ML20082C349
| ML20082C349 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 11/01/1983 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20082C340 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-52562, NUDOCS 8311220033 | |
| Download: ML20082C349 (2) | |
Text
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m UNITED STATES
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8 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
k WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMEN 0 MENT NO.
TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. NPF-2 ALA8AMA POWER CCMPANY JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-348 INTRODUCTION By letter dated October 21, 1983, Alabama Power Company (APCo) requested a one-time only change to Technical Specification 3.3.3.2a to allow the moveable incore detection system to be operable with 74' percent of the detector thimbles.
The normal requirement is for 75 percent operable detector thimbles for per-forming core flux mapping every 31 effective full power days.
EVALUATION On October 13, 1983 the licensee performed a flux map with 74 percent of the moveable detector thimbles due to mechanical thimble blockage. As a result, APCo applied a 50 percent extra uncertainty to the results of this map and determined that the parameters for power distribution monitoring still meet applicable Technical Specificationrrequirements.
In addition, APCo and Westinghouse have' evaluated the use of 37 versus 38 (corresponding to.the 74 percent versus the 75 percent requirement) of the incore thimbles to perform i
surveillance testing and have determined that there is only a minor difference in the flux measurements determined by each configuration.
Our experience 4
indicates that this.is a reasonable and acceptable conclusion.
APCo personnel made numerous reactor containment building entries in attempts to repair the incore flux mapping system. However, due to high radiation fields caused when the 1C incore detector drive unit became inoperable with its detector not in the storage position the job was terminated until radiation levels decayed. The next core map is required within 31 effective full power days or about November 22, 1983.
SUMMARY
The-function of the requirement to measure the power distribution is to ensure that limiting power distributions used as input for accident analyses are not exceeded in normal operation of the power plant.
Since the licensee has shown that the map when using only 74 percent vice 75 percent of the moveable incbre detectors' the Technical Specification requirements for all distribution parameters is still met, we conclude that the requested change does not involve a reduction in a margin of safety and is, therefore, acceptable.
8311220033 831101 PDR ADOCK 05000348 P
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FlfiAL fi0 SIGNIFICAflT HAZARDS C0f4SIDERAT10li DETERfilf4ATI0ti By telecopy letter dated October 21, 1983 the licensee requested an emergency one-time only Technical Specifcation change to preclude plant shutdown on October 22, 1983.
The licensee has determined that the one-time change does not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.92.
The licensee also determined that the change is not consistent with any of the Commission's examples "likely to involve significant hazards considerations" (48FR14870).
We agree.
We have found that the requested chanae does not involve a signifi' cant hazards consideration also.
Our basis is the evaluation sumary, above, which concludes that the margin of safety is not reduced by accepting 74 percent vice 75 percent of the incore thimbles for the one-time flux map of October 13, 1983.,
The licensee identified operational circumstances which necessitated emergency authorization in the form of Commission approval given by letter of October 21, 1983.
Without our action at that time a plant shutdown would have been made by 7:00 a.m.
on October 22, 1983.
Prior to our action the State of Alabama was consulted on this matter and had no coments on the proposed determination. As discussed at-
_, the acceptance on a one-time basis of the core flux map of October 13, 1983 does not constitute a reduction in safety margins.
The change does not involve a significant increase in the probability of consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, the ' Commission has made a final determination that the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.
Environmental Consideration We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact.
Having nade this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insig-nificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statenent or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
- Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Date: t{ovember 1,1983 o incipal Contributors:
r M. Dunnenfeld E. A. Reeves
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