ML20082N657

Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1995 for TMI Unit 1

ML20082N657
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	03/31/1995
From:	Broughton T, Heysek W GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
C311-95-2191, NUDOCS 9504250319
Download: ML20082N657 (9)

Text

~.

3 e.

GPU Nuclear Corporation Nuclear m::1!:"*

Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057-0480 (717)944-7621 Writer's Direct Dial Number:

(717) 948-8005 April 12,1995 C311-95-2191 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:

Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

20555

+

Gentlemen:

Subject:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit I (TMI-1)

Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 Monthly Operating Report for March 1995 Enclosed are two copies of the March 1995 Monthly Operating Report for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1.

Sincerely, y'

,ly k T. G. Broughton Vice President and Director, TMI WGH Attachments cc: Administrator, Region I TMI Senior Resident Inspector T95001 f.UC100 9504250319 950331

\\

PDR ADOCK 05000289 R

PDR GPU Nuclear Corporaton is a subsidiary of General Pubic Utilities Corporation

d

~

OPERATIONS

SUMMARY

March 1995 The plant entered the mcnth operating at 100% power and remained at that level throughout the entire month. An Unusual Event was entered on March 7 for approximately one hour and 42 minutes because of a 15 to 20 gpm reactor coolant leak caused by an instrument tubing / fitting separation.

Since the affected channels o.f the Reactor Coolant Inventory Trending System have not been restored to an OPERABLE status within 30 days, the details, including cause, the action being taken and the projected date of return, are described within this monthly operating report in accordance with Technical Specification section 3.24.

Net unit electrical output averaged approximately 819 MWe during March.

MAJOR SAFETY RELATED MAINTENANCE The following is a summary of major safety related maintenance items accomplished during the month.

INSTRUMENT TjflNG FITTING MAINTENANCE During a routine periodic Reactor Building (RB) entry at 100% power, technicians were inspecting tubing fittings for boron indications and tightening those fittings where such indications had been previously noted.

When a technician applied a wrench to the tubing nut of a 1/2" Parker Hannifin compression fitting at a manifold in the Reactor Coolant Inventory Trending System (RCITS), the tubing blew out of the tubing nut, filling the area with steam. The technicians exited the area and notified the Control Room. An Unusual Event was declared at 1140 Hours due to an estimated leak rate of 15 to 20 gallons per minute Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak.

Valves RC-V-1208 and RC-V-1209 (reference leg root valves) were closed but these valve manipulations failed to stop the leakage. After authorization was received from Radiological Controls, an Operations Shift Foreman entered the 'D' Ring and shut valves RC-V-1196 and RC-V-1197 (drop line root valves) which stopped the leak after approximately one hour and sixteen minutes. The Unusual Event was terminated at 1322 Hours.

Approximately 1000 gallons of reactor coolant were accumulated in the RB sump.

Plant shutdown was not required.

The cause of the leak was personnel error during installation between 1984 and 1985 when contractor personnel failed to tighten the fitting sufficiently.

Inspection and testing has indicated that the problem was an isolated occurrence and does not extend beyond RCITS.

There were no adverse safety consequences or safety implications that resulted from the event, and this event did not affect the health and safety of the public.

The immediate corrective action taken was to stop the leak by shutting the root valves, RC-V-1196 and RC-V-1197.

The section of tubing, nut, and ferrule where the leak occurred were removed from the RB for inspection.

Plant Engineering inspected the tubing / fittings and determined that the fitting had 2

l

not been adequately tightened. As a result, additional corrective actions included inspection of similar fittings for potential failure, disassembly and inspection of a sample of fittings in the RCITS as well as other accessible fittings in the RB and Auxiliary Building and providing interim guidance for work on methanical joints when pressure is greater than 200 psig and temperature is greater than 200'F.

Actions planned to prevent recurrence include: isolate the reactor vessel level transmitters at the next shutdown opportunity; add previously described procedural guidance prior to the 11R Outage; inspect tubing joints, repair and restore RCITS to operation prior to Cycle 11 startup, review the process controllir.g the turnover of information between modification crews prior to the 11R Outage and implement any necessary

. changes.

LER 95-001-00 was voluntarily submitted on April 6, 1995 describing the event.

LIMITOROUE VALVE OPERATOR WORK Limitorque Operator modification activities performed and completed in March included replacement of the operator spring pack, installation of a high ratio gear, and replacement of the thermal overloads on valves MU-V-16A, MU-V-16C, and MU-V-MO The operator spring pack and installation of a higher ratio gear was m p alled on valve MU-V-36.

Other maintenance items completed with the modifications included replacing the operator grease on MU-V-16A, operator preventive maintenance, and MOVATS/ VOTES operator testing.

