ML20080P732
| ML20080P732 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/21/1984 |
| From: | Blake E METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8402230096 | |
| Download: ML20080P732 (90) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE'THE COMMISSION In the Matter of
)
)
METROPOLITAN' EDISON COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-289 SP
)
(Restart-Management'
-(Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
Phase)
. Station, Unit No. 1)
)
LICENSEE'S COMMENTS ON THE LIST OF INTEGRITY ISSUES In a January 20,- 1984 Memorandum,' Samuel J. Chilk, the Secretary to.the-Commission, provided to the parties to the
~TMI-l restart proceeding a proposed List of Integrity Issues
_ prepared by'the NRC's Office of General Counsel and Office of k'
Policy Evaluation at the' request of Commissioner Asselstine, l.
The' parties were invited to submit comments on three aspects of
._this List:
(1) whether the List is accurate.and complete; (2)
.whether the listed issues are resolved or unresolved; and (3)
L which unresolved issues must be resolved prior to-a restart de-L
' cision.- Memorandum at'1.
-Licansee herein submits its Comments on'the List of. Integrity Issues.
Appended to these Comments is i '
l' 8402230096 840221 PDR'ADOCK 05000289 i; '
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a Status' Report which indicates Licensee's understanding of the 2.
current status of each of the items included in the List of In-E =~
tegrity Issues.
At the, outset, Licensee. concurs with several opinions of individual-Commissioners that are set forth in the January 20 i
Memorandum.
Licensee agrees with Commissioners Asselstine and.
I Gilinsky that the List of Integrity Issues should have included any issues referred to.the office of Investigation (OI) for.
further investigation which may have a bearing on Licensee's integrity.
By definition, a List of Integrity Issues should not have excluded such matters.- Licensee has no reason to be-p lieve~that. disclosure of issues under investigation would prej-udice.suc'h investigations or otherwise be counterproductive.
- Clearly,'however,. nondisclosure of any such issues limits the
. ability of the parties to effectively address the questions raised in the January 20 Memorandum.
Licensee also-agrees with Chairman Palladino that the par-ties and'the Commission itself would have been much better j
x served had the proposed List of Integrity Issues included the
. Commission's-understanding of the status of the issues listed.
Had the Commission provided this information, the parties would not needLto'do so in their. comments but, more importantly, could have focused on any disagreements they have with the pro-
. posed status report, and the significance of such disagree-ments.- In this' regard, as with.the decision to delete from the Listlissues under. investigation, disclosure of'such information ;
n
1 would have enhanced the Commission's ability to make a restart decision.
-The Commission first asks the parties to comment an the accuracy and completeness of the List of Integrity Issues.
As the Commission itself acknowledges, the proposed List of Integ-rity Issues is intended to be no more than "a compilation of issues.
which at face value appear to have some possible connection with management integrity."
Memorandum at 1-2.
Moreover, as the Commission further acknowledges, "[m]any of the items, as raised in the proceeding, did not specifically concern integrity."
Id. at 2.
Notwithstanding these stated caveats about the derivation of the List, Licensee believes that the proposed List is misleading.
If the standard to be employed by the Commission in designating an issue as an "in-tegrity issue" is that the subject "may conceivably bear on in-tegrity," Memorandum at 2, one can, with little imagination, designate literally every aspect of Licensee's capability to manage a power plant an " integrity issue."
In fact, Licensee fully expects that the cumulative comments of the intervenors on the List of Integrity Issues will accomplish this effect with each'intervenor attaching the restart issues of interest to it to the " integrity" bandwagon.
There is no basis for l
transforming every management issue, such as the substantive adequacy of Licensee's training program (List Item I.B), as well as design and other issues (see, e.g.,
List Item III.J),
into an inquiry of what the issue " conceivably" implies about !
a 4-
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Licensee!stintegrity.
It'is inappropriate to consider as an integrity! issue every question of judgment on technical or man-
- agement matters, particularly if reasonable minds could differ on the. judgment: applied.
It is'also inappropriate for the Com-
. mission;to dignify by inclusion on such a list, integrity" itemstfor..which ther?
Is been no shred of evidence put for-
. ward, but' represent merely bald assertions.
In fact, to con-Latruct and publish a' list of issues employing these bases is patently unfair.
-Some of the issues included in the proposed List legiti-
-mately can be termed'~" integrity" issues. - However, the vast ma-
'jority of the. issues :cn1 the proposed List.of Integrity Issues t
have absolutely.no. factual relationship to the issue of Licens-ree's integrity, - other; than mere assertion.
In the absence of a
. substantial basis for linking each of these issues with Licens-fee's integrity, that issue ought not be treated by the Commis-7
^
sion as an integrity. issue.
The'second question identified in the' January 20 Memuran-fdum concerns the current status of the items included in the proposed List of Integrity Issues.. Specifically, the Commis-sion.has asked whether the items'are " resolved" or
"- unre solved.' "_ - In one sense, with'the possible exception of
-Lemergency planning where~the Commission has completed its re-p qview, therelare no items. finally resolved by the Commission in 1the Restart Proceeding.
In another sense, almost all items
'have-'been resolved'-- by_-Licensing Board consideration and
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.c determination, Appeal Board consideration and determination, or other means such as NRC inspection or investigation.
As previ-ously indicated, attached to our Comments is Licensee's synop-sis'of the status of the proposed List items.
Our synopsis re-flects that all but two items, which concern leak rate test practices at TMI-1 and TMI-2 (III.A and III.B), are resolved.
" Resolved" in Licensee's view means that there exists a suffi-ciently developed factual understanding of the issue that it can be decided now by the Commission for purposes of restart, whether or not it has previously been decided by someone else (i.e.,
the Licensing Board, OI, NRC Staff, etc.), and regard-less of whether still further inquiries are ongoing (i.e., by Licensee investigations, Appeal Board review, or OI investiga-tions).
This definition squares with the Commission's an-nounced approach to decide restart while the appellate review was proceeding, and with the_ reality that there is unlikely to be any point.in time when no allegations or questions exist which may be worthy of further inquiry, for example through ad-ditional investigations.
It also squares with the Commission's legal obligations in this case.
Most of the issues on the proposed list were fully ad-dressed and resolved by the Licensing Board on the basis of ex-tensive record evidence adduced during the restart proceeding.
A few of the listed issues were addressed and sufficiently re-solved, for purposes of deciding the question of restart, in documents, statements and pleadings provided to the Commission, t m
s-
.e.g.,
III.H (Quinn allegations) and III.I (unattended radiation
. worker exams).
