ML20081D609

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Forwards Rev 9 to Analysis of Hydrogen Control Measures at McGuire Nuclear Station, Providing Technical Info to Establish Applicability of McGuire Rept to Catawba.Rev to Drawings Expected by 831201
ML20081D609
Person / Time
Site: Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire  
Issue date: 10/20/1983
From: Tucker H
DUKE POWER CO.
To: Adensam E, Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8311010268
Download: ML20081D609 (62)
v • d • e


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I DUKE POWER Godmm P.O. DOX 33180 CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242 HAL IL TUCKER TELEPHONE vu.a ensennewt (704) 373-4531

" " * " ^ " " " " " ' " " "

October 20, 1983 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention:

Ms. E. G. Adensam, Chief Licensing Branch No. 4 Re: Catawba Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

Dear Mr. Denton:

Attached herewith are twenty (20) copies of Revision 9 to Duke Power Company's report, "An Analysis of Hydrogen Control Measures at McGuire Nuclear Station".

This revision consists of an Appendix which provides the necessary technical information to establish the applicability of the McGuire report to Catawba Nuclear Station.

The following specific information is included in the Appendix:

1.

A discussion of the applicability of previously submitted technical information to Catawba.

2.

Confirmatory analysis of containment response using CLASIX with initial conditions and assumptions identical to the base case analysis performed for McGuire.

3.

Assessment of equipment survivability at Catawba based on comparison between the qualification profiles used at McGuire and Catawba.

It is our conclusion that the report, "An Analysis of Hydrogen Control Measures at McGuire Nuclear Station", supplemented by the information provided in this submittal, establishes the basis for the acceptability of the hydrogen control measures at Catawba.

You will note that certain figures in the Appendix are to be supplied later.

These figures are Duke drawings which are in the process of being revised to reflect the changes made in the instrumentation, control, and power distribution of the Hydrogen Mitigation System as a result of our recent commitment to provide remote operation and control room indication of system status. We expect new revisions of these drawings to be available December 1, 1983 and will distribute the missing figures to you at that time.

Boro

('G11010268 831020 l

kO PDR ADOCK 05000369 P

PDR L.

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'o Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director October 20, 1983 Page 2 Please advise if there are any further questions regarding this matter.

Very truly yours,

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f dc Hal B. Tucker ROS/php Attachments cc:

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 NRC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station Mr. W. T. Orders NRC Resident Irspector McGuire Nuclear Station Mr. Robert Guild, Esq.

Attorney-at-Law P. O. Box 12097 Charleston, South Carolina 29412 Palmetto Alliance 2135 Devine Street Columbia, South Carolina 29205 Mr. Jesse L. Riley Carolina Environmental Study Group 854 Henley Place Charlotte, North Carolina 28207

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Appendix A Applicability to Catawba Nuclear Station O

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i Section lA INTRODUCTION I

TABLE OF CONTENTS i

1.0A introduction

.I 1.1A Applicability of McGuire Information i

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l 1.0A Introduction The document entitled "An Analysis of Hydrogen Control Measures at McGuire

.j Nuclear Station" was issued in three volumes in October, 1981. Subsequent re-a visions to this document have been issued to keep the information current and to document responses to NRC questions. As a result of'this information, approval was granted by NRC of the hydrogen mitigation system at McGuire in supplement 7 to the McGuire Safety Analysis Report, NUREG-0422.

The Catawba Nuclear station of Duke Power Company, because the design of its containment building and associated systems is virtually identical to that of McGuire, will utilize hydrogen control measures which are identical to those i

used at McGuire and described in the main body of the report on hydrogen control measures for McGuire, hereinaf ter called the " Red Book."

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i 1.1A Applicability of McGuire Information The following information is provided concerning the specific appilcability of i

the information in the Red Book to Catawba Nuclear' Station.

4 Section 1.0 - Applicable in its entirity.

Section 2.0

- Applicable in its entirity.

l' Section 3.0 - The text description of the hydrogen mitigation system is l

appIIcable to Catawba, but new tables and figures are included in,this Appendix.

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Section 4.0 - The general discussion of containment response and sensitivities

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is applicable to Catawba. The results of a confirmatory analysis performed for Catawba using the latest version of CLASIX is reported in this appendix.

i Section 5.0 The methods of assessment of equipment survivability are ide-tical i

between units. A new section has been included in this Appendix to document the survivability.of Catawba equipment not identical to that used in similar applica-tions at McGuire.

