant excavation was afug where the plans
^
' y 3
)
l g
be any damage to the fdl concrett rom assessments resolved both of those qtacs-i f
new sits. In order ta keep thc hole dry while Ahhough acknowledging the posubic
[
'H,
,l j
waser welling up from below."
tions successfully, according to Ilrian 5
j i j gi
(
2 R
' W j
q
%,kj
]
[
.tw C ;7 m M...w $.. %
f, A
@ $39@Hw d ygi gi g m @ h w. g g g 4Tg y g m
k l
,:..., ~,-
... ~.
.. w
... ~
-r, m,
l te i t I [
' M g.
I A
i V
' (.
I 2
- ~
? lI role of the failure of the engineering theory Assurance Manager for Water ford,'
adhered to in the company's plant. It is a
,g L in the appearance of the initial cracks ia acknowledged the discovery in a telephone
. form of a contract between the federal' M Q-'
n n.e.
8 i-d Waterford's nuclear island foundation interview on May I 8, saying that the plant's regulatory agency and the utdity, requiring 3
mat, both Gerrets and Grant insisted that foundation mat could be described "as not the utility to execute th< construction and Q - --
l e
f I
[ !!
there were no other cracks of significance being water tight at the present time." Ger,
engineering plan the FSAR describer.
~
~{
iI!
in the (cundation. On the following day, rets said that he didn't know ho, the prob-
]
l r
L
~ j l !
however, an inspection was conducted and lem would be resolved, but he thought that.
a g
i i
E
' the cracks in the floor of the gas surge tank it was written up lo get Waterford's Final l hanging the F3AR,however,is pot h,p room, the waste gas tank room and waste Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) changed. l an unusual approach taken by'
' kNI l
"We found some (cracked and seeping) utdity companies hooked on the6 areas that are fairly hmited and that hasl gas compression room "D** of the reactor l.
horn of a thorny construction or design DakSWd F
t-h j auuhary buikling were reported in a non-s M l conformance report dated May 11,198L been documented," he said. "I think the :
dilemma, according to sources familiar mat of the reactor auxiliary budJms," the conformance report) is to really get the dustry.
'D e "There are concrete cracks in the base main reason for the NCR (non-with practices in the tiucicar power in-:
i [i j
i l
l l [ [ l if report reads. "his is evidenced by the per.
FSAR changed. The Final Safety Analysis Questions revolving around the cracks io 4
it j', plation of water in small amounts up Report is a comprehensive report the Waterford's foundation mas, sucanwhde,'
Menu for May 23-May 28,
i.
h[i h j through the cracks." The cracks reported Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires are among the topics staff investigators for ;
h 5 MondayM3rd! ' '
.! { arc a mirror imarc of those first discovered utihties building nuclear power plants to the U.S. Ifouse of Representatives
- Sub '
i
[
l ': in July,1977,beneath the reactor contam-compile detailing their design, construc-committee on Energy and the Environment
[
j i
mern vessel.
tion, engineering and quahty assurance have asked investigators for the NRC in Chicken P6cata
! '.j Tom Gerrets. L P& L's Quality program, among others, that will be Washington to check into, a
CrMrtichokc Quiche jlj Seafood Basque
[
l ;'W Special Sale On
'"Sh 2 g
Zucciani Quiche 4
j p k.
e Design-It-Yourself Sofas & Sofa Beds!
E"ad yh
'~"
Top Ilat Pork Medalhons
" *:n i 25% Off All Floor Models! 50% Off All Fabrics in Stockl Baked vidaiia ordons a
Spirmh Soup i
g:
Ihursday 26th_
j M
~
m
,e Peached Redfish with C, aper Sauce l
g 'MEAy h> e[ [}].-
Eriday 27th Q {U Pick the Style...
?"", D; ^'=aad2a*
25- _,cr #
GQg$.r--
' 4' j
L Choose from ovel sgge j
brnbalay.
gg j
different s,.
b Crawfish Plc j
stylos. froditional.
r rile Gumbo v
3 contemporory and
[.Q, iritafween. Each of ouf ggggggY. 2M l;! 't quohly constfucted Dewey's Darbequed Chkken
. i, sofo-beds pfovides ller s Baked Beans i -i:.
superior comfort elfher
]
j
--me, I
i l
... - %.g l
l
~
,e*
rn s e r~
Not To Worry J
9 Nuclear Regulatory Commission t-it!
- Water scepage through the founda-Waterford's design calls for the plant, to By RON R!DENHOUR
.,-4 y
agiee.
tion was not anucipated by Waterford*s be a sort of steel and concrete boat floatmg im Fort, Louisiana Pomr lhnt remains to be seen.
designers, raising questions about the ade-on the water.irspregnated sands bes. cath A
l 5
l' L pubh. Light l
and Company's Th"'i' ia f'c' a go d dealofinf rma.
quacy I the origi,nal dedgn and the and su.roundMg it. In order to get their 1
tion available, includmg comments made engmeerms assumpoons it is based on.
boat in the uner, however, Waterford's c spokesman, told by LP&L officials on the day before the
- New cracks in the foundation, engineers had io install a complicated water Gattibtl last week that LP&L newesi cracks were discovered, which iug.
discovered on May II, suggest ihaithe control ana pumping system designed to officials met on Monday, May gests that the cracks in Waterford's foun.
design and engineering prot lems responsi-keep the excavation dug for the common 23 and aE d'"""""d'""9"i""b"'
bie for the rirrt eracks are yet so be iesolv-roundaiion mat dry w hile the huge slab =as eyed hard im.ced to take a cleaf-
'I 8
the integrity of the plant's design and the ed, raising further questions about LP&L's put together and the three structures it sup-m; e about the weep-crrect it may have on water rord's promise assumptions about their ability to ports went up.
l I
ing, hai,line cracks that have been appear-to operate safely.
guarantee Waterford's safe operathn.
According to Water ford's design theory ing in the foundation of the Waterford III
- Ahhough the water seeping through Waterford's "floatmg" design is unique the ground water at the plant site would be nuclear power plant since 1977. Don't the cracks in Waterford's foundation is among U.S. nuclear reactors. Louisiana's allowed to flow back into the area beneath F
=
y,,,,,
l worry about the cracks, Fort said. Hey currently a minimal amount, the plant's peculiar geology, particularly the mushy and around the nuclear island on a con-1 I,
don't mean anything.
design requires the foundation to be water-
" jelly ground" nature of the soils nearest trolled basis as the plant went up, a process g
"These hairline cracks... are absolutely tight throughout its espected 30-40 year the river, induced Waterford's designers to called sc<harging. Under the re<harging
' W i ( 'l insignificant to the structural integrit !
operating life.
P an a foundation for the plant that includ-theory, the flow of groundwater would be j l
l that plant," Fort said. "We met Monday,
- LP&L internal documents written in cd no pilings. Mrce of Waterford's four conteoPed in such a way that the water sur-
' 3 I
"j several of us did, on this particular thing.
1977 after cracks in the foundation directly.
major buildings, all of tluwe dealing with rounding the nuclear island wou!J be in a j
Of course, as everybody who's k nowledge-below Waterford's nuclear reactor were the handling of nuclear materials, were state of equilibrium vis a vis the weight of l
able about it said, it's just absolutely first discovered ca!!cd them a "significant built on what is called a " common founda-the nuclear island, creating a buoyant ef-l nothing to worry about and we're not 30-deviation from performance specifica-tion mat", an enormous steel-reinforced fect that would actually " float" the island a
5 3
l ing to worry about it." Fort also said that tions" which could affect the " safe opera-concrete slab rneasuring 270 feet in width, on the hydrostatic sand around it.
l LP&L officials are sure that the U.S.
tion of the plant."
380 feet in lengih and 12 feet in thickness.
In the spring of 1977, however, not long
=
r hhf1k h
{.f.
h
(
9
. w.
' i u-r.
i l
Collecting A Mandate i
s i
a i
u
! l j
%s2
' i Mdb. I'm circuMing
%n't you Mink that ih
.. bust up gul s
l l q m, I i
$r!
U N.h I
t,!1!!! M f M T, P 0"WQ[f[".%, !
^
II
'i E
i L
I j
j l
i I
l
=
i l
j i
)
j i
l l
llll j
l
,l j
l
+
i>
,'j t
I I
-l q
i l
l ll I
l l
g P
L.!
b l I
I l
i
[.
q g
i.
, j;,,yL 3_ j 4
i 7
-ep.
^
- ~ ~
eg., _..
m.,
.N N
";w.
. e : &' e, T
2m m zig;.
L,;;! w.j p ;3-h a
.f."..J w,55?;.@g f~ 4; T
.;,. W
'(i.-;
P :,'
IP;
'!d.6! !
m 3
j.
