ML20082B896
| ML20082B896 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 10/19/1983 |
| From: | NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20082B880 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 PROC-831019, NUDOCS 8311210364 | |
| Download: ML20082B896 (158) | |
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MILLSTONE UNIT NO. 3 CONTROT. ROOM DESIGN REVIEW IMPLEMENTATION PLAN ] w/ NUREG 0737, Supplement 1, NRC Task Action Plan requests all licensees of nuclear power plants and applicants for operating licenses to con-duct a control room design review. This is Northeast Nuclear Energy Company's plan for its Millstone Unit No. 3 plant. PREPARED BY: #f4L1h26 DATE: A' f 8 i' f / APPROVED BY: ., 4 DATE: /C 9 75 8311210364 831110 PDR ADOCK 05000423 F PDR
I 7 x,) EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The Control Room Design Review (CRDR) is a part of the efforts to upgrade the emergency response capabilities within the nuclear power industry. This plan delin-cates the methods that will be performed for Millstone Unit No. 3. The purpose of the CRDR is to ensure that the control room will provide effective and safe con-trol facilities during emergency operations. The following block diagram is a descriptive overview of the process, starting with the preparation of this plan, and concluding in a summary report. To accomplish this we will perform a control room sur-vey and compare its equipment with established human engineering guidelines for possible shortcomings; i.e., Human Engineering Deficiencies (HED's).. A re-view will also be made of similar plants to identify known deficiencies for potential effects on Millstone Unit No. 3. The operators of Millstone Unit No. 3 will also be asked for their analysis (likes and dis-likes) of the control room. A walk-through of the q operator's task (Task. Analysis .-a walk-through of each j opert.t ing scenario) using -Westinghouse's Emergency Response Guidelines (ERG's) will be performed to verify an operator's ability to perform tasks within the frame work provided. Any deficiencies (e.g., improper pro-cedures, training, hardware, missing displays, etc.) will be noted, assessed, and corrective action will be l taken as applicable. . The assessment phase will- categorize all identified ! HED's for severity. Once categorized, all- involved ! disciplines (Plant Process Computer / Safety Parameter l Display System [PPC/SpDS] designers, CRDR team members,
- training / staffing, and Emergency Operating Procedures
[EOP] authors) will participate in the resolution.of l these HED's to provide.' the best and most appropriate. j solution to identified problems.- l Upon agreement and approval by NU, these corrections-i will then be scheduled for . implementation and a summary report prepared for submission to the NRC. t i
J Ew , @$ C) S G N G I R F I E F A T S Y S I RR A T KS 4 O S 4P 1 1 f l E AM T SR M P O I E M A R G S A N I O D I T K A C C O I L F B I D 0 r
- O N E
l O N T I W A C Y NS & TE E N F S E AL I V L P EW I M 'D SE S R D TU ND E R Il I I RV lI T N 'D SH T N I R Il EE R D EE E E E C MH N R P X DH SF E EC C I SO E LS G E A C P I S N M A I E H D N E M O P O O R L E L V O E R D T N O S C D P L S I O Y / C V P l RME T N RUR I P O S C 0 G N I N I A I R T
MP3 - CRDR TABLE Or CONTENTS SECTION PAGE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1 2.0 OVERVIEW 3 2.1 Background 3 2.2 Purpose 3 2.3 Scope 3 2.4 Objectives 5 2.5 Description of CRDR Activities 6 2.6 Definition of Terms 9 3.0 MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING (REVIEW TEAM) 14 3.1 Management 14 3.2 Review Team 15 3.3 Consultants 22 3.4 Review Team Activities 22 3.5 Review Team Orientation 22 4.0 INVESTIGATION PHASE 26
/
( / 4.1 Operating Experience Review 26 4.2 Control Room Survey 32 4.3 Task Analysis 36 5.0 ASSESSMENT PHASE 40 5.1 Objective 40 5.2 Evaluation Criteria 40 6.0 CORRECTION PHASE 42 6.1 Enhancements 43 6.2 Class Improvements 44 6.3 Individual Discrepancy Correction 44 6.4 Documentation and Disposition 45 4 7.0 IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 48 8.0 REPORTING PHASE 49' 9.0 DOCUMENTATION 50 9.1 General Documentation Requirements 50 9.2 Review Documentation 51
,_s 9.3 Document Control 51 52 V) 9.4 References l
(i) i
MP3 - CRDR TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) SECTION PAGE 10.0 COORDINATION WITH OTHER ACTIVITIES 54 i 11.0
SUMMARY
56 I 6 O (ii)~ m ~ ------.--a- - - - . - - - - - - - - _ . - - -
i MP3 - CRDR
,) LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1 Millstone Unit No. 3 Site FIGURE 2 General Arrangement of Control Room FIGURE 3 Photograph of Control Boards FIGURE 4 Photograph of Control Boards FIGURE 5 Control Panel Tabulation FIGURE 6 Control Room Design Review Flow Chart FIGURE 7 Project Organization FIGURE 8 CRDR Schedule FIGURE 9 Task / System Sequence Matrix FIGURE 10 Instrumentation Requirements Table FIGURE 11 Controls Requirements Table
) FIGURE 12 Element Table -- Task E10.2 FIGURE 13 Plant Specific Task. Analysis Format 1
,,Y (iii)
MP3 - CRDR
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LIST CF APPENDICES l l l APPENDIX A Resumes APPENDIX B Cover Letter / Questionnaire APPENDIX C Checklists (Sample) APPENDIX D Human Engineering Discrepancies APPENDIX E Emergency Response Guidelines Index r\ l l l n G (iv)
MILLSTONE UNIT NO. 3 1 CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW
1.0 INTRODUCTION
l Millstone Point on Long Icland Sound in Waterford, Connecticut, is the site containing three nuclear power plants operated by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO), a subsidiary of Northeast Utilities (NU). The plants are Millstone Unit No. 1 (MP1) with a General Electric Boiling Water Reactor (BWR); Millstone Unit No. 2 (MP2) with a Combustion Engineering Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR); and Millstone Unit No. 3 (MP3), the subject plant for this review (Figure 1). Millstone Unit No. 3 is a 3411 megawatt thermal (1150 mega-watt electric) pressurized water reactor nuclear unit under construction in Waterford, Connecticut, scheduled for com- [d) merical operation in May of 1986. The reactor and its four coolant loop system were supplied by Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the turbine generator by General Electric Company, and the engineer-conatructor is Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation of Boston, Massachusetts. The Control Room Design Review (CRDR) is a part of the effort within the nuclear power industry and the Nuclear Regulatory
' Commission (NRC) to upgrade the emergency response capabilities.
While the CRDR is directed toward the control room, other areas of concern (e.g., Safety Parameter Display System [SPDS], Post. Accident Monitoring [PAM), Emergency Operating Procedures [EOP's]) that are interrelated with.the control room are also ( addressed. A k.
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- 1. Reactor Containment II. Turbine Building 21. Baron Test Tanks
- 2. ESF Building 12. Main Steam Valve Building 22. Baron Recovery Tanks
- 3. Hydrogen Recombiner Building 13. Auxiliary Boiler Room 23. Primary Water Storage Tanks 30'
- 4. Fuel Building 14. Condensate Polishing Enclosure 24. Waste Test Tanks
- 5. Waste Disposal 15. Warehouse 25. Demineralized Water Storage Tanh
- 6. Auxiliary Building 16. Main Transformers 26. Refueling Water Storage Tank
- 7. Shop 27. Condensate Storage Tank
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- 10. Diesel Generator Building 30. Intake Structure
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l MP3 - CRDR 2 v Guidance for the CRDR and related activities has been pro-vided by the NRC in the form of various NUREG's and regula-tory guides. A Nuclear Utility Task Action Committee (NUTAC) with staff support from the Institute of Nuclear power Opera-tions (INpO) was formed to develop a generic control room design review implementation plan from these guidelines. The purpose is to assist the individual utilities in their specific plan development for the implementation of the CRDR. These documents have been used by NNECO for their objectives, however, some of the specific criteria have been modified for adaptation to this particular plant. This implementation plan describes how NNECO will conduct a review of the Millstone Unit No. 3 control room. Although NNECO does not intend to wait for NRC approval of this plan 9 before commencing the review, we anticipate that any defici-encies noted by the NRC Staff will be brought to NNECO's attention in a timely manner. Thus, this plan is the basis upon which Millstone Unit No. 3 will do their review and upon which to judge that a thorough CRDR has been conducted. A qualified schedule is included in Section 4.0 of this plan. Millstone Unit No. 3 is a Near Term Operating License (NTOL) plant scheduled for fueling in 1985, thus the schedule con-tains tentative dates. This is due to two predominate facts; the actual construction of the plant, and the implementation of other emergency capability initiatives. The scheduling of the latter is to be negotiated with the NRC licensing project manager for Millstone Unit No. 3 in accordance with NUREG 0737, Supplement 1. This schedule was developed primarily from the actual plant construction phases, but does contain input from the other emergency capability initiatives.
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2.0 OVERVIEW
2.1 Background
The Millstone Unit No. 3 main control board's design has evolved from extensive operational experience. Beginning with the project's conception, this design has continued to incorporate such experience from Northeast Utilities' operating plants (fossil and nuclear), and from the industry. In order to achieve optimum operating conditions, significant efforts have been invested in the design and layout of the boards, including use of a full-scale mock-up. 2.2 Purpose The purpose of NNECO's CRDR is to ensure that the Millstone G Unit No. 3 control room will provide effective and safe control facilities during emergency operation by: o review and evaluation of the control room work space, instrumentation and controls, and other equipment from a human engineering point of view that takes into account both system demands and operator capabilities; e identification, assessment, and schedule implementa-tion of control room design modifications that correct inadequate or unsuitable items. 2.3 Scope The CRDR will be performed utilizing the objectives and
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approach as provided in this plan, developed from the various
Mp3 - CRDR 4 guidelines. It is understood that the regulatory documents serve as guidance; not requirements or as inflexible criteria to be used by NRC reviewers. They include, but are not limited to, the following. NUREG REPORT TITLE 0696 Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities 0700 Guidelines for Control Room Design Review 0899 Guidelines for the Preparation of Emergency Operating Procedures 0801 Evaluation Criteria for Detailed Control Room Design Reviews 0737 Supplement 1: Requirements for Emergency Response Capability as Required by NRC Generic Letter 82-33, dated 12/17/82 REG. GUIDES TITLE 1.47 Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems, Revision 0, May 1973 1.97 Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following An Accident, Revision 2, December 1980 The equipment to be included in the review will be controls, displays, and other components on the control boards, peri-pheral consoles, communications equipment, ancillary devices, and procedures that the control room operators would be expected to interface with. The auxiliary shutdown and transfer panels will also be included in this review, s
Mp3 - CRDR 5 s Figure 2 is the general arrangement of the control room. Figures 3 and 4 are photographs of the control boards, and Figure 5 is a comprehensive tabulation of the panels to be enveloped by the review process. 2.4 Objectives To ensure that the CRDR fulfills its stated purpose, several objectives will be met during the review. 2.4.1 To compile all criteria and standards used for design and layout of the main control boards for considera-tion of the principles that were incorporated in the original design. 2.4.2 To review relevant plant operational experience using appropriate documentation from similar plants and operator interviews as applied to nuclear power plant operations. 2.4.3 To perform a control room survey that compares the control room design with accepted human engineering criteria. 2.4.4 To determine the input and output requirements of con-trol room operator tasks during emergency conditions. 2.4.5 To identify human engineering discrepancies (HED's). 2.4.6 To determine the extent and importance of any identified discrepancies. 2.4.7 To dispose of any identified discrepancies.
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P MP3 - CRDR FIGURE 5 . CONTROL PANEL TABULATION Main Board 1 (MB1) - Primary Auxiliary Panel Main Board 2 (MB2) - Engineered Safeguards Panel Main Board 3 (MB3) - Chemical & Volurae Control Panel Main Board 4 (MB4) - Reactor Control Panel Main Board 5 (MB5) - Steam Generator & Feedwater Panel Main Board 6 (MBG) - Mechanical Panel Main Board 7 (MB7) - Turbine Generator Panel Main Board 8 (MB8) - Station Electric Panel h Panel FPS - Main Fire Protection Panel Panel SMC - Seismic Panel Panel VP1 - Main Heating & Ventilating Pane) NIS Panels - Nuclear Instrumentation Panels INC Panels - Flux Mapping Panels RMS Panels - Radiation Monitoring Panels Panel ASP -
. Axiliary Shutdown Panel (Switchgear Room) and Transfer Panels Panels ESC A k B -
Emergency Generator Load Sequences
_ MP3 - CRDR 6
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J 2.4.8 To verify that the proposed resolutions do, in fact, eliminate or mitigate the discrepancies for which they are formulated. 2.4.9 To identify training and staffing, as necessary, to ensure that the control room operators can function adequately with any control room changes. 2.4.10 To validate that the changes eliminate or mitigate the discrepancies formulated. 2.5 Description of CRDR Activitics To achieve the stated objectives, several activities will be completed during the review. A flow chart of these activities is presented in FJgure 6. Note that the CRDR has been divided into six phases--planning, investigation, assessment, correc-tion, implementation, and reporting. The planning phase is represented by this implementation plan. The activities within each phase will be described in more detail later, but a brief synopsis at this time will help give a general picture of the review process. 2.5.1 Investigatio_n e The investigation phLre will constitute the data 1 gathering portion of'the CRDR. 1 < A review:of the design evolution (i.e., bases,
' experience, documents, etc.) will be performed compiling the criteria and standards used for
~~ the'd'esign and layout of the control boards.
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MP3 - CRDR D FIGURE 6 CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW FLOW CHART PHASE DESCRIPTION PLANNING DEVELOP IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 1 I R M EXPERIENCE TASK SURVEY REVIEW ANALYSIS INVESTIGATION i I IDENTIFY HED'S 3 ' ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT OF HED'S G ;; CORRECTION DEVELOP ENHANCEMENT AND MODIFICATIONS G n IMPLEMENTATION PROVIDE IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULING G , ; REPORTING PROVIDE
SUMMARY
REPORT O !