Section 6.0 Applicable in its entirity.

I Appilcable in its entirity.

Section 7.0 4

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Section 3.0A DESCRIPTION OF PERMANENT HYDROGEN MITIGATION SYSTEM.

Table of Contents 3.lA Introduction i

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3.lA introduction 1

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The hydrogen mitigation system used at Catawba is identical to that used at McGuire, except for minor differences in terminal box designation and igniter location. The design basis and system description are unchanged from McGuire, and the methods of operation and testing will also be identical to those used 1

at McGuire.

i' The following tables and figures are provided in this sectton which provide specific information related to Catawba:

e Table 3.1A-1 provides the same information on igniter locations at Table 3.4-1 does for McGuire.

Figure 3.4-1 is applicable to both Catawba and McGuire and is not repeated in the appendix.

Figure 3.1A-1 (Catawba drawing CNEE-0165-02.01) is the equivalent of Figure 3.4-2, 1

Figures 3.1 A-2 through 3.1 A-5 provide a schematic representation of igniter loca-i i

tions in the Catawba containment building.

These figures are analogous to Figures 3.4-3 through 3.4-6 for McGuire.

i Figure 3.1 A-6 shows the power distribution, control, and indication for the l

Hydrogen Mitigation System for Catawba.

It is analogous to figure 3.4-7 for McGuire.

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1 i-l Figure 3.1A-7 shows the specific Igniter assignments in the various strings inside containment, illustrating the separation and redundancy in the system.

This figure 'is analogous to Figure 3.4-9 for McGui re, f

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Table 3.1A-1 Page 1 of 2 Hydrogen Igniter Locations Term. Box No.

Room; Area Elevation Azimuth IEHM0001 incore instr. tunnel 547 94 1EHM0002 incore instr. tunnel 547 86 1EHM0003 lower cont. pipe tunnel 562 92 1EHM0004 lower cont. pipe tunnel 562 88 IEHM0005 lower cont. pipe tunnel 562 178 IEHM0006 lower cont. pipe tunnel 562 182 IEHM0007 lower cont. pipe tunnel 562 277 1EHM0008 lower cont. pipe tunnel 562 273 1EHM0009 lower cont, pipe tunnel 562 5

1El:M0010 lower cont. pipe tunnel 562 8

1EHM0011 lower containment 590 326 1EHM0012 lower containment 590 326 1EHM0013 fan / accumulator room 601 324 1EHM0014 fan / accumulator room 601 324 1EHM0015 top of S/G enclosure 643 335 1EHM0016 top of S/G enclosure 643 339 v) 1EHM0017 lower containment 590 2o 1EHM0018 lower containment 590 6

1EHM0019 fan / accumulator room 601 42 lEHM0020 fan / accumulator room 601 42 1EHM0021 top of S/G enclosure 643 18 1EHM0022 top of S/G enclosure 643 22 1EHM0023 fan / accumulator room 590 53 1EHM0024 fan / accumulator room 590 53 1EHM0025 fan / accumulator room 590 214 IEHM0026 fan / accumulator room 590 214 1EHM0027 air return fan discharge 590 245 1EHM0028 air return fan discharge 590 243 1EHM0029 incore instr. seal table area 590 91 1EHM0030 incore instr. seal table area 590 96 1EHM0031 reactor vessel cavity 602 22 1EHM0032 reactor vessel cavity 602 158 1EHM0033 top of PZR enclosure 641 114 1

d IEHM0034 top of PZR enclosure 641 114 1EHM0035 lower containment 590 145 i

1EHM0036 lower containment ~

590 145

. Table 3.1A-1 (cont'd)

Page 2 of 2 Term.' Box No.