During work on MU-V-16D, the valve was cycled before either the correct torque switch limiter plate was installed or the torque switch setting was reduced.

This resulted in an over-thrust condition which was documented by Material Nonconformance Report (MNCR)# 95-0009. The valve was inspected per the MNCR and was found acceptable "as is".

Subsequently, during M0 VATS testing on valve MU-V-16C, the operator *

'ing plate appeared to separate from the valve yoke bushing. The limitor operator was removed and the operator mounting plate and valve yoke uushing were inspected per MNCR# 95-0010.

The threads on the mounting plate were found to be damaged and required replacement.

After the valve was reassembled, it was retested using the VOTES testing equipment and returned to service.

MAKE UP PUMP COOLER INLET VALVE NS-V-80 Make Up Pump t.ooler Inlet Valve NS-V-80 was removed from service because it was hard to operate. During the process of disassembling the valve, the upper grease fitting was found to be filled with dried anti-seize compound which prevented lubrication of the yoke assembly. All parts were cleaned and lubricated with an approved grease prior to reassembling the valve.

Additional grease was injected into the yoke assembly until adequately lubricated. The valve tested satisfactorily and was returned to service.

3

REACTOR BUILDING COOLING FAN AH-E-1B Reactor Building Cooling Fan AH-E-1B was removed from service during a scheduled Reactor Building entry. The internal shroud covers were removed to allow inspection of the tube bundle inlet / outlet o-ring gaskets for indication of leakage.

Fluorescent dye was added to the cooling water system and a black light was used to locate leakage inside AH-E-18.

None was evident. While the unit was open, the internal tube bundle structural supports and flange bolts and nuts were inspected. The internal shroud covers were reinstalled and AH-E-1B returned to service. The inspection results indicate AH-E-1B is in satisfactory condition.

4

4 OPERATING DATA REPORT DOCKET NO.

50 289 DATE April 12,1995 -

COMPLETED BY W G HEYSEK OPERATING STATUS TELEPHONE (717) 948-8191

1. UNIT NT.ME:

THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 1 l NOTES:

l

2. REPORTING PERIOD:

MARCH 1995 l

l

3. LICENSED THERMAL POWER:

2568 l l

4. NAMEPLATE RATING (GROSS MWe);

872 l

S. DESIGN ELECTRICAL RATING (NET MWe):

819 j

6. MAXIMUM DEPENDABLE CAPACITY (GROSS MWe):

834 ]

l

7. MAXIMUM DEPENDABLE CAPACITY (NET MWe):

786 l l

l.

i

8. IF CHANGES OCCUR IN (ITEMS 3-7) SINCE LAST REPORT, GAVE REASONS:

9. POWER LEVEL TO WHICH RESTRICTED, IF ANY (NET MWe):

10. REASONS FOR RESTRICTIONS, IF ANY:

THIS MONTH YR-TO-DATE CUMMULATIVE

11. HOURS IN REPORTING PERIOD (HRS) 744.0 2160.0 180385.0

12. NUMBER OF HOURS REACTOR WAS CRITICAL (HRS) 744.0 2160.0 103748.7 1

13. REACTOR RESERVE SHUTDOWN HOURS (HRS) 0.0 0.0 2284.0

14. HOURS GENERATOR ON-LINE (HRS) 744.0 2160.0 102615.1

15. UNIT RESERVE SHUTDOWN HOURS (HRS) 0.0 0.0 0.0

16. GROSS THERMAL ENERGY GENERATED (MWH) 1908743 5541949 251458220

17. GROSS ELECTRICAL ENERGY GENERATED (MWH) 644698 1876742 84559996

18. NET ELECTRICAL ENERGY GENERATED (MWH) 609022 1772756 79428174 j

19. UNIT SERVICE FACTOR

(%)

100.0 100.0 56.9

20. UNIT AVAILABILITY FACTOR

(%)

100.0 100.0 56.9'

21. UNIT CAPACITY FACTOR (USING MDC NET) 104.1 104.4 56.0

22. UNIT CAPACITY FACTOR (USING DER NET) 99.9 100.2 53.8

23. UNIT FORCED OUTAGE RATE

(%)

0.0 0.0 37.1 UNIT FORCED OUTAGE HOURS (HRS) 0.0 0.0 60761.2

24. SHUTDOWNS SCHEDULED OVER NEXT 6 MONTHS (TYPE, DATE AND DURATION OF EACH):

Refuelino Outane startina September 8,1995, duration 45 da_ys.

25. IF SHUT DOWN AT END OF REPORT PERIOD, ESTIMATED DATE OF STARTUP:

i i

5

~

[p.

., f a-l l

AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL i

DOCKET NO.