Some of the items were unsuccessfully raised by the intervenors before the Appeal Board in motions to reopen the record, e.g.,
Item III.H.
The Commission should consider all of these resolutions fully adequate in the absence of a substantive basis for challenging them, i.e.,
an issue which would justify reopening the record.
Cf. Pacific Gas Electric go. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-598, 11'N.R.C. 876, 879 (1980) (tripartite test for re-opening the record).
It is a questionable procedure indeed, and certainly unfair, for the Commission to continually recon-
' sider issues that have been decided after lengthy review by the agency.
This is particularly troublesome to Licensee because the repeat'ed resurrection of an issue in and of itself tends to bestow on the issue a currency and a legitimacy which the facts belie.
Finally, as to the two issues Licensee considers unresolved in the proposed List, the Commission asks whether they need to be resolved prior to a restart decision.
One of these issuas, leak rate practices at TMI-1 (III.B), can proper-ly be tied to the Commission's immediate effectiveness decision and should be resolved prior to restart.
With respect to the other issue,'the HartmaIn allegations (III.A), Licenaee has made management, staffing and other changes at TMI-1 to assure no significant impact on safety of TMI-1 operations regardless of the outcome of the-investigation of Hartman issues.
These i
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changesJought to' provide-the Commission with the reasonable as-
'surance it needs.to: permit restart,. assuming the Commission has no information from the Office.of Investigations of which Li-
,censee is unaware'that suggests the current GPU Nuclear Corpo-
-ration and,-particularly, the TMI-1 organization lacks integri-ty.
-7n summary, in Licensee's view, there is'(or will be, shortly,-in the case of TMI-1 leak rate practices) sufficient information before the Commission on every issue to give it the requisite reasonable assurance it requires that TMI-l can be operated safely.
It was the lack of this reasonable assurance that formed the basis for the Commission's July 2,'1979 immedi-
'ately effective shutdown order and subsequent August 9, 1979 order,--CLI-79-8,' convening the restart hearing.
As Licensee (and the Staff) has stated repeatedly to the-Commission, most recently in its October. 27,.1983 Response to Commission Order of October 7, 1983,'the Commission's clear legal obligation is to lift its immediately effective suspension Order when the Tfacts'which gave rise to'the Order no-lohger exist.
The Com-L l
mission has before it three favorable partial initial decisions p
- from the Licensing. Board. -Continuing the extraordinary remedy
'of;immediate license suspension-imposed over four and a half L
-years.ago on the. basis of unsupported allegations about Licens-ee's integrity is unreasonable.and has no legitimate basis.
~
4
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~In conclusion, because of its unreasonable scope, the pro-posed Listlof Integrity 1 Issues is not a useful device for I:
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a assessing the status of integrity issues for purposes of deciding the question of restart.
Licensee does believe, how-ever, that it is high time that the Commission decided the question of restart.
Notwithstanding the identified problems with the proposed List of Integrity Issues, and whether the listed items are " integrity" issues or not, a review of that List ~ confirms the ability of the Commission to make a restart decision on every issue, excepting TMI-1 leak rate testing practices.
On that issue, the Commission would be better served by obtaining additional information from its Office of Investigations which Licensee believes will support its view that this item does not pose a bar to restart.
Respectfully submitted, L 4. A A,A.
George F.
Trowbridge, P.C.
Ernest L. Blake, Jr.,
P.C.
Deborah B.
Bauser SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 (202) 822-1000 Counsel for Licensee i
Dated:
February 21, 1984
. n_
a 6
UNIEED STATES OF AMERICA
-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the Matter of
)
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON-COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-289 SP
)
(Restart-Management (Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
Phase)
Station, Unit No. 1)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Licensee's comments on the List of Integrity Issues" and " Status Report on List of Integrity Issues" were served this 21st day of February, 1984, by deposit in the U.S. mail, first class, postage prepaid, upon'the persons on the attached Service List.
M x hab.
Ernest L.
Blake, Jr. P.C.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Commission In the Matter of
)
)
~ METROPOLITAN EDISCN COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-289
)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
Station, Unit No. 1)
)
SERVICE LIST Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Administrative Judge U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission John H. Buck Washington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board Victor Gilinsky, Connaissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Was'hington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Administrative Judge Thomas M.
Roberts, Connaissioner Christine N. Kohl U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Washington,_D.C.- 20555 Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission James K. Asselstine', Comunissioner Washington, D.C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comunission Washington, D.C.
20555 Administrative Judge Ivan W.
Smith, Chairman Frederick Bernthal, Commissioner Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connaission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(
Washington, D.C.
'20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Gary J. Edles, Chairman Sheldon J. Wolfe
. Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comunission.
Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 b
Administrative Judge Mr. Henry D. Mukill Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.
Vice President Atcaic Safety & Licensing Board GPU Nuclear Corporation U.S. Nuclear Angulatory Commission P.O. Box 480 Washington, D.C.
20555 Middletown, PA 17057 Docketing and Service section (3)
Mr. and Mrs. Noman Aamodt office of the Secretary R.D.
5 U.S. Nuclear Angulatory Constission Coatesville, PA 19320 Washington, D.C.
20555 Ms. Imuise Bradford Atomic Safety & Licensing Board TMI AM RT Panel 1011 Green Street U.S. Nuclear Dagulatory Commission Barrisburg, PA 17102 Washington, D.C.
20555 Joanne Doroshow, Esquire Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal The Christic Instiitute Board Panel 1324 North Capitol Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cosutission Washington, D.C.
20002 Washington, D.C.
20555 Ms. Gail Phelps Jack R. Goldberg, Esq. (4)
ANGER /TMI PIRC office of the Executive Legal 1037 Maclay Street Director Harrisburg, PA 17103 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq.
Harmon & Weiss Douglas R. Blazey, Esq.
1725 Eye Street, N.W.,
Suite 306 Chief Counsel Washington, D.C.
20006 Department of Environmental Resources Michael F. McBride, Esq.
514 Executive House LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae P.O. Box 2357 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W Iarrisburg, PA 17120 Suite 1100 Washington, D.C.
20036 John A. Imvin, Esq.
Assistant Counsel Michael W. Maupin, Esq.
l Pennsylvania Public Utility Hunton & Williams Commission 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 3265 P.O. Box 1535 j
Marrisburg, PA 17120 Richmond, VA 23212 i
David E. Cole, Esq.
Smith & Smith, P.C.
2931 Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Y
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- 4 '
e-Status Report on List of Integrity Issu?s I.
Items Raised In Original Management Hearing A.
Whether Licensee Withheld Information During the Ac-cident (the "Information Flow" Issue).
- 1.
