ML20081A983
| ML20081A983 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1995 |
| From: | Dennis Morey SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9503150370 | |
| Download: ML20081A983 (4) | |
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,2 W. N 1-Southern Nuclear Operatng Company.
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- Post Offee Box 1295 '
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- Birmingham, Alabama 35201
~l i*1 Telephone (205) 868-5131 "
.o.s.uo,ey Southern Nudear Operating Company j
Vee President Farley Project the Southem electruc system.
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1 March 9,1995
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'I Docket Numbers:
50-348 l
50-364
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
ATfN: De-at Control Desk j
Washington, DC 20555 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Reply to an Tawar Follow-up Item (IFI)
NRC Ia= pac *ian Report Nos. 50-348/94-25 and 50-364/94-25
'i Gentle >= a As requested by your tr=====M 1 dated January 30,1995, this letter isycrais to IFI 50-348, 364/94-l 25-01, " Exercise Weakness for failure of the Control Room Supervisors to recognize an Emergency l
Action level (EAL) for an Alert classi6 cation". The Southern Nuclear Operstmg Company (SNC) response to IFI 50-348, 364/94-25-01 is provided in A*=rk-t 1.
Respectfully subnutted,
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Dave Morey BLM/ cit:ifi94b21. doc Attachments cc:
Mr. S. D. Ebneter Mr. B. L. Siegel Mr. T. M. Ross s
/fp 9503150370 950309 PDR1 ADOCK 05000348
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ATTACHMENTI i
RESPONSE TO IFI 50-348,364/94-25-01 t
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l RESPONSE TO IFI 50-348,364/94-25-01
'IFI 50-348,364/94-25-01 states the following:
FNP-0-EIP-9.0, " Emergency Classification and Actions" provided for off l
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normal events to be classified into one of the four emergency classification categories. The initial classification of the exercise was to be an Alert as required by EIP-9, Guideline 3, step 1.3 " Degraded Core / Fuel Fault" due to Dose Equivalent Iodine (DEI) being > 300 pCi/gm. The EAL input was a telephone call from Chemistry at 8:05 a.m. that the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) sample indicated the " DEI was 384 pCilgm." Both the Unit I and Unit 2 Supervisors for the exercise failed to recognize the high RCS activity as an EAL entry for an Alert cla:sification. A decision was made to classify at a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) based on a containment integrity issue due to the indication that the mini-purge system may not have completely isolated on demand. While the NOUE notification message was being prepared, the oncall Emergency Director (ED) came into the Control Room. When the oncall ED was presented a status brief he asked if the RCS activity wouldn't be an Alert classification. The acting ED (Unit 2 Shift Supervisor) then reviewed the EAL and confirmed the Alert classification. The NOUE message formulation was terminated and the Alert declaration was made at 8:32 a. m. and required notifications were made shortly thereafter. The failure of the Control Room shift to recognize the Alert EAL was identified as an esercise weakness for inspector follow-up.
SNC Resoonss In response to IFI 50-348,364/94-25-01, FNP determined the error was a personnel error made by the drill Unit 2 Shift Supenisor. There has been no esidence of a generic weakness in classification during Simulator training, or other plant drills.
He crew had made a decision that a NOUE was required based on a shutdown required by a loss of containment integrity, and was in the process of declaring a NOUE. The Unit 1 Shift Supervisor then received the initial report of RCS activity being 384 pCi/gm DEI and evaluated that value against Technical Specifications. The Unit 1 Shift Supenisor determined that a shutdown was required by Technical Specifications and thought this only cons
- tuted a second NOUE declaration criteria. He Unit 1 Shift Supervisor then reported this aformation to the on-shift ED (Unit 2 Shift Supenisor) who also inappropriately categorized the high RCS activity and required shutdown as a NOUE. The Unit 2 Shift Supenisor did a review of the Alert EALs, but overlooked the failed fuel criteria.
He Supenisors did not perform a systematic evaluation of the EALs and during their quick look at the Alert levels, they overlooked the failed fuel criteria for Alert.
The drill on<all Emergency Director corrected the Shift Supervisors failure to classify the alert condition based on high RCS actisity.
During 1995 Cycle one retraining, all Senior Reactor Operators, Emergency Directors, Recovery Managers, Recovery Manager Assistants and Technical Managers received trainmg relating to the exercise weakness. He main topics of the training were 1) the errors Page1
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RESPONSE TO IFI 50-348, 364/94-25 '#
'i made during the akrt classi6 cation,2) the faded fuel entena for all a.w,.cy classification.
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,,, f ' criteria,3) the exercise scenario includag the correct emergency classificatens and 4) the necessity of using a sym t.ic approach to emergency classification.
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