MP3 - CRDR 7 O This compilation will be utilized in the survey and as consideration in the assessment and correction phases of any deficiencies. During this phase a control room survey will compare the characteristics of the control room with appro-priate human engineering design guidelines to identify any HED's. An exmmination of operating experience, generic and plant similar, will be conducted by a review of generic documents, such as plant trip reports and through interviews with the control room operators. The data obtained will be reviewed for their potential classification as HED's. Task analysis, using Westinghouse Emergency Response Guidelines (ERG's) for appropriate plant transients, will be performed to determine the tasks required of operators during emergencies. The instrumentation and control requirements for those tasks will be established and their adequacy and completeness determined. Items found in non-compliance will be classified as HED's. , This adequacy and completeness determination will be accomplished by an inventory of the equipment required l as well as a verification (static review) of the equipment's human suitability. The validation (dynamic review) of the equipment will be performed as an addendum to this plan. See Section 4.3.3 of this plan for further detail.
MP3 - CRDR 8 0 2.5.2 Assessment Phase During the assessment phase, all discrepancies identified in the investigation phase will be classified for their potential impact on emergency operation. 2.5.3 Correction Phase l Recommended resolutions of discrepancies identified in the assessment phase will include methods by enhancement, modification, and/or other means (e.g., training or changes to procedures). The actions proposed to resolve HED's will also be analyzed for their affect on operation. These HED resolutions will additionally be verified by their x implementation on a full scale mock-up for final review and approval by the review team, NNECO personnel, and the CRDR project management. Dis-crepancies found to be non-significant will be documented for inclusion in the records of the review. 2.5.4 Implementation Phase I A recommended schedule will be developed to ensure the integration of proposed control room changes with other. post-TMI programs, as well as plant operating status. The schedule will take into account the required training of operators on pending changes. Administrative follow-up will be instituted to ensure the successful completion and validation of all control room changes. The
MP3 - CRDR 9 0 actual implementation will occur subsequent to the reporting phase. 2.5.5 Reporting Phase A summary report will be submitted to the NRC at the conclusion of the review that will: e Summarize the results of the review in accor-dance with this plan. e Summarize the resolutions for discrepancies. e Schedule the implementation of these resolutions. e Provide reference data for the detailed docu-mentation material developed in the review. 2.6 Definition of Terms 2.6.1 Control Room Design Review (CRDR) A post-TMI task listed in NUREG 0660, Task 1.D.1,
" Task Action Plan Developed As A Result Of The TMI-2 Accident", and NUREG 0737, the Staff supple-ment to NUREG 0660.
2.6.2 Control Room Survey One of the activities that constitutes a CRDR. The control room survey is a static verification of the control room performed by comparing the control room instrumentation and layout with selected human
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engineering design criteria. i
MP3 - CRDR 10 9 2.6.3 Elements of a Utility CRDR Implementation Process The necessary parts of a cohesive CRDR implementation process that a utility considers in developing and reviewing their implementation plan and schedule. 2.6.4 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP's) Plant procedures directing the operator actions necessary to mitigate the consequences of trans-ients and accidents that cause plant parameters to exceed their reactor protection setpoints and/or other appropriate technical limits. 2.6.5 Emergency Response Guidelines (ERG's) O Guidelines for the response to transients and acci-dents developed by the Westinghouse Owners Group that provide the bases for plant-specific EOP's. 2.6.6 Function 1 An activity by one or more system parts that contri-butes to a larger activity or goal. l 2.6.7 Function Analysis An examination of the required functions with respect i to available manpower, technology, and other resources to determine how the functions may be allocated and executed. npllm =lllilm m
MP3 - CRDR 11 D 2.6.8 Human Engineering (HE)
"The science of optimizing tite performutce of hwnan beings, especially in industry. Also, more namely, the science of design of equ.ipnent for efficient use by hwnan beings."
2.6.9 Human Engineering Discrepancy (HED) A characteristic of the control room that does not comply with human engineering criteria. 2.6.10 Operator A licensed individual who manipulates a control or device; e.g., Reactor Operator (RO), Senior Reactor Operator (SRO). G 2.6.11 Operational Experience Review One of the activities that constitutes a CRDR. The operating experience review screens plant operating documents and operator experience to discover human engineering shortcomings that have caused actual operating problems (or near misses) in the past. 2.6.12 Review Team A group of individuals responsible for directing and enacting the CRDR of a specific control room. O
MP3 - CRDR 12 2.6.13 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) l l I, A computer-driven aid to the control room operating staff for use in monitoring the status of critical safety functions that constitutes the basis for plant-specific, symptom-oriented EOP's. The SPDS functions will be performed by the Plant Process Computer (PPC). 2.6.14 Task A specific action or individual step that contri-butes to the accomplishment of a function. 2.6.15 Task Analysis G The task analysis, using the ERG's which establish the operator's task requirements, is a tool or method used to delineate system functions and the specific actions that must take place to accomplish those functions. In the CRDR context task analysis is used to determine the individual tasks that must be completed to allow successful emergency operation. This activity checks control room conformity to emergency operating procedures. 2.6.16 Validation The process of determining whether the control room operating staff can perform their functions effec-tively given control room instrumentation, procedures, and training. In the CRDR context, validation implies a dynamic performance evaluation. 9
MP3 - CRDR 13 2.6.17 Verification The process of determining whether instrumentation, controls, and other equipment are present and suit-able to meet the specific requirements of the emergency tasks performed by the operators. The control room survey is also a verification activity; a check of the control room equipment's suitability for use by the operator. In the CRDR context, veri-fication implies a static check of instrumentation against human engineering criteria and operators required actions. G 9
L MP3 -'CRDR 14 4 i 3.0 MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING (REVIEW TEAM) 3.1 Management NNECO is a wholly owned subsidiary of Northeast Utilities (NU). The CRDR will be conducted under the normal project policy and organization of the NU System which utilizies the services of the Northeast Utilities Service Company (NUSCO)'for its engineering and operation functions. The scope of responsi-bilities and definition of major functions for the Nuclear Engineering and Operations Group is contained in Northeast Utilities' " Nuclear Engineering and Operations Policies and Procedures Manual". Figure 7 is the project organization in accordance with these procedures for this CRDR. [J The ultimate responsibility for the CRDR resides with the Senior Vice President of Nuclear Engineering and Operations and his subordinate, the Vice President of Generation Engineering and Construction. The Millstone Unit No. 3 Project is responsible for the design, construction, and licensing of the plant. The CRDR has been included as a part of the overall project. The CRDR project manager was selected, who in turn commissioned members for the review team in accordance with NU normal. policies and procedures. This review team provides Millstone Unit No. 3 project management.the oversight.to ensure the-integration of the project objectives and to fulfill the intent of the review. The resources and constraints were further identified and' analyzed.for. integration in this plan by the team and the >"}g Millstone Unit No. 3 Project. J l _ _ _ _ . - _ - - _ - _ _ _ - - _ - - l
MP3 - CRDR
'/ FIGURE 7 l
l PROJECT ORGANIZATION 1 l l Senior Vice President Nuclear Engineering & Operations W. G. COUNSIL Vice President Generation Engineering & Construction R. P. WERNER Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3 Project Liaison R. E. BUSCH J. J. FESTA s s CRDR Project Manager
) T. A. SHAFFER l i I ph CRDR Project Engineer i 1 A W. C. MISSION I l ,Sn'M l I I I l
l CORE REVIEW TEAM. DISCIPLINE SUPPORT l 1 1 I W. C. MISSION, Ccntrols Spec. P. A. BLASIOLI, Licensing Engr. l l R. W. ROTHGEB, Operations Engr. E. P. PERKINS, Nuclear Engr. I I A. M. STAVE, H. F. Engr. R. L. BEVERIDGE, PRA/ Safety Analysis l I J. A. BP.ESLIN, H. F. Engr. J. M. CLARK, Electrical Engr. I I R. E. CHIDLEY, Nuclear Engr. M. F. SAMEK, instrumentation Engr. I i A. C. MACRIS, Nuclear Engr. B. S. KAUFMAN, Mechanical Engr. I i E. M. KUHN, Admin. Specialist R. C. THOMAS, Mechanical Engr. I I K. L. PARKINSON, Training Supv. l l P. P. SLOWIK, Computer Spec. 1 I J. G. TOSCAS, Operations Engr. I l R. P. MORRISON, JR. , H. F. Engr. I I I I I
-~s l l
l l 1 I l
MP3 - CRDR 15 3._.s 1 m) 3.2 Review Team l l The review team is a multi-disciplined team of individuals with the wide range of skills necessary to perform the design review. They are responsible for planning, scheduling, and coordinating the entire integrated CRDR. The team includes members of NNECO, NUSCO, and consultants. Within this review team are the disciplines that constitute the core team, the full time personnel assigned to the project. This core team includes the following expertise. e Technical Advisor (having held an SRO license). e Human Factors Specialist (s).
-g e Controls Specialist (s).
U e Nuclear Engineer (s). Supplementing this core team as required are other disciplines including mechanical, electrical, and nuclear engineering, training, computer operations, and licensing. These disci-plines are from various NU operations and engineering depart-ments, and consultants. During the course of the review, any additional specialists (e.g., lighting,. acoustics, etc.) required for specific tasks will be made available as needed. The review team has been provided with' specific support as a part of the charge for. enacting the CRDR, including the following. e Access to information (records, documents, plans,
N procedures, drawings, etc.).
L)
MP3 - CRDR 16 e Access to required facilities. e Access to personnel with useful or necessary informa-tion (reactor operators, architect / engineers, management). e Freedom to document dissenting opinions. 3.2.1 CRDR Manager The manager, as the team's key person, will have full authority to implement the provisions delineated within this plan. Specifics include the following. e Interface with the Millstone Unit No. 3 Project and upper management. e Provide licensing liaison support. e Ensure the review is conducted in a professional, objective, and timely manner, consistent with this plan. e Select the review team's specific members, o Provide guidance as requested and required. The CRDR manager's qualifications include a baccalau-reate degree in Electrical Engineering; the super-visor of the Controls Engineering Unit of the Electrical Engineering Branch of the Generation Engineering Department; and eight years of experi-x
MP3 - CRDR 17
)
J ence in the engineering of nuclear units. His resume is attached in the appendices of this plan. 3.2.2 CRDR Project Engineer The project engineer is the team's coordinator. Because of the detailed knowledge of the NU systems and methods, this individual provides the cohesive force for the different departments and consultants involved in the review. The CRDR project engineer's specific responsibilities include the following. e Provide team orientation. e Preparation of the implementation plan. e Obtain training in selected areas, as required. e Direct and support day-to-day team activities. o Identify the need to management for specialists' support when necessary, o Direct all phases.o<f the review. e Provide management with a regular status report of the team's activities and progress. His que.lifications include an equivalent associates degree in Architectural Engineering, eight years of experience in consulting engineering, and twenty-
l MP3 - CRDR 18 _) three years of experience in utility engineering and administration. The past nine years have been in the l Generation Engineering Department and specifically in the design of nuclear power plants (e.g., a generation specialist in control board designs, human engineering applications, etc.). His resume is attached in the appendices of this plan. 3.2.3 Technical Advisor (Having Held SRO License) This member of the core team is from NNECO and his expertise provides the operational factor of the review. His specific responsibilities include the following. s e Obtain orientation in selected areas. e Assist in the preparation of the implementation plan. e Assist in all phases of the CRDR. e Serve as core team member of the review, o Provide the review team with the operational aspects and constraints in assessing the dis-crepancies found during the survey phase of the review. e Direct liaison with training and operations. m
/
MP3 - CRDR 19 D His qualifications include a bachelor of science . I degree in Chemistry, fifteen years of nuclear -
)
operating experience, the past nine. years of which have been with the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company. Presently he is staff assistant to the Millstone l Unit No. 3 plant superintendent. His resume.is attached in the appendices of this plan. 3.2.4 Human Factors Specialists (HFS) i The Human Factors Specialists, as members of the core team in all phases of the control room review, will direct the team with regard to the human. factors criteria for the entire project. Specific responsibilites include the'following. F e Obtain orientation in selected areas. e Assist in the preparation of the implementation plan. e Assist in all phases of the.CRDR. e Serve as core team members'of the review. e Provide the review team with the human inter-face aspects in assessing the' discrepancies found during the survey phase of'the review. Qualifications include.a Master.of Arts Degree in
-Psychology, a Doctor of Philosophy Candidate, and D
MP3 - CRDR 20 1 more than twenty years of related human factors experience in the aerospace industry. Resumes are attached in the appendices of this plan. 3.2.5 Controls Specialist (CS) The Controls Specialist will assist in the identi-fication of plant system design features and will serve as the review team discipline on the capabil-itias and limitations of controls and instruments. He will also provide input to the team during the assessment phase of the review, especially when the review team considers proposals for mitigations of HED's. His specific responsibilities include the following. o Obtain orientation in selected areas. e Preparation of the implementation plan. o Serve as core team member of the review. e Provide his expertise in the assessment phase. NOTE: The Controls Specialist is also the project engineer, a normal procedure in the NU System for projects that fall within the responsiblity scope of the individual departments. See Section 3.2.2 for additional responsibilites and qualifications. . l 8 1 l l
MP3 - CRDR 21 3.2.6 Nuclear Engineers (NE) The Nuclear Engineers will assist in the identifica-tion and utilization of plant systems and will serve as the review team disciplines on the capabilities and limitations of these systems. They will provide their expertise during the task analysis phase as well as the assessment and correction phases of the review. Specific responsibilites include the following. o Obtain orientation in selected areas. o Serve as core team members of the review. e Provide expertise in task analysis, assessment, and correction phases. Their qualifications include a Bachelor of Science and a Master of Science in Engineering and thirteen to twenty-nine years in-Navy nuclear power experience. Their resumes are attached in the appendices of this plan. 3.2.7 Discipline Support As stated previously, other discipline support will be utilized to provide their individual expertise as required. Their qualifications are included in their resumes in the appendices of this plan. O
l } MP3 - CRDR 22 3.3 Consultants In addition to the review team members from the NU System, additional expertise from The Interlock Group of Malvern, Pennsylvania, has been retained to assist in the review. They will serve as members of the team in all areas of fulfilling NU requirements for manpower allocation. As members of the team they will provide input to all phases of the review from planning through to the summary report. Their qualifications are included in their resumes in the appendices of this plan. 3.4 Review Team Activities The review team activities are to perform the CRDR as out-I lined in Section 2.5, Description of CRDR Activities. The details of the activity are further stipulated in Section 4.0 of this plan, Procedures for the CRDR. 3.5 Review Team Orientation Each member of the review team will bring his own in-depth knowledge of specific topics to the team. It is important, however, that the team be able to conduct the CRDR from a common basis of understanding. The core team will undergo an orientation program designed to provide each team member with certain basic knowledge requirements. The purpose of this orientation is to acquaint each member with the other disciplines' perspective represented on the~ team--not to make each team member an expert in all specialties. I
MP3 - CRDR 23 D The orientation program will consist of the following minimum instructional areas. 3.5.1 Human Factors Orientation provided for the core review team will familiarize them with principles of human factors and their application to the control room review. Included in this area is a synopsis of the history of the CRDR requirements and its ultimate goals. This orientation area will be slanted toward those review team members with little background in human engineering. The core team members of NU have had this orientation prior to the preparation of this implementation plan. The consultants bring this area of expertise with them as a part of their I credentials and experience to assist us. 3.5.2 Plant Familiarization The core team members will receive plant familiariza-tion, consisting of a review of the available docu-mentation, the actual control room, and the plant systems. 3.5.3 CRDR Familiarization The full review team will receive a full indoctrin-ation of the plan, the methodologies for performing the review, and their participation in the review by the members of the core team. m 4
MP3 - CRDR 24 I 3.5.4 Miscellaneous During the course of the review, any other areas requiring orientation that are identified will be obtained to meet the needs. I i
. .- . . - - _. .- - - . . . . . . . - ~..
