ML20082D171
| ML20082D171 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1995 |
| From: | Wharton L NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20082D176 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9504070325 | |
| Download: ML20082D171 (7) | |
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UNITED STATES g
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UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY w
CALLAWAY PLANT. UNIT _1 DOCKET NO. 50-483 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 96' License No. NPF-30 43 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
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A.
The application for amendment filed by Union Electric Company (UE, 4
the licensee) dated August 4, 1994, as supplemented on 4'
March 14, 1995, and March 28, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act),
A and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 3
B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the
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provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; Y
C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by li this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be it conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
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D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and 4
E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifica-tions as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and-
'M paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-30 is hereby amended to read as follows:
j 9504070325 950330 PDR ADOCK 05000483 P
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Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised s
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through Amendment No.
96, and the Environmental Protection Plan,
contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are' h.
hereby incorporated into the license.. UE shall operate the facili,1y
'd in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the N 3;i
- f y Environmental Protection Plan.
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This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance. The..
3#71 Technical Specifications are to be implemented within 30 days from the~.
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.date of issuance.
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FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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L. Raynard Wharton, Project Manager Project Directorate III-3 cf Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV k
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
-4 Specifications "Ifj Date of issuance:
March 30, 1995 4-
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' ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT N0. 96 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-30 DOCKET NO. 50-483 i
Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages,. indicated by an asterisk, are.
also provided to maintain document completeness.
REMOVE INSERT
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3/4 6-14 3/4 6-14 a
B 3/4 1-3 B 3/4 1-3 s
B 3/4 1-4*
B 3/4 1-4*
B 3/4 5-3*
B 3/4 5-3*
B 3/4 5-4 B 3/4 5-4 B 3/4 6-3 B 3/4 6-3 S
B 3/4 6-4 B 3/4 6-4 j
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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
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RECIRCULATION FLUID oH CONTROL (RFPC) SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.2 The RFPC System shall be OPERABLE with each of the two storage baskets (one within the confines of each of the two containment recirculation sumps) containing a minimum of 30", but not to exceed 36.8" (uniform depth),
of granular trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP-C).
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APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 "4
ACTION:
5 With the RFPC System inoperable, restore the system to OPERABLE status within a
72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the G
RFPC System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS n$
4.6.2.2 The RFPC System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 1'
months by verifying that:
1 (a)
One TSP-C storage basket is in place in the confines of each containment recirculation sump, and Jd 4
(b)
Both baskets show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal
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corrosion, and 4
(c)
Each basket contains between 30" and 36.8" (uniform depth) of Jh granular TSP-C.
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-9C CALLAWAY - UNIT ]
3/4 6-14 Amendment No. A( 96
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%l REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES l
B0 RATION SYSTEMS (Continued) 1
- With the RCS temperature below 200*F, one Boration System is acceptable
- 9i without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity 31 condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE 4;
ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single Boron:'
J Injection System becomes-inoperable.
1
- g )1 The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging to be
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OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charg ng pumps except 7) the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable in MODES 4, 5, an 6 provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV or an RHR suction relief valve.
The boron capability required belew 200*F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1% Ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 140*F.
~'l This condition requires either 2968 sallons of 7000 ppm borated water frm the y 'i boric acid storage tanks or 14,076 gallons of 2350 ppm borated water from the
' '1 RWST.
j The contained water vclume limits include allowance for water not availaole because of discharge line location and other physical j
characteristics.
. i 1l The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST.
1l also ensure a minimum equilibrium sump pH of 7.1 for the solution recirculated jl within Containment after a LOCA.
This pH level minimizes the evolution of MJ iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.
a The OPERABILITY of one Boration System during REFUELING ensures that this
-system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.
3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES a,
This specifications of this section ensure that:
(1) acceptable power Gi distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is main-tained, and (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated acci-dent analyses are limited. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance Aq with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.
Verification that the s
i Digital Rod Position indicator agrees with the demanded position within i 12
- 1, i steps at 24, 48, 120 and 228 steps withdrawn for the Control Banks and 18, 210 and 228 steps withdrawn for the Shutdown Banks provides assurance that the a
Digital Rod Position Indicator is operating correctly over the full range of indication.
