ML20082L123

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Final Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Spare Gould Unitized Starters Supplied by Brown Boveri to Be Provided W/Correct Wire & Wiring Terminations.Item Determined Not Reportable Per Part 21
ML20082L123
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/29/1983
From: Devincentis J
PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO.
To: Starostecki R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
REF-PT21-83-059-000 PT21-83-059-000, PT21-83-59, SBN-586, NUDOCS 8312050418
Download: ML20082L123 (2)


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1671 Worcemw Rood Frominghom. Monochwietts 01701 (617) 872 8100 PutAc Service of New Hompshire November 29, 1983 S BN- 586 T.F. Q2.2.2/Q2.2.3 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Attention: Mr. Richard W. Starostecki, Director Division of Project and Resident Programs Ref erence s: (a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 (b) Telecon of September 23, 1983, V. L. Killpack to W. J. Lazarus (NRC, Region I)

(c) PSNH letter, dated September 28, 1983, "Potentially Reportable 10CFR21 Item; Gould Unitized Starters",

J. DeVincentis to Director, Region I

Subject:

Final 10CFR21 Report; Gould Unitized Starters

Dear Sir:

On September 28, 1983, a potentially reportable 10CFR21 item was filed

[ Reference (c)] regarding the failure of spare Could unitized starters to be provided with the correct wire and wiring terminations. As a result of further investigations, we have determined that this item is not reportable under 10CFR21.

The following information is provided:

Description of the Deficiency:

Four Could unitized starters were supplied by Brown Boveri Electric, Inc. , as spare parts for a Class lE Motor Control Center (MCC) as reported by Reference (c). The qualification report, which was based on the engineering specification for the equipment, indicated ring lug termination and 900C rated wiring. However, compression-type terminations and 60 C wiring were actually supplied in these parts.

0312050418 831129

{DRADOCK 05000443 PDR 1000 Elm St.. P.O. Box 330. Monchester. NH O3105 Telephone (603) 669-4000 TWX 7102207595 gg

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?s United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 29, 1983 Attention. Mr. Richard W. Starostecki Page 2 The problem was found when Startup Test personnel noticed the discrepancy while replacing a failed starter in an MCC undergoing test. This MCC was in a non-nuclear system, but, due to conservatism in design and procurement, was required to contain wiring identical to that used for Class lE MCCs.

Analysis of Safety Implications:

Although the qualification report identified ring lug termination, this was provided to meet an engineering specification requirement (Specification No. 9763-006-143-1, Section 2.4.8.2), and was based on a preference for ease in maintenance and testing. There is no reason to believe that an equivalent compression termination would have f ailed in any postulated accident (including SSE).

With regard to wiring being 600C insteed of 000C; the 900C was also identified in the qualification report and was provided to meet a specification requirement (Specification No. 9763-006-143-1, Section 2.4.8.1),

which was based on a preference for conservatism and additional margin. Since the MCCs are located in a mild environment, there is no reason to believe that a 600C wire would have failed in any postulated accident.

Corrective Action Being Taken:

All Could spare starters have been checked for the proper wiring as have all installed starters in Class lE MCCs. As reported in Reference (c), the problem has been isolated to the four starters supplied under Purchase Order Number 180512. The starters in question will be rewired with the correct wiring and will be controlled in accordance with the applicable site non-conformance and corrective action procedures. In addition, a review of the station receipt inspection program and the procurement documentation for future spare parts orders has been conducted.

In summary, it should be noted that this problem was detected by qualified personnel performing their routine duties in the course of the construction of Seabrook Station and that adequate controls were in place for the identification and disposition of this problem. This is considered to be the final report on this item.

Very truly yours, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY N

John DeVincentis Project Manager JDV /ALL/bal Attachment cc: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555