50-289..

I UNIT

.TM1-1 DATE Acril 12 1995'

'I

. COMPLETED BY W G HEYSEK' TELEPHONE

'(717)'948-8191-MONTH:

MARCH DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL-DAY AVERACE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-NET)

(MWe-NET).

i 1

822 17 814 2

824' 18 819 3

824

-19 818 4

823 20 817-3 5

822 21 815 l

6 819 22 818

)

7' 816 23

919.

8 813 24 820 9

823 25 819 10 825 26 818-II 822

.27 819 12 819 28 818 13 816 29 818 14 814 30 817

-15 813 31 819 16 812-l F

i 4

1 l

j t

I 6

u., _ _ _ _.,

s a

e

,i 5

1

' 9 9 9k1 1e8

,s-y8 2e4 1H9 9

81l

.)

2 - iG7 1

Ir 1

1 6

f p.7 0

05' DAW (

O B

t l

U N

.EEYE e

s B

hm F

o OMTBN e.

n e

NAA O o n MDDH wt u

n s w

R_

b'W) i m

e

?

T EP C a t

.e i

d h

ET TE

&e h

A KI EL e

w s

bs1 6

CN LE h

a 1

d m4 e

OU PT C

7 D

M d 0 i

m E

sE y

O t

n n

o w

mL i

n i

h a

C e'

h at x

e b

ie E

A

- e ih

-I x

• u eE

.*F 5 6 n

5 9

9 s

h *.,

a n e 1

e t

h m, s h A.

e

_ p h

s- _ m

.E c

i t

. (

w4af t

m n r

r u u r

n n- _ e e s h

a d s

. 0 M

ne e 3

1 g? 4 ed s o yC S

H TNO M

o e

T e m*n n

nn e

R aE e o

a v

J O

R N

(

P E

R n

n g

m%%A

==

=

=

R

=

~

E e

r i

e e t h*

'a r

~

n e

mt 7n iA seR c

tr i % % E" sT h r s

i o e

a R

F yT.

t p

n sr e

m o s

m lel w4" i m-7 u

p u

_m d

u i

f g q

e e A B C D K y.

r(

RR f

2

'e pyT dh d u md r e o d F S N

1F S l

l

., 7 s $-

REFUELING INFORMATION RE0 VEST

1. Name of Facility:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1

2. Scheduled date for next refueling shutdown:

September 8, 1995

3. Scheduled date for restart following current refueling: NA

4. Will refueling or resumption of operation thereafter require a technical specification change or other license amendment?

YES. See 6.c below.

5. Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action and supporting information:

NA 6.

Important licensing considerations associated with refueling, e.g. new or different fuel design or supplier, unreviewed design or per formance analysis methods, significant changes in fuel design, new operating procedures:

a) TMI will use the new Mark B10 fuel assembly in the Cycle 11 reload batch which is an upgraded design of the Mark B9 assembly used in Cycle 10.

The Mark B10 provides a leaf-type cruciform assembly holddown spring to replace the previous coil spring design which has experienced random failures during operation and requires visual inspection each outage.

The Mark BIO design meets all current BWFC fuel design criteria and is in use at other B&W 177 FA plants.

b) TMI also will use four new Westinghouse Lead Test Assemblies (LTA) in the Cycle 11 reload batch. Their planned operation is for three consecutive i

cycles with discharge at end-of-Cycle 13.

j The four W LTAs inserted in Cycle 9 were discharged at EOC-9 due to detection of fuel rod failures caused by grid-to-rod fretting similar to that seen in W Vantage 5H fuel designs. The Cycle 11 LTAs will.use the generic W recommended design fix of rotated intermediate spacer grids to minimize flow-induced fuel vibrations and thus eliminate fretting.

A prototype LTA was flow-tested to demonstrate the effectiveness of the fix. The production LTA will use ZIRLO fuel rod cladding, guide tubes and instrumentation tube and intermediate grids in place of Zircaloy 4 materials used for the Cycle 9 LTAs. Otherwise, the Cycle 11 LTA design is basically the same as the Cycle 9 design.

The LTAs will meet current W fuel design criteria while operating within i

TMI core operating limits.

LTA enrichment and core location will ensure that an LTA will not be the lead (hot) assembly at any time during the i

cycle and will not set any safety or operating limits. The LTAs will remain bounded by existing UFSAR safety analyses results.

c) GPUN is planning to place two types of BWFC advanced non-zircaloy cladding in TMI-1 Cycle 11; eight rods each. The two types will be equally distributed in two Mark BIO fuel assemblies; one rod of each material in each of the four peripheral rows per assembly. These cladding materials are also being irradiated in the McGuire reactor and 8

i