Room; Area

. Elevation Azimuth IEHM0037 fan / accumulator room 601 121 IEHM0038 fan / accumulator room 601 121 1EHM0039 top of S/G enclosure 643 161 1EHM0040 top of S/G enclosure 643 165 1EHM0041 lower containment 590 172 IEHM0042 lower containment 590 176 l

IEHM0043 fan / accumulator room 601 216 IEHM0044 fan / accumulator room 601 216 IEHM0045 top of S/G enclosure 643 206 1EHM0046 top of S/G enclosure 643 210 1EHM0047 ice condenser 666 232 1EHM0048 ice condenser 666 321 1EHM0049 Ice condenser 666 11 1EHM0050 Ice. condenser 666 34 IEHM0051 ice condenser-666 59 IEHM0052 ice condenser 666 84 1EHM0053 ice condenser 666 108 IEHM0054 Ice condenser 666 133 IEHM0055 ice. condenser 666 157 IEHM0056 Ice condenser 666 183 1EHM0057 ice condenser 666 206 1EHM0058 ice condenser 666 232 1EHM0059 upper containment dome 714 318 1EHM0060 upper containment dome 714 310 1EHM0061 upper containment dome 714 49 1EHM0062 upper containment dome 714 57 1EHM0063 upper containment dome 714 140 IEHM0064 upper containment dome 714 132 1EHM0065 upper containment dome 714:

218 1EHM0066 upper containment. dome 714 226 1EHM0067 lower containment 557 85 IEHM0068 lower containment 557 85 1EHM0069 mldelevation upper' containment.

649 140 1EHM0070 midelevation upper containment ~

649 220 '

'1EHM0071 midelevation upper containment 649 320 1EHM0072 midelevation upper containment 649 40

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CATRWBA CONTAINMENT - SECTION AT.EL 565 I

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CATAWBR CONTAINMENT-SECTION AT'EL-.721 i!O f-L F

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ANALYSIS OF CONTAINMENT RESPONSE TO HYDROGEN RELEASE

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AND COMBUSTION

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l Table of Contents.

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4.lA int roduction j

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4.2A Selection of Analysis Conditions 4.3A Results of Analysis

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4.4A Conclusions f

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b 4.1A Introduction The Catawba containment building is virtually identical to that of McGuire, it is expected, therefore, that the response of the Catawba containment building would also be identical to that of,McGui e.

It was concluded that a CLASIX model of the Catawba containment.sFould be made and some confirmatory analysis performed as a comparison with sim.ilar analysis done for McGuire. This analysis was undertaken fo( two reasons [:

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The'TMD model of Catawbagsed by Westinghouse for analysis of the containment responsc. to LOCA ha I some minor differences when compared with that used for McCulre. These dif Ferences concern the allocation of system volume among the various compartments -(the overall containment volume used was identical to that used at McGuire) and in the heat sink structure details. The TMD mo'el~of Catawba is discussed on the Catawba FSAR, Section 6.2. The d

parameters presented in the FSAR were used to develop the CLASIX model, i

2.

Several corrections have been made to CLASIX based on the NRC review and subsequent evaluaticn by the users of the code. These changes consisted mainly of corrections in the heat transfer models for radiation and convec-tion and in the flow path logic for propagating flames. An analysis of i n i

Catawba using the corrected version of CLASIX provides some verification of the effects of the corrections on the analy' sis performed previously for J

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4 4.2A Selection of Analysis Conditions Since this analysis of Catawba using CLASIX was intended to be used for com-parison with similar analysis performed for McGuire, it was decided to use the base case conditions reported in Section 4.4 as the underlying assumptions con-cerning the characteristics of the hydrogen burn. The burn timesselected were consistent with flame speeds of approximately six feet /second, with ignition at 8.5% hydrogen by volume and burn completion of 100%.

Note that implicit in these assumptions are the following conservatisms:

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No credit is taken for any hydrogen consumption before the volumetric content reaches 8.5%. This is unrealistically conservative based on many recent test results and results in a large rate of energy input to the containment.

2.

Burn times, while based on flame speeds of six feet /second, assume simultaneous ignition at all igniter sites and propagation in all directions.

For example, the burn time for the upper plenum of the ice condenser is seven seconds.

These conservative assumptions, combined with the conservatism of no burning until 8.5%, result in high burning rates for hydrogen.

In the upper plenum, this burn rate is approximately 6 lbm/sec.

It can be concluded that a burn rate in excess of this rate is unilkely, if the more realistic assumptions of ignition at 6-6.5% hydrogen were used, even if the flame speed may have been underpredicted at 6 ft/sec.

Tables 4.2A-1 through 4.2A-16 contain the CLASIX parameters used for the Catawba

' analysis.

1 4.3A Results of Analysis f

The results of the Catawba analysis are 111ustrated in Figures 4.3A-1 through 4.3A-14.