MP3 - CRDR 25 m 4.0- INVESTIGATION PHASE To achieve the objectives outlined in Section 2.4 and to ! explain in detail the activities of the review (Section 2.5), these procedures will constitute the methodology in performing the Investigation Phase of the CRDR. Figure 8 is the schedule for performing the CRDR. In develop-ing the schedule, the team recognized that it would be physi-cally impossible to complete all parts of the review due to the fact that some of the plant system components represented in the control room would not be completed. Ths construction. of the plant, however, is such that the great majority of the review can be completed at this time. The items held in abeyance are as follows. F . e Environmental Survey e Communications Survey. e Computer Survey. e Validation Step of the Task Analysis (see Section 4.3 for the full discussion on this item) These will be scheduled.for. completion prior to commercial operation, utilizing the principles within, for the develop-ment of the appropriate checklists and forms, and~ submitted in a subsequent submittal as an Addendum toLt he report for this' review. 4
O O U
=
ca 1 MILLSTONE UNIT No. 3 -- CRDR SCHEDULE to 1983
- 1984 PHASE MAR APR JUN MAY JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY PLANNING EXPERIENCE REVIEW
*e m
CONTROL ROOM O SURVEY en TASK ANALYSIS ASSESSMENT OF HED'S CORRECTIONS IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE DOCUMENTATION /
~ ~ '~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~
FINAL REPORT ~~ ~~~ LICENSING SUPPORT -- -- -- - -- - -- --- - ----- - - --- - ------- --
MP3 - CRDR 26 L I This phase, the investigative and data gathering portion of the review, is divided into three parts: the operating experience review, the control room survey, and the task analysis review. 4.1 Operating Experience Review An operating experience review will provide information on potential problem areas in the control room by studying actual occurrences of other plants as well as to survey the Millstone Unit No. 3 operating personnel for their past operational experience for correlation to this unit. This information will be utilized for the identification of possible HED's on this unit in the other phases of the review. 4.1.1 Historical Documentation Review The Nuclear Safety Engineering Department of NU presently reviews all Licensee Event Reports (LER's) for Connecticut Yankee in Haddam, Connecticut, and Millstone Units No. 1 and No. 2 in Waterford, Connecticut. In addition, they review all Significant Operating Experience Reports (SOER's) and Significant Event Reports (SER's) distributed by the Institute of Nuclear power Operations (INPO) for applicability to the four nuclear plants involved in the NU system.
MP3 - CRDR 27 m l J All NU LER's as well as the SOER's and SER's for
- the past four years will be rescreened'by the review team for specific applicability to this CaDR.
These reviews will be supplemented by a review of the LER's from other Westinghouse NSSS I plants for potential problems. The plants are as follows. e Salem 1 & 2 of New Jersey PSE&G Company e Sequoyah 1 of TVA
- e. McGuire 1 & 2 of Duke power Company.
/ 4.1.2 Document Screening The core team, after examining these SOER's, SER's, and LER's, will obtain copies of those involving control room operator, procedural, and/or control board. equipment failure as.well as design. arrange-ment errors. Each report obtained will then be reviewed in depth to determine if it defines one or more of the following.
e Equipment referenced (valve / pump controls, displays, indicators, etc.)'are in the physical confines'of the control room or remote shutdown panel. 7 L.
, to MP3 - CRDR 28 e Procedure steps referenced are accomplished within the physical confines of the control room or remote shutdown panel.
e Personnel error referenced occurred in the control room, on equipment in the control room or remote shutdown panel, or entailed a deviation from procedures that were accomplished in the control room or remote shutdown panel. Reports that meet any of the above selective criteria will be incorporated into the control room survey and/or the task analysis phase of the review for further identification as to applicability to this plant. 4.1.3 Operating Personnel Survey A most valuable source of data on operational prob-lems are the people that have operated a plant and will be the operators of this plant. The intent of this part of the survey is to gain as much first-hand information as possible on actual and potential operational errors. The survey will consist of a self-administered questionnaire and a follow-up interview of the licensable staff with prior operating experience. (a) Questionnaire Construction An open-ended, self-administered questionnaire approach has been adopted. By this method NNECO
MP3 - CRDR 29 D feels the operating personnel can be questioned and still maximize the use of their time and that of the core team. The survey will cover the following topics. e Work Space Layout (Ergonomics) and Environment e Panel Design e Annunciator Warning System e Communications e Displays I e Procedures e Staffing o Training e Other Areas for Operator Comment A sample of the questionnaire is included in the appendices. Assembly of the questionnaire has been done so that each topic area is sampled completely in item content. A section is included so that suggestions for improvements in each topic area are solicited. I
MP3 - CRDR 30 l l l A cover letter is included which (1) explains the purpose; (2) describes the questionnaire and provides instruction; (3) conveys what will be done with the results; and (4) requests bio-graphical information. 1 (b) Questionnaire Distribution The questionnaire will be given to previously licensed and selected personnel of the Millstone Unit No. 3 Operations Department. At the time of distribution the recipients will receive a briefing by the Operations Supervisor and/or a CRDR core team member. The briefing will emphasize the elements discussed in the cover letter.
~
(c) Questionnaire Data Analysis After the questionnaires have been completed, they will be examined and reviewed on an item-by-item basis. Responses will be summarized for further evaluation. It is anticipated that both positive and nega-tive control features will be identified by the respondents. Further investigation will therefore be carried out for each item to determine whether they are in accordance with sound human engineering conventions and prac-tices. Positive responses will be recorded and retained for consideration in subsequent
4 s' MP3 - CRDR 31 review processes (e.g., as possible recom-mendations for corrective action to llED's). I l Negative responses will be investigated further by the control room design survey and the task analysis reviews. The biographical data collected in the question-naire cover letter will be summarized to provide the review team with the demographics and experience of the operating personnel for comparison with the human engineering standards being utilized. (d) Interviews Interviews may be conducted dependent upon the answers received by the questionnaire or if felt necessary by the core team. The purpose of any interviews will be to clarify any unclear information obtained by the question-naire.and tq ensure that all important areas have been addressed. The operating personnel to be interviewed will be selected from the control room personnel and interviews will be performed by selected members of the core tenm. 1
MP3 - CRDR 32 4.1.4 Design Criteria and Standard Compilation i Concurrent with our Operating Experience Review and Personnel Survey, the documentation file of the design of the main control boards will be reviewed for all pertinent data (e.g., acronyms, abbreviations, switch type utilization, meter type utilization, color standards, etc.). This data will be compiled and documented for utilization in the assessment phase and to a lesser extent during the control room survey. During the assessment phase, this compilation will establish guidance for disposing of differences between the design criteria and the CRDR acceptance criteria to present a frame of reference for resolving human engineering deficiencies. I 4.2 Control Room Survey 4.2.1 Survey The control room survey, a human factors engineering (HFE) review, will be a systematic evaluation of the Millstone Unit No. 3 control room using NUPTG 0700, Section 6, as design criteria. The survey will determine if the work space, instruments, and con-trols are in compliance with this criteria. The documents in Section 9.0 of this plan will be referenced as necessary for clarification. Non-compliance items will be recorded as human engineering discrepancies (f.ED's) on the HED form in the appendices. Photographic evidence of a I
i MP3 - CRDR 33 ; non-compliance item will be made when deemed neces-sary to support the assessment and correction phases. l The methodology of converting the design criteria into specific checklists is tailored for Millstone r Unit No. 3 and categorizes the equipment being evaluated by levels of complexit3 These levels are identified as Component, Set, and Panel. Examples of these checklists are contained in the , appendices. (a) Component Level The first and most fundamental level of the control room survey is the component review. F~/ Categories of sbnilar type components will be identified (e.g., indicator lights, annuncia-tor tiles, labels, J-handle selectors, push-buttons, etc.). The checklist addresses design characteristics of the components that remain consistent for all similar types, regardless of their application. The' checklist will be administered on the actual panels in the Mill-stone Unit No. 3 control room. (b) Set Level The second level of the control room survey is the set design. A set-is defined as a unique arrangement of components which.can (1) serve a common. function, or (2) are repeated frequently. throughout the control room, or-(3) are identi-
MP3 - CRDR 34 D fled by a single, common placard (e.g., valve position control and indication utilizes a control switen, a position meter, and status lights). Categories of similar type sets will be identified on the Millstone Unit No. 3 panels. This review primarily addresses relative arrange-ment of components in the set, as well as move-ment relationships between the components and identification (component legends and labeling) within the set. The administration of this checklist uses descriptive data about the com-ponents available from the component design checklist, and a knowledge of spatial relation-ships available from the mock-up or control room. (c) Panel Level The panel review provides the third level of this survey. This is a top-down functional operational review, whereas the component and . set reviews are a bottom-up approach. The functional evaluation consists of a review of control / display relationships, the ability of system functional grouping to support system understanding, and how the console grouping related to overall plant operations in normal and emergency conditions. Panels will be reviewed individually to deter-mine their function with respect to overall plant control. An evaluation will be made of the functional arrangement of controls, dis-
MP3 - CRDR ' 35 l l plays (indicators), and annunciators with respect to groupings, and consistency with plant configuration. The relationship of panels to each other in an operational con-text will be evaluated. This part of the revicw assists in the human engineering suitability portion of Paragraph 2.6.17, Verification. Finally, an overview survey will be performed to address the general layout, availability, accessibility, and anthropometric suitability of the control room. 4.2.2 Survey Administration
- s. ) The core team will review the checklists prior to administration to ensure complete compatibility with Millstone Unit No. 3. Areas of concern will be dis-cussed and appropriate resolutions determined. Based on the resolution, the checklists will be finalized.
The actual design review will be conducted as indic-ated in Paragraph 4.2.1, Survey. Upon completion of the survey, the core team will review the checklists' results for completeness prior to the commencement of the assessment phase. Any core team member can docu-ment opinions concerning the potential classification of the control room features under concern, which may be in conflict with the opinion of the majority of the team. This opinion will be forwarded to the CRDR project manager for inclusion in the review documenta-tion. These documents will be available during the
~y. assessment phase and any audit of the CRDR.
-)
~
MP3 - CRDR 3G D 4.3 Task Analysis The objective of task analysis is to identify the instru-mentation and control requirements used by the control room staff for emergency operation and ensure that the required systems can be efficiently and reliably operated under these conditions. The presence or absence of equipment as well as its human engineering suitability will be determined and verified. This is the verification for human engineering suitability of Paragraph 2.6.17. Non-compliance items will be recorded as HED's on the HED form in the appendices. Thorough function analyses of transients and accident con-ditions have been performed by the NSSS vendors in their development of emergency guidelines. These generic guide-lines define the functions allocated to the control room I operating staff to provide effective operation and control of the plant under a variety of emergency conditions. As such, the ERG's form a sou.:d technical basis for the develop-ment of plant-specific ERG's and EOP's, for training require-ments for the operators, and for the task analysis phase of the CRDR. Millstone Unit No. 3 will develop their EOP's from these ERG's. The approved version of these procedures will not be completed for integration in the CRDR during 1983. Thus, the ERG's discussed above will be used for the purpose of this review. Then tha final EOP's are issued, the core team will validate that the review done for the CRDR using the ERG's was indeed appropriate and complete. Any deviations to these ERG's by the EOP's will be documented and included in the Addendum Report of open items discussed previously in this plan.
r MP3 - CRDR 37 4.3.1 Guidelines to be Evaluated The ERG's used for this review are the Westinghouse ERG's developed by the Westinghouse Owners Group and recently approved by the NRC Procedures and Test Review Branch. Specifically, Millstone Unit No. 3 will use Westinghouse's Guidelines, Revision 1, ERG's, and System Review / Task Analysis (SR/TA's).. 4.3.2 Methodology The generic ERG's are provided in procedural format and are supported with functional flow block diagrams which establish generic tasks. Therefore, the remain-ing work is to perform a plant-specific functional analysis using the generic ERG's. This will develop the plant-specific functional flow block diagrams and establish the plant-specific tasks to be analyzed. l The criteria for the plant-specific tasks to be analyzed will be the Westinghouse generic emergency operational events. Duplication of tasks will not be reanalyzed. Supporting documents from the generic analysis provide Task / System Matrices that relate systems to task ele-ments (Figure 9). Also, Instrument and Control Require-ment Tables were developed for each system-and are related to the task elements'(Figures 10 and 11). An example of a task element table is shown in Figure 12. This analysis is thoroughly documented and will be used in support of the Millstone Unit No. 3 CRDR. The Task / System Matrices will be used.to verify that all
MP3 - CRDR FIGURE 9 Other l l l l l l bl l l l l l Pneumatic Power l l l l l l l l l l Electncal Power l l l l l l l l l ! Steam Generator Blowdown l l l l l l l l l l l l l l Auxillary Feedwater l *l l l x! l l l xl l l l l , l Main Feedwater and Condensate l l l l l l l l l l l l l l Main Steam l l*I *l I l *l l l *l lM l Containment Atmoschere Control l l l l l ! I l l l l l l Containment Soray l ! ! l l I I I E Service Water l I l l l l l I h Component Cooling Water l l l l l l I 5 Chemical and Volume Control l l l l l l Residual Heat Removal l l l l*l l l l Safety injection
- l l l l l* l l l Reactor Coolant l*l* *
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- l * *l l l Containment instrumentation l* l l l l l l l l Radiation Instrumentation l l l l l l l l l Control Rod Instrumentation l l l l l l l i Nuclear Instrumentation l l l l l l i ESF Actuation l l l l *l l
} Reactor Trio Actuation l l l l l Sequence - ~ , , , e a a d a . s s . ,
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MP3 - CRDR FIGURE 10 INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS TABLE l SYSTEM: Containment Instrumentation INSTRUMENTATION: Phase A Containment Isolation Valves TASK CRITERIA REQUIREMENTS REQUIREMENTS MP3 EQUIPMENTl e Indication of E00.6 Position (Closed) (C20.17) FZ1.1 FZ3.3 FI3.10.A l D r l t
- 1. . Enter plant-specific eqdipment.