! ! u. u v
!i h '-
tiefore the first cracks beneath the plant's particular given amount, because it comes NP.C approsal to change their Final Safety ideas include develornns t he property, con-
' ![
l reactor were discovered at Wates ford, in several varietics... At this time in the Analysis Report (ISAR)in a way which
- erting she faohty into a penon or posubly d
there was a problem with the water re.
plant hfe you'd cupect it to be pretty stable doesn't require Water ford to be watertight.
turning she fac hty over so the national
~
y charging system. Waterford's engineers and I understand that's exactly the case."
De FSAR is LP&L*s basic bloeprint for guard or uaic puhee.
l were not able to control the rate of re.
On the day after this conversation eccur.
the construction of Waterford, a sort of br f ears there has been talk abous clos-l*
charging in the way their design and con.
red May ll,1993 EDASCO engineers contract with the NRC which outlines how ing the facihty, which is located on a me.
struction plan called for. According to a wrote a new non<unformance report an-Waterford is built and guarantees its dean strip bounded by West End, Robert E.
tce ar.d Ponichartrain boulesards.
4[.l.
civil engineer for Waterford's prime con.
nouncing the discovery of new ct acks in the safety.
a L
N. ii!
tractor, the architect <ngineering firm of foundation of Waterford's nuclear island.
At one time there were discussions that f'DASCO Services, Inc., there was a lag in According to non<onformance report $
gg the center should be used by the Mosquito M %j.,! P !
the called for state of equihbrium between E212, repnrted in language mirroring that contsol Board to breed cannibal mos-
. '.q the weight of the plant and that of the waler used back in 1977 to report the first cracks a
MO
" " " ' ' ^ " " ' " ' ' " ' ' " * * ' ' " " ' ' ' " '.
T
]~![q ding to Brian Grant, the EDASCO civil colating up through new cracks discovered Hoth proposals were dropped, however, underground shcher to store ciay records M
in she soils sur roandmg it. That lag, accor.
dncovered, water was discovered to be per-4 4
l
[!
enginect, caused the common foundation in the floor of the reactor auxiliary umors that the cily plans to close the and City llatt officials ws,: *t indicate any
- I
- I mat to flea in an unanticipated way, buildings, which is in turn the top of the Ci.il Defense Center at the lake end definiac future plans.Of feoalsonly say that l
i; creating a condition EDASCO's engineers common foundation mat.
of West [nd floulevard ase proving to be closure is a posubdity.
'i 4
have since analyzed as ** stress reversal".
While LP&L officials and spokesmen irue. City llall of ficials are now admitting Of course, the proposal raises queuions
[I' i
' 9' Sitess reversal, a reflection of motion in the continuetominimitetheimportanceof the that the proposal is under consideration.
as to whether there is a need for the Cisil
- j'-
}-
foundation, created cracks in the founda.
cracks and the w ater sceping through them, I her e n much speculation as so what abe ci.
Defense Center. Ihe facihty was budi in I!
I tion that ran all the way through it, which they also say they are considering seeking ty wdi do in the event of a closure. Some the late '50s
- hen there was much concern h!
in turn allowed water to come th ough.
t w.1.
+
)g i[.F/, p* rp.
j i Waterford's boat, in other words, was i
i springing leaks.
)y d.
i Despite the sanguine attitude towards f,. n.a,.
gy a
- I l
the problem currently being displayed by j [f I PAL officials, the discovery of those ty g~ W,9
~
L,
,3
[!
uacks in 1977 caused a gscat deal of con-l cern then. In a seport written on July 29, 1(
Qo' If 1977, an unidentsfied EDASCO ofGcial
- ! N.,d, U '
- il
' h' i l [!
'O*J
-E i
j
;l Y
[s, i
wrote that: "De 12 foot thick common 4
!L foundation mat is considered to be thick I !l if enough to not require waterproofing to 3,}.4 P 'i
.j 4
h 4 Y'
[;4,}g$h}h j
j'h j'
prevent leakage, therefore, this dcIect is
- umsidered to have possibly adversely af-j..
'f* it {,
ql fected the safe operation of the plant and is i
comedered a significant deviation from 3
>s Q'
l ep k'
D Aff r
g,' i performance specifications which will se.
NI pire cutensive repairs to establish the ade-g IN "SECOND BEST" I
fj Ih' quacy of the_str.ucture.".A..few days later
,l i
1 g
3 r_.
' t!
h W.Lj B
+
7 i
i /L T r 0.i, ;,
That's why we insist on us6ng only the freshest, finest ingredients and
.p d
!r I
4 h3. !' M*%)
preparing our dishes the way they should be prepared - step by o
j 3
3,.-
1, fq
[ g' y
7 7; r
r 'j
' ]
.l l
-l
' ;K
. j i.; ]i 1 l
l i
l
. i 1
4 i
i.
. I p
F i
i
]
I i
I l
l l
.1 i
([
F1 L
f
(
~
^~ ~..
i
~
? Quality,ordrol Failure At LP&L coql the reac, tor in an emerghey, a failure. !
plained: "Of particular 'cdncern is the lack leading directly to significant re-worldng of nuclear experience throughout the A /
By RON RIDENHOUR @1983 on each of the systems and the NRC man.
organization and the, apparent lack of ap. -
dated re-training-of workers involved in preciation by high-level management of the hf%
m 6Enitude of the project it is cports by the Nuclear !
those projects.
LP&Lspokesman Jim Forte and Water, tmdertakmg.
Regulatory Comnu<ss on rord plant manager David B. l.cster both i
and a senes of manage-sold Gambit that they had no idea what im-LP& L's downplaying of the importance ment audits of Louisiana act the failure to catch the problems at an of the quality assurance program Power and'Li ht Company in-arly gage has had on the cost of Water-throughout.the plant's construction pro-ford's construction nor how long the prob-dicate that LP&L's Waterford tems would delay the project's completion.
F Y
'#'" * *""Y 9" "5 ^5 'h*
- 5' os i
III nuclear power plant'. Was.
Neither would say what the relationship ofunder's and ng o he m tu e f built with madequate quality assurance between the problems of the four emer-Waterford's compicxity' programs because of one of the leanest gency coolant systems had on LP&L's re-According to Richard Ilubbard of MilB technical staffs in the. nuclear power in,
scheduling of the plant's projected comple-Technical Associates of San Jose, Califor-tion date from nud-1983 to early 1984. Nor nia, LP&L's high level management's reac-dustry. He management audits, commis- )
would they comment on the relationship tion to the demands of quality assurance "
~
l sioned by LP&L but not previously made public, took place over a period of several )
betwcen tho;c problems and LP&L's shared by many utility executives, general!
years from the mid-1970s to'the present, simultaneous announcement that the six or i
while the NRC reports more months of delay would be accom g people who tend to think of nuclear reac-
, conclusions appeared m,reaclung the same 1
tors as simply another way of boilin8 1981.and 1982.
pamed by a 5500 m thon leap m.
water.
Taken together, the reports raise serious Waterford's ultimate cost.
"He NRC says t hat quality assurance is questions about the entire quahty assur-
- Ite timmg of the two events, hoyvever, essential," llubbard, the former mana er ance program at LP&L, which is responsi-suggests that there may mdced by a sub-of quality assurance for General Electric' i
l bleboth for assuring safety at the ptant and 8 stantive link. Although the en,tical NRC Nuclear Division, told Gambit in a avondmg costly delays and reworkmg of '
~ report and,the accompanying fine were an-telephone interview last week. "Qualit systems. Waterford til has been subject to '
pounced to the pubhc m, December, they assurance must be a program and it mus I
j yvere based on an NRC quality assurance be implemented. Onc orthet hings that I've repeated delays and cost overruns mspect,on conducted between May 16 and found is that almost everybody has a pro-throughout its more than 10-ycar history.
s 1
l While concedm, g that their record at
, July 15,1982.
Waterford has,been b!cmished by a critical lzster professed complete confidence a,rt. gram. If you went out to Waterford they'd
' show you a set of manuals a foot high but I
NRC report and an accompanying $20,000 Fl[c_ quality assurance philosophy employed what Ihe results of Diablo Canyon and fine, both fikt! by the commission last by'LP&L at Waterford throt1ghout the other plants have shown is that while December, LP&L exectatives vigorously i
cour se of the construction project, which is utilities had a program they didn't imple-defended the company s construction and
- now said to be 97 percent finished. But a ment it. nat may be because they didn't l
sa fety record at the ncarly complete nucicar series of NRC reports has been sharply have enough peopic or the people weren't
~
plant,n a three-hour mierview last week, critical of LP&L's management of the properly trained. It usually gets back to the i
. staunchly asseaing that LP&L's decision Waterford project in general, particularly,
fact that the management wasn't behind to mamtain a ' lean and mean" qpalilY aheir approac! to quality assurance on the assurance group at Waterford will ulti-construction s te.
' ; nuY
~7 "~""
Ofparticular mately benefit the company's customers In an interim report on Waterferd filed s
through decreased costs.
