ML20080T124

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Responds to NRC 830914 Telcon Re Violations Noted in IE Insp Repts 50-277/83-16 & 50-278/83-16.Corrective Actions: Administrative Procedures Reexamined W/Expectation That Costly & Impractical Requirements Can Be Eliminated
ML20080T124
Person / Time
Site: Peach Bottom  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/23/1983
From: Gallagher J
PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To: Starostecki R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20080T093 List:
References
NUDOCS 8310200172
Download: ML20080T124 (2)


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j, PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 23O1 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 JOSEPH W. GALLAGHER stsetnic enoouNon" carantiesnt 1215)841-5003 September 23, 1983 Docket Nos. 50-277 50-278 Inspection No. 50-277/83-16 50-278/83-16 Mr. Richard W. Starostecki, Director Division of Project & Resident Programs U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Starostecki:

In a telecon on September 14th, Mr. Lowell Tripp of your staff requested amplification of our response dated August 11, 1983, to the referenced Inspection Report, Appendix B.

In particular, Mr. Tripp asked what corrective steps have been taken and results achieved, what corrective steps would avoid future violation, and date of full compliance.

This violation related to f ailure to continuously escort a company employee, temporarily classified as a visitor because of a lapse in yearly requalification training.

Plant procadarc requires that visitors be continuously escorted when within the protected araa.

Mr.

Tripp stated that NRC recognized that this incident had no security consequences.

The condition was corrected immediately in that both parties involved immediately lef t the protected area.

Both individuals, because of their position in our organization, examined the cause of this occurrence, the impact on plant security and possible methods to avoid recurrence.

Additionally, the escorting superintendent and I discussed this incident as to the exact cause, corrective actions, security impact, and effect on other personnel through example.

It was concluded that no questions of security existed because of the long service and loyalty of the parties involved.

It was stressed, however, that those in position of authority have the necessity to set proper example for other employees.

It was concluded that without the long-term professional relationship of the two involved, this 8310200172 831013 DR ADOCK 0500027

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, M r. Ri char d W. Starostecki Page 2 deficiency would not likely have developed.

Full compliance is considered to have been achieved af ter the parties lef t the protected area and completed their examination of the incident.

Further, the administrative procedures relating to our access' program are being re-examined with the expectation that certain impractical, unnecessary and costly procedure requirements, as was present in this specific case, can be elimi nated.

This examination has already yielded a change in our yearly requalification program for senior management personnel, which will minimize the likelihood of a recurrence.

In conclusion, we consider this incident to have been corrected immediately, that recurrence is not likely, and that full compliance was achieved when the parties left the protected area.

We view this matter as closed.

Very truly yours,-

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