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MP3 - CRDR FIGURE 11 CONTROLS REQUIREMENTS TABLE SYSTEM: Chemical and Volume Control CONTROLS: Plant-specific controls for letdown flow. TASK l CRITERIA REQUIREMENTS REQUIREMENTS MP3 EQUIPMENT e Control Pressurizer E02.9 Level E30.21 E3B.3.C FPl.20 FI3.3.A FI3.14 e Control RCS FZ1.4.B Pressure FI1.8 e Equalize Charging E3A 3 and Letdown E3A.11 (E3A.22) FI3.4.B i l l
- 1. Enter plant-specific equipment.
MP3 - CRDR h FIGURE 12 ELEMENT TABLE -- TASK E10.2 l FUNCTION: Diagnose plant condition. l TASK E10.2: Check containment sump level. TASK OBJECTIVE: To check for a containment recirculation sump level symptomatic of a loss of reactor coolant. TASK DECISION (CRITERIA) REQUIREMENTS: To determine if con-tainment sump level is increasing. TASK KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENTS: That abnormal containment con-ditions, including containment recirculation sump level, are symptomatic of a loss of reactor coolant. TASK INSTRUMENTATION (CRITERIA) MP3 EQUIPMENT l REQUIREMENTS e Containment recirculation sump level indication (increasing). TASK ACTION (CRITERIA) REQUIREMENTS e If containment recirculation sump level is increasing, go to next task. e If containment recirculatian sump level is not increasing, go to Task E00.29. TASK CONTROL CAPABILITY (CRITERIA) REQUIREMENTS e None CONSEQUENCES OF TASK ERROR / OMISSION: If containment recircu-lation sump level is not increasing, task error / omission will result in continued operator actions to mitigate a loss of reactor coolant when the operator should go to Task E00.29 to rediagnose the event.
- 1. Enter plant-specific equipment.
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MP3 - CRDR 38 D system functions are covered and will result in a functional sequence outline to serve as a direct input to the plant-specific task analysis. The task analysis will identify specific instrumenta-tion and controls required for the accomplishment of Millstone Unit No. 3 tasks. In addition to the task information already covered in the generic element table (see Figure 12), specific analyses of instru-ments and controls will be performed using the format in Figure 13, This form identifies all instruments and controls to be used for each task action, codes those that are not performed by the control room operator, notes readings and accuracy of readings required, and specifies the instrument identification and panel location. In addition, information developed I from the Experience Review and items from the Control Room Survey (including human engineering suitability) that require task analysis will be noted on the task analysis form to be considered at the appropriate point in the analyses. This analysis will be conducted in both the control room and on the control room mock-up to verify availability and human engineering suitability. The validation phase will be held in abeyance as explained in the following Section 4.3.3. I
MP3 - CRDR 39 9 Validation Approach 4.3.3 Concurrent with the construction schedule of Mill-stone Unit No. 3, NNECO has developed and is adhering to their own schedule for plant familiari-zation, procedur.e writing, training, startup, etc. This schedule is such that the operators will not have completed or received their training in the use of the emergency procedures (generic or plant-specific) prior to this review. Training has been scheduled in the use of the specific emergency procedures only when they have been completed. Therefore, this step of the review will be held in abeyance and be performed in conjunction with the training of plant-specific EOP's. In this manner a meaningful validation of the functions I allocated to the operator will be performed on the plant-specific simulator and reported as part of the Addendum. The methodology will be developed as part of the training and submitted with the Addendum also. D
l MP3 - CRDR 40 1 9 5.0 ASSESSMENT PHASE 1 5.1 Objective The objective of this phase of the CRDR is to evaluate for significance the HED's defined in the previous phases of the review, including consideration of the design standards and objectives. 5.2 Evaluation Criteria Human engineering discrepancies found during the control room survey, the operating experience review, and the task analysis review, will be evaluated according to their potential to adversely affect emergency operation. Those items that will not be implemented prior to issuance of an operating license will be prioritized for resolution. The following four categories are des!'. ul to be unique so a consensus can be obtained from the ceam as to which priority each HED should be assigned. 5.2.1 Priority 1 (Safety Significant) HED's that are judged likely to adversely affect the management of emergency conditions by the control room operators. Most of the HED's placed in this category will probably be found during task analysis, supported by the results of the survey and operating experience review. D
hip 3 - CRDR 41 D 5.2.2 l Priority 2 (Operational / Reliability)
- HED's that are known to have caused problems or appear to cause problems during normal operation. The HED's placed in this category will probably emerge during operator interviews and reviews of incident reports.
Some support may come from the control room survey. 5.2.3 Priority 3 (Minor Consequences) HED's that can be determined to have minor affect on the safety or reliability of operations. 5.2.4 Priority 4 (No Consequences)
--s 1
HED's that do not fit into any of the above categories. (_.) These are judged by the review team as not affecting emergency operation and not previously documented as causing problems during operation. l Northeast Utilities has developed and is using Probabilistic j Risk Assessment (PRA) methodologies for evaluating operator l and equipment performance. These methodologies may be used ! by the review team, and documented, to assist them in evalu- [ ating the priority classification of HED's. l l Should the review team not be able to reach a consensus on the disposition of a particular HED, the majority will rule. Any review team member who feels strongly that a HED has been assessed as too low (or high) will be able to put that opinion in writing to the CRDR project manager, and have the statement included in the record of the CRDR.
-.s
l MP3 - CRDR 42 , 1 d j 6.0 CORRECTION PHASE Correction is the process that resolves the discrepancies. Initially, the compiled list of HED's is reviewed for assign-ment to probable categories of solution. Experience has shown, however, that many of these initial assignments are eventually changed, so HED's will be grouped in broad improvement cate-gories. These categories will be as follows. e Enhancement The use of several techniques of surface demarcation, coloring, mimics, labeling, and swapping that can be accomplished at minimal cost. e Class Improvements F_/ A combination of minor changes to a particular type of control or indicator that will correct a whole class of problems. e Individual Discrepancy Corrections A solution or combination of solutions that will correct one particular discrepancy. Large numbers of HED's can be corrected through enhancements, including labeling and component swapping. Many more that are class problems can be corrected'by specific improvement to the class of components. These, then, will be the first priority in attempting to find solutions. Additional solution methods that may be used individually or in combination if necessary x are as follows.
MP3 - CRDR 43 e Operator organization and communications, o CRT display alternatives. e procedural and administrative solutions. e Special training requirements. e Component replacement and panel alteration. 6.1 Enhancements Enhancements include a number of techniques that involve surface improvements, such as demarcation lines, shading, and improved labeling. Also included in the enhancement
~
, category is the possibility of component swapping. This involves changing the location of a control or indicator with a like unit within the same panel, usually within the same grouping. Swapping involves simple exchanges of locations without the need for panel modifications. In some cases, this technique can greatly improve the effec-tiveness of surface enhancements, and can resolve many more HED's than would otherwise be possible with enhance-ments alone.
Terminology used on control room panels is normally taken from design documents and system prints. These engineering terms are not always adequate when transferred to control panels. A review of terminology with the control room review team will identify specific terminology to be used on control room panels. The approved terminology will be documented in a manual. F
'" i
MP3 - CRDR 44 6.2 Class Improvements The objective of this method is to consolidate classes of discrepancies that pertain to one type of control or indica-tion, and design improvements for that class. The enhancements discussed previously pertain to the panels and panel labeling, but do not include changes to the individual control or indicator. It is usually possible to make direct changes to a control or indicator, thereby correcting a whole group of problems. Labeling on an indicator, scale improvements or changes, scale enhance-ments, and deletions of extraneous markings are examples. Discrepancies on annunciators is a class of problems that will result in class improvement designs. 6.3 Individual Discrepancy Correction The objective of this method is to correct all remaining discrepancies. A large percentage of discrepancies can be corrected through panel enhancements and class improvements. The remaining HED's must be corrected one by one using the most perform-ance/ cost effective method or combination of methods. All resolutions that do not meet accepted, good human engineer-ing practice will then be further analyzed to determine acceptable improvements. D
MP3 - CRDR 45 L n.d If it is necessary to delay the completion of any solution beyond the operating license date because of design or imple-mentation problems, it will be necessary to assess the safety consequences of that particular delay in accordance with Section 5.0 of this plan and schedule in accordance with Section 7.0, the implementation phase. 6.4 Documentation and Disposition 6.4.1 Documentation Documentation of the HED's will be accomplished in the-following manner. A HED Status Summary will be made and maintained in
~'
; a computer file. It will be updated as changes occur
-~l and will be printed for distribution periodically and on request. The summary will indicate the current assignment, the status, and action required. This will be an important quality control tool for com-pletion of work. Criteria for the satisfactory completion of HED's is provided in Section 2.3 (Scope). These criteria have been consolidated and assigned a resolution code and as HED's are resolved, will be assigned to one of these codes. ^b 1 I ) _.
MP3 - CRDR 46 i Code Description i A Meets Human Factors Engineering (HFE) ' f guidelines originally or as improved. B Minor deviation, but satisfies the under-lying performance principle implied by HFE. guidelines. C Meets HFE guidelines through a combination of solutions. D Meets HFE guidelines.through other.means that are judged to satisfy the intent of the guidelines. D E Does not meet HFE guidelines; a correction may increase potential for error. F
~
Solutions do not meet all guidelines, but-are judged to be acceptable for safe operation for.the reason stated. 6.4.2 Disposition The documentation previously described will be compiled in a class format to be included in.the. summary report. The resolutions will be incorporated into the design document panel prints as well as included and verified ( on the control room mock-up. I A t
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MP3 - CRDR' q Following final approval by the Millstone Unit No. 3 Project and NU management, any recommended changes will be implemented by NNECO in accordance with their normal change process with Stone & Webster Engineering Corpora-tion, the architect / engineer. F
MP3 - CRDR 48 m 7.0 IMPLEMENTATION PHASE l The actions required to resolve significant HED's will vary, as will the time required to complete proposed changes. It also must be recognized that the preparation of a schedule , without knowledge of the changes to be made is little more than a guess. NNECO will proceed with the implementation as' rapidly as ~ practical upon completion of the correction phase. A number of factors will be considered in this implementation including but not limited to the following, o Severity of the discrepancy, e Safety consequence of errors that could be caused by the discrepancy. e Impact on plant construction, testing, startup, etc. e Impact on operator training / retraining. e Procurement schedules. e Correction degree of difficulty. L A complete schedule will be included with the summary report. 3
MP3 - CRDR 49 D 8.0 REPORTING PHASE l Upon completion of the CRDR, a summary report of the results will be submitted to the NRC for review. This report will describe the results of the CRDR. It will summarize the re-view process by phases, the identified human engineering dis-crepancies, and the recommended corrective actions with imple-mentation schedules for each action. All phases of the CRDR, and its complete documentation, will be available for NRC evaluation and review. In addition, the addendum report, including the methodologies for performing the following,will be submitted prior to com-merical operation, o Environmental Survey e Communications Survey e Process Computer Survey e Validation Step of Task Analysis Changes that do not provide a full and complete correction of an identified HED, or decisions to allow a discrepancy to remain, will be justified and information pertinent to such decisions will be provided. Identified design improvements, safety related or not, will be described. Any deviation or personnel change from the proposed CRDR plan described herein will be included and appropriate explanation provided.
MP3 - CRDR 50 D 9.0 DOCUMENTATION Adequate documentation and document control creates a trace-able and systematic translation of information from one phase of the CRDR to the next. It is mandatory that the CRDR team have immediate access to a complete, up-to-date library of documents to: e Provide a support base to manage and execute the various steps of the control room review. o Provide a design data base from which future control room modifications may be made. Therefore, a data base library is being established to ensure
~~
s the success of the CRDR process. ~l/ This section describes the documentation system and management procedures that Millstone Unit No. 3 will use to support the control room review. 9.1 General Documentation Requirements Many documents will be referenced and prcduced during the CRDR project. They will meet the following requirements. 9.1.1 Provide a record of documents used by the review team as references during various phases of the CRDR. l 9.1.2 Provide a record of documents produced by the review l team as project output.