Hydrogen is consumed in a series of burns in the lower compartment and i

ice condenser upper plenum. There are six lower compartment burns and 31 upper g

i plenum burns. The maximum pressure response in containment occurs at t = 4967 seconds when simultaneous burns are occurring in the two compartments. This maximum pressure is 27.84 psia, well below the containment design pressure of 30.0 psia. This may be compared to a maximum pressure of 27.6 psia found during analysis conducted for McGuire and described in Section 4.4.

Note also that six lower compartment burns were also found in the McGuire analysis, and these six burns were used as a basis for establishing boundary conditions for survivability of lower containment equipment. The McGuire analysis showed fewer burns in the upper plenum, but survivability of the equipment in this area was not based on a specific number of burns, therefore the previous analysis for McGuire is appli-cable to Catawba.

Total hydrogen consumption by the series of burns is 1022 lbm, compared with 1032 lbm for the McGuire analysis.

Peak temperatures reached during hydrogen burning for Catawba are 1221 F in the lower compartment and 1513 F in the upper plenum. Peak temperatures for McGuire are 1328 F and 1526 F respectively. The results of the i

analysis are summarized in Table 4.3A-1, which may be compared to Table 4.4-1 for McGuire.

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1 Despite the slight modeling differences between Catawls and McGuire, the base case analysis which considers burning at six feet /second is essentially the same for the two units. The Catawba analysis shows greater response for the overall transient, but the difference is minor and probably due to the smaller number of heat sinks modeled for Catawba. There is also a larger quantity of hydrogen consumed in the upper plenum at Catawba when compared with McGuire resulting in a somewhat larger energy input into the model of the upper part of the ice con-denser and somewhat greater Ice melt. This is due to the increased flow through the ice condanser because modeled flow areas were slightly larger,for Catawba.

It can be concluded that there are no significant differences in the analysis results for the two plants when Identical transients are analyzed.

1O Since the results of the McGuire CLASIX analysis were used to assist in establishing temperature boundary conditions for equipment survivability analysis, the tempera-tures profiles for Catawba were compared with those from the McCulre analysis.

It was noted that for each case the McGuire analysis bounds the temperature pro-l files for Catawba. This can also be concluded by noting that each lower compart-ment burn in Catawba consumed slightly less hydrogen than that of McGuire, and a

the overall peak temperatures are lower in the regions of interest.

It can therefore be concluded that the Catawba analysis supports the use of the tempera-ture boundary conditions generated for McGuire for assessment of equipment surviv-ability at Catawba.

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I Table 4.2A-1 Catawba CLASIX Input MARCH Reactor Coolant Mass and Energy Release Rates 52D Sequence Time H O Mass Release Rate H 0 Energy Release Rate 2

3 (seconds)

(Ibn/sec)

(Btu /see) c 0.0 197.2 1.167 x 10' 2172 190.5 1.097 x 10' 4

2478 44.85 5.230 x 10 3180 53.53 6.547 x 10 4

3804 34.82 4.262 x 10 4428 21.40 2.842 x*10 4752 48.42 5.55S x 10 5700 19.42 2.182 x 10 4 i

6012 14.07 1.583 x 10 4

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6960 5.253 5.989 x 10 7062 4.718 5.388 x 10 7206 4.060 4.693 x 10 t

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MARCH Hydrogen Generation Rates and Temperatures S2D Secuence Time H Mass Release Rate H Temperature 2

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0.0 0.0 61 3480 0.0 61 l

3804 0.0413 67 i

4116 0.260 1582 442B 0.740 795 4752 1.07 771 5700 0.430 612 6330 0.223 555 6648 0.160 535 6960 0.117 519 8070 0.0367 519 e

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Catawba CMSIX Input MARQi Fission Product Energy Release Rates 1

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Time Energy Release Rate (seconds)

(Btu /sec) 0.0 0.0 3810 0.0 4116 1803 i

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Table 4.2A-4 Catawba CLASIX Input Burn Parameters tower Ice Condenser Ice Condenser Upper Dead Ended Compartment tower Plenta Upper Plenta Compartment Region Hydrogen fF for Ignition 0.085 0.99**

0.085 0.085 0.085 HydrogenfFforPropagation 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 Hydrogen Fraction Burned 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 i

MinimumOxygenfFforIgnition 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 MinimtaOxygenfFtoSupport Combustion 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 i

Burn Time (sec)8 9

6 7

13 7

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    • There are no Ignition sources in this compartment

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Volume (f t )