Since the Digital Rod Position System does not indicate the actual shutdown rod position between 18 steps and 210 steps, only points in the indicated ranges are picked for verification of agreement with demanded position. Shutdown and control rods are positioned at 225 steps or higher for fully withdrawn.
CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. 29,44,96
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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)
The centrifugal charging pump maximum total pump flow Surveillance Requirement ensures the maximum injection flow limit of 550 gpm is not a
exceeded. This value of flow is comprised of the total flow to the four branch lines of 469 gpm and a seal injection flow of 79 gpm plus 2 gpm for i
instrument uncertainties.
The safety injection pump maximum total pump flow Surveillance Require-inent ensures the maximum injection flow limit of 675 gpm is not exceeded.
This value of flow includes a n'ominal 30 gpm of mini-flow.
The test procedure places requirements on instrument accuracy (20 inches of water column for the charging branch lines and 10 inches of water column for the safety injection branch lines) and setting tolerance (30 inches of i
water column for both the charging and safety injection branch lines) such i
that branch line flow imbalance remains within the assumptions of the safety anaiyses.
The raximum and minimum potential pump performance curves, in conjunc-4 tion with the maximum and minimum flow Surveillance Requirements, the maximum-total system resistance, and the test procedure requirements, ensure that the assumptions of the safety analyses remain valid.
The surveillance flow and differential pressur: requirements are the Safety Analysis Limits and do not include instrument uncertainties.
These instrument uncertainties will be accounted for in the surveillance test trocedure to assure that the Safety Analysis Limits are met.
The Surveillance Requirements for leakage testing of ECCS check valves ensure that a failure of one valve will not cause an inter-system LOCA.
The Surveillance Requirement to vent the ECCS pump casings and accessible, i.e., can be reached without personnel hazard or high radiation dose, discharge piping ensures against inoperable pumps caused by gas binding or water hammer in ECCS piping.
3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK N
The OPERABILITY of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borgPld water is available
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for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that:
(1) sufficient water is avail-able within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and (2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following I
mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes assuming all the control rods-are out of the core.
These assurotions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.
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i CALLAWAY - UNIT I B 3/a 5-3 Amendment No. A2. 68
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[0NTAINMENT SYSTEMS
. BASES 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM The 36-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be closed and blank flanged during plant operations since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident. Maintaining these valves closed and blank flanged during plant f
operation ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive material will not be d
released via the Containment Purge System.
To provide assurance that the 36-inch containment purge valves cannot be inadvertently opened, the valves are blank flanged.
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o The use of the containment mini-purge lines is restricted to the 18-inch ourge supply and exhaust isolation valves since, unlike the 36-inch valves, the W
18-inch valves are capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break 7
accident. Therefore, the SITE BOUNDARY dose guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of an accident during containment purging J",
operation. Operation will be limited to 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> during a calendar year. The total time the Containment Purge (vent) System isolation valves may be opea during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 in a calendar year is a function of anticipated need i
and operating experience. Only safety-related reasons; e.g., containment d
b assure control or the reduction of airborne radioactivity to facilitate personnel access for surveillance and maintenance activities, should be used to support additional time requests. Only safety-related reasons should be used to justify the opening of these isolation valves during MODES 1,'2, 3, and 4 in any.
4 calendar year regardless of the allowable hours.
Leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves will provide early 3
indication of resilient material seal degradation and will allow opportunity for q~,
repair before gross leakage failures could develop.
The 0.60 L leakage limit of Specification 3.6.1.2b. shall not be exceeded when the leaka,ge rates determined by the leakage integrity tests of these valves are added to the a
previously determined total for all valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests.
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3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSID E 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spra/ System ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA e or steam line break. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment
- l leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
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The Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System are redundant to each other in providing post-accident cooling of the Containment atmosphere. However, the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for-removing iodine from the containment atmosphere and therefore th'e time requirements for restoring an inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment.
CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-3 Amendment No. 96
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