I by. the NRC's Advisory Comminee on
' gf cern is the lack
, Charges filed against LP&L by the'NRC
. Reactor Safeguards on August II,1981, f I
8 m its December 6,1982 report, however raise doubts that a skeleton quality j
committee chainnan J. Carson Mark com -
nuC Br assurimcc (QA) crew has cut the costs of
-plained to rhe NRC that "the management experience #
Water ford's construction. To the contrary and staffing at Waterford ill is less well
[/)f10ughout t/n]'
=I the repori details the failure of LPAL's established Ihan at other nuclear plants at a-romte ncti.m O T sta ff to c.. i nn.n...n...
similar time dmme their comtmeti9n and.
m._
II r
I "um '
e-r-r vr m-pm, v a
- t. A
~
such' a program to the extent that they i pt9-13 should have been."
traits, these personnel cannot, in hfAC's Licensing, construction arid operation opinion, adequately cover those facets of of nuclear power plants are regulated by construction monitoring that 'should be the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
die case of Waterford, to be ultisaately covered to ensure LP&L is receiving appro ^
. Quality assurance is more than a simple 7g# a sp n ibic for qualityassurance. As a fur.
priate performance for the. dollars
.. h.PPgggfMn Of ther cross-check the commission requires being expended." The report went on to phrase under the NRC's guidelines. It is a difelP nedeng/ncer/ng quality control and quality assurance in-suggest that LP&L's QA staff at Water-carefully mandated and slefined program designed to guarantee that nuclear power practiccf andthorough spectims to be made and " signed off" at ford be expanded to cover a number of plants are built according to the NRC's ri I
.subcontradors. contractors ancas that were then going un-monitored y d t he prime cont ractor, a company in the standards, something the NRC calls : inun#8einent and 70-P an by LP&L, the same recommendation the "essentialtoIheprotectionofpublic. health gmnunatic controls to the thse of Waterford called EDASCO Sevices, report said hianagement Analysis con-and safety and of the environment."(See dcSlgn,fabricadon,
] i ty to assure die quality of the work of the,y. Ultimately, however, th sultants had made to LP&L in 1977, two box). It is, typically, an area of primary concern to contractors working on A i confIructlan and Operatlan of. 4,000 workers at Waterford is LP&L's.years earlier, when they had conducted a similar assessment of Waterford's con-nuclear power plant constrinction sill; npc/carpowerplan/ SIS According to a management consulting struction operations.
because any part of the plant that does not t cSSentialto theprotect/On of limi hired by LP&L to assess the Interestingly, nearly every short-coming meet the NRC's constructioq standards thepublic hfalth andSafety
'*"P""I s management of the Waterford of LP&L's QA program cited in the NRC's n
mu'st be brolight up to those standards, at !
construct on project in 1979, Management complaint filed in December,1982, was i
least theoretically, before that part of the i and of the em'ironment.
Analysis Company (MAC) of San Diego forecast in the 1979'msnagement report project will be okayed by NRCinspectors. ' Quality aSSuranceprorldcy California, LP&Us five-person quality Management Analysis Company submit-It is particularly important to contractors ! fhjg nggggga7), gjgcj jjne and
. assurance staff for construction was the ted to LP&L in 1979. Despite the MAC p
because on most nuclear projects the work l control. Throilgh a qua#ty sma!! cst of any nuclear power plan (llien recommendations, however, as well as must pass NRC QA standards before final.
under construction in the country. prear some in-house pressure 'to heed them, payment is made.
aSSuranceprogram that meets
".MACis not awareoranyotherttuc LP&L s iop management reveis continued Work that doesn't measure up is simply lVuclearllegulatory project in tius country wherein construc-.
to insist that a five-person quality ordered rc<fone, no questions asked, or at tion as bems momtored by as few owner in-l assurance group could adeq'iately monitor least that's the way it's supposed to be.
ConuniSSlon requirements, Gg dividuals," the July 31,1979 report reads.
she work of 5,000!aborers. According to To ensuie that NRC QA standards are i organitationSper[Ornung
The personnel... for I,P&L at the Water-LP&L documents nowin Gambifs posses-met, the commission requires the company work that IS ultimately related ford"!H site are hardworking, dedicated sion. (Se debate oveg the size and adequacy holding the co'nstruction pcmit, LP&L in Ii ii a s.
n spite f these of LP&Us QA scam bubbled' quietly I to theSafety Of aplant I operation are rcquired to throughout the entire penod of construc.
t /.
2, h.
tion untilit was finally forced Io Ihe surface coniluct the work in a pre-d by the approaching coinpletion of the p! ant P anned and docmnented and the need 1 begin preparations for l
actual operanon.
Manner (O [# dependently i
The chronology of events revealed in the rcrify die adequacy of the
- NRC report, reflected against the back-completed work, to proride ground or the ignored MAC study, raises TcCordS that willcon)Irm the serious questions about thE huge cost over-runs of Waterford, the adequacy of the acceptability O[ Work and plant's construction, its safety and could manufactureditemsand to call into question the viability of the entire assure that allm. dividualS construction quality assurance program at Waerford, including the NRC's tole in the involved with the work are properly trainedand qua#fied -
tp carry out their rapomibilitia.
' - Nuclear Regulatory Conuniwlon Annuni Renort.
o...
process.
As Waterfordmeamicompletion in the closing days of 1981, the NRC began to pressure LP&L lo add the final component then undertook act ual " walk down" audits to its QA program, an element called or physical inspections of the systems to operations quality assurance, an entity compare the actual work to the paper trail wholly separate from construction QA.
EBASCO and its minions had prepared.
Construction QA is charged with assuring What followed was a (istressing set of the integrity of the construction process, revelations. LP&L's QA auditors, who but ogierations QA must assure Ihat the.
theoretically had been at least spot-plant is fit for nuclear operations. Opera-checking the work of EBASCO and its con-tractors and subcontractors as the work tions Qb is not added until the plant is
, developed, discovered that, nearingithe point in its construction "although schedule where the prime contractor is EUASCO QA had represented the systems preparing to start turning the plant over to as being ready for turnover and had in-its owner: LP&L in the case of Waterford.
cluded statements that the quality records
- Ihe plant is not tumed over in one fell
' had been reviewed, (they) had not actually swoop, but rather in a picccmeal, system-compared the records with the 'as-built by-system fashion.
systems. In fact,"the records oid nof ac-Under pressure from the NRC and tually represent a true statutof the systems
- included statements from contractors andat that time." Additionally, the packag behind schedule islate 1981, LP&L finally filled two of its six permanent operations QA positions in Deceniber, bringing in I EBASCO QA indicating tht! portions of Ihrcc other QA people from of her positions the packages 'were incomplete and not in the company on a temporary basis to fill QA/QCacceptable.
all but one of the six pqsitions. By then Ultimately LP& L uncovered a myrihd of EUASCO, LP&L's prime contractor of problems in the four systems as 1) the as-Waterford had already certified threc j built drawings didn't accurately reflect systems as being completed and ready for
. what was in fact built; 2) reverse slope tub-tumover. By early 1982, EDASCO and its ing runs; 3) incorrect seismic support contractors and subcontractors hatt cer-designations; 4) dimensional errors; 5) sup-tified four more systems, which together ports not installed; 6) improper bolting; comprise the heart of the criticallyimpor-
- 7) deformed tubing; 8) tubing and bolt tant emergency core coolant system: the heads not allowing for thermal expansion.
containment spray system, the high pres-These problems and others prompted a sure safety injection system, the low series of immediate re-training programs pressure safety injection system and the for contractor personnel, re-work and re-safety injection tanks.
inspection of all the various specified prob-Prompted by inadequacies discovered Icm areas. On one system only 50 of 338 by LP&L's operations QA group in the hangers were found acceptable.
systems EBASCO reptesented as ready for
' Suddenly, after fighiing the prospect of adding to its construction QA staff for over operations, LP&L's construction QA undertook a careful audit of what are
'seven yeais during which the vast bulk of called the four " turnover packages." Dis-Waterford's construction had been com-covering serious <liscrepancies in pleted, LP&L acted swiftly to beef up their EBASCO's quality records, an extensive and EllASCO's construction QA. staffs.
set of " controls" the NRC requires the LP&L doubled the staff of its construction contractors to maintain, construction QA 1
6
',:'p r ; e
.. = -.
3-it-1.5 QA group. EBASCO raised its QA num-tractors, the prime contracter (EBASCO),
MacKenzie's cone:rn. " Anytime there a're.
bers from 10 to 17 and added another 30 LP&L and the NRC failed to discover nusaUegations made that the quality re-record reviewers.
merous instances of substandard construe. quirements are not being met the public hr.s Although tP&L stoked up its QA crew tion work in four of the reactor's mest concern," according to Hubbard. "You in the beginning of l982 and the period that critical safety systems. What else did they do all these analyses of accidents and so foUowed, they had been informed of the miss?