Was'information wilfully withheld?
RESPONSE I.A.1.-
Resolved.
The information flow issue has been addressed in numerous forums and by numerous review groups.
Reports by the principal
. investigators of the accident all support the Licensing Board's conclusion that it "could identify no evidence in any of the ir.vestigations that any such possible actions (i.e., withhold-ing of~1nformation] by individuals employed by Licensee was part of a-management decision to do so, e.g.,
a conspiracy or_ company approach."
Management Partial Initial Decision (Management PID) at 1 478, LBP-81-32, 14 N.R.C. 381, 544 (Aug.
27, 1981).
Licensee has never claimed, however, that communi-cations were adequate during the accident.- To the contrary, as Licensee has-previously stated, "There has never been any ques-
. tion in our mind.but what there was inadequacy of communica-tions."
Transcript of Presentation on TMI-1 Restart, Oct. 14, 1981, at 74 (Dieckamp).
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This issue has been addressed in:
Management P.ID at 11,469-503 (14 N.R.C.
at 540'-56')'.
Report.of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island (1979), at 18, 175-76.
NRC Special Inquiry Group (SIG) Report (1980), Vol. I at 159-60; Vol. II, Pt. 3 at 898-902; SIG Memorandum to Chairman Ahearne,. March 4, 1980, at 1-42, 63-74.
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation,
" Nuclear Accident and Recovery at Three Mile Island," (1980) at 13-15.
NUREG-0600, " Investigation Into The March 28, 1979 Three Mile Island Accident by Of-fice of Inspection and Enforcement,"
(August 1979) SS 3.3.2, 3.3.3 and 3.4.
NUREG-0760, " Investigation Into Information Flow During the Accident at Three Mile Is-t land" (Jan. 1981).
Report of Majority Staff of the House Com-
.mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
" Reporting of Information Concerning the Accident at Three Mile Island," (March 1981).
. 1
-.----.m.
5 s
Transcript of Oral Argument on Immediate
-Effectiveness (Oct. 14, 1981),-at 73-81, 86-89,: 91-9'4, 117-121.
Transe.-ipt of Public Meeting (Dec. 21, 1981), " Discussion of Information Flow Dur-
..ing TMI Accident," passim.
e Licensee Comments on Commissioner Gilinsky's Tentative Conclusion (Aug. 4, 1983), at 4-19.
I.
Items Raised In Original Management Hearing A.
Whether Licensee Withheld Information During the Ac-
..cident'(the "Information Flow" Issue).,
2.
'Were any current GPU~ Nuclear personnel involved in any wilfull withholding?
RESPONSE I.A.2.
Resolved.
As noted by the Licensing Board, the two persons on whom the adequacy of information flow on the day of the accident has
. focused were Gary P. Miller and John Herbein.
Management PID at 1 479 (14 N.R.C. at 545).
By letter dated March 11, 1982, Licensee informed the Appeal Board and the parties that Mr.
Herbein no longer worked for GPU Nuclear.
In its August 20, 1982 Immediate Effectiveness Comments before the Commission, at 7, Licensee notified the Commission and the parties that effec-tive October 1, 1982, Mr. Miller was being transferred out of GPU's nuclear activities.
[
l-l l -.
I.
Items Raised In Original Management Hearing
~A.
Whether Licensee Withheld Information During the Ac-
.s.cident_ ( the ".Information. Flow.'.' Issue ).
3.
Did licensee's respon'se to-the accident indicate a, lack of forthrightness inconsistent with its responsibilities to the NRC,- the Commonwealth, and public health and safety?
RESPONSE I.A.3.
Resolved.
See Response I.A.1, supra.
i
-5
I.
Items Raised In Original Management Hearing A.
Whether Licensec Withheld Information During the Ac-cident,(the."Information. Flow" Issue).
4; Are steps taken by licensee-subsequent to the accident sufficient to ensure a better informa-tion flow in the future?
RESPONSE I.A.4.
Resolved.
In the emergency planning PID, the Licensing Board re-
~ viewed the provisions in Licensee's Emergency Plan and Emergen-cy Plan Implementing Procedures for notifying the NRC and local governments of emergency situations, as well as the nature and timing of information transmitted.
Emergency Planning PID at 11 1503-21, LBP-81-59, 14 N.R.C.
1211, 1514-20 (Dec. 14, 1981)
(See, especially, 1 1515, discussion of " Emergency Status Re-port" checklist).
While not'specifically comparing current provisions to the acknowledged deficiencies which' occurred in 1979, the Board found that the current plans and procedures are adequate for the timely and complete transmittal of information to the affected government agencies.
Id.1/
The Appeal Board also passed favorably upon the issue of "Information Transmit-tal."
See ALAB-697, 16 N.R.C.
1265, 1269-72 (1982).
The Com-t mission considered, but did not take review of this decision.
See Memorandum to the Board and Parties, dated February 3, 1983, from Samuel J.'Chilk, Secretary of the Commission.
1/
Licensee presented supplemental oral direct testimony spe-cifically responding to the recommendations in NUREG-0760 relating to information flow.
See Tr. 13,776 '/9 (Gi at:gi ).
i i
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Licensee also notes that the addition'of an STA on shift and the-increased shift manning levels greatly enhance the ability of the Licerisee to relay information about' an emergency condition.
See Management PId at 11 556-83 (14 N.R.C.
at 571-82).
This issue is also addressed in:
Transcript of Oral Argument on Immediate Effec-tiveness-(Oct. 14, 1981), at 42-48.
Testimony of Robert C.
Arnold before Licensing Board on February 2, 1981.
See Arnold, ff. Tr. 11,434, at 24-25.
" Lessons Learned Workshop," NAD-83-01, report sub-mitted by Licensee to the Commission on Jan. 19, 1984, at 3-13, 3-14.
4 -.
I.
Items Raised In Original Management Hearing B.
Is Licensee Committed to Establishing an Adequate
.. Training.. Program?
1.
Does th'e del'ay in obtaining a TMI-1 replica training simulator reflect adversely on manage-ment's attitude toward training?
RESPONSE I.B.1.
Resolved.
The.need, prior to restart, for an exact replica simulator was argued by intervenor Aamodt and rejected by the Licensing Board.
See Management PID at 11 252-58 (14 N.R.C. at 468-70).
In reaching this conclusion, the Board viewed favorably Licen-see's simulator' training program, as well as the commitment to install an exact replica simulator in 1985, and a basic princi-ples trainer.and a CRT part-task simulator in the interim.
Id.
at 1 258.
