ML20080T186
| ML20080T186 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 08/11/1983 |
| From: | Daltroff S PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Starostecki R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20080T093 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8310200196 | |
| Download: ML20080T186 (3) | |
Text
a e
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 MARKET STREET
(
P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 0
SHIELDS L DALTROFF ELECTRIC PRODUCTION August 11, 1983 Docket Nos. 50-277 50-278 Inspection No. 50-277/83-16 50-278/83-16 Mr. Richard W.
Starostecki, Director Division of Project & Resident Programs U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1 631 Park Avanue King of Prussia, PA 19406
Dear. Mr. Starostecki:
Your letter of July 20, 1983, forwarded combined Inspection Report 50-277/83-16 and 50-278/83-16.
The report cited two apparent violations of NRC requirements.
This letter will restate the violations and provide our responses.
1.
Technical Specification 6.13, High Radiation Area, requires high radiation areas where the intensity of radiation ir greater than 1000 millirem per hour to be provided with locked doors to prevent unauthorized entry.
Contrary to the above, about 1:00 p.m. on June 22, 1983, the intensity of radiation exceeded 1000 millirem per hour on the Turbine deck 165 foot elevation and the door to the room was opened and not locked.
8310200196 831013 PDR ADOCK 05000277 G
,y r
7
. Mr. Richard W. Starostecki Page 2
Response
The door was closed by shift supervision upon identification of the problem by the inspector.
Investigation has concluded that the door was lef t open due to an individual personnel error.
The individual, a vendor employee, blocked the door open to move equipment from the turbine area.
After passing through, he forgot to unblock and close the door.
Procedure A-86, Administrative Procedure for Corrective Action, was implemented.
The individual was identified, informed of his error, and denied access to the protected area.
The individual is no longer at Peach Bottom.
2.
The licensee's accepted Security Plan of May, 1978, (revised October, 1980) and Security Procedure PP-25, Revision 1, Instructions to Personnel Escorts, require that visitors in the Protected Area be continuously escorted by an individual authorized unescorted access.
Contrary to the above, about 11:25 a.m. on June 7,
- 1983, a visitor in the vicinity of the Administrative Building, within the Protected Area, was not continuously escorted.
Response
This was a personnel error caused by two visiting nuclear superintendents.
Both have had many years of responsible involvement with Peach Bottom Station.
Together, they have served the Philadelphia Electric Company for a combined total of more than 57 years.
Certainly, neither one, in anyone's eyes, would be considered a " security risk".
Both had current security clearance to the site.
Both of the nuclear superintendents have had unescorted priviledges; however, one had permitted his General Employee Training to expire, thereby requiring that he be badged as a " visitor".
This visitor's badge imposed escort requirements.
In passing from the Administration O f fices to the exit, they were momentarily separated and thereby violated the details of the security plan.
This violation is considered to be of minimal consequence since the violati:r took place on route from the
Mr.-Richard W. Starostecki page 3 Administration building to the guard house and because of the credentials and security clearance of the individuals involved.
If there are any further questions, please do not hesitate to' contact us.
Very truly yours, a
fl cc: A. R.
Blough, Site Inspector t
r
(
,_,.r., _
,,, - - -.,