- forth, but aD those analyses are based on problems long before. According to "I g' ess it just comes down to a things working the way they're supposed to u
George "Les" Constab!g the NRC's resi-philosophy difference," Constable finaHy and being designed correctly. If you End dent inspector at Waterford, LP&L observed. "LP&L hired EBASCO to build "didn't perceive" the situation as prob-the plant for them and to do the quality in.
eout that the design was not implememed properly or the construction that vds su Iematic. " Hey argued very strongly that spection of the plant."
posed to be done in a certam way viasn'p.
rh he unanswered questions in au this then all the assurances you have9are t,
revolve around money and safety. How meaningless."
much has LP&L's insistent failure to Gary Groesch of Citizens for Safe fonow the advice ofits consultants and the How many errors in urgings of NRC officials concernmg the in.
Energy, is concemed about the vision of Waterford's quality assurance program adequare size of wateriores quality assur.
outuned by & NRC disclosures and othe quaIfly are DOW
.ance staff cost in terms of re-work and documents. "Who knows what kind.of delays in completion of the plant? How plant LP&L has at Waterford?" Groesch--
Cover 9d With Cement many aron in quauty am now coveed told GamW "LP&l.doesn't know. WiW with cement or hidden behind uuulation or that kind of quality assurance program orhidden behind lost in
- bowels a the plant's =neuit
- y muldn't "
InSU/affon?
or... or what? What is the danger to the LP&L of course takes exception to public?
Groesch's contention that they couldn't According to Dr. James MacKenzie of know whether or not Waterford IIIis safe, the Washington D.C. based Union of According to plant manager Dave Lester, a what they were doing was saving their con--
Concemed Scientists, a group of primarily product of Admiral Hyman Rickover's Ph.D. refugees from the nuclear power in-nuclear navy, there are systems on top of sumers money," Constable told Gambit last week, "because they didn't need to dustry who now oppose it, the conse-
. systems on top of systems at the plant, all have au those layers of quality control.
quences of poor QA can be very serious, designed to prevent accidents. Lester spent "De technology reaHy requires uncom-part oflast week rnnning the plant through nat's what they hired EBASCO to do.
prommn? quality everywhere," MacKen.
mock emergency operations. He is, con.
That was their standard argument."
zie told Gambit in a telephone interview, vinced that the odds of an accident happen.
According to Constable LP&L's actions "in the design, in the consuuction of the ing at Waterford are off the chart. "So were all legal, as long as they're the " bag plant and the components that go into it.
breakdowns had occurred in a number of To the extent that a utility fails to maintain many things have to go wrong at once," he-holder." LP&L did finally discover that said, "so many things have to break down this program it is just jeopardmng the peo-at the same time, it's just inconceivable."
areas, Constable said, but "wc stiu cited ple around it. As soon as an incident Lester also believes that the fact that the
- them for aHowing it to happen in the first ocurs, whether it is a valve or a pump or problems with the emergency cooling sys-place beause some of the problems had whatever that breaks down, then the tem were discovered during the audits con-gone through severat layers on inspection."
chickens are going to come home to roost, ducted by the operations quality assuranc?
In other words, the quality insurance in-He safety of the public requires a very staff and fu:ther nailed down by the con.
tWough quality assurance program."
sunction QA staffis proof that the plant's spectors for t e subcontractors, the con-MHB's Richard Hubbard shares cross-checking system works. Admittedly, h
it would have been better if they had been discovered earlier, Lester said, but the im-partant point is that they were caught.
And, he cautions, there were several other :
layers of tests yet to be conducted after the audits that finally did disclose the trotiblein.
the emergency cooling system.
Richard Hubbard has a different view.
"You test and inspect along the way,"
Hubbard said. "Some thmgs become im-possible to test or inspect later on because i
you pour concrete around it or you put in-sulation over it or things of that sort and it makes it very difficult to go back and take a look. So if you've had a real breakdown '
along the way there are some thmgs that are very difficult to know the quality of."
"nere is a very large econornic aspect to this," Hubbard continued. "CWng it that late in the cycle means that there's more delay... and that costs money. Dere are severe economic consequences for not catching these problems in a timely fashion."
m
p y
.r.
. ~ '...
g.
e hy dhw-':
Coms. ?;p.mCW s-du~ ~-
misin:,9
- n. - -
MtMuisiaha.Ppsyr4ndiTJ
_ongsi:hedu!c3Iny.l.
a
> pany President.fack Mh3Myatt; moved'thiplant*3co 4
- barckg, fdi1P&L'i2x~eiiu'tf7c~suitef Ydocths' lotificet:"iiiibredialistic.*
EhitgW ~
in ~
t
'scSiddli IdD
$60Wciin belaid ficTohb
~
IQtPgQa Uy 9'pe6ple:who" an
~gth on 'ditiibmo.miMitW5ckM J
~
^^
Mfdtd'rJinitiaritt ' " " obtaid'an an donths#thisitTaselwithbstT
[structionjermit!
_. ' '"the"NRCMithfan Mitdr[$j ch"We beliive it ereforcs
~
M@on:per'und30iiidsthb. Wit $if6y delayin%1itilidEg'thedonstr6ii
.tt?g*d 3n
? ann
~'
Zw6did bisperanngioda91t the'empitil
'ftisist,i6eifWsfeffoid' ure'!
~
!tcostlesithad31.billfdk/LW att'said1
' zatuenst$notherfstictmdaths,M
'9 August.when-LP,&Ifatidou[rsed aniginithe'totalislippagdfifth'Epis:it'sp
~ditionaLdelay. ingar.eiford'sicompI pletichYdateEfollowiiigtLP&fjN i
Ttion date and anether cos'tr Eieife
' " ptioCEcomW6erf6i egmir/
r
$beennodeliyin'o%iininU5sboh.th"Eiei ^~;$ttiiddttG@
u
$thi,Eine 6f.350rddIITon3"Hid f
't6i39784.H8Eschmmittee -
ititip Mtion:perrmt thi'slief~would'liiVe'bhen.jW6c p,oienidientMicis6ns,'Edditibed hcompleted pdotto'tlic'mysiad of'ieguWidng'oKfheWRC'o'r citiffninte:veho
- ,latory changes' Yhd'tliiiiocreising5diffpT.!.ITrtlietto'nfiarh'],the'H6oset' '
3ficulty in' constructing #a~nucicar fyiiiiiiish.'FPC'(FederalP6iiver Cdmmis.g
@ti6di.%.g a piriod/offrecor,d.gowerj<.#jsibirM'nf'Cordissico)'stidstics call 6d'thc'Pederal Enefg'yM t" plant durin mfra-Regtiliiloty R&'f Fe'deialt re@gulatory > infinenc.Qthat'mistiianagerbentis mbri of a'dstiM M
i&~}WM*
essininaritt bah'freguratoiy chadgespbds t
T;telArive. to safety,sciited uncertamties$9ci6zsirjo' position in'incr; easing c renvironmental'and
.l',legalissues Aith ass p
fin-the interfrelitionships.have been the $?Quotingi1977 Cdngressional Research!:"
Q ServicePstudy2the r reporte said CthatM
?prisdaiy cause of<at'.lenttiS13biIlicirL*2Mlehgthy.f:66structionthbes'arelisitlieQ
$doliars of the presentiiestimated cost off('iesult@filic:'pidsent'fedeial*licensing
- Waferford III//.Wyatt added/b "* WUs ster'n t}iiiithefare'6f the usce tai 1Not everyone igrees.4 i A'-d$'Maboufetpicted 'growib ih electrical'de EC
~
r nty n
?'9 Congress, in fact, takes specific issue umand andofthe financial difficuhics oC s
rwith Wyatt's contentions in an OctoberB intiliticiin ' obtaining capital 16 fund"ci' -4 l
" 1981' report of the H.ouse Committee on 2:
- Government Operationsr" Unforeseen l
- '!pe.sive'm'iclear construction ~piojecis.*f i
' Indeed the timing of LP&L's lates:
l
' ' difficulties in managing this complex 2 rescheduling announcement forWater '
j and sophisticated technology (nuclear. : ford's~ completion raises the question of]
l
~
power), unanticipated problems in rais V E mismanagement on the part of LP&L,Y mistakes by utility management are theibg the necessary capital and plain did V listed when'the company announced the '
real reasons for construction stretch r delay'and another enormous. (5500;
. outsi no matter how attractive it might. million) cost overnm.
.be to scapegoat the NRC and its pro ',.
WhileLP&L officials aie not the least',.
a cesses for lagging. construction l bit shy about specubrms on the costim.i schedt3es."
Specifica!!y' addressin.'
' ' 4 pact on Waterford of the actions of the g the case of' Waterford III the committee report iaid LNRC and environmentalists, they are '
c reluctant to put a value on the impact of
-27monthsofconstnictionscheduleslip, :the breakdown of their own quality pages for Waterford at the feet of LP&L assurance program at the plant. What is
. for a variety, of reasonsJ As soon;as';.: the relationship between the discoveries"
?LP&L. received its construction permit,
';according to the re;iort,'.the utility an ["Tection of EBASCO's work on th
..in May, June, and July,1982. or thire.
s nounced atwo.msnthdelayinconstruc-%.erhergency. coolant: systems, and 'the'-
- tion startup to deal with a !cngthy anti. ' August,1982 amiouncement of.. Water-
~ trust proceeding. In February,1976, ac. ford's re-scheduled date of completion-cording to the report'LP&L announced. i and the additional $500 million cost in '
another.13.' month revision'of Water-'
Jford's completion schedule, based on[ crease?T T. ;..... ' _...?2'
).'what LP&L told the NRC',wis a more.1 ' Jim ' Forte'and. Dave Lester both.q
.;. realistic" cvaluation of its'construc-%.: doubted
- that thi answer could -be'.
z,... !...