Had the Board viewed Licensee's actions as substan-Ltively insufficient or as an indication of a poor attitude to-
' wards training, it would not have endorsed Licensee's current simulator training program or its future simulator training commitments.
See also Licensee counsel's letters to Appeal Board and parties of October 6, 1982 and November 3, 1983 enclosing annual status reports on e: tact replica simulator.
s h._
I.
Items Raised In Original Management Hearing B.
Is Licensee Committed to Establishing an Adequate Training Program?
2.
Does the amount of time that TMI-1 operators will spend annually in simulator training re-flect adversely on management's attitude toward training?
RESPONSE I.B.2.
Resolved.
As with the previous issue, the amount of annual simulator training was litigated under Aamodt Contention 2.
The Licens-in*1 Board found that Licensee's present simulator training was adequate and in accord with the industry standard.
Management PIJ at 11 256-57 (14 N.R.C.
at 469-70); see also Tr. 12,265 (Newton) (amount of simulator training is also a function of the availability of the B&W simulator).
In Licensee's view, its simulator training program reflects positively on Li,cen-see's attitude toward training.
l l
-9 9
I.
Items Raised In Original Management Hearing B.
Is Licensee Committed to Establishing an Adequate Training. Program?
.3.
Do'es management's failure to establish a training program that is equivalent to a college curriculum reflect adversely on management's at-titude towards training?
RESPONSE I.B.3.
Resolved.
The Aamodts alleged that the TMI-1 training program was deficient in that it did not measure up to college level stan-dards in faculty, facilities or curriculum.
The Licensing Board disagreed, stating that it did not believe the training ~
program should be equivalent to a college curriculum.
- Rather, appropriately, it is "a vocational training program designed to equip its participants with knowledge sufficient for them to understand and safely operate TMI-1."
Management PID at 1 262 (14 N.R.C. at 472).
The nuclear industry's standards are fully consistent with this view.
See also Management PID at 11 163-207, 225-41, 263 (14 N.R.C.
at 441-55, 459-65, 472-73)
(discussion of operator training program). i l
}
t I.-
Items Raised in Original Management Haaring
.B.-
Is Licensee Committed-to Establishing an Adequate Training Program?
4.
Does failure to require ~ operators to attain a 100% test score on the NRC's operating license exam reflect adversely on management's attitude toward training?
RESPONSE I.B.4.
Resolved.
It is'the Staff, not' Licensee, who dictates the required minimum passing score on NRC license exams; therefore, this criterion cannot possibly reflect adversely upon Licerisee's management integrity.
In any event, the Licensing Board con-sidered and found reasonable the Staff's explanation of why a 100% test score is not necessary, Management PID at 1 264 (14 N.R.C.
at 473-74); moreover, such a standard makes little sense.
Licensee agrees with the reasoning provided by the Staff as to why a 100% test score on the NRC exam is not rea-sonable.
See Licensee's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclu-sions of Law on Management-Issues, May-15, 1981, at 148-49.
7
I.
Items' Raised In Original Management Hearing B.
Is Licensee Committed to Establishing an Adequate Training Program?--
5.
Does licensee maintain an adequate awareness of operator attitude, foster morale and ensure an appreciation of the significance of operator ac-tions?
RESPONSE I.B.S.
Resolved.
During the' initial management proceeding, this subject was reviewed by the Licensing Board in its consideration of Aamodt Contention 2 and was found not to be a problem.
Management PID at f 267 (14 N.R.C. at 475).
Subsequently, during the reopened hearing, it was determined that at times morale among the oper-
'ators was low, in large part because of the reexamination re-quirement imposed on the TMI-1 licensed operators.
Reopened PID at 1 2239, LBP-82-56, 16 N.R.C. 281, 336 (July 27, 1982).
Licensee has undertaken a number of actions to improve morale and to ensure that the significance of operator actions is fully appreciated.
For example, after the discovery of cheating at TMI, Henry Hukill, Vice President of TMI-1, met in-dividually and collectively with the licensed operators.
Id.
at 11 2237-40 (16 N.R.C. at 336-37).
Mr. Hukill also testified that he would. talk to an operator before he certified that the
, individual.is recommended for the NRC exam.
In addition, he would talk to the individual after he received a license "to ensure in my own mind that the attitude of this individual is.
~'
'what I consider appropriate to'be manning the shift as a li-censed operator."
Reopened Proceeding, Tr.-24,053-54 (Hukill).
~51censee's procedures now require this pre-certification meet-ing as well as.an annual meeting between the Vice President, TMI-1,'and each licensed _ operator.
Since the close'of the record, Licensee's training program T
has been subjected to reviews by the NRC Staff, Licensee, out-
~ side ~ consultants, and independent review groups.
- See, e.g.,
Data-Design Laboratories report (transmitted by Licensee's counsel cn1 Oct. 5, 1982); 1983 draft and final INPO evaluations l(transmitted on' June-20 and September 7, 1983); Report of the Lessons Learned Workshop,_NAD-83-01 (transmitted on Jan. 19,
-1984)'.
Licensee also contracted with the psychological con-sulting firm of Rohrer, Hibler & Replogle, Inc. (RHR) for the express 1 purpose of working with the operators to identify to Lmanagement operator' attitudes and concerns.
The RHR Report and
' Licensee's responses to RHR's recommendations have been provid-(L ' ~
ed to the Appeal Board'and parties.
See Licensee counsel f
transmittal letters of May 16,_ 1983 and December 28, 1983.
The Licensee effortsEreferred to above, each of which was voluntar-
- ilyLself-initiated by Licensee, collectively reflect manage-L ment's responsible approach to its training program, generally, l
[
and specifically to assessing licensed operator attitude, mor-i
- ale and appreciation of,the significance of operator actions.
-See also NUREG-0680, Supp. No. 4, "TMI-1 Restart, An Evaluation r
J
'of: the RHR, BETA and Draft INPO Reports as They Affect Restart Issues at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 Docket 50-289," Oct. 1983, at 1-2, 3-16 ("the operators themselves have a positive attitude toward safety")-.
. F
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Items Raised In_ Original Management Hearing B.
.Is Licensee Committed to Establishing an Adequate
. Training Program?
6.
.Was th'a 1978 training program in violation of NRC requirements,.and, if so, was management aware of this (Book investigation)?
RESPONSE I.B.6.
Resolved.
A June 1977 memorandum from Theodore Book, then TMI-1 con-trol room operator, to James P. O'Hanlon, then TMI-1.Superin-
'tendent, as well as notes made by Mr. O'Hanlon, suggested a possibility that training records had been falsified, in viola-tion of NRC requirements.