217400 24200 47000 670000 127600 Tenperature (F) 100 32 32 75 100 0 Pressure (psia) 3.08 3.12 3.12 3.11 3.08 2

N Pressure (psla) 11.63 11.78 11.78 11.75 11.63 y

H O Pressure (psia) 0.28 0.09 0.09 0. 13 0.28 2

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Catawba CLASIX Input Flow Path Parameters Ir-I.P LP-UP UP-UC UC-LC DE-If 2

Minimtsn Flow Area (f t )

3.0 229 4

Flow toss Coefficient 1.16 1.04 1.43 1.5 5.1 l

Burn Propagation Delay Time (sec)*

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l Ice Bed Parameters

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Parameter Value Initial Ice Mass 2.46 x 10 lbm 6

Initial Ice Heat Transfer Area 2.96 x 105 ft2 l

l Heat of Fusion of Ice 150 Btu /lbm 6

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Flow Loss Coefficient 0.0 Initial Net Free Gas Volume 86300'ft3 i

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Table 4.2A-8 Ny Catawba CLASIX Input Ice Condenser Door Parameters Lower Inlet Doors Maximtra Opening Angle 55 Minimum Differential Pressure for Maximtra Opening 0.0206 psi Maximtzn Flow Area 2

810 ft Bypass Flow Area 0

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Intermediate Deck Doors Maximtra Opening Angle 89 Minimtra Differential Pressure for Maximtzn Opening

,5.5 psi Maximtra Flow Area 2

982.5 ft Bypass Flow Area 20 f t s)

Top Deck Doors Maximtra opening Angle 0

89 Minimtrn Differential Pressure for Maximtra Opening 1.15 psi Maximtra Flow area 2

2003 ft Bypass Flow Area 2

20 ft Minimtra Differential Pressure to Initiate Door Openi.'vg 0.005 psi t

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  • Initiated 10 minutes after the containment reaches 3.0 psig pressure.

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1 Catawba CM SIX Input i

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' Spray System Parameters Pa ra. eter Value Drop Diameter 0.0268 in Drep Fall Time 10 sec Flow Rate 6800 gpn Temperature 125 F 2

Drop Film Coefficient 20 Btu /hr ft F 1

Initiation Time

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  • Initiated 30 seconds after the containment reaches 3.0 psig pressure.

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9-Table 4.2A-11 Catawba Cf.ASIX Input Radiant Heat Transfer Beam Lenoth Comeartment Beam Lencth (ft)

Lower Compart:nent 25.0 Ice Condenser Lower Plenum 8.5 Ice Condenser Upper Plenum 8.5 Upper Compartment 59.0 Dead Ended Region 8.5 O

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l Table 4.2A-12 Catawba CIASIX Input Material Decendent Passive Heat Sink Parameters Parameter Material Value Draissivity Concrete 0.9 Carbon Steel 0.9 Paint 0.9

  • 1hermal Conductivity Paint on Steel 0.2 (Btu /hr f t F)

Paint on Concrete 0.C833 Paint on Concrete

  • 0.09 Concrete

' 26.0 Carbon Steel 26.0 Insulation 0.25 Volunetric Heat Capacity Paint on Steel 0.7 (Btu /ft F)

Paint on Concrete 28.4 Paint on Concrete

  • 0.7 Concrete 23.0 Concrete

56.4 Insulation 0.645 Exit Heat Transfer Coefficient Paint to Steel or Concrete 10 4 2

(Btu /hr ft F)

Concrete to Concrete 108 Steel to Insulation 10 Insulation to Steel or Concrete 0.7 Last tayer Adiabatic Wall 0

1 1

  • Applies only to wall in Table and wall in Table

+ Applies only to walls in the ice condenser.

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O Table 4.2A-13 i

Catawba CLASIX Input Upper Compartment Passive Heat Sinks CLASIX Initial Wall Wall Temperature Surface Layer Number Layer Layer Number' Description (F)

Area (ft )

Humber of Nodes Material Thickness (ft) 1 Part of the polar crane wall, 120 13720 1

2 paint 0.001 containment shell, and 2

5 carbon steel 0.0247 miscellaneous steel 2

Part of the polar crane wall, 120 21590 1

2 paint 0.001 containment sheII, and 2

30 carbon steel 0.61 miscellaneous steel r

3 Part of the' polar crane wall 120 14770 1

2 paint 0.0083 2

12 concrete 1.361 4

Part of the refueling canal 120.

