ML20081K218
| ML20081K218 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 11/02/1983 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, SD-413-414-83-1, NUDOCS 8311090306 | |
| Download: ML20081K218 (3) | |
Text
DUKE POWER GOMPAhT P.O. Box 33180 GHAMLOTTE, N.C. 28242 HALH. TUCKER k
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November 2, 1983 8l
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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 11 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re: Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55e, please find attached Significant Deficiency Report SD 413-414/83-14.
Very truly yours, d
i cW Hal B. Tucker LTP/php Attachment cc: Director INPO Records Center Office of Inspection and Enforcement Suite 1500 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Washington,-D. C. 20555 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Resident Inspector Mr. Robert Guild, Esq.
Catawba Nuclear Station Attorney-at-Law P. O. Box 12097 Palmetto Alliance Charleston, South Carolina 29412 2135 Devine Street Columbia, South Carolina 29205 g1090306931102
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g f JPO/HBT/LTP Novembsr 2, 1983 Catawba Nuclear Station Significant Deficiency Report Report Number: SD'413-414/83-14
-Report Date:.' November 2, 1983
' Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
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Identification of~ Deficiency: _ Potential Deficiency of Seal at Conduit Connection to Safety-Related, Equipment Located in Harsh Environments
-Initial Report: On October 3, 1983, H. Dance..NRC Region II, was notified of the subject deficiency by W. O. Henry, R.-E.
Patterson and R. D. Carroll of Duke Power Company, 422 South Church Street, Charlotte, North Carolina 28242.
Description of Deficiency: At McGuire Nuclear Station, steam generator blowdown recycle system valve 1BB143 and associated limit switches had been subjected to direct' primary coolant system spray from a body-bonnet leak from valve 1NC018 for a period of at'least three weeks, as documented in McGuire. Incident Investiga-
' tion ~ Report No. 1-83-62.
Subsequently, a limit switch failure was discovered.
during trouble-shooting of a blown fuse in the control circuits of valve 1BB143
'and was attributed to moisture intrusion into the limit switch at the junction between the conduit connector and limit-switch housing. This event led to the investigation to.dctermine the cause of moisture intrusion into the limit switch.
JAs part of this investigation, several components, including limit switches, with:the as-installed conduit connections were tested the week of September 25, 1983 at postulated accident temperatures and presstres. Results of this pre--
.liminary_ testing indicated that the equipment / cable interface using a Crouse-Hinds conduit' coupling as a sealing method is susceptible to moisture seepage.
'In light of the potential inadequate seal at the equipment interface'for devices
~ tilizing the Crouse-Hinds coupling option of the McGuire installation specifica-u tion, the NRC was notified. ' Subsequent cursory reviews of components and installa-tion procedures used at Catawba 1 and 2 revealed that a similar Duke Power installa-tion' procedure was' used in some safety-related applications in harsh em*ironments.
' Analysis of Safety' Implications: Of concern is safety-related equipment which is located in the Reactor Building, Dog Houses, or UHI Accumulator Rooms, and is. required to function under postulated accident conditions in the respective areas. and'is currently being installed per an option of the Duke installation specification.which may be susceptible to moisture seepage. Although operational experience (i.e.,Linstalled limit switch at McGuire. Nuclear Station exposed'to
! direct reactor coolant spray for a minimum of three weeks prior to failure) and evaluation testing indicate - that the Crouse-Hinds coupling option affords
-resistance to moisture intrusion.under environmental conditions beyond design basis, this option has not been verified to assure device functioning under
- postulated accident conditions.
J JP0/HBT/LTP
.o Novembsr 2, 1983 Corrective Action: Prior'to fuel load of each unit, safety-related equipment, located in the associated Reactor Building, Dog Houses and UHI Accumulator Rooms and required to function under the postulated accident conditions, will
-be reviewed to determine sealing requirements and the cable entrance seal
-installation method used. _ Based on the results of these reviews, safety-related equipment installed per an option of the installation procedure which may be susceptible to moisture seepage will be sealed at the conduit fittings to ensure that moisture will not penetrate the equipment / cable interface.
Duke will provide the NRC a final report by March 15, 1984 describing corrective action taken.