... ~.. discovered.s
- y.Wn ~
- v.~-:.:n..
- w..,. n
~ ~. m.. x.. s ;.
v
.~.
G AMBiT. Maren 19.1933
Y 3]
8_ h a J f._
"1 A
I_
8d a
M a
J
'_.N"
E ',b3 X. I l. J' MM. NhME _"' T Ek.
-I^^
f q
,,,,____f_'a L_
_Qs "d*
h.'
ff' fh '"$6NWW Mi. $$$ $.l. -V
- .\\.O d
L#ao's To Blame?C The utilities blame environmentalists. Consumers blame' the utilities. An exclusive i
report on an unpublished study, actually commissioned by the u'tilities, which indicates i.
\\
. w o s to blame for cost overruns. By Ron Ridenhour. Page.16.
hi
,--,n--
~. w z
p;;
p w.+,,a n -o1 ~
~
~
It's your fault'
- 9 s'
'l l
j g
Not enough planning!
- ggg$*
/
j, r-
.,fiff
^
l p
?
~'
l h g ( flf p
No it's your fault
,t too nn'hregadon g
j..
q
~m 7'4.
4
~
f f......,....... m...,
. t '
&)!mns, But who's going to 1..,l
e H-u-23 ES & mss E MRM M M M FdBE M W M EmirBNap NRC "Looking into" Waterford ill
~
L By RON RIDENHOUR.
discuss possible problems in the quality program that uitimately led to the rejection still awaiting a list of specific questions assurance program at Waterford, located of four critical safetysystems by LP&L, an Udall's staffers have' promised to provide.
uClear RCgulatory Com-
.25 miles upriver from New Orleans at Taft, NRC order to retain the employees of at Gambit has learned,that NRC officials HliSSion Officials, Under Louisiana.
least two subcontractors and substantial
- involved in the inspection of LP&L qtrality Udall's staff investigators, who con-rework on the four systems at a so-far assurance and quality control prottams PICSSure from a COngrCS-firmed that the meeting occurred, asked the' unspecified cost; 4.6, J.
during May, Juhe, and July,19g2, origi-SiOnal SUDCO.llfulllCC, DCgan NRC to look into three possiblc problem
- an unspecified potenti.!!ylsignificant nally intended to'inipose a larger fine on g "looking into" thrCc Separate areas in the quality assurance program at construction deficiency.
records and actual construction practices" LP&L for " deficiencies involving' QA Waterford:
NRC officials from the Office of Reac-arcaS Of Qtlallly aSSuranCC-
- a contract dispute between LP&L and f or Regulation and the Office ofinspection at Waterford. LP&L executives learned of TClated QUCSllonS at Louisiana ihe manuracturer of the nucicar reactor at and Enforcement have agreed to pursue the the larger fine, however, and interceded in Pocer and Light Company's Waterford Waterford that may have resulted in.a questions raised by Udall's staffinvestiga-tife company's behalf, successfully argbing 111 nuclear power plant on Wednesday.
" crippled quality assurance' program" dur' tors, according to Joosten. Robert Purple, that since LP&L quality assurance officials April 20, an assistant to NRC Commis-ing a critical stage of the reactor's design the Deputy Director of the NRC's Division originally brought the problems cited in the sioner Victor Gilinsky has told Gambit.
and manufacture, raising serious questions of Licensing, pari of the Office of Reactor December 6,1982, inspection report to the j
According to James Joosten, technical about the unit's safety:
Regulation, told Gambit that he attended attention of the NRC, the fine shoultl~ be !
assistant to Gilinsky, he met with staff in-
- potential irregularities in the handling the meeting and agreed to pursue the ques-reduced. That process resulted in'. the~
vestigators from U.S. Representative Mor-of an NRCinspection report and resulting tions that were raised in it, although it is too
$20,000 penah) finally levied against the ris Udall's Subcommittee on Energy and
$20,000 penalty of LP&L for the break.
' early to call his inquiry an " official in-utility in March,1983. LP&L sent a letter the Emiromnent on Tuesday, April 19, to down of its quality assurance oversight vestigation." According to Purple, he is to the N RC asking shat that penalty also be.
l i
reduced, urging that it be eliminated l 4; altose,tirer thit Ccmbusti:n Engineering t:Id LP&L %/
1 that they w:uld n:t maintain the NRC
'CE's QA pt: gram f r Waterford is y
NRQKegion IV, the regi n remonsible
.for dealing with Waterford Ill, has been inandated quality assurance program for mems fr:m an LPOL QA auditor repo
.5 the subject of congressional investigations the design and manufacture of Wat' r-ing the discovery of serious problems j
during the last year for allowing targets of
' ford's nuclear reactor and other safety-CE's Waterford QA program during e
NRC investigations to change investigatoryrelated components for what is called the Dec.,1976 audit of CE's Q4 records reports before they are officially published, nuclear steam supply system unless LP&L their Chattanooga plant. According to tl a practice that is in direct contradiction of rnet CE's demands for atleast $4 millionin memo, Combustion Engineering personn NRC regulations. A staff investigator for additional payments. Although Combus-sent to steer the LP&l/EBASCO auditir.
9 Oversight and Investigations Subcommit-tion Engineering frequently claimed to be team away from " sensitive" areas durin tee of the House Committee on Interior meeting the NRC QA requirements during,
the audit brought it to a haft when 'the and Insular Affairs, the congressional the dispute which covered a period of at discovered the auditors' intention to repor
. c:mmittee charged with oversight of the least six and a half years in the corre-certain deficiencies they were finding.
Nuc! ear Regulatory Commission, told spondence between the companies Gambit Officials from both LP& Land Combus
, Gambit that LP&L's intercession to reduce has obtained, the last letter in the sequence,tion Engineering have denied that an.
the size of the penalty originally intended to dated, September 16,1977, tells LP&L that serious problems ever sxisted in CE'.
CE has always adhered to the QA stan-Waterford QA program, but they have be imposed against the company raises
- dards agreed to between them in their refused to provide requested documenta-similar questions.
Quality assuran:e is a complex program 9riginal contract, standards that.are far tion backing up their assertions as well as the NRC requires all companies in volved in below those required by the NRC. Further refusing to respond to detailed questions the design, manufacture, construction or
' adding to the doubts about the adequacy of Gambit has submitted to them concerning the controversy.
cperation of nuclear power plants, fuel a
systems or related components to maintain in order to guarantee the safe construction and operation of the plants and protect the public against serious accidents. A study of
-m
.c An inquiry, not ait officialInvestigation the Waterford III and the surrounding area, for instance, estimated that as many ts %,000 people could die in New Oricans and the area around Waterford if an acci-dent like the one that came within minutes of occurnns at Three Mile Island in 1979 should happen at Waterford. Diablo Can-
"fon, Zimmer and Midlands, nuclear power plants in California, Ohio and Michigan that are 100% completed as far as con.
struction is concerned, have never been started up and many predict that they will never operate. The reason: faulty quality assurance programs implemented by the c:nstruction permit holding utilities have raised profound questions regarding their ability to withstand accidents that could lehd to substantialloss oflife.
. Congressional staffers are reportedly-
'cbncerned that the quality assurance prob.
lems specified in the December 6,1982, inspection report on Waterford may be indicative of far larg:r problems. NRC investigators have been asked to discover if the inspection report and the reduced fine s
of LP&L is an attempt to minimize the true proportions of the breakdown in the qual.
icy assurance program at Waterford.
Udall's staff also asked NRC investiga-t:rs to obtain copies of all correspondence between LP&L, EBASCO Services, Inc.
and Combustion Engineering detailing the n:rure of the contract dispute between LP&Lund CE over the cost of CE's quality bsuritnce program for Waterford.