4031 1

2 paint 0.00133 and miscellaneous concrete 2

12 concrete 1.304 5

Miscellaneous steel lining 120 5760 1

4 carbon steel 0.0078 6

Upper compartment platforms 120-6831 1

10 galvanized 0.0183 steel t

1 l

O O

O Table 4.2A-14 Catawba CLASIX Input Lower Compartment Passive Heat Sinks CLASIX Initial Wall Wall Temperature Surface L yer Number Layer layer Number Description (F)

Area (ft2)

Number of Nodes Material Thickness (ft) 7.

Miscellaneous concrete 120 2209 1

2 paint 0.00131 i

2 10 concrete 1.000 9

Platforms-120 2000 1

4 carbon steel 0.00783 1

10 Miscellaneous concrete 120 14800 1

2 paint 0.00083 2

13 concrete 1.384 11 Miscellaneous concrete 120 10360 1

2 paint

.00083 2

27 concrete 2.752 l

1 8

12 Reactor Cavity 120 4544 1

2 paint

.00083 2

80 concrete 8.042 13 Miscellaneous steel 120 15740 1

2 paint

.001000 2

25 carbon steel.05220 14 Miscellaneous steel 120 219.8 1

2 paint

.00100 2

100 carbon steel 333

-~ - - - -

O O

O Table 4.2A-15 Catawba CLASIX Input Ice Condenser Lower Plenum Passive Heat Sinks CLASIX Initial Wall Wall Temperature Surface Layer Number Layer layer Number Descripilon (F)

Area (f t )

Number of Nodes Material Thickness (ft) 1 15 Ice Baskets 32 180628 1

3 carbon steel 0.00663 16 Lattice Frames and 32 105300 1

11 carbon steel 0.0217 support structure 18 Ice Condenser Floor 32 3336 1

2 paint

.00512 2

8 concrete 0.948 19

. Containment Wall Panels 32 16240 1

3 carbon steel 0.00521 and Containment Shell 2

8 insulation 0.948 3

31 stainless stee10.625 4

20 Crane Wall Panels and 32 11097 1

3 carbon steel 0.00521 Crane Wall 2

8 Insulation 0.948 3

9 concrete 1.0 l

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Table 4.2A-16 I

Catawba CLASIX Input I

i Ice Condenser Upper Plenum Passive Heat Sinks i

CLASIX Initial Wall l

Wall' Tempe ra tu re Surface Layer Number Layer Layer j

' Number Description (F)

Area (ft )

Number of Nodes Material Thickness (ft) l s

8-Containment Wall Panels 32 2860 1

3 carbon steel 0.00521 l

i and Containment Shell 2

8 insulation 0.948

[

3 31 stainless steel 0.0625 L

i 17 Crane Wall Panels and 32 1955 1

3 carbon steel 0,00521 Crane Wall 2

8 insulation 0.948 j

3 9

concrete 1.0 L

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Table 4.3A-1 l

Catawba CLASIX Results Summary Flame Speed - 6 ft/sec Basic Transient l

Number of burns LC 6

UP 31 4

Magnitude of burns (Ibm)

LC 60-100 UP 18-20 Total H burned (Ibm) 1022 2

{

H remaining-(1bm) 516 2

Peak temperature (F)

LC 1221.5 LP 275 UP 1513 UC 180 DE 287 Peak pressure (psig)

LC 12.7 LP 12.5 UP 12.84 i

UC 12.2 j

DE 12.7 5

lee remaining (Ibm) 3.56 x 10 LC - Lower Compartment i

j LP - Lower Ice Condenser Plenum UP - Upper Ice Condenser Plenum UC - Upper Compartment DE - Dead-Ended Regions (Accumulator Rooms, etc.)

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4 Section 5.0A j

EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY i

1 i

l Table of Contents 5.lA introduction 1l' h 5.2A Equipment identical between Stations 4

L-j 5.3A Equipment Not identical between Stations-5.4A Conclusions

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5.0A Equipment Survivability 5.1A Introduction The survivability of the vital equipment used at McGuire was shown in Section 5.0 by analysis, test, and comparison with equipment qualification data.

Equipment used in similar applications at l

Catawba dif fers, in some cases, from that at McGui re.

The dis-cussion in this section will consider each item individually, compare It to the item used at McGuire, and present the basis for its sur-q vivability.