Mp3 - CRDR 51 D 9.1.3 provide a record of correspondence generated or received by the review team during the review. 9.1.4 Allow an audit path to be generated through the project documentation. 9.1.5 Retain project files in a manner that allows future access to help determine the effects of control room changes proposed in the future. 9.2 Review Documentation Throughout the review process, documents will be processed to record data, analyses, and findings. Whenever practical and appropriate, standard forms developed in this plan will be used. These forms appear in the appendices. Any or all of these forms may be revised based on the experience gained during the review. The documentation generated by the review is required to do the following. 9.2.1 Document the criteria used for each review activity. 9.2.2 Record the results of the survey, operating experience review, and task analysis. 9.2.3 Compile HED's and associated data for review and assessment. 9.3 Document Control The control of documents, their final disposition as well as any reviews, will fall under the normal procedures of the NU D
MP3 - CRDR 52 D System by the Nuclear Records Department and in accordance with the " Nuclear Engineering and Operations Policies and Procedures Manual". These procedures will be further reviewed for incorporation of the principles applied in this review to any future modifications to the control room. 9.4 References The following documents are resources to be used during the review project. As the review progresses, it is anticipated that additional material and references will be identified and obtained. 9.4.1 Millstone Unit No. 3 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). 9.4.2 Westinghouse Emergency Response Guidelines (ERG's), Revision 1. 9.4.3 Regulatory Guides (e.g. , Regulatory Guide 1.97, Regulatory Guide 1.47, etc.). 9.4.4 NRC Guidance Documents (e.g., NUREG 0700). 9.4.5 Control Room Drawings (Floor Plans, Panel Layouts, etc.). 9.4.6 Control Room Photographs. 9.4.7 Human Factors Design Information: e Van Cott & Kinkade e McCormick e MIL-STD-1472C
MP3 - CRDR 53 1 III i 9.4.8 System Descriptions. 1 l l 9.4.9 Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P&ID's). 9.4.10 Operating Training Manuals. 9.4.11 Instrument Tabulations. 9.4.12 Annunciator and Label Engraving Lists. 9.4.13 Westinghouse Owners Group - Generic System Review / Task Analysis. 9.4.14 Functional Response Guidelines (FRG's). 9.4.15 INPO/TVA Pilot Systems Review Report (INPO 82-014). 9.4.16 CRDR NUTAC INPO Documents. 9.4.17 NU Policy and Procedures Manuals, 9.4.18 Other ERC Plans--SPDS, EOP, AMI (1.97), ERF. 9.4.19 Probabilistic Safety Study for Millstone Unit No. 3. o
MP3 - CRDR 54 9 10.0 COORDINATION WITH OTHER ACTIVITIES Supplement 1 of NUREG 0737 requires the integration of post-TMI activities. Specifically, these activities are: o Control Room Design Review (CRDR). e Staffing and Training o Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP's). e Regulatory Guide 1.97 Provisions (R.G. 1.97). e Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). e Emergency Response Facilities. A part of the integration will occur in the use of function and task analyses as recommended in Supplement 1. The task analysis is an examination of task!; that have been generated by the function analysis. ,Section 4.3, Task Analysis, explains the objective and methodology for performing these analyses. This integration will occur during the walk-through or veri-fication stage of the task analysis. As the core team walks through the specific tasks developed from the ERG's, "they will record any and each: shortcoming or discrepancy (e.g., special training required, control location, lack of computer display, etc.) as a HED. During the assessment an'd correction phases of the CRDR, disciplines for each Supplement 1 activity will supplement the core team in the resolvement of these HED's (e.g., training will be modified,sthe control will be operated
*a m.
l MP3 - CRDR 55 by a second operator, a display will be added to the SPDS, etc.). Any hardware modifications or enhancement resolutions will be verified by an additional walk-through by the core team. Upon satisfactorily completing this phase, these ERG's, including the task analysis documentation, will assist the Operations Department in development of the plant-specific EOP's. In summary, the resolution of HED's (integrating all inputs from Supplement 1, 0737 activities) could include: o PPC/SPDS display additio4.7. e Training to enhance operators' cognitive analysis. I e Requirements of additional or modified staffing. e Utilization of Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrumentation. e Development of specific EOP's. Finally, with an integrated and verified frame work for the writing of the EOP's, the dynamic validiation step will be performed on the plant simulator per Section 4.3.3 of this plan. This validiation will be a true vrt !ation of the specific procedures rather than one *' w -ify additional discrepancies. I
MP3 - CRDR 56 9 il.O
SUMMARY
This implementation plan was developed to describe the process whereby NNECO will conduct the human factors review of its control room. A sincere effort has been made by NNECO to ensure that all major aspects of an effective CRDR have been considered during the develop-ment of this plan. Since NNECO is committed to perform their CRDR as desciibed in this document, the accept-ability of the review should also be judged against this document. D D
i MP3 - CRDR l 1 D l APPENDICES A RESUMES B COVER LETTER / QUESTIONNAIRE C CHECKLISTS (SAMPLE) D HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES E EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES INDEX D
A4 a - _ _ e_ _ _ D l i APPENDIX A RESUMES l D l
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-1 D RESUME OF: Thomas A. Shaffer EXPERIENCE: 1977 - Present Northeast Utilities Service Company, Berlin, i Connecticut, Generation Electrical Engineering 1980 - Present Supervisor, Controls Engineering Unit of Generation Electrical Engineering Plan, schedule, coordinate, and supervise engineering activities involving control systems for NU's generating plants (nuclear, fossil, and hydro) and LNG facilities. Responsible for coordinating activities necessary to install new and modified systems and equipment to improve safety, performance, and availability of generating plants. Responsible for supervision of all project / discipline engineering functions supporting projects and operations activities. 1977 - 1980 Engineer, Generation Electrical Engineering Group Responsible for retrofit assignments at Connecticut Yankee and Millstone Units No. 1 and No. 2, utilizing skills in Systems Engineering and Control Systems Design, Process Instrumentation and Control, Cost and Scheduling, BWR/PWR NSSS Reactor Control and Protection Systems, Construc-tion Supervision, Startup Testing, and Troubleshooting. Responsible for review of related items of the Three Mile Island Accident such as Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, Human Factors Engineering for Control Board Designs, and Control System Logic relative to Man / Machine Interface. Responsible for Design Review for Millstone Unit No. 3 in areas of specification review, instrumentation installation design docu-ments, control systems design, standards and regulatory guides.
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-2 T. A, Shaffer (continued) 1974 - 1977 Bechtel Power Corporation, Gaithersburg, Maryland, Gaithersburg Power Division Engineer, Control Systems Group Responsible for control systems specifica-tions, engineered safety actuation system, flow elements, main and auxiliary control boards, seismic monitoring instrumentation, and access secu; toy systems. Preparation of instrument installation details, logic dia-grams, loop diagrams, control board designs, instrument location diagrams, seismic and separation criteria documents. Vendor and field liaison, liaison with client-repre-sentative. Projects: Millstone Unit No. 2 and SNUPPS (Standard Nuclear Unit Power Plant Systems). Instrumentation / Electrical Engineer (1976), Calvert Cliffs Unit No. 2, field engineering. Responsible for installation of instruments and their associated electrical circuits, startup testing. 6/73 - G/74 Part Time -- Student Engineer with AMP, Inc., Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Automatic Machine Division. Directly involved in all phases of machine design and product development. Duties included detailing machine components, electrical design, and troubleshooting. EDUCATION: 1972 Associate Degree in Electrical and Electronic Design Technology 1974 Bachelor of Technology Degree in Electrical and Electronic Design with special emphasis on Solid State and Digital Logic Circuits; Pennsylvania State University D
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-3 III RESUME OF: Walter C. Mission j EXPERIENCE: 1974 - Present Northeast Utilities Service Company, Berlin, Connecticut, Generation Electrical Engineering Generation Specialist, Controls Group Responsible for providing design and instal-lation services for all power plants, pre-dominately the four nuclear units. 1967 - 1973 Communications Manager, Administration Department, Northeast Utilities (merger of HELCO, CL&P, and WMECO) Responsible for the coordination of all telecommunications for the system companies. 1957 - 1967 The Hartford Electric Light Company (HELCO), Electrical Engineering Department Responsible for performing the engineering for substation and fossil power plant instal-lations. 1951 - 1959 Marchant & Minges, Consulting Engineers, West Hartford, Connecticut Design Engineer EDUCATION: 1951 Graduate of Architectural Engineering from Wentworth Institute, Boston, Massachusetts, Associate Degree Level I
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-4 RESUME OF: Ronald W. Rothgeb EXPERIENCE: l 1982 - Present Northeast Utilities Service Company, Waterford, Connecticut, Millstone Unit No. 3 Staff Engineer Responsible for duties of Shift Technical Advisor on Millstone Unit No. 2. Partici-pated as the Operations Representative in the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). Drafted charters for the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) and Joint Test Group. Completed a Westinghouse NSSS familiarization course based on the SNUPPS plants and attended a SNUPPS operator simulator course. Attended the cold license school and taught various secondary systems. Function as a full voting member of the PORC. h 1980 - 1982 Senior Engineer, Millstone Unit No. 2 Participation in refueling /backfit activities and operations support. Responsible for the review of permanent plant changes including 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations. Qualified, main-tained certification and performed the duties of an Emergency Duty Officer / Manager of Technical Support and as a Shift Technical Advisor. Participated in the operator requalification and simulator training programs as required to maintain the SRO license current. Functioned as a full voting member of the PORC. 1974 - 1980 Startup Engineer, Millstone Unit No. 2 Responsible for preparation, implementation, and evaluation of startup tests for assigned systems. Followed construction and resolu-tion of identified deficiencies in these systems. Reviewed the operating procedures for these systems. Assumed the duties and responsibilities of a Shift Supervisor I
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-5 9 R. W. Rothgeb (continued) during the time period when the cold license exam review session was conducted. After the unit was declared commercial, followed various projects within the Unit Engineering Department. 1969 - 1974 U. S. Navy Satisfactorily completed Nuclear Power Training. Qualified as Watch Officer on S1W and S5W power plants. Served three years as Submarine Engineering Department Division Officer. EDUCATION: 1968 B.S. in Chemistry Purdue University D Senior Reactor Operators License on Millstone Unit No. 2 (License active from June 1977 through January 1983) D
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-6 h RESUME OF: Allan M. Stave EXPERIENCE: 1983 - Present Northeast Utilities Service Company, Berlin, l Connecticut l l 1965 - 1983 United Technologies Corporation (Norden Systems and Sikorsky Aircraft) 1960 - 1965 General Electric Missile and Space Vehicle Department 1958 - 1960 Wright Air Development Center More than twenty years of human factors applied and research experience while employed at listed organizations. Work during this time was in the following areas. Manned and Unmanned Space Vehicles
) Training Equipment (Aircraft)
Flight Simulator Design Design of Training Programs Military Aircraft Helicopter Crew Compartments Helicopter Maintainability Military Command and Control Systems Man / Computer Interfaces Effects of Fatigue on Performance Effects of Noise and Vibration on Pilot Performance Design and Execution of Experimental Studies Design and Execution of Survey and Interview Type Studies D
i l MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-7 9 A. M. Stave (continued) l j Work Space Layout Control Panel Layout Complex Display Design and Evaluation Quantification of Human Performance Task Analysis Design and Execution of Training Programs EDUCATION: 1954 Bachelor of Arts Degree, Psychology University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, Pcnnsylvania 1955 Master of Arts Degree, Psychology Boston University Boston, Massachusetts 1964 Doctor of Philosophy Candidate Industrial Psychology Temple University Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Graduate work included courses in the following areas: Statistics Human Factors Engineering Experimental Design Sensory / Perceptual Processes Industrial. Psychology Test Construction / Design Survey Techniques l l Interviewing ' l
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-8 D RESUME OF: Joseph A. Breslin EXPERIENCE: [The Interlock Group] 1955 - Present Past twenty-five years engaged in human factors research and training analysis and design, under U.S. Navy, Air Force, Army, and industrial contracts. Previous diversified management and technical experience in private industry, including senior positions with Rand Corporation, System Development Corporation, Boeing Corporation, and Bell Telephone Laboratories. Instrumental in the areas of training analysis and personnel subsystem development including training organization and management, train-ing needs analysis, training evaluation and material development, manpower requirements, and facility requirements definition. Task Analysis Conducted detailed task analysis as part of CRDR for a major utility. Orchestrated a comprehensive control room validation walk-through. Developed and implemented function, link, and task analysis. Participated in critical incident studies. Managed and conducted man / machine function allocations, demographic studies, manpower i I analysis and forecasts, and job design projects. l Panel Design Assisted in the design and implementation of control panel design improvements as related to CRDR efforts. Conducted anthropometric studiec and appli-cations in work space design including cock-D pit layout, and auxiliary support equipment design.
l MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-9 J. A. Breslin (continued) l l i Participated in computer generated display design and evaluation. Training Developed and implemented multi-media train-ing programs. Reviewed and evaluated computer based simu-lation systems for the Trident training facility. Involved in computer assisted and aided instruction, programmed texts, and inter-active audio / visual projects. Developed and implemented instructional systems development (ISD) techniques. Developed and implemented computer based, command and control systems. I EDUCATION: 1955 B.S., Psychology and Management St. Joseph's University Graduate Studies, Operations Research and Computer Science M. I. T. D
1 l MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-10 I l 9 RESUME OF: Ralph E. Chidley l EXPERIENCE: [The Interlock Group] 1954 - Present Directly involved in human factors and I training for twenty-nine years. Broad experience in operating and design of con-trol systems with hands-on application of human factors in systems design. Work has covered work space design and environmental conditions analysis, panel design, opera-tional computer display concepts and design, procedures development, and training. Extensive experience in operation of sub-marine systems including nuclear plant operation, missile fire control and launch-ing, inertial navigation, torpedo fire con-trol, command and control, and ship control. Specific experience listed below. Task Analysis Designed comprehensive " top-down" task analysis for a major utility's CRDR. Developed innovative techniques in " top-down" systems analysis and task analysis. Developed detailed team training task analysis in military and commercial contexts. Panel Design Designed control panel improvements as part of a CRDR. Designed Trident SSBN control room layout. Designed Polaris SSBN ship control and ballast control panels. Designed an integrated CRT operational con-cept and display content as part of a CRDR. Designed and integrated CRT displays for sub-marine fire control systems and associated training systems. Contributed to the design layout for the 680 Class SSN.