Documents obtained by Gambit show I
l lJ l\\
lI I
~hnnnse "8 men"AI.,t. + R
- r. ]
1 :
- l s hj].
t es d
e r E y ".i s
~
o E 's, d comOe eh t t o
rL ne -
t *' s wt aClia"y'fg.
js on' a
u r
s u a r e s
e npi t
i c&
c u b, o i y g nCdt p
u r c e *'
sin caeudusng "t
s c l
pd u 'la jf s r p
'd P l
r c i
f "nga aeE ae ai a kQ exD yi nr r e
n
. et a
h e mt n
,shhc eod '}ias?"A, t
n l
Ln
.i u r
l n n s f 'o in e d f C.
r t s u
t oli g sc e
oiec td hne r
ef ij n uhr vt r
ori mwipoar rd dt s a
t a e H @".m A s t
et C,teh g
ar uLi wh nu y#
unhogc.* g b & f,Po"t Chitd hh r ay u o,
t n ar fl ceEo t
at/
y c
ca i %o o cEgc, QL*
yo Et ot i m i n,M d
efit eC i
mfli us s '
- e rh t a t
dCe a
' i ' n'g n ^"
f r
t a
,a n *-
6 m wn"ml i e 7 Ln a
e'w re8i u n g
,d r P" g
l a&
e ' o,e e na i mY 9 n.o r
t c
Un u e ac o c '" yfh i S.
l e
4 hde1 t v
wdti ae#6f m p, t
.# n " p,n t
Qi t
s n i e h o L-f 1 et e*
ml i
hahl u*
a l
f n
e t
t n o
c s "'
eoiidt er ep" oreRrLo" e
cg r
r u de n-e a*
ot u
owt a
hb u
- w. i r a p'p 4 n n
aYlsjr e
- Pe*
/n*
h d y "I w w d W)t e
s4t 4 dde*mh nt 7 a d
ynt c e.
a M" d e '"a e ^"
i "r
n" n
e9h "
w n a m *' F f
s nm o
ri e e
'eiouiv1 u*
pn c tT o
rf da t
cLi hue ot t
i a
vi Y ei m e h s cb ee ye g s '"
a r
v
'. e c
,lp da e ee h ao*d l
$'e h 3 o gT dj r
l l
g u
uk c r sl t
- n r
ep Eil ct 3 dr u Y s' a e
o r
gen *ee eWoauc#
o d E.r A rd
- r t-u aP ga c
c E't i i bc'g c ;c t 3f s, Qh' ~a d
.g c
r el i
r k
e t
w a8 os' c e 0" 8 o m.du"q r e e# u l
r fA
'aya&tm,W:bi U bs tr5 h '" uf n d '^
nb wt r
d Q qy a ;g un-ed f
e e
o o n,,li a
bg
" r a
n i t '
i e*n e a 9" ; h p
vI "
es oi.
.p r
s o"'
b e.ro"rt n
dgWgiao, r k m j d 'h i r
ne end s*
ae'le nr e $e't e
C-s' a
a a t
c
,T r I'
c f snnepY'.
nt Reg d' a t
,t gly p d
r e
~t
'f. g r
S g
e t
t c NfIs r fn o"*fmAwpeto v o "" I" on r g[e n h -
i l
e a
ugsa u
d-yo ipr et -
p9 og u o l
ei af u
gv n--
t i
~.
biw hnag q gi c i*
l l
y,*,
l ?-
j O.I{ygV,. % g.1q;.,N. S.
' i. '
[j't 1 '.k
" Shp'r Yf.yb g-
- 4. ; g.,),
i 9
y
,)),I,3., j 3
i t
4, M.' D,(j:,4i' i'
f l
k L
?g
- 3. 1 7[d -
3 g.1 '.,
g d - V-g Q,jF;# ~
h, '
, %h. i j4,b f
% g u,I 4p,p C.
t
.g
. J
y;,gg, g o W'.
)
1
},
g t
q 8
g
@fg.f.h' YQNN'HM.
2p J*';",.(M.T *,[. -
e 3Wf
,*I' c
- g..,p[
e h.gkG g'g W'
l
,~
r r
j
?
p
'M.I.lp^7k 3..
f f., g{l[,gc$
- 9. ~
h J!
Tr T
. y Wt a,
l Y,
L
, N " }
g' j :
S3 M
jj.,y c,'g,b, L
MtKj';W.
bT.Qd*
h@h.MU.(..
7.
f t.
yi Q*'-[F @wlM6 N g+
_f'.dM J
'g' i t '.I f
e
.~
. f 7;,.b,Q 8
b
- l. 3 ' jN
(
g s
.D'P
@d
~-
d '
,nt j,y, g
y., 3n. ' ; 5.$ p~',,gd,<, k.,y, e
.n
.i e
d 2" %" D* %.N. [i y7.4* O.
t a2
.pg M
li e %.,
t h.
i hhT.$l.
b,'
?'.
g
.O t'
Q%.g,i
(.
}",
, j.
- cf' g3, 't T'
if
-[,-
, 1
}! f
{'
d
,g f pi@[i 0 hs, r
'[
g,[{Pg
.,; Q g y j g
?
9 ',. i'@
- t'
,s f
1 gp,
- ?':
7
.,c
.' j.i
, M V- %
cd
- d. a W' h'.gd f E
4M y;. P'. h "*,N J:
t g
y. '.h.Ih':' h
- [l,9 '
m 5hfi N S 'p.
g$.M
. b! %dWN@l.g y J
sW2b o
'Ad ggbn'.,.bbNA@dl
. p*
jtcMGC p > '.-
e M
i 8
r i
f D. d u
,MF i
,4}e d.
f p,' *M.%,h ),t t'4 rl t
jAus%S
..(
if V8 r %
'u. 4 r @ i
- ,M'a 9' 9 5
s
- y i
C' d
e
?'
J lN4 4
i ff.
% @M.h t#' W. !
i s
VP.qNN.
g% T h^ MUM' Nd',1. @ }s ' 8 i.
i S
4M f
gef3N 3i d
t
~ %,
h.lgO k b'9M #$ W" N.1."
ON,{j.,
5
)t s
dY. h
,@' Z- > GQ {
p, t.
H.
gf];'
8
- r. J' 9
4 MhD T+'AQ'
[
Q
,l
- r. I
4 i
-h g
Q9.NNd F
.P Id t
- y. /c Ni jh.
- h i
e A*
M.
, t t
F
('U
\\
$h. 3
.M_ @{5,M '
a f@%~~
MM@fr5W!
f* I J
2 i g-
/
m h
.-9D/
i d
O
. A' 7
$,p.'fhc.M W
W #
9
.i
,2 i
.-'4
}/.f,d.
- Q' d
?
e M }Ie-It
?.
i jk} +.Mk" 0Q, k
b )i'. %
,pj J
f; h"
.,3(-
g-
'. f g ' I' ' '.
l
,,}
rl s te '- e.,,'..
. i i e y' e e d d e t
,U.
g e m [is'mm t
h t
ac a s A e-ae n s.
t r gt uAahteot y L6t s
er r n u m h f)i.
t deoidot ht sl 7 a s
n r c i i -
r r i es n ca d
h vibQwt ids e
o ts f t lyrQb l
St o e e p o (t n
el d
l ga
&9hl w m i C gisuodCtaiCinrdetady y
a t
t oir l
a mgue P1 pps ta a'c oy f
t r' ;- (ane af t.
t s
,l
,mi t
p bleIf uuvle udt n
.e
- rt eyr oa l
s as oe ut e
h x t
l i
s 2:
uQ rrtet ct hi r et e r e c e nsn aepeui e
c L
nie u r.
r t
s n ct s e s a
ii ocn s t n c
aae inme o cgr o<
n g
t z
o
.Eoenc o 't ir st er s
n y c r.
Cmoya n d ai e aant ei tD aiatc r t iL yet r ea r L e "t d n & toiml s
ae s r a e r s ot e a uf f
aae a b
cpnC r oejs c
aft u
t eWlpondia3 n
ywfhie e S. sp t.
yalcos ta s pi l
uif ol e
h h hh dAnipodl t
a t
u ar a ge f r E 're c gP e
f s n w.b l nyAi yes g t t s
nQr s
f gaf on e
al n si i
s i (
c n
nLl cme a
e,
r t
R 'sOorSe a 'e e
,lia u edn pdd let s ca r oti r
Rieivdgrfot gI n i
lu a
d r
docl n mL pi iema chi o i
bt ai rigr hi r d
t u
i yb nI I e t
l e
s t
r e
nf or r m
g s
et l S r l e en wnt t-
- t* draft o(,CE',s quality ass'urance pro. ~
LP&L,s rettisal to,&nte up for addidonal, >
QA costs are supgiorted by the documents sm for Waterford by December I 1976'-
t NO PROBL" EMS.W,c -
the' WC mandated QA %.'.-cats
-'.i
- r - - -.,
-C 't
' Gambit has seen, their claim that CE met p >SAYCOMPANYOFFtCIALS,3. -'
cinclusi4ninLP&L'sFSARto'theNRC '
- omprehensive' document detailing au the f.Qpokesmen for both' P&L' and Com.
throughout the period of design and fabri.
! ograms and.procedursedadertaken by a/
l P.b)astion E'ngineering deny [t);t CE's quality
. cadon of Waterford s reactor components iclear power plant license holder to en
'.re safe construction and operadon of the' asstiance program for Wileir ever feu
.h'P'" . 988I'**
%(f.iWe're prepared:to s'af,befohWRCmmisY
', istandards.t 4: E f:,
NRC ST ND RdS ^ *
- sat.in accordance.witir,NRC 9H=
ne[rento[f minufacturer,$ponded,tk]
~M
~
' Pilon of i
- . Mune,*1970, the NRC.firetsublished at Yeques with s Decirnber 7 1976 letter.