Note that the steam generator water level transmitters do not appear on the list of essential equipment inside containment at Catawba, as these transmitters at Catawba are located outside of l

containment, in the annulus.

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5.2A Equipment identical between Stations For the following equipment, identical models are used at McGuire and Catawba:

pressurizer water level transmitter Duke supplied reactor coolant loop RTD cable containment air return fan hydrogen skimmer fan The survivability of this equipment was established for McGuire in Section 5.0, amplified by additional information given in response to NRC questlons, Section 7.0.

On that basis, the survivability of the above equipment is ensured for Catawba.

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5.3A Equipment Not identical between Stations a

The remainder of the items on this list of essential equipment are not identical between Catawba and McGuire. This equipment has for Catasba been qualified to the same or more severe accident profiles as used for McGuire.

These items are discussed specifically in the following subsections.

5.3.lA Reactor Coolant Loop RTD's and Integral Cables As discussed in Section 5.4, of concern in assessing the hydrogen burn surviv-ability of the reactor coolant loop RTD's is the integral cable.* The RTD itself is located in a well and subject to a continuous temperature by conduction from the reactor coolant loop far higher than the temperature it will reach as O

t j

a result of hydrogen burning. The survivability of the McGuire RTD integral v

cable was established based on analysis and test. The RdF(NSSS)21205 RTD's used at Catawba were qualified using a more severe accident profile than that used for the Rosemont 176KS RTD's used at McGuire. The peak temperature profile I

is in excess of 400 F for the Catawba RTD compared with 332 F for McGuire. The additional margin available in the cable used at Catawba thus ensures its surviv-ability in the hydrogen burn environment.

5.3.2A Core Exit Thermocouple Cables The core exit thermocouple cables at Catawba are mineral Insulated and have

-been LOCA qualified to a temperature of 389 F.

This is higher than the LOCA qualification temperature of 346 F for the core exit thermocouple cable at McGuire.

It may be concluded that this cable will survive on the basis of this V) comparison and the discussion in Section 5.4.2.4.

l

~

5.3.3A Electric Hydrogen Recombiners

%-)

Both McGuire and Catawba have electric hydrogen recombiners mcnufactured by Westinghouse Sturdevant. Model A is used at McGuire and Model B is used at Catawba, with the difference being a slightly lower qualification temperature for Catawba (288 F} as compared to McGuire (309 F).

Because the electric hydrogen recombiner is itself a significant source of energy and heat when it is operating, this difference is not considered significant, in addition, no hydrogen is burned in the upper compartment, so the effect of hydrogen burning on the recombiners need not be considered.

5.3.4A Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valves The Limitorque motor operated valves used at Catawba have been LOCA tested to

,U approximately the same temperature as that used for the Target Rock solenoid valves used at McGuire.

In addition, the motor operated valves are much more massive and will exhibit less response to the transient hydrogen flames.

It may therefore be concluded that the reactor vessel head vent valves will survive hydrogen burning.

5 3.5A Pressurizer PORV The Valcor solenoid valves used at Catawba were qualified to approximately the same LOCA temperature as that used for the ASCO solenoid valves used in McGuire.

It may be concluded that the pressurizer.PORV controls will survive hydrogen burning. The pressurizer PORV itself at both stations 'is a large air operated gj valve for which hydrogen burning will not represent a concern.

i t

i 5.3.6A Pressurizer PORV Block Valves l

The Rotork actuator used at McGuire and the Limitorque actuator used at Cataw ba are LOCA qualified to approximately the same temperature. These massive electric motor operators are not affected significantly by hydrogen burning, and it may 1

1 l

therefore be concluded that the PORV block valve will survive hydrogen burning.

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5.4A Conclusions l

The basis for the conclusion that essential equipment at McGuire will survive hydrogen burning was given in Section 5.0.

In Section 5.0A, the basis for survivability of essential equipment in Catawba is demonstrated based on the conclusions drawn for McGuire. As was stated in Section 5.0, the equipment most susceptible to large temperature rises due to hydrogen burning is the cabling associated with essential instrumentation.

For Catawba, this cabling has been qualified to more severe accident profiles than at McGuire. More l

massive equipment for which the effects of hydrogen burning are less has been j

qualified for essentially the same conditions at both stations.

Survivability i

of essential equipment at Catawba is thus ensured.

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