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-11 R. E. Chidley (continued) Procedures and Training Developed procedure writing guidelines for the preparation of normal and emergency operating procedures as part of a CRDR project. Directed the systems analysis design and integration of Navy training simulators into the Trident training facility. Directed development of entire Trident training system including curricula for 140 courses representing 22,000 class hours. Designed team training curriculum development strategies and techniques. Developed a team training curriculum for submarine sonar crews. Member of evaluation team specifying I simulator training requirements for Coast Guard Academy cadets in ship-handling. EDUCATION: 1954 B.S., Engineering U.S. Naval Academy Naval Nuclear Power School Commanding Officer (Two Nuclear Submarines) I i I 1 _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - A
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-12 RESUME OF: Athos C. Macris EXPERIENCE: [The Interlock Group] 1971 - Present Educational and professional experience in areas of human factors engineering, experi-mental design, and industrial engineering. In the commercial nuclear industry, managed one of the earliest independent systems-based control room design reviews. Project involved the design and construction of a full-scale mock-up of control room panels, a systematic human engineering panel evalu-ation, operational talk-throughs and walk-throughs using the mock-up, and the drafting of the first NUREG 0700 Program Plan Report to receive a favorable NRC review. Subsequent to the Program Plan Report, the project be-came integrative, involving a top-down task analysis, control panel improvement design, control room team organization definition, and procedure writing guidelines, all in preparation for plant licensing. The final l CRDR report was submitted to the NRC in the spring of 1983. This effort and associated commercial nuclear human factors work totals over three years experience. Related professional experience involves extensive application of human factors engineering, systems and task analyses, and performance evaluation of command and control systems, and submarine control-display operational systems. Specific experience is listed below. Task Analysis
- Conducted comprehensive task analysis as part of a CRDR for a' major utility.
Conducted various task analyses for several operr.cional submarine sonar systems as part of human performance specifications. Participated in performanced-based curri-culum developments based on task analyses. D
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-13 A. C. Macris (continued) Participated in team performance require-ments and subsequent curriculum development for complex command and control simulation systems. Panel Design Conducted and managed design improvements related to control room design review efforts. Reviewed initial designs and redesigned a major utility's waste gas monitoring panel. Redesigned analog display faces to meet HFE standards. Participated in CRT display format design and review for operational displays. Contributed to tactical and operational sonar and fire control decision-making display reviews. Assisted in evaluation of computer generated ship-handling displays. Procedures and Training Assisted in the development of procedure writing guidelines as part of a CRDR pro-ject. Directed and managed the operational training systems development for a major shipboard-shorebased simulator based training system. Participated in detailed curriculum develop-ment for the submarine force's newest sonar systems. Developed operational team training curri-culum for submarine sonar crews. J
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-14 A. C. Macris (continued)
- l l EDUCATION:
1971 B.S., Mechanical Engineering University of Illinois 1978 M.S., Ocean Engineering University of Connecticut Present M.A. (Current), Industrial / Organizational Psychology University of New Haven Qualified as Engineering Officer of Watch SSW Naval Reactor System b P D
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-15 RESUME OF: Elaine M. Kuhn EXPERIENCE: [The Interlock Group] 1965 - Present Over twelve years experience in education and human performance systems development. Recently directly responsible or assisted CRDR team in documentation of control room inventory, survey administration, verifica-tion, and validation of control room ' functions. Specific experience is listed below. Task Analysie Assisted in the analysis and documentation of a detailed CRDR. Participated and assisted in various task analyses efforts associated with U.S. Navy ISD specifications. Panel Design Developed and documented comprehensive CRDR inventory. Assisted in administration of a control room survey. Assisted in verification and validation efforts of CRDR. EDUCATION: 1965 B.A., English Annhurst College 1971 M.S., Education University of Connecticut Present M.A., Industrial / Organizational Psychology University of New Haven I
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-16 h RESUME OF: Paul A. Blasioli EXPERIENCE: 1980 - Present Northeast Utilities Service Company, Berlin, l Connecticut Present Senior Licensing Engineer 1981 - 1983 Licensing Engineer 1980 - 1981 Associate Licensing Engineer Responsible for the review and evaluation of the conformance of operating nuclear gen-erating facilities (primarily Millstone Unit No. 1) and activities to current applicable NRC regulations, operating license conditions, regulatory guides, codes, and standards. Responsible for advising company personnel on the appropriateness and sufficiency of actions taken in response to regulations, orders, requests for information, or action
} on new and on-going licensing issues.
Responsible for several generic licensing issues (e.g., Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737, emergency preparedness, hydrogen control). 1977 - 1980 Public Service of Indiana 1979 - 1980 Staff Licensing Engineer Responsible for overall status and review of responses to NRC bulletins and requests for information, and coordination of such responses with the remainder of the project. Responsible for the review of new or revised regulatory requirements for applicability to the project, and the coordination of the implementation of such requirements. Responsible for both on-site and off-site emergency planning and preparedness. D
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-17 I 1 D P. A. Blasioli (continued) I 1977 - 1979 Engineer - Nuclear Performed design reviews of radiation monitoring, HVAC, and radwaste systems and specifications for compliance with NRC requirements, industry standards, project design criteria, and requirements for operations and maintenance. Reviewed vendor offerings for compliance with equipment specifications. Lead responsibility for preparation of NSSS specification and contract for two future units, review of vendor technical and com-mercial offerings, and performance of a detailed evaluation to determine the pre-ferred vendor. EDUCATION: I 1971 Honor Graduate of Taconic High School Pittsfield, Massachusetts 1975 B.S., Engineering Physics Cornell University 1977 Master of Nuclear Engineering Cornell University D
1 l MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-18 RESUME OF: Everett P. Perkins, Jr. EXPERIENCE: , 1977 - Present Northeast Utilities Service Company, Berlin, Connecticut 1981 - Present Engineer, Nuclear Safety Engineering Section Responsible for performing independent reviews of operational problems at NU's and other operating U.S. nuclear plants. In-dcpth understanding and familiarity with the operation of both pressurized water reactors and boiling water reactors. 1977 - 1981 Assistant / Associate Engineer, Licensing and Safeguards Section Responsibility of licensing engineer for Connecticut Yankee nuclear plant. Required detailed knowledge of relevant federal I regulations, current licensing issues, and involved daily interface with NRC Staff on behalf of NU and Connecticut Yankee. Also worked in NU's System Communications Depart-ment as company spokesman for nuclear related matters. EDUCATION: 1977 B.S., Nuclear Engineering Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Troy, New York D
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-19 RESUME OF: Robert L. Beveridge 1 EXPERIENCE: 1981 - Present Northeast Utilities Service Company, Berlin, Connecticut Scientist (Discipline Support for PRA/ Safety Analysis) Responsible for human reliability analyses in risk assessments for nuclear power plants. 1971 - 1981 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Safety Engineer Responsible for implementation of an occupational safety and health program at this scientific research facility. 1965 - 1971 United States Navy, Submarine Service Nuclear Reactor Operator EDUCATION: 1978 B.S., Industrial Technology San Jose State University San Jose, California 1981 M.S., Safety Institute of Systems Safety Management University of Southern California III !
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-20 RESUME OF: John M. Clark l EXPERIENCE: 1 1970 - Present Northeast Utilities Service Company, Berlin, Connecticut Staff Engineer, Generation Electrical Engineering Lead electrical engineer for Millstone Unit No. 3, overseeing architect / engineer's work. Responsible for engineering of security systems at Millstone Site. Prior to working on Millstone Unit No. 3, worked in Generation Reliability Section and was lead electrical engineer on Mill-stone Unit No. 2. Joined NU from U.S. Navy Service. EDUCATION: 1966 B.S., Electrical Engineering University of Oklahoma 1972 M.S., Electrical Engineering University of Connecticut D
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-21 RESUME OF: Mark F. Samek EXPERIENCE: 1978 - Present Northeast Utilities Service Company, Berlin, l Connecticut l Senior Engineer, Instrumentation Group, Generation Electrical Engineering Responsible for engineering and installation of various instrumentation and control systems for system nuclear power plants. Responsible for stack flow monitoring system, recirculation pump trip control system, con-tainment high range radiation monitors, and high range effluent radiation monitors. Also performed as lead instrumentation engineer for Millstone Unit No. 3. 1973 - 1977 U.S. Army Signal Corps Captain l Platoon leader responsible for installation and operation of multi-channel radio and radio-teletype communications at division level in 3rd Infantry Division. Communications-electronics staff officer in artillery battalion. EDUCATION: 1972 B.S., Electrical Engineering Worcester Polytechnic Institute 1973 M.S., Electrical Engineering Worcester Polytechnic Institute 1978 M.S., Nuclear Engineering Massachusetts Institute of Technology II> -
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-22 RESUME OF: Brian S. Kaufman EXPERIENCE: 1977 - Present Northeast Utilities Service Company, Berlin, Connecticut Engineer, Generation Mechanical Engineering Responsible for backfit and betterment pro-jects for NU's operating plants. Responsi-bilities also include conceptual engineering, preparation of equipment specifications, bid evaluations, coordination of all support engineering and design, and technical assis-tance for field installation and acceptance testing of NU's system operating plants. In addition, experienced in engineering estimates for retired plant restoration. 1976 - 1977 Gibbs & Hill 1974 - 1976 Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation Previously responsible for the design and engineering of various balance of plant systems, equipment sizing, and calculations. EDUCATION: 1974 B.S., Mechanical Engineering City College of New York l l l l l l D
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-23 D RESUME OF: Robert C. Thomas EXPERIENCE: 1981 - Present Northeast Utilities Service Company, Berlin, Connecticut Engineer, Generation Mechanical Engineering Responsible for backfit and betterment pro-jects for reactor plant systems within nuclear generating plants. Involves NSSS systems and equipment, reactor coolant systems, steam generators, containment systems, water chemistry, and radwaste systems. 1978 - 1981 United Technologies Corporation, Hartford, Connecticut Positions held and divisions worked for include: 1980 - 1981 Hamilton Standard, Windsor Locks, Connecticut Analytical Engineer Responsibilities included the design and analysis of the environmental control and life support systems (ECS/LSS) for NASA's Space Operations Center (SOC). Also acted as project manager for a study responsible for determining the engineering and market potential of Hamilton Standard Technology for use on-board submarines. 1978 - 1980 United Technologies Research Center, East Hartford, Connecticut Associate System Engineer Engaged in technical and economic feasibility studies of energy conversion systems. This involved both conventional power generation systems as well as conceptual designs. In-cluded in these are thermal energy storage systems, waste heat recovery systems, and thermal transmission systems, and solar energy systems.
+
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-24 D R. C. Thomas (continued) 1978 Consultants and Designers, Inc. Heat Transfer Consultant Engineer Heat Transfer Consultant Engineer at Pratt & Whitney Aircraft. Work involved three-dimensional heat transfer analysis of gas turbine blades as well as making recommenda-tions for heat transfer analysis methodology. 1976 - 1978 Combustion Engineering, Inc., Windsor, Connecticut Nuclear Engineer
. Engaged in transient computer analysis and environmental qualification of nuclear power plant safety systems. Also performed heat and mass transfer analyses of secondary side for nuclear steam supply systems.
1973 - 1976 United Technologies Corporation, Hartford, Connecticut Positions held and divisions worked for include: 1974 - 1976 Power Systems Division, South Windsor, Connecticut Analytical Engineer Performed fluid flow, heat and mass transfer analysis on acid and base cell systems. Developed mathematical and electrical models for analysis of heat transfer and fluid flow within fuel cell reactant flow fields. This enabled the optimization of the reactant flow configuration for a given power plant. 1973 - 1974 Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Test Engineer Responsible for computer acquisition of temperature and pressure data from JT9D gas turbine engine test stands. Coordinated pressure transducers and millivolt signal multiplexing equipment between test stands and computer interfacing.
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-25 R. C. Thomas (continued) i EDUCATION: 1973 B.S., Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering University of Rochester Rochester, New York 1975 M.S., Mechanical Engineering Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Hartford Graduate Center Hartford, Connecticut Committee Member ASME Nuclear Heat Exchanger Committee l D
i l l l MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-26 j D RESUME OF: Keith L. Parkinson EXPERIENCE: 1982 - Present Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Waterford, Connecticut Assistant Training Supervisor - Millstone Unit No. 3 Operators Responsible for development and supervision of Millstone Unit No. 3 licensed operator training. Quality Assurance Engineer (June / July 1982), QA/QC Department, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company. Participated in audits of vendor and station activities. 1968 - 1982 U.S. Navy Satisfactorily completed Nuclear Power Train-ing. Qualified Watch Officer on A1W and S5W. Qualified as Engineer Officer on Naval Nuclear Power Plant (S5W). Qualified for command of a nuclear powered submarine. Three years as Submarine Engineering Depart-ment Division Officer; four years as Sub-marine Weapons Department Head; two years as Submarine Squadron Operations Officer and Engineering Inspector / Trainer; two years as Nuclear Powered Submarine Executive Officer; two years as Submarine School Director of Enlisted Basic Training Department; eighteen months as Submarine School Support Department Director. EDUCATION: 1964 B.S., Electrical Engineering Purdue University Completed training resulting in vendor certification as Senior Reactor Operator on Westinghouse four-loop pressurized I water reactor.