VCdmbustion
- Engineering, Conn'ectic' t.
F u
'dch saldin part!."we are una,ble'to take, d
what has since beoocne the nuclear powa
T, band idilitic' affairs ' office loid Gembillast eild2that in':aH:of"our' work for"the
.ladustry's bible on quality assurance, a list *
- dit ct this tim. - Wity assurance-
. e for a qual t,
agram whichis reponsive" to the NRC.
g ggy pig,(4 q ag.
g of 18 quauty assurance criteria'for nuclear mdated quality assurance.progmms.1 PN ggy r1 sower plants known as 10CFR50, Appene
,N, R sulad lipdustry.
. dix B. " Quality assurance," wdd g to :
mt under the terms of its NRC-issued {
'&L was already, committed to.imple-f. g g.,
i Appendix B. " comprises aR those planned
,:lloth PIlon aEd LP&L spokess'n'an Tiry and systematic acions neousary to pmvide astruction permit. Combustion Engi ring had been working on Waterford's7.p g adequate con 6depos that.a struaure,7, g,,,
i comments exchanged by the-Waterford systein, w component will perform satis '
mponents for several years at the tame,..
eeMInagers:fo.,rboth)DA$CO and factwHy inmics. Quality assurance Q hough how much work was done and
- y..
cludes quality control, which comprises,
uch components are involved remains I"-
^~
~
those quality assurance actions related tos-
- 1 car at this time.
Combustion Engineenng's Waterford.. 't Pdc /Self hommuch the physical characteristics of a material,d structure, components, or system which oject Manager, W.D. Mawhinney insistsF M gfgehNas afM5k'd, and provides a means to control the quality of g
. ansther section of the December 7 letter. - b. -
d in other communications between the.
.eh0Wlf aff9Cf3,.Waf8tf0fd, the matalal, struaure, component, w-system to prd=*-=d'-' requirements."
ree companies that CE hasin fact livedr fWmalits 6ffdleaf' 3 Appendix-B's 18 criteria cover detailed
, to the NRC quality assurangt;reqmre-y ',g.yy,
definitions of what a quality assurance pro-f""-".
mts, which increased substantially be-een the 1970 signing of the-onginalcon d - $ Combustion' Engineerin'g;rincludits gram is, what design control means, docu. '
period during which these negotisuons ?j don the.NRC-mandated.QA, standards In preparation ' or applying to the NRC.
f
' uned. If LP&L wantsto take credit for y ( altogether if LP&L refused to meet CE's for an operating. permit for.Waterford,:'
st CE effort, Mawhinney wr'tes, then. & contract demands,.as, simply." hardball LP&L was required to fDe their Ana ey will h:ve to amend the o n'alcon -
-negotianons" betweert contendihg parties analysis report with the NRC, the compre
.:t or suffer the consequences.1 e-
. In a contract dispu'te$ ' '
hensive documentation the NRC requi/es<
LP&L's contract disput_e with Combus, 4 J. "In'our view," CE's Piloh told Gambit.
nuclear power plant owners to submit as
- n Engineering concernmg quality.
"it's partc t a <ontract discussion about evidence that they have complied with all -
o urance revolved-around the,cpttcal,.
money owed for services rendered."
relevant NRC regulations for the construc-N LP&L'.s Fort offered a'selar, view, say-tion and operation of the plant..Wlule g
uld dditi al
_ capable alnd competent manager - was, mI.Ing that1 the CE Project Ma NRC regulations allow 6tilities like LP&L
. by gro ng N cl Regula o I
t to delegate the meeting of these various '
p g
eMec,sa nad %,
P
.td get more now than%'o,ngm,uWng regulations to the family of "mtractors'
- e tect wee e 19 0s 8"ing o e
was ally con
- who actually designlike Waterford the engineer, fabricate smalcontract between LP&L and Com i tracted for. The contract called for the level and construct a plant QA which aisted at the time of the orig-utility itselfis ultimately held responsiNie to '
od of egott on du n 96 9
- mal agreement. It s unfortunate for you ensure that all federal guidelines are actual.
$ lined by the' documents now in that the QA requirements have been in-ly fulfilled '
e o
y n uallyaf p
s e
an o
e ac
.: safety and operation of the Waterford for, LP&L will have to pay the extra cost."'
are designed to ensure compliance with the p
! nuclear power plant remains unclear.
-gures in the LP&L documents, which. L. Fort adds that "the basic reason for the regulations'and the FSAR. The nuclear g strongtstancely,CE4was that: LP&L power industry's most famous bad cases through EBASCWhyd assmed a very plants like Diablo Canyon in California-
.8 thm n betwee C sti
. tough posture in assunng (for the protec-and'Zimmer in Ohio, plants which will
..;; meeting, LP&L.and EBASCO Serv-
. tion of the company and iu customers) that probably never operate even though they ps, Inc.*,1LP&L s prime contractor for CE not be overcompensa'ted for meeting are 100 percent ccmplete. are disasters :
aterfordi suggest that the dollar figure
. new NRC fequirements.oper and above which have been laid directly at the feet of
.ns between $2 milhon and 54 million.
those of the original, agreement."
botched quality assurance programs and While the contentions of 7ert and Pilon the failure of the license-holding utility that CE's tough talk is a' response t company to adequately oversee them.
CE REFUSES TO CERTIFY CA Combustion Engineering apparently seized on LP&L's need to submit their Waterford III FSAR to the NRC as.the op '
nortunity to resolve what met to ba *
~.
.wu 1:ng-standing contract argument. Al.
'though the record represented by 'the, t documents Gqmbit has is'mciomplete, they.
~.
W curract adminWat, o his QA.dutics,
Solury, in addiu.on t disclose a nine month runnmg fight be N which IF6nly onfitemMaised in, the, maresponsEHities tween the two compani:s in which neither. November 10 letter, Stampley again at.
(not defined) which a ppear to be in conflict. l the issue of a contract amendment for the e tacks CE's assertions.
Y -: A....
with his.QA responsibilit es. (He appeared. -
added QA costs. nor the issuc of which QA i "You identify corporate','(prysumiibly to be more interested in protecting CE 1 standards CE has foDowed on the Water- ; generic)" [ meaning ~systemwide, ed.)
contractually than in,providing endence ford project are resolved.
" commitments to' increased QQequire-that LP&L records ar,e.being adequately During the course of the nine month run-ments made 1sy CE,".:.Stamprey chides -
rclained.)
ning batt!c Combustion Engineering takes Mawhinney, "yet state that?CE is commit.
"CE's position was that we'could not a cumber of positions, all of which seem in-ted to comply to iner. eased quality assur -
audit to (the latest NRC QA standards) deed designed to force LP&L to settle their anoe requirements'only wh'ere gBASCO or because the requirements addressed there joint contract dispute on terms favorable to LP&L has directed compliance? Under.
are over and abose contractual quality.-
i CE. Ahhough CE frequently asserts in these' circumstances," Stampty continues, assurance requirements.
streng language that they have in fact met "we must question whether yo% generic
" Harry Mulliken stated: 'We are not the NRC-mandated QA guidelines they' sure to what extent we can allow you (LP&L) to take credit for meeung re--
also suggest the contrary position on sev.
- ? f quirements if you do Dot pay for it.'
eral occasions. Information contained in.
9 w.
'"CE management does not believe that
~'"
the documents Gambit has seen states that CE is responsible for CE statements, com-Combustion Engineering adhered to the -
quality assurance program "which was im.
The present head of mitments and/or responses to AEC (now.
L piemented under the terms" of the origmal ;f,p&j,'s quality assurance
? NRC) questions in the Waterford III"
~ PSAR [prehminary safety analysis report contract between CE and LP&I,,, that is to.
Program saId that if he
-ed.) unless CE was issued a contract sup-say,CE may have fo!! owed a QA program for.Waterford that does not meet NRC encountered a itUR* -
piement which affords compensation to s
g
. t/Onlike'the onesi ~
. CE for impteenenting..the-requirements l descr/ bed by the audito.'Il standards.
- and/or addressmath6 conwmtments'.
The record we have shows the following rS jf'.Some CE PSAR commitments (nocn f
sequence of events.
Tse oiPuTE BEGlNS
.i he Would thinkIn terms
- November 2,1976. LP&L asks CE to sub. '
of citing the cofnpany in sjecifically dermed) may not have been) an audit reportj,j,...
' worked on' or addressed during design, or g C
mit documentation ofits QA program for
' ' ', s,: ' '.?r*
L inclusion in LP&L's FSAR.
' if they were addressed, CE will not give-November 10, 1976. CE's Mawhinney i
' 7' details to EBASCO/LP&L for credit in the'~
"FSAR prior to resolution of the contract'
[
writes EBASCO's Waterford 111 Project
-a Manager, R.K. Stampley, making, accord-disputes. (Some engineering design and/or -
irg'to Stampley,"the scrious charge of bad commitments are... relevant to Waterford
- calculations may have been indefinitely.
faith on the part of LP&L" over the 11L.. the extent to which CE has adopted postponed awaiting supplements to the-utility's failure to settle a number of out-escalating Quality Assurance (or Quality contract. There was also some indication
- 2 standing contract disputes, including the-Control) requirements in performance,of that CE may decline to defend, at NRC' QA issue.
its contract fbr Waterford.111 remams hearings, areas of contract disputes.)"
