ML20080R456
| ML20080R456 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/22/1984 |
| From: | Hukill H GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 5211-84-2044, IEB-79-01, IEB-79-1, NUDOCS 8402280295 | |
| Download: ML20080R456 (3) | |
Text
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GPU Nuclear Corporation NggIgf Post Office Box 480 Route 441 South Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057-0191 717 944 7621 TELEX 84 2386 Writer's Direct Dial Number:
February 22, 1984 5211-84-2044 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn:
J. F. Stolz, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #4 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 200555
Dear Sir:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 9TMIOl)
Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment (Supp. 1)
As discussed in a phone conversation of February 17, 1984 by J. Van Vliet (NRC) and L. W. Harding (G3UN) part of the discussion of Item 60 on E/P Converters was inadvertently omitted. Because qualification of this E/P converter can only be shown by analysis in a steam environnent, it will be replaced by March, 1985 in order to satisfy 10CFR50.49.
A justification for continued operation and revised page 3 of Attachment II of our February 10, 1984 (5211-84-2038) submittal is attached.
Sincerely, H. D. Hukill V:) - TMI-l cc:
J. Van Vliet R. J. Conte 8402280295 840222 jj PDR ADOCK 05000 pp P
t' l GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of the General Public Utilities Corporation
- a-l
Justification for Continued Operation I.
Introductiion Bailey E/P Converters for the EFW control valves are required for the proper operation of the Brag,wicy Feedwater Systen. No testing basis is available
' to justify their operation as NRC requires. We agree that testing should be performed to substatiate operability. h refore, the E/P converters will be replaced with mits that have been tested.
DLscuesian h EFW Systan serves to provide heat renoval from the primary during accidents when the main feedwater systen is not available.
In the event of.an HELB in the Intermediate Building failure of E/P Converter mder a steam environment could render the control valves inoperable.
In this miikely event of an HELB in the Intermediate Building the proposed method for alternate cooling of the RCS would be feed and bleed using the makeup ptmps and reactor cool m t safety valves.
Conclusion
'Iberefore, based on the Feed and Bleed cooling method which enploys safety grade mvironmentally qualified equipment, we conclude that 'IME-1 can operate safely mtil such time as the Bailey E/P Converters are replaced.
- d. Qualificaton of lead splices is contr lled within tne corrective
.maintenanca program by GPUN procedure ' 420-Y-15.
EFP-2 was analyzed in Westinghouse Report dated 1/81 for motor insulation life analysis which envelope the thermal lag peak for the Intermediate Bldg. of 3260F.
Similarity for the above listed motors is established by Westinghouse report WCAP 8754, Rev.1, Section 2.
D.
Victoreen Radiation Monitors 1.
These radiation monitors (RM-A2, 5 & 6) are indicators of LOCA and are located outside contairenent (subject to a mild environment),
They are not required for a main steam line or feedwater line break.
These SCEW sheets will be deleted.
E.
Static-0 Rino Presure Switch 1.
TER Item 57 [FW Iso. Press Switch (600-607)]
These switches will be replaced prior to June 1984 by a qualified pressure switch. No justification for centinued operation is required since the plant wil not go critical prior to restart and therefore no nuclear heat will be generated.
F.
Eailey E/P Converters 1.
TER Item 60 [MSV-4][EFV-30]
The limiting design basis event for these components is a steamline break in the Intermediate Building with loss of offsite power (condenser unavailable).
For this event if MSV-4's are not available due to E/P converter failure pressure control and heat removal are accomplished via the Main Steam Safety Valves when EFW is e
available.
Therefore, the E/P converters for the MSV-4's need not be environmentally qualified.
i-Since testing information for the E/P converters for the EFV-30's is not available, they will be replaced with qualified converters by March, 1985.
l G.
NAMCO Limit Switches 1.
TER Item 66 & 67 [MSV-6; MSV-13]
Under LOCA and MSLB sufficient flow is provided to the OTSG's by a single motor driven EFW pump.
(See GRUN letter dated 3/22/83).
The steam driven EFW pump is only required for station blackout which does not produce a harsh environment. Failure of the limit switch (MSV-6)
I with MSV-6 open may result in initially cverfeeding the OTSG's wnich could be reduced immediately (manually) based on qualified EFW flow and OTSG level instrumentation.
Therefore the EFW system will func-tion and the operator will not be misled.
Failure of the limit switch (MSV-13) results in the inability to nonitor valve position and nay l
result in lifting reliefs but