As documented in Board Notification-83-17A, dated June ~27, 1983, the Office of Investigations con-ducted an inquiry of the matter and concluded no investigation
.was necessary.
See Board Notification 83-71A, dated June 27, 1983.
l r
l t
I.
Items Raised In Original Management Hearing B.
Is Licensee Committed to Establishing an Adequate Training Program?
7.
Has licensee taken adequate corrective oteps with regard to any identified deficiencies?
RESPONSE I.B.7.
Resolved.
The substance of Licensee's training program was litigated during the initial management phase of the hearing.
See generally Management PID at 11 163-276 (14 N.R.C. at 441-79).
The Board received evidence on all facets of Licensee's training programs, including the additional programs required 7
as a result of' training deficiencies icentified as " lessons learned" items from the TMI-2 accident.
In sum, the Board made the following findings:
Licensee has in place at TMI-i a comprehensive and acceptable training program.
Licensee has substantially augmented its training department.
Li-censee has complied with the Commission's August 9, 1979 and March 6, 1980 Orders insofar as they relate to training."
Id.,
1 276 (14 N.R.C. at 478-79).
As a result of the discovery of cheating on the NRC exams, Licensee determined that serious deficiencies existed with re-spect to the administration of the TMI training program.
See Reopened PID at 11 2321-47 (16 N.R.C. at 355-65).
These deficiencies were acknowledged by Licensee.
Action was taken to prevent recurrence of these deficiencies.
See id. at 1 2330 L
16-m n
-w-
,,-n
=
(16 N.R.C. at 359).
On the basis of Licensee's acknowledgment of deficiencies, and with the added assurance of several li-cense conditions relating to the training program, the Board concluded that Licensee's training program was adequate.
Id.,
11 2061-68, 2396-400, 2410, 2419-21 (16 N.R.C.
at 296-97, 378-79, 381, 383-84).
"The cheating episodes are not a reflec-tion on upper-level management's competence, good intentions and efforts.
We remain satisfied that Licensee was unstinting in the. resources it devoted to the training pro-gram.". Iji., 1 2400 (14 N.R.C.
at 379).
Since the close of the record, Licensee's training program also has been reviewed a number of times.
These reviews depict an adequate training program.
See I.B.5, supra.
The status of Licensee's compliance with the Board-mandated training condi-tions was reported to the~ Appeal Board and parties in a letter from-Staff counsel dated January 20, 1984. _. _
, ~. _
\\
I.
Items Raised In Original Management Hearing C.
.Did Management Pursue Activities Prior to the Acci-
,' dent That Endangered Public Health and Safety?
1.
Did GPU defer safety-related maintenance and re-pair beyond.the point established by its own procedures?
RESPONSE I.C.1.
Resolved.
This issue is part one of a'five-part contention asserted by intervenor TMIA.
The issue was fully considered by the Li-censing-Board during the initial management proceeding.
On the basis of~the substantial evidence presented, see Management PID at 11 277-300 (14 N.R.C.
at 479-88), the Board found "no evi-dance that Licensee has improperly deferred safety-related maintenance-and repair either beyond a point established by its own procedures or so as to endanger the health and safety of
~
the public."
Id. at 1 300 (14 N.R.C.
at 488).
i I
i-I' 1.
I
S I.
Items Raised In Original Management Hearing C.
Did Management Pursue Activities Prior to the Acci-dent That Endangered Public Health.and Safety?
2.
.Did GPU drastically cut its maintenance budget?
RESPONSE I.C.2.
Resolved.
This issue, part two of TMIA's maintenance contention, was addressea and favorably resolved by the Board.
Management PID, 11 320-24 (14 N.R.C. at 493-94).
Specifically, the Board reached the following conclusions:
[A]lthough a budget cut was proposed in early 1979 which would have affected TMI-1 maintenance activities, there is no evidence to support the contention that this cut was drastic, or would.have been drastic if the TMI-2 accident had not oc-curred.
Nor is there any reason to believe that the method used by Licensee to identi-fy priorities for reduction did not satis-factorily identify and exclude items which could not be eliminated from the 1979 bud-get without affecting safe operation of the plant..Nor is there any basis to conclude that the propo' sed budget cuts demonstrate an underlying management philosophy of compromising safety in favor of profits as
. alleged by TMIA.
i Iji., 1 324 (14 N.R.C. at 494).
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'I.'
. Items Raised In Original Management Hearing C.
Did Management Pursue Activities Prior to the Acci-dont That Endangered.Public Health and Safety?
3.
Did GPU fail to keep accurate and complete main-tenance records?
RESPONSE-I.C.3.-
Resolved.
- This is the third part of TMIA's five-part maintenance contention.
In addition, the Board raised its own question re-garding recordkeeping practices.
See Management PID at 1 302
.(14 N.R.C. at 488).
After a thorough investigation into the
. matter,.the Board found that maintenance records were auditable 1
and that none of-the identified recordkeeping problems " dis-1 closed safety problems."
Id., 1 314 (14 N.R.C. at 491).
More-over, in
'3e Board's view, the extensive changes in Licensee's safety-related record keeping program and its QA/QC programs related to maintenance has resulted and should continue to re-sult in substantial' improvements." '
Id.,
1 348, (14 N.R.C.
at
-501).
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I.
Items Raised In Original Management Hearing
[
F C.
Did Management Puroue Activities Prior to the Acci-dont That Endangered Public Health and Safety?
?
4.
Did GPU have an inadequate _and understaffed QA/QC program related to maintenance?
l RESPONSE I.C.4.
Resolved.
l This issue is part four of TMIA's maintenance contention.
The Board considered whether Licensee has an adequate and ap-propriately staffed QA/QC program relating to maintenance, not-withstanding the fact that TMIA was in default on this part of its contenti'on. -See Management PID, 1 326 (14 N.R.C. at 495).
The Board found that any inferences that might be drawn about the, adequacy of QA/QC staffing in the past have been mooted by the enlargement of the QA/QC organization and program.
Id. at 1 330 (14 N.R.C.
et 496); see also id. at 11 107-15 (14 N.R.C.
at 424-28).(discussion of Licensee's QA organization).
On this issue,- the Board stated, The Board is satisfied that Licensee's QA program and organization will be in a posi-tion.to reasonably assure, or bring to the attention of top management in those cases where it cannot assure, that the organiza-tions which make up the plant and corporate structure are performing properly the func-tions for which they were intended.
If the QA functions are properly performed, the
. Licensee's QA program and organization as restructured would promote the safe op-eration of TMI-1.
Id., 1 115 (14 N.R.C. at 428).
o Subsequent reviews of Licensee's QA/QC program reflect fa-verably on Licensee's performance of QA/QC at TMI-1.
