ML20082K557
| ML20082K557 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/21/1983 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| REF-SSINS-6820 IEB-82-02, IEB-82-2, NUDOCS 8312050225 | |
| Download: ML20082K557 (4) | |
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4 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATT T N NESSEEU37401 400 Citestnut Street-Tower II November 21, 1983 03IIOV25 P l: 5l n
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - RESPONSE TO IE BULLETIN NO. 82 DEGRADATION OF THREADED FASTENERS IN THE REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY OF PWR PLANTS In response to your letter dated June 2,1982, enclosed is our final response to the subject bulletin. Please refer to letters to you dated August 2, 1982 and February 18, 1983 which provided our previous submittals concerning Bulletin No. 82-02.
In response to action item 2, the enclosure lists the threaded fasteners which were examined during the first refueling outage at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant unit 2.
This report completes TVA's response to the subject bulletin.
If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2676.
To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY l
L. M. Mills, Nanager Nuclear Licensing Enclosure cc:
Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 I I d-8312050225 831121 PDR ADOCK 05000327
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1983-TVA SOTH ANNIVERSARY An Equal Opportunity Employer V
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ENCLOSURE -
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2, CYCLE 1 OUTAGE - IE BULLETIN NO. 82-02'-
DEGRADATION OF THREADED FASTENERS IN THE REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY OF PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR PLANTS The following threaded fasteners were examined in accordance with IE Bulletin No. 62-02, action item 2, during the first refueling outage at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. TVA procedures used in examination of the subject bolting were N-VT-1, revision 4; N-PT-7, revision 0; and N-MT-3, revision O.
All fasteners received a visual and surface examination.
I.
Pressurizer to Pressure Relief Valve Inlet Bolting 1.
Twelve bolts - RCS-74BC 2.
Twelve bolts - RCS-94BC 3
Twelve bolts - RCS-107BC B.
Pressuriser Relier Valve to Bonnet Bolts i
1.
Eight bolts - RV2-8010-A 2.
Eight bolts - RV2-8010-C 3
Eight bolts - RV1-8010-A These examinations revealed no evidence of degradation.
'I.
Residual Heat Removal System
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Fourteen-Inch Check Valve i
All 16 bolts examined, RHR Valve' no. 2-74-1, were rejected during visual examination due to corrosion, pitting, and mechanical damage.
This degradation was associated with evident signs of borated water corrosion due to leakage from gasket failure. All bolting was replaced in accordance with MRA-107364 and baseline examination was performed on new bolts.
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m SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2, CYCLE 1 OUTAGE - IE BULLETIN NO. 82 DEGRADATION OF THREADED FASTENERS IN THE REACTOR u00LANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY OF PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR PLANTS III. Steam Generators A.
Steam Generators 2 and 3
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A total of 64 bolts were examined and 11 were rejected for the following reasons:
1.
Five - mechanical damage (e.g., nicks, dents, etc.)
2.
Three - corrosion and mechanical damage (e.g., nicks, dents, etc.)
3 Two - borated water corrosion and pitting due to evident signs of gasket failure.
4.
One inch axial indication revealed frem surface
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examination due to mechanical damage.
B.
Steam Generator 1 (Hot Leg Side)
A total of 16 bolts were examined and a total of 4 were rejected for the following reasons:
1.
Two - mechanical damage (e.g., nick, dents, etc.)
i 2.
Two - borated water corrosion and pitting 1
C.
Steam Generator 4 (Hot Leg Side) l A total of 16 bolts were examined and a total of 4 were rejected for the following reasons:
1.
One - mechanical damage (e.g., nicks, dents, etc.)
2.
Two - borated water corrosion and pitting 3
One inch linear indication due to mechanical damage was revealed from surface examination.
All rejectea bolting was replaced in accordance with MRA-111817.
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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2, CYCLE 1 OUTAGE - IE BULLETIN NO. 82-02..
DEGRADATION OF THREADED FASTENERS IN THE REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY OF PRESSUd12ED WATER REACTOR PLANTS IV.
Upper Head Injection System-Eight-Inch Grayloc Bolted Connections A.
Four bolts - UPIF-55BC B.
Four bolts - UPIF-60BC C.
Four bolts - UPIF-63BC D.
Four bolts - UPIF-28BC E.
Four bolts - UPIF-31BC F.
Four bolts - UPIF-36BC G.
Four bolts - UPIF-1-31BC H.
Four bolts - UPIF-53BC No evidence of degradation was observed during the examination of the reference bolting.
All threadea fasteners examined were removed during routine inspection and maintenance.
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