December 7,1976. CE's Mawhinney writes ;
unclear and must be substantiated by CE."
Hastings " acquired the impression that '
Sumpley, refusing to supply documenta-LP&L and EBASCO management and tion that CE's QA program for Waterford CONTRACT DISPUTE DISRUPTS AUDIT project personnel were fully aware of the o
i has met NRC guidelines. "LP&L has not-December 15-17,1976. Quality assurance specific areas of contract disputes.
SCO and "LP&L may not have been adequately
. ' auditors Ed Maloney of EBAR.E. Hastings of LP&L arrive at Combus-
, protected in the CE-Chattanooga works expressed to us their intention of amending d
the sontract" to include the upgraded N RC QArequirements, Mawhinney says," con p ' ' tion Engineering's Chattanooga works to
' contract because:
b sequently, we are unable to take credit at substantiate CE's Q A claims. They are met "a. CE Windsor issued and adminis-this time for a quality assurance program there.by John Solury of CE's Windsor, tered the contract.
which is responsive to'.' them. He asserts, '
Connecticut. QA' office, and Harry Mulli-
"b. The contract between CE and its.
however, that CE has made a "substantiil
' ken of CE's Windsor Project Management subtidiary supplier may not' detail which-office. On December 16 the audit was
' unsatisfactory items' are.to befp effort" to develop and implement pro...
the customer (LP&L/EBASCD). ported to smas.which meet the NRC QA standards. I halted when Solury, told Mulliken and 2; -
! ' Hastings that they cotild not " write up'.'. a "c. LP&L has not examined audits by PROJECT IN JEOPARDY X
discovery of QA program sh' rtcomings in
.:CE-Windsor of CE s'ubsidiary suppliers. -
o December 13,1976. EBASCO's Stampley e
' the CE records.vaultJ.'because it:is not' P "No one other than the project manager, i
responds to Mawhinney's November 9 -
covered by an LP&L/EBASCO contract."
at Windsor was permitted to tell the :
Ictter, saying that it " jeopardizes the rela,
During the discussion that followed, ac-l* auditors which records will actually be re-tionship necessary for the successful com-
. cording to 'the" memorandum"Hastings tained at Chattanooga for LP&L. (He, of a pletion of this project." Stampley goes on wrote on December 28 for his LP&L super-course, was not available during the audit.) ~
=
to attack CE's claims on a point-by-point visor. A.E. Henderson,it became clear that-
"LP&L/EBASCO personnel on audits.
bisis, shredding most of Mawhinney's Solury and <Mulliken "were sent from I.at Chattanooga works are not allowed to t E
claims on the grounds that they are so Windsor as '... escorts to 'stide and direct read / review CE fabrication procedures.
poorly documented that LP&L/EBASCO the auditors' and to prevent the auditors (We were also not shown welder qualifica.
has littic basis for evaluating them. On the from writing up.*sensitiv_e' findings which tions, even after repeated requests...)"
subject of CE'saim for additional com
?,
might evennially set into 'tfic public docu pensation for the upgraded QA program, ment toom.
, 7 " p
- -e t
'Q34 I
r I
The' present. head of LP'&L's quality 4
assurance program, Tom Gerrets, told G mbit that if he encountered a situation like the'ons described by the auditors who i
~
went to CE in December of 1976, he would t
think in terms of citing the company in an' j
audit report and even issuing a stop work'
)
order. But he pointed out that in the 3+,.,
December 1976 audit LP&L was not the g....
primary auditor. Instead the lead auditor- -
- gC.;;. p*g'
.,.,. C was ERASCO, LP&L's prime contractor, and they did issue an audit report which
- J:,
l
' cited certain spedfic violations of the.m-
. TWoontrw room uneen.nm, o.,,,wm g,_
g,,,,,,,,% y,
dards for. records management. LPAL.
.L
( /4S^ : N /
- 7
. records do not show whether or not those '
~ - ~ ~ -
,. 9 l
audit citations were ever resolved, and s
EBASCO's audit apparently did not men.
/ be unnecc$sary.',.
,s.
. to include" the upgraded NRC'qualityr.
f thn the questions about quality assurance June 29,1977. As Combustion Engmeer-.
assurance requirements, "although sp i
>ln~ general raised by the LP&L auditor's.
ang's deadline approaches, R.K. Stampicy cific commitments were made by LP&L in
' memorandum.
of EBASCO hurriedly auempts to arrange the PSAR to implement" them. (emphasis Y
..s A SERIES OF MEETINGS a series of meetings between CE, EBASCO added).
4 and LP&L executives and quality.assur-According to LPAL's vice president for.",;
April 19,1977. Stampley and Mawhinney
. meet to discuss CE's claims for further ance personnel to iron out their problems.!
nuclear power, Lee Maurin, the utility has M He schedules an August 4,.1977 meeting in.
now devised a method for dealing.with.'
compensation "for additional quality re.-
Windsor, Connecticut between A.E. Hen-contract disputes of this kind. To avoid.;
'quirements which have been imposed on derson, LP&L's Manager of QA B.R..
what he called " blackmail" by subcontrac. ;
CE in performance of the Waterford proj-Mazo EBASCO's. Chief QA Engineer, tors, Maurin says the company now pays ect which are in excess of contract -
D.A. Galligan, Waterford til Project QA -
such demands on invoice, but expressly, requirements."
Engineer for EBASCO, and " top CE QA reserves the rights to recover money'"
May 31, IM7, CE's Mawhinney writes to EBASCO's Stampley cornplaining about personnel" Another rnecting is scheduled through legal recourse. That method, a day cather, August 3,1977, so that Maurin says, was d evelped after the dispute.
the burden of the NRC QA standards, "When this contract was sign:d," he EBASCO and LP&L QA representauves with CE was resolved.
were to "finahze their identification of QA Although the record represented by claims, "CE was almost the sole judge of what constituted an adequate quality pro-requirenients beyond the scope of the CE-these documents is clearly incomplete, contract." Stampley also promised to issue LP&L has refused to respond to a detailed -
gram. CE believes that the products and a " recommendation letter to LP&L with list of questions Gambit has submitted to systems we delivered at that time indicated that our judgment was adequate..." The respect to,QA claims by July 8,1977." -
them. LP&L, for instance, has refused to.
W't deficiency report with the NRC.,
letter includes two enclosures, the first of CCNFLICT UNRESOLVED mfican which shows "in table form the original September 16,1977. Efforts of all parties concerning Combustion Engineering's ap-c contract quality requirements and com.
to resolve the dispute have apparently parent failure to implement the NRC re "
pares them to the requirements we are cur, failed as of this date. In a letter written by quired quality assurance program; how this rent!y meeting in fulfulment of Waterford PSAR commitments." The second enclos.
Mawhinney to Stampley 10 weeks after the issue was finally resolved, if it in fact ever :
ure lists in the briefest manner CE's claims passage of CE's June 30,1977 deadline for was; if it was finally resolved, how much.
for an additional $4 million in quality -
l LP&L's compliance to CE's contract de-extra LP&L finally paid CE for the in.
assurance program claims. The letter also i mands, Mawhinney apparently surrenders creased QA program; if they in fact did 5 the long. held claim that CE has been m finally accede to CE's contract demands,.
~
gives LP&L a deadline for agreeing to CE's l compliance with th'c NRC QA. require-how CE was able,if they in fact were able...
contract claims. lf LP&L does not agree to ments all along.. Referring to a.1977 to prove that the CE. administered Q A pro,[
CE's terms, Mawhinney writes, "CE is willing to and will return to the contractual
, EBASCO t letter. which states that-gram in fact met the NRC requirements $
l. EBASCO/LP&L)1as still not received "the throughout the course of the design andr:
l qualityrequirements on June 30,1977..Webelieve that by doing so, we can curtail a input for Chapter.17.(Quality Assurance)".. ' fabrication of the Waterford reactor and" from CE, Mawhinney refers Stampley to its related components.
corciderable amount of the quality assur.
his December 7,1976 letter "which for..
Is there any danger to the integrity of ance effort for engineering which has not warded a description of the Quality Assur -
Waterford's critical safety.related com. -
vet been completed. This will decrease CE's ance program for Waterford 111 which was.
ponents caused by the contract fight be7-
- l costs for programs which LP&L believes to smplemented under the terms of the con-tween CE and LP&L and CE's possible i GAM. At s
tract between Combustion Engineering failure to implement the required QA pro-,
and Loultiona Power and Light. We re -
gram? Is there any danger to the public?.
mind you that LP&L has not indicated to These are clearly the major questions.
CE any intentio.n of amending the contract,~. unanswered at this time.
m
~.
,