See In-spection Report 83-10 (May 17, 1983) transmitted on May 18, 1983; INPO Report (May, 1983), transmitted on June 20, 1983, at 6-7; SALP Report (Nov., 1982), transmitted on Feb. 7, 1983, at 25 ("In summary, QA management attention and involvement were
'eggressive and oriented toward nuclear safety.
Qual 1ty Assur-ance staffing was ample and~ effectively used to produce a high level of performance with respect to safety.")
e
I u.
l
., r.
I.
Items Raised In Original Management Hearing C.
Did Management Pursue Activities Prior to the Acci-dent That Endangered Public Health and Safety?
5.
Did licensee require' extensive use of overtime in performing safety-related maintenance?
If so, did this lead to poor quality safety-related maintenance?
RESPONSE I.C.S.
Resolved.
This is the fifth issue identified in'the five-part TMIA contention on past maintenance practices.
The Board considered the, evidentiary presentation of TMIA and Licensee, and called a Board witness on this issue.
Management PID, 11 331-48 (14 N.R.C. at 496-50).
The Board concluded that " Licensee has not disregarded the importance of safety-related maintenance in safoly operating s nuclear plant
. by extensively using overtime."
Id., 1 348 (14 N.R.C. at 501).
Moreover, Licensee is committed to be bound by the Staff guidelines on overtime.
Id. at 11 342-43 (14 N.R.C. at 498-500).
1
I.
Items Raised In Original Management Hearing
)
C.
Did Management Pursue Activities Prior to the Acci-i dent.That Endangered Public Health and Safety?
6.
Has licensee taken adequate corrective steps re-garding any identified deficiencies?
RESPO'NSE I.C.6.
Resolved.
Licensee believes this seemingly broad question is limited to pre-accident maintenance, as indicated on page three of the January 20, 1984 Chilk Memorandum.
In this regard, the Licens-ing Board' rejected TMIA Contention 5 and found " substantial im-provements" in Licensee's maintenance practices.
Management
'PID, 1 348 (14 N.R.C. at 501).
Since the close of the record, NRC has conducted a number of inspections of maintenance at TMI-1 which confirm the effec-tiveness of Licensee's post-accident maintenance program.
See Insp'ections=81-08 (June 25, 1981), 81-11-(Aug. 1, 1981), 81-22 (Nov. 12, 1981), 81-27 (Dec.
4, 1981), 82-10 (Sept.
1, 1982),
83-10 (May 17,-1983), 83-15.(July 29, 1983), and 83-22 (Sept.
27, 1983).- In addition, the 1982 SALP. Report reviewed Licen-see's maintenance program and concluded " licensee management attention and involvement in this area were evident.
Resources we're ample and reasonably effective such that satisfactory per-formance with respect'to safety was achieved."
SALP Report,
.Nov. 1, 1982, at 16; see also NUREG-0680, Supp. No. 4 (Oct.
1983) at 5-4 ("we have not found, during our inspections, any
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I.-
Items Raised In Original Management Hearing D..
Possible Influence of Financial Considerations on Technical Decisions
'1.
Are there indications that financial considera-tions had.an undue influence on TMI operations prior to the accident?
2.
If there was any impropar influence, has licens-ee taken adequate steps to assure that this will not recur?
RESPONSE I.D.1-2.
Resolved.
Issue (6) in the Commission's March 6, 1980 Order, CLI-80-5, asked'whether the financial / technical relationship is such.as to prevent financial ~ considerations from having an im-r
- proper impact on the safe operation of TMI-1.
11 N.R.C. 408.
r This was an uncontested issue during the management proceeding.
Management PID at 1 388 (14 N.R.C. at 514).
However, the Li-
. censing Board received' evidence from Licensee and from the
. Staff.
Id., 11 389-401 (14 N.R.C. at 514-18).. After consid-ering this evidence, the Board found that "GPU's management, even in-times of financial. stress-has recognized the unique demands of its nuclear obligations, and has shifted available-resources to meet.those obligations."
Id., 1 400 (14 N.R.C.
at 518).
It concluded that the relationship between Licensee's corporate finance and-technical departments is such as to pre--
vent financial considerations from having an improper impact
-upon technical decisions.
Id., 1 401-(14 N.R.C. at 518).
The
.recent changes in tlun GPU Nuclear Board of Directors, with 2
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three outside directors, should provide an even greater assur-ance that operations will not be unduly influenced by financial considerations.
See' Statement o'f GPU at 12, appended to tran-script of-Nov.-28, _1983 Commission Meeting.
i
o I.
Items Raised In Original Management Hearing E.
Whether the Mailgram Sent by Mr. Dieckamp to Con-gressman Udall on May 9, 1979 Regarding the "Prassure Spike" Was a Material False Statement 1.
Did Dieckamp know there had been a pressure spike at 1:50 p.m. on March 28, 1979 at the time he wrote to Udall?2/
RESPONSE I.E.1.
Resolved.
This issue centers on the accuracy of Mr. Dieckamp's mailgram to Representative Udall on May 9, 1979, in which it was stated:
There is no evidence that anyone in-terpreted the " pressure spike" and the spray initiation in terms of reactor core damage at the time of the spiko nor that anyone withheld any information.
Staff Ex. 5, NUREG.0760, Attachment 117.
This issue has been addressed'specifically on at least four separate occasions be-fore the NRC:
(1) The Rogovin Special Inquiry Group, see March 4,
1980 Supplemental Report, " Evidence re Questions Posed to Chairman Ahearne by Congressman Udall in Letters vf January 21 and February 4, 1980," at 81; (2) NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement, see Staff Ex. 5, NUREG-0760; (3) the Licensing 2/
There is no question that on May 9, 1979, Mr. Dieckamp hmew there has been a pressure spike at 1:50 p.m. on March 28, 1979.
This is clear from the mailgram itself.
See Management PID, 1 498 (14 N.R.C. at 555).
The question that has been raised and reraised concerns.Mr. Dieckamp's awareness, as of May 9, 1979, of anyone's " interpretation" or appreciation of the spike on the day it occurred.,
~
s.
. v.
Board record and.the Management PID, see' Management PID, $$
1498-503 -(14 N.R.C.
at 555-56); and (4) the Commission's own immediate' effectiveness' review, see Licensee's Comments on Im-mediate Effectiveness of. Partial Initial Decision (Sept. 11,
'1981) and Transcript of' Oral Argument on Immediate Effec-
^
tiveness: (Oct. 13, 1981), at 91-94.
The Licensing Board accepted I&E's conclusion that Mr.
