ML20081K495

Special Rept 91-05:on 910528,decided That Fire Barrier Doors C52 & C63 Needed to Be Breached for Period Greater than Seven Days to Facilitate Removal of Acoustical Plaster, Asbestos Ceiling.Continuous Fire Watch Established

ML20081K495
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	06/26/1991
From:	Wallace E TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
91-05, 91-5, NUDOCS 9106270388
Download: ML20081K495 (3)

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k Temessee veey Aome um voet sneet cnonawaa wnessee 37c2 JUN 261891 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77 AND DPR SPECIAL REPORT 91-05 This special report provides details concerning contTol building Fire Doors C52 and C63 being breached for greater than seven days to facilitate the asbestos abatement activity in the relay room on Elevation 732 of the control building. This report is being made in accordance with Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.12.a. The enclosure contains the details concerning the condition.

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone M. A. Cooper at (615) 843-8422.

Vcry truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY d,'

E. G. W 1 . ace Muhager Nuclear k eens,ing and Regulatory Affairs Enclosure cc: See page 2 O g.f h ^$

f,(hC1d 9106270388 910626 PDR S

ADOCK 05000327 PDR

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2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commisnion JUN 261991 cc (Enclosure):

Ma. S. C. Black, Deputy Director Project Directorate 11-4 U.S. Nuclear Regul& tory Cocainston One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. D. E. LaBurge, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 NRC Resident inspector Sequoyah Huclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy Daisy, Tennesnec 37379 Mr. H. A. Wilson, Project Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 11 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323

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ENCLOSURE SQN SPECI AL REPORT 91- 05 DESCRIPTION OF CONDITION On May 28, 1991, with Units 1 and 2 operating in Mode 1 (100 percent power, 2,235 pounds per square inch gauge and 578 degrees Fahrenheit), it was decided that Fire Harrier Doors CS2 and C63 needed to be breached for a period greater than seven days to facilitate an asbestos abatement activity in the control building relay room, Elevation 732. Fire Doors CS2 and C63 serve the relay room. Limiting Conditton for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 was entered at 1045 Eastern daylight time on May 28, 1991, and a continuous fire watch was established in the relay room as required by LCO 3.7.12, Action Statement (a). The continuous firc watch will remain in effect until the fire doors are returned to service. The scheduled completion of the asbestos abatement activity is October 1, 1991.

CAUSE OF CONDITION The accoustical plaster, asbestos colling is being removed because of its deteriorated condition, and the adjoining gypsum board walls in the relay room are being removed because they do not meet the design requirements for fire-rated walls. The walls are to be replaced with walls that are approved by the Underwriters haboratory and extend to the ceiling as reported to NRC in 3pecial Report 90-11 dated March 21, 1991. Because of the interaction of the two activities, the health concerns accociated with asbestos activities, and the deteriorated condition of the ceiling, the ceiling will be removed concurrently with the wall repair. The modification work area has been ecparated physically and sealed from the relay board and vital equipment. The dones must be blocked open to permit ventilation and f acilitate traf fic to the separated areas. The breaching of the doors was a planned activity with knowledge that the seven-day Technical Specification 3.7.12 Action Statement (a) would be exceeded.

AN.ALYSIS OF r'ONDTTION This event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of Action Statement (a) of LCO 3.1.12. The existing fire detection system in the relay room consists of ionization-type detectors that actuate fire dampers to isolate the room and also actuate a fire alarm. A continuous fire watch has been established and will remain in effect until the asbestos abatement activity is complete. Fire suppression is provided by means of the hose station in the staltway outside the room and by self-contained fire extinguishers for use by the fire brigade. Therefore, there is no danger to plant personnel or equipment.

CORRECTIVE ACTION A continuous fire watch was established in the relay room and will remain in effect for the duration of the asbestos abatement activity. This activity is scheduled for completion by October 1, 1991, 1

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