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-27 I Philip P. Slowik RESUME OF: EXPERIENCE: 1981 - Present Northeast Utilities Service Company, Berlin, Connecticut Senior Engineer, Process Computer Engineering Process Computer Engineering project engineer on Millstone Unit No. 3 plant computer pro-ject. This application uses a distributed mini-computer system to monitor approx 1-mately 6,500 plant variables. Involved in all phases of the project including prepara-tion of specifications, monitoring of hard-ware vendor, acceptance testing of system, plant installation, monitoring of schedules, and coordination of all software development and testing efforts. 1979 - 1981 Bristol Instrumentation Systems, System Development Department, Waterbury, Connecticut Involved in the development of a digital distributed control system utilizing mini-and micro-computers for industrial appli-cation. Position involved the preparation and monitoring of development schedules, and the coordination of hardware, software, and testing activities. Additional responsi-bilities included the functional definition, testing, and evaluation of sub-systems to be integrated into the distributed system (e.g., data acquisition and control tele-metry equipment, and operator interface equipment). 1973 - 1979 Combustion Engineering, Inc., Nuclear Power Systems Division (ICE Department), Windsor, Connecticut 1978 - 1979 Computer Systems Engineering, Control and Protection Systems Section Involved in the application of mini-computers to nuclear power plant control systems. Position involved the preparation and l l
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-28 I P. P. Slowik (continued) presentation of proposals, establishment of system interfaces, the preparation of hard-ware and software specifications, and hard-ware procurement. 1976 - 1978 Computer Systems Engineering, Reactor Monitoring and Pro-tection Systems Section Involved in the functional design, analysis, and licensing support for reactor protection systems. Position involved the calculation of equipment setpoints, development of test requirements, and the preparation of design specifications based on NRC requirements and industry standards. 1973 - 1976 Reactor Dynamics, Control Systems Section Involved in the functional and hardware design, performance analysis, hardware I procurement, and site follow of control systems for nuclear power plants. Responsi-bilities included the supervision of four technical personnel to support the design and procurement efforts. EDUCATION: 1970 Associate in Engineering Holyoke Community College 1973 B.S., Electrical Engineering (Magna Cum Laude) University of Massachusetts 1981 M.S., Control & Communication Systems University of Connecticut D
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-29 RESUME OF: James G. Toscas EXPERIENCE: [The Interlock Group] 1973 - Present Over ten years experience in area of nuclear reactor engineering and technology. During this tenure with a major utility, BWR experi-ence included regulatory interface for nuclear engineering subject, complete startup testing program administration, nuclear instrumentation sensitivity and failure analysis, core flow instrumentation procedure development and calibration, new fuel physical inspections, core power distribution and thermal limits analysis, and criticality predictions and monitoring of approach to critical. Conducted control rod movements, ge.nerator synchronization, boron reactivity control, and dilution rate calculation for power ramp during xenon transient at operating PWR or PWR simulators. I Experience at operating training and research reactors. Conducted fuel loading and instru-mentation arrangement, startup criticalities, instrument calibration, and radiation monitor-ing and dosimetry. Developed complete training programs and training modules, using task analysis metho-dology where appropriate in area of nuclear training and training technology. EDUCATION: 1971 B.A., Physics University of Chicago 1973 M.S., Nuclear Engineering University of Illinois D
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX A-30 RESUME OF: Richard P. Morrison, Jr. l EXPERIENCE: [The Interlock Group] 1980 - Present Educational and professional experience in areas of physical and psychological occupa-tional stress, human factors research, and industrial psychology. Related professional experience involves extensive development of perceived occupa-tional stress inventory. Prepared report evaluating the current levels of stress and satisfaction for a high technology corpor-ation, including suggestions for company improvements. Recommendation:s included human factors criteria and task analysis. Co-authored study of memory loss due to introduction of novel stimuli and possible methods of eliminating memory deficits in training. I EDUCATION: 1980 B.A., Psychology University of Connecticut 1983 M.A., Social / Industrial Psychology Connecticut College D
D i APPENDIX B I COVER LETTER & QUESTIONNAIRE D l
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX B-1 QUESTIONNAIRE INSTRUCTIONS A design review of the Millstone Unit No. 3 control room is being performed, as required by the NRC. Its purpose is to determine the design adequacy of the control room and auxi-liary shutdown panel from an operational standpoint. The best source of information for this review is to talk directly to the people who have had operational experience and will operate this unit. That is why we have requested your assis-tance. The attached questionnaire is a part of the review process. It has been prepared by the review team and will be adminis-tered by The Interlock Group, the consultants assisting NU in this review. The purpose of the questionnaire.is to high-light any categories of design errors you feel have been made for possible improvement. We are also interested in the good features you believe have been utilized in the design. Follow-up interviews are planned to clarify our interpretation of your answers. Please respond to the questions as they apply to your job or position, and in relation to your experience. Where you feel unqualified to answer, please indicate so, and explain. Full explanatory sentences are much more useful than yes-no answers, so please be as informative as possible. Feel free 20 ask The Interlock Group and/or the NU project team any questions you may have concerning the questionnaire. Phone numbers are included below for this purpose. Dean Macris (Interlock) 536-4974 Ron Rothgeb (NU) 447-1791, ext. 4325 Walt Mission (NU) 666-6911, ext. 3773 Al Stave (NU) 666-6911, ext. 3627 Chip Perkins (NU) 666-6911, ext. 3630 11> l
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX B-2 D OPERATOR QUESTIONNAIRE PERSONAL INFORMATION Name: Work Phone Number: Education: Position /
Title:
Years Experience in Industry: Years With Northeast Utilities: Years at Millstone: Training in Current Position: (directly related to your work) School / Facility (name if applicable) Courses Completed: On-Site Training: D i
11P3 - CRDR APPENDIX B-3 D Job Related Experience: hiilitary: Other: (nuclear, fossil, etc.) D
l MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX B-4 D l l i i A. WORKSPACE LAYOUT AND ENVIRONMENT 1
- 1. Ilow will the size of the control room af feet your performance in (1) normal conditions, and (2) emergency conditions?
I t h l l l l
l MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX B-5 I Ill l l l l A. WORKSPACE LAYOUT AND ENVIRONMENT i
- 2. (a) What do you think of the general layout of the control room?
Best I have seen Good, I can work with it Average, I can work with it, but it could be better Poor, I cannot work with it (b) What are the things you like best about the control room layout? I (c) What are the things that bother you about the control room layout? Some things to consider are: Panel-to-panel arrangement Operational sequences Two-man operation Board accessibility
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX B-6 l A. WORKSPACE LAYOUT AND ENVIRONMENT l 3. Below is a list of environmental factors which might cause ! control room problems. From your experience in other con-trol rooms, please rank them in the order of their potential to cause problems (lowest number for the worst offenders). Ventilation Temperature Humidity Illumination Noise (ambient) Excessive Control Room Traffic General Appearance (color coordination, etc.) Other (please specify) Comment on your choices. I l 1 I l l l l D l
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX B-7 I B. PANEL DESIGN (Main Boards and Auxiliary Shutdown Panel)
- 1. Are the controls and indicators at the Millstone Unit No. 3 plant better arranged for supporting operations for (a) cor-mal, or (b) emergency conditions? Please comment on your responses.
I l
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX B-8 D B. PANEL DESIGN (Main Boards and Auxiliary Shutdown Panel)
- 2. Within each specific board, are the controls located such that related displays can be viewed and used easily? Please explain your answers.
I h
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX B-9 l B. PANEL DESIGN (Main Boards and Auxiliary Shutdown Panel)
- 3. Comment on the labeling of controls and indicators on the panels (e.g., does the label describe the component's use?).
I D
I MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX B-10 l B. PANEL DESIGN (Main Boards and Auxiliary Shutdown Panel) , 4. Comment on panel mimicing (e.g., do mimics aid in operation, are they clear and not confusing?). I h
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX B-11 B. PANEL DESIGN (Main Boards and Auxiliary Shutdown Panel) l S. llave controls been selected and oriented to minimize accidental disturbance of control settings? Please l describe examples of problems in this area. I D
l l MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX B-12 B. PANEL DESIGN (Main Boards and Auxiliary Shutdown Panel)
- 6. In your opinion, are too many or too few functions performed automatically (i.e., should the operators have greater or less system control)? Please explain your answer.
I h
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX B-13 C. ANNUNCIATOR WARNING SYSTEM
- 1. In your opinion, does the design of the annunciator system help or hinder you in plant operation?
l l D
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX B-14 C. ANNUNCIATOR WARNING SYSTEM
- 2. Please rate the tiles with respect to:
l l Need Great OK Fixing Legibility Color Coding Grouping Location on Proper Panel Please comment on those areas you feel need fixing. D 9
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX B-15 D C. ANNUNCIATOR WARNING SYSTEM
- 3. Do audible alarms aid or distract you in plant operation?
l I l l 1 l I
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX B-16 C. ANNUNCIATOR WARNING SYSTEM
- 4. Please comment on annunciator controls and different flash rates.
I i I l I q l 1 1
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX B-17 D. DISPLAYS l
- 1. If Millstone Unit No. 3 CRT displays could present any display you might want, without regard to size, shape, or space, what would you like to see displayed, and why?
l l D
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX B-18 I D. DISPLAYS
- 2. Would it be helpful if procedural sequences were displayed on a CRT in addition to having hard copy formats (manuals, etc.)?
I l
MPO - CRDR APPENDIX B-19 l E. COMMUNICATIONS 1
- 1. In your opinion, do you feel that the tolophone and mainten-ance jack systems are adequate for all plant operations?
Please elaborate. I h
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX B-20 I E. COMMUNICATIONS
- 2. Please rate the communications at Millstone Unit No. 3.
Excellent Good Average Poor (a) Operator to Operator , _ (b) Supervisor to Operator (c) Control Room to Remainder of Plant Based on the above, how might things be improved? D l
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX B-21 F. STAFFING
- 1. In your opinion, what is the number of operators needed to operate the control room effectively during each of the following?
(a) Steady state operations (b) Transients (i.e., s$artup/ shutdown) (c) Off-normal / emergency operations
\
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__y, g , p_ -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - i avEnmx c p CilECKLISTS (S.4MPLE}
5 m i O lc O Page _ of _ m COMPONENT STYLE ,
?EVIEWED BY MANUFACTURER DATE MFG. ICENTFICATION NUREG 0700 COMPUANCE ITEM SECT 6 REVIEW ITEM REQUIREMENT 6 NO. REFERENCE YES REMARKS Type of Control
- Linear Pushbuttons S~lideswitch o Rotary J-Handles Key Operated Selector Controls Thumbwheel 1 6421 o Direction of Novement (select for appropriate Function Control Action 6%%1a control) 6931a, b on, Start, Run Up, Right, 6638a, b Open Forward, Clock-wise, Pull l
I Off, Stop, Down, Left Back- O o Close ward, Counter- og g m clockwise, Push (D 'O trl
! H I e w Right Clockwise, Right OD M g %d I
O Left Counterclockwise, WO g Left [ O l
. Raise Up pr I w Lower I W $
e
5 o i O
- o O
- c Page _ of _
COMPONENT STYLE REVIEWED BY MANUFACTURER DATE MFG. IDENTIFICATION NUREG SECT 6 0700: f COMPLIANCE ITEM REVEW ITEM REQUIREMENT -- E NO, REFERENCE YES REMARKS Increase Forward, Up, Right, Clockwise Decrease Backward, Down, Left. Counter-clockwise 2 6638c
- Control visibility Control position information o should be visible during control operation.
3 6411e
- Durability of controls Controls should not routinely o exhibit design deficiencies such 85
-- broken or chipped operators tO >
po t
-- loose or slipping operators AB M
-- Internal backlash or slip-page O] y ya e 4 O H 6411d(2)
- Compatibility with emergency gear Easy to activate with protective OD M o gear. g 5 6412e
- Resistance to movement CJ 3 Controls should have resistance tY o so distinct or sustained effort ! O Is required for activation.
h w M 02 et
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- =
0
.C Page _ of _
COMPONENT STYLE REVIEWED BY MANUFACTURER DATE MFG. IDENTIFICATION NUREG 0700 ITEM SECT 6 COMPLIANCE REVEW ITEM REQUREMENT E NO. REFERENCE YES REMARKS c PUSHBUTTONS 6 6431b
- Indication of activation A positive indication should be provided in the form of a " snap",
" audible click" or Integral IIght.
7 643tc
- Surface A slip resistant or concave sur-face should be provided.
8 6432a-d
- Round pushbutton dimensions Diameter for fingertip operation (Inches)
- 1. Unguarded and nonrecessed pushbuttons yo>
Minimum 0.385 W0 t
- 2. Guarded or recessed push- :n 9 t buttons O 'O tu O
Minimum 0.75 O s Displacement for thumb or finger OgM operation (inches) Minimum 0.125 O WO Resistance for fingertip opera- :T O tion (ounces) O Minimum 10 Maximum 40 h s 01 l et l ( _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
w1 OEw % s2 s* n
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/ o tO S
T S I L K C N E O H I C T A N G T C I I E F S S I E T D N E T D E I S N LO I ET NA A C
? O L
M E T I ii
APPENDIX C MP3 - CRDR Set Design Checklist D Page 2 of 11 CONSIDERATIONS FOR ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH HFE DESIGN CRITERIA The considerations presented in this appendix were derived from relevant HFE design documents and checklists as indicated. They will be used for conducting the set design evaluation. All considerations of a criteria category (e.g., Identification, Arrangement, Visibility, Information, etc. ) must be in compliance before the criteria column can be " checked-off" by the reviewer. Those criteria that are not in compliance, as well as other design discrepancies noted by the reviewer, will be recorded on the form for subsequent analysis. The term "any" implies that any one of the bulleted alternatives must apply to satisfy the consideration. The term "all" implies that all bulleted statements must apply. i
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX C Set Design Checklist Page 3 of 11 CONSIDERATIONS WilICil ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITil IIFE IDENTIFICATION (IDENT) CRITERIA A check mark (V) in the "IDENT" column of the Set Design Checklist indicates that all of the identification considera-tions listed below apply for each set of components which was evaluated. Considerations which do not apply indicate a non-compliance with IIFE design criteria. These are identified on l the form by the consideration number instead of a check mark. CRITERIA SOURCE NUMBER CONSIDERATION NUREG 0700
- 1. Contents of the set was obvious by: 6.8.3.1 6.8.1.3 ANY e component arrangement and separa-tion e lines, shading, or texture Whichever, it was consistent with all other sets of this description.
- 2. Sets appear identical for the same 6.8.2.1 function in:
D ALL e similar systems (e.g., pump 1 and pump 2) e alternate channels (e.g., 21A, 218)
- 3. The set was labeled if its identification 6.6.1.1 was not otherwise obvious. 6.5.3.2a(1)
- 4. Labels described equipment function: 6.6.3.7 6.6.3.3c e briefly and succinctly I
e with commonly accepted terminology e with correct spelling e with procedure compatibility
- 5. Labeling of the set was consistent with 6.6.3.3 all other sets of this description in:
ALL e location relative to set e label medium (placard, silkscreen) e level and type of description e durability e format-location of identification or special coding
l MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX C Set Design Checklist Page 4 of 11 CRITERIA SOURCE NUMBER CONSIDERATION NUREG 0700 l
- 6. All label orientation was horizontal. 6.6.2.3 l
- 7. Label medium minimized: 6.6.2.4 e obscurement by wear l e obscurement by dirt e
f accidental removal , e total replacement difficulty ) 1
- 8. Related controls and/or displays should 6.9.1.1c be easily identifiable by association 6.4.2.2b ANY including:
e location e label e coding e demarcation e consistency l I 1 l 1 l l l l
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX C Set Design Checklist Page 5 of 11 l CONSIDERATIONS WilICII ENSURE COMPLI ANCE WITH life ARRANGEMENT (ARR) CRITEllI A A check mark (V) in the "ARR" column of the Set Design Check-list indicates that all of the arrangement considerations listed below apply for each set of components which was evaluated. Considerations which do not apply indicate a non-compliance with IIFE design criteria. These are identified on the form by the consideration number instead of a check mark. CRITERIA SOURCE NUMBER CONSIDERATION NUREG 0700
- 1. Comporents were arranged in the set by: 6.8.2.1 e frequency of operation o sequence of operation Whichever, it was consistent with all other sets of this description.
- 2. Components arranged by frequency of 6.8.2.2 operation, sequence of operation, or 6.9.2.lb
.' NY identification were in order from:
e left to right e top to bottom Whichever, it was consistent with all other sets of this description.
- 3. Sets were arranged so that displays 6.9.1.1 closest to optimal display locations ANY were:
o most important to the activity (high criticality) e most frequently used e most accurately read e most difficult to read Whichever, it was consistent with all other sets of this description.
- 4. Sets were arranged so that controls 6.9.1.1 closest to optimal control locations were:
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX C Set Design Checklist Page 6 of 11 CRITERIA SOURCE NUMBER CONSIDERATION NUREG 0700 e most important to the activity (high criticality) l e most frequently used e most accurately set e most difficult to actuate Whichever, it was consistent with all other sets of this description.
- 5. There was adequate separation between 6.8.3.1 components to accommodate:
ALL e display visibility e control actuation e discrimination as a unique set
- 6. All controls were located: 6.9.1.2a,b,c -
ANY e below associated displays e to right of associated displays
) Whichever, it was consistent with all other sets of this description.
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX C Set Design Checklist Page 7 of 11 CONSIDERATION WIIICll ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITl! IIFE VISIBILITY l (VIS) CRITERIA A check mark (V) in the "VIS" column of the Set Design Check-list indicates that all of the visibility considerations listed below apply for each set of components which was evaluated. Considerations which do not apply indicate a non-compliance with IIFE design criteria. These are identified on the form by the consideration number instead of a check mark. CRITERIA SOURCE NUMBER CONSIDERATION NUREG 0700
- 1. The set label and display were 6.1.2.3f 6.1.2.2e ALL e readable up to 45 degrees either 6.6.2.4 side of the perpendicular sight 6.6.2.1 line e not obscured by controls regard- 6.9.1.1 less of their setting 6.1.2.2e(2) e were not obscured by displays regardless of their indication e display not obscured during control manipulation
- 2. No information was obscured as a result 6.1.4.1b of wearing masks or protective gloves. 6.4.1.1d(1)
- 3. There was a high degree of brightness 6.8.1.3b,c,d contrast between the panel and:
ALL e legends or placards e lines, shading or texture defining the set e components in the failed mode e components in all operating modes
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX C Set Design Checklist g Page 8 of 11 CONSIDERATIONS WIIICII ENSURE COMPLI ANCE WITII IIFE INFORMATION (INFO) CRITERIA j A check mark (J) in the " INFO" column of the Set Design Checklist indicates that all of the information considerations listed below apply for each set of components which was evalu-ated. Considerations which do not apply indicate a non-com-pliance with IIFE design criteria. These are identified on the form by the consideration number instead of a check mark. CRITERIA SOURCE NUMBER CONSIDERATION NUREG 0700
- 1. Display design was adequate to accom- 6.5.1.2a modate the required degree of reading accuracy for the activity. Display design did not exceed reading accuracy requirements.
- 2. Information was presented in such a form 6.5.1.2b that no interpretation or decoding was necessary.
- 3. Legends were limited only to informa- 6.4.3.3b I tion needed to perform the activity. 6.5.3.3b
- 4. Indicator lights were used only when one 6.5.3.1c state of information was required (e.g.,
ON, LOW, etc.) and significance of color code alone was unmistakable.
- 5. Analog meters primarily displayed rate 6.5.1 of-change information. Digital indica- 6.9.3.1c ALL tors primarily displayed absolute in-formation. As a result, operational degradation did not occur where:
o high accuracy and fast reading were unattainable from meters e high rate information was unattain-able from indicators.
- 6. All analog meters: 6.5.1 6.5.2 ALL e were moving pointer, fixed scale e had minimum, maximum, and normal operating ranges identified e numerical progression was similar for ganged meters e
D e were damped and stable used linear scale o " increased" to the right or upward
Mp3 - CRDR APPENDIX C Set Design Checklist Page 9 of 11 D CONSIDERATIONS WHICH ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH HFE ACTIVATION (ACT) CRITERIA A check mark (J) in the "ACT" column of the Set Design Checklist indicates that all of the activity considerations listed below apply for each set of components which was eval-uated. Considerations which do not apply indicate a non-compliance with HFE design criteria. These are identified on the form by the consideration number instead of a check mark. CRITERIA SOURCE NUMBER CONSIDERATION NUREG 0700
- 1. Direction and method of operating con- 6.4.2.1 trol was obvious from:
ALL e its appearance or labeling (including arrows) e its operation (cannot be mani-pulated any other way)
- 2. Control setting required no interpreta- 6.5.1.2b tion or decoding or information speci-fically for the activation.
- 3. Related components were obvious in 6.4.2.2 appearance by: 6.5.1.6 ANY 6.8.2.1 e coding (color, size, shape, etc.)
e mimics e arrangement e type of component operation Whichever, it was consistent with all other sets of this description.
- 4. Control feedback was: 6.4.2.2d 6.4.4.1c ALL e tactile e visual or auditory e immediate e redundant (obvious from other sources) e provided without additional operator effort
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX C Set Design Checklist g Page 10 of 11 CRITERIA SOURCE NUMBER CONSIDERATION NUREG 0700
- 5. Control design characteristics (i.e., 6.4.1.2e dimensions, resistance, displacement, 6.8.3.1 ALL and separation) accommodated: 6.9 6.1.2.1 e the control / display relationship (what he operated) e anthropometric considerations (what he was capable of operating) e activity requirements (what the procedure addressed)
- 6. Controls could not be accidentally 6.4.1.2a,b,c,f,g activated due to their: 6.8.3.1b ALL e shape e location e operation (detent, force, movement, etc.)
e visibility
- 7. Sensitive adjustments were: 6.4.1.2 I 6.6 ALL e recessed or guarded e obvious by their appearance e labeled accordingly
- 8. Whatever mechanism was employed to pre- 6.4.1.2c vent accidental actuation, it did not encumber the normal operation.
- 9. No controls required a protective guard, 6.4.1.2d barrier, or cover to prevent accidental actuation, other than that incorporated in the component design.
- 10. Unauthorized personnel activation is 6.4.4.3a controlled through a securing device (key operated) on the control.
- 11. Display response time should be in real 6.9.3.1c time: 6.5.1 ANY e no time lag between system change and display indication e time lag due to attaining ultimate system state should be displayed as l parameter changes
l MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX C Set Design Checklist Page 11 of 11 D i l CRITERIA SOURCE NUMBER CONSIDERATION NUREG 0700
- 12. Control display ratio of the set: 6.9.3.2a,c,d e controls and displays should have a precision not greatly exceeding the requirement e feedback should be apparent from control movement I
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lc Page _ of _ REVIEWED BY DATE INDIVIDUAL PANEL CHECKLIST PAEL MJEG 0700 6 pgo REVEW REQURMNT ygg NO/ FEMAR(S Ato 16 6334 Tile legends unambiguous, concise, specific, under-standable. ARRANGEMENT WITHIN GROUPS 17 6631 Clearly indicate primary function; secondary function 6637a if required. 6921a 18 6632a Labels indicate intended action. 19 6632b.c d Labels clear, direct, understandable, avoid technical 6632e and non-standard terms, consistent with available 6633c procedures. [ 09 D 'O 20 6635 Labels should be brief and concise. t: o trl 6514c ~ Z H U 21 Numbers should not distract from reading. O M O tr M
, CD 22 66'33b 6514d Consistent use of terminology and abbreviations. gQO r
23 6634 Use standard symbols consistently, distinguishable. M 6636 "
n T u 1 o w C w Page _ of _ REVIEWED BY INDIVIDUAL PANEL' CHECKLIST GEM PAE1. N NLEG 0700 ED NO NN YES FIEMAFES CONTROL-DlSPLAy INTEGRATION 7 6922 Displays arranged above controls: Directly above, same relative position in group, patterns, color, lines, or sequence 8 6411c Consistent practice in functionally similar groups. 9 6411(1,2,4) Most effective use of panel space: frequency, signi-6312 ficance, importance, special requirements. 6821b 10 6821c Functionally related groups located together. ANNUNCIATOR RELATIONSHIP
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WP T tra 3 t 11 6331a Annunciator panels above related Indications and OO til controls, -g to C O M 12 6333 Arranged in matrix of no more than 50 tiles.
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13 Grouped by system, function, or other logic that n a WX relates to associated displays and controls. [ 14 Groups easily distinguishable, CO et 15 6343 Matrix labeled for easy relation to procedures.
s: M l O w O w Page _ of _ REVIEWED BY WDIVIDUAL PANEL CHECKLIST ITB4 PME. M.NEG 0700 E NO NN YES REMMES CROUP LAYOUT 1 6813 Recognition of groups: 6661 Easy to identify groups 6662 Demarcation: con t ra s t , pe rmanen t Shading / color Emergency controls set off 2 6664a Mimics: Color, discriminate, contrast Same color for same contents 'O t > Maximum 4 parallel lines with same color 6664b(1,2,3) [$ OO rn
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3 Lines different widths, no overlap, show flow w 2 direction W g ] 4 6664b(4,5) clearly indicate origin, terminal, source, and O:3" X destination points %o O O MX 5 6664b(61 Identify components ~ r 6 u) 6664c Symbols understandable, common, and consistent
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APPENDIX D D IIUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY l
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX D-1 HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY HED No. TITLE: PRIORITY: COMMENT: Reviewer Date Ref. Source l IDENTIFICATION: Panel: Component Name: ID or No.: DESCRIPTION: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS: l RESOLUTION: (Code ) l Approved Signature: Date:
/ / Additional page(s) a ttached
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX D-2 I HED FORM INSTRUCTIONS HED NUMBER: Assign numbers consecutively using one of the following prefixes (reviewer assign prefix, admin. assign number): L = Labels P = Panel Layout O = Overall Integration D = Displays (CRT) I = Indicators C = Controls l A = Annunciators ' IC = Interior Communications W = Work Space and Environment TITLE: One to four words that describe the system or component involved. PRIORITY: To be assigned as required during Assessment and Correction Phases. COMMENT: One sentence stating the general type of discrepancy. REVIEWER: The reviewer's initials. DATE: The date report prepared.
REFERENCE:
List the reference or guideline number. SOURCE: Which CRDR activity; Survey, TA, HE Suit., Interview, etc. IDENTIFICATION: Panel; give panel number or name, indicate which part, VB = vertical board, BB = benchborad, AP = alarm panel. List all panels that have this discrepancy. COMPONENT NAME: Give the name and/or number of the instrument or control that has the discrepancy. ID or NUMBER: List identification numbers, or indicate number of components that are included in this HED. DESCRIPTION: Give details of the problem. (Do not say what should be done.) POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS: Normally to be supplied later during assess-ment phase. If you know a simple solution, make a note here when
} initially filling out. This entry will be deleted when the resolution has been written up.
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX D-3 RESOLUTION: To be supplied during correction phase. Assign resolution code in parenthesis. Describe authorized resolution. SIGNATURE: To be signed by the client project coordinator having approva-1 authority. ADDITIONAL PAGE(S): Check box if additional page(s) attached. l l h 1 l
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.).f , * APPENDIX E EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES I
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX E-1 h WESTINGHOUSE OWNERS GROUP l l EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES D HIGH PRESSURE REVISION 1 i SEPTEMBER 1,1983 h
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX E-2 l> EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES OPTIMAL RECOVERY GUIDELINES E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection ES-0.0 Rediagnosis ES-0.1 Reactor Trip Response ES-0.2 Natural Circulation Cooldown ES-0.3 Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Vessel (with RVLIS) ES-0.4 Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Vessel (without RVLIS) E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant ES-1.1 SI Termination ES-1.2 Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization ES-1,3 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation ES-1.4 Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation l E-2 Faulted Steam Generator Isolation E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) ES-3.1 Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Backfill ES-3.2 Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Blowdown ES-3.3 Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Steam Dump ECA-0.0 Loss of All AC Power ECA-0.1 Loss of All AC Power Recovery Without SI Required ECA-0.2 Loss of All AC Power Recovery With SI Required ECA-1.1 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation ECA-1.2 LOCA Outside Containment ECA-2.1 Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators I
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX E-3 OPTIMAL RECOVERY GUIDELINES (continued) ECA-3.1 SGTR With Loss of Reactor Coolant-Subcooled Recovery Desired ECA-3.2 SGTR With Loss of Reactor Coolant-Saturated Recovery Desired f ECA-3.3 SGTR Without Pressurizer Pressure Control D D
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX E-4 FUNCTION RESTORATION GUIDELINES I F-0 The Critical Safety Function Status Trees F-0.1 Suberiticality F-0.2 Core Cooling l F-0.3 Heat Sink F-0.4 Integrity F-0.5 Containment I F-0.6 Inventory FR-S.1 Response to Nuclear Power Generation /ATWS FR-S.2 Response to Loss of Core Shutdown FR-C.1 Response to Inadequate Core Cooling FR-C.2 Response to Degraded Core Cooling FR-C.3 Response to Saturated Core Cooling Condition I FR-H.1 Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink FR-H.2 Response to Steam Generator Overpressure FR-H.3 Response to Steam Generator Iligh Level FR-H.4 Response to Loss of Normal Steam Release Capabilities FR-H.S Response to Steam Generator Low Level FR-P.1 Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions FR-P.2 Response to Anticipated Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions FR-Z.1 Response to High Containment Pressure FR-Z.2 Response to Containment Flooding FR-Z.3 Response to High Containment Radiation Level
MP3 - CRDR APPENDIX E-5 FUNCTION RESTORATION' GUIDELINES (continued) FR-I.1 Response to Iligh Pressurizer Level FR-I.2 Response to Low Pressurizer Level FR-I.3 Response to Voids in Reactor Vessel N s i
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