Dieckamp believed the statement to be true when he made it in the mailgram. ' Management PID, 1 501 (14 N.R.C. at 556).
Subsequent to the mailgram, there were statements made to
~ investigators by two operators who were present in the TMI-2 control room-on the day of the accident concerning their aware-ness and appreciation of what is now commonly known as the hy-
~
drogen spike.
See Management PID, 1 499 (14 N.R.C. at 555).
!The earliest of the interviews of either of these two individu-als through which.their appreciation on March 28th of the hy-drogen spike came later to be recognized was conducted by NRC
.I&E investigators almost two. weeks after Mr. Dieckamp's
'mailgram; the Company did not receive a transcript of that in-terview until~ months later; and in the only' interview of either of these two: individuals which took place prior to Mr.
Dieckamp's May 9 mailgram-(conducted by GPU personnel on April
-25th), no appreciation of the pressure spike as of the day of the accident,:was reported.
After all their interviews, NRC investigators have. concluded, in fact, that " hydrogen was not 1
i I
i 4
l t
- believed to be:the cause of the pressure spike...[and] hydrogen'
- was not discussed on March 28, 1979." 'NUREG-0760, at 24.
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I.
Items Raised-In Original Management Hearing F.
Hartman Allegations 1.
Hartman allegations regarding possible falsifi-cation of leak rate data were raised in proceed-ing, but not addressed.
They will be discussed infra.
RESPONSE I.F.1.
See response to III.A, infra.
e i
l-ll-I
I II.
Issues Raised By The Cheating Incidents A.
. Adequacy of Management Response to Cheating 1.
'Did management wilfully constrain the NRC inves-tigation by' having management representatives sit through NRC interviews?
RESPONSE II.A.l.
Resolved.
This issue was fully litigated before the Licensing Board in the reopened proceeding.
In summary, permitting management representatives to be present during NRC interviews with Lican-see employees was standard NRC Staff practice.
For example, this practice was. allowed during the investigation that re-sulted in the issuance of NUREG 0600.
Thus, during the initial I&E. investigation of the two individuals who cheated on the NRC exams,.a management official was present during employee inter-views, at the employee's request.
The Staff subsequently changed its policy about management's presence, and Licensee accfded to the Staff's position.
The Staff concluded that com-pany presence'during the initial interviews was inhibiting; however, in its view, this presence did not affect the overall
. effectiveness-of the investigation.
Furthermore, the Staff does not believe Licensee was motivated by a desire to con-strain the investigation. The' Licensing Board agreed with these views.
See Reopened PID, 11 2229-34 (16 N.R.C.
at 334-35); see also " Licensee's Comments on Commissioner Gilinsky's Tentative
-Conclusion" (Aug. 4, 1983), at 30-32.
Noting with approval -
l Licensee's stated purpose of attending the interviews in order to gain first-hand knowledge of the scope of the problem, the Board stated:
Were it not for the possible inhibiting ef-fact, it would be management's duty to be present at interviews to learn both the
' scope' and the details of its problem.
To meet its responsibilities to the public, the NRC, its ratepayers, owners and employ-ees, management should have made every rea-sonable effort to stay on top of the NRC investigation.
Reopened PID, 1 2232 (16 N.R.C. at 335).
)
II.
Issues Raised By The Cheating Incidents A.
Adequacy of Management Response to Cheating 2.
Did management conduct a thorough investigation to determine who cheated?
RESPONSE II.A.2.
Resolved.
The Board concluded that " Licensee conducted an adequate investigation into the cheating incidents."
Reopened PID, 1 2271 (16 N.R.C. at 344).
Notwithstanding identified weak-nesses in the investigation, the fact is that "(a)fter intense scrutiny of the weekly examination papsrs and after thorough questioning under liberal cross-examination by intervenors and the Commonwealth, and after Judge Milhollin's own very careful inquiries, little was discovered in the way of concrete evi-dence of cheating beyond that disclosed by Licensee's own in-
.quiries."
Id; see also " Licensee's Comments on Commissioner Gilinsky's Tentative Conclusion" (Aug. 4, 1983), at 26-33, 35-36.
i i
I f
i !
s I1' Issues Raised By.The Cheating Incidents A.
Adequacy of Management Response to Cheating.
3.
Did management. impose appropriate sanctiona on
'those who cheated?
RESPONSE II.A.3.
Resolved.
The Board found that Licensee took appropriate personnel action as to 0, W, VV and Shipman.
Reopened PID, 1 2057 (16
- N.R.C. at 294).
As to G and H, the Board proposed sanctions, which were immediately instituted by Licensee.
Id., 1 2419(1)
(16 N.R.C.
at 383-84); see also Licensee's Immediate Effec-
-tivenes:s Comments ( Aug. ~20, 1982), at 4-6.
2. - -. -
II.
Issues Raised By The Cheating Incidents A.
Adequacy of Management Response to Cheating 4.
Has management taken appropriate steps to make it more difficult for one to cheat?
RESPONSE II.A.4.
Resolved.
The Board found appropriate the new procedures implemented by-Licensee to make cheating very difficult.
Further, it re-quired an additional safeguard against undetected cheating, namely, that Licensee institute a procedure for routine sam-pling and review of exam answers for evidence of cheating.
Re-opened PID, 11 2330-31 (16 N.R.C. at 359-60).
This procedure, imposed as a license condition, has been implemented by Licen-see and accepted as satisfactory after review by the Staff.
See letter from Staff counsel (Goldberg) to the Appeal Board and the parties,' Jan. 20, 1984. -
II.
Issues Raised By The Cheating Incidents A.
Adequacy of Management Response to Cheating 5.
Did management break the sequestration agreement and improperly coach GPU employees who testified in the reopened hearing?
RESPONSE II.A.S.
Resolved.
Licensee did not improperly coach GPU employees who testified in the reopened hearing.
The sequestration order in question provided that certain Licensee employee witnesses be excluded from the hearing room during the testimony of other 1
Licensee witnesses, and that these witnesses not discuss their testimony among themselves.
See Special Master's Report at 17, LBP-82-34B, 15 N.R.C.
918, 927 (April 28, 1982).
The al-legation-that Licensee broke the sequestration order was made by the Aamodts, based on their mis, understanding that the order applied to the testimony of other witnesses, in particular, a Sta'ff witness.
This was not the case.
See Special Master's
" Memorandum and Order Denying Motion to Stay the Hearing" (Feb.29, 1982).
l i L m
II.. Issues Raised By The Cheating Incidents B.
Managements' Knowledge of and/or Involvement in Cheating 1.
Did management encourage, condone or participate in the cheating?
-RESPONSE II.B.1.
Resolved.
The Licensing Board found "no evidence that Licensee's management encouraged or condoned cheating on the relevant NRC or company administered examinations."
Reopened FID, 1 2047 (16 N.R.C. at 292).
It also completely exonerated Mr. Ross, Manager of Plant Operations, who was accused of having partici-pated in cheating.
Id., 1 2225 (16 N.R.C. at 333).
4, _ -.
f II.
IssuesfRaised.By The Cheating Incidents B.
Managements Knowledge of and/or Involvement in i
Cheating 2.
Did Ross' attempt to keep the proctor away'from the examination room for a prolonged period of
. time to facilitate cheating?
RESPOt1SE II.B.2.
Resolved.
i The Licensing Board looked very closely at the allegations made~against Mr. Ross, the Manager of Plant Operations.
After a carefu1~ review of the record, including the adverse findings of.the Special-Master, the Board found "that the accusation i
4
.that Mr. Ross impeded proctoring was incredible and that the accusor's testimony on that issue was unreliably unbiguous."
i
- Reopened PID, 1 2046 (16 N.R.C. at 292).
- j. I l
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......... - -. =
II.
Issues Raised By The Cheating Incidents B.
Management's Knowledge of and/or Involvement in Cheating 3.
Did Ross unreasonably broaden the answer keys?
RESPONSE II.B.3.
Reso}ved.
The Licensing Board reached the following conclusion about this allegation:
There were two examination. questions giving rise to the charge that the respective an-swer keys were improperly broadened.
Our own analysis of the changes proposed by Mr.
Ross convinced us that, on one question, the change was correct and, on the other, the proposed change, although not literally correct, was not unconscionable and could not be attributed to bad faith.
Mr. Ross was the highest-level member of TMI-1 man-agement whose ethical conduct was ques-tioned, and we conclude that all of the charges against him were unfounded.
Reopened PID, 1 2046 (16 N.R.C. at 292).
l.-- --.
I
-4 1
II.
Issues Raised By The Cheating Incidents C.
Extent of Cheating 1.
Does the extent of cheating reflect adversely on management's integrity and ability to operate the plant consistent with public health and safety?
RESPONSE II.C.1.
Resolved.
After considering all of the evidence, the Licensing Board concluded, "The cheating episodes are not a reflection on upper-level management's competence, good intentions and ef-forts.
There is no evidence whatever that the large ma-jority of the TMI-1 operators lacked competence and integrity."
Reopened PID, 11 2400, 2417 (16 N.R.C.
at 379, 383).
In gener-al, the Board was convinced that Licensee is capable of cor-recting and intends to correct the problems revealed by the re-opened proceeding.
Id., 1 2411 (16 N.R.C. at 382).
See also
" Licensee Comments on Commissioner Gilinsky's Tentative Conclu-sion" (Aug. 4, 1983), at 34-36.
. a
.~
I I '.
Issues. Raised By The Cheating Incidents C.
Extent of Cheating 2.
Do TMI-1 operators have sufficient integrity to perform their duties?
RESPONSE II.C.2.
Resolved.
-The Licensing Board, on the basis of the record, found that "[t]here is no evidence whatever that the large majority
=of the TMI-1 operators lacked competence and integrity."
Re-opened PID, 1 2417 (16 N.R.C. at 383).
With respect to those TMI-1 operators whose integrity was specifically questioned, the Licensing Board determined that Licensee had taken appro-priate disciplinary action (e.g.,
Mr. Shipman) or the issue has been mooted by these individuals' subsequent departure or re-moval as licensed operators (e.g.,
Messrs.
O, W, G and H).
l,
n II. ' Issues. Raised By The Cheating Incidents C.
Extent of Cheating 3.
Does Husted have sufficient integrity to super-vise training of unlicensed individuals?
RESPONSE II.C.3.
Resolved.
The Licensing Board reviewed evidence.regarding Mr.
Husted's conduct during the April, 1980 NRC exams and his con-duct during the subsequent NRC investigations.
See generally, l
v Reopened PID, 1 2148-68 (16 N.R.C. at 315-20).
The Board found uno reliable evidence that Mr. Husted cheated.
The Board also
~
I
~
found-that Mr. Husted voluntarily came forward with information for the NRC investigators.
Nevertheless, Mr. Husted displayed an inappropriate lack of seriousness about the matters at issue. 1The Board ~therefore'strongly criticized Husted's atti-tude;_however,.no action'was taken against his license because tho' Board had-no evidence that his attitude was manifested in
- his performance as a teacher.
Id., 1 2168 (16 N.R.C.
at 319-20).
Licensee has conducted a number'of evaluations of Mr.
Husted's attitude and instructor performance. - See Licensee's Repl'y to Comments of Other Parties on Immediate Effectiveness,
- Sept.
1, 1982, at 41-42.
Moveover, instructor' evaluations now
'are an established practice in the TMI. Training Department.
'See January 20, 1984 letter from Staff counsel to the Appeal
' Board and.the parties.
In addition, Mr. Musted's qualifica-
'tions and delivery will be specifically assessed during the _
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post-restart audit of the TMI-1 training-program.
See Reopened
. PID, 1 2168 (16 N.R.C. at 320); letter dated June 10, 1983 from H.-Dieckamp to Chairman Palladino (attached letter from H.
Dieckamp to~the Honorable Richard Thornburgh).
G e
l.f-II.
Issues Raised By The Cheating Incidents D.
Training and Testing Program 1.
'Is licensee's administration of its operator training and testing program sufficient to pro-
{
vide confidence in the integrity of management?
RESPONSE II.D.1.
Resolved.
There was no dispute during the reopened proceeding that there were serious deficiencies in Licensee's past administra-tion of its training programs.
Licensee took actions in order to remedy those deficiencies.
The Board expressed its confi-dence in Licensee's ability to improve its training program, noting, "If we were not convinced that the Licensee is capable of. correcting.and intends to correct the problems revealed by this reopened proceeding. ~., we could not, as we do, con-clude this proceeding in favor of restart."
Reopened PID, 1 2412 (16 N.R.C. at 382).
The Board did-impose four license conditions directsd at Licensee's training program.
Id.,
1 2347 (16 N.R.C. at 364-65).
Licensee has implemented all of the conditions imposed by the Licensing Board with the excep-s tion of the audit requirement, which is a post-restart require-ment to which Licensee has committed and which is pending NRC approval.
See letter dated January 20, 1984 to the Appeal Board and parties-from J.R. Goldberg, Staff counsel.
Licensee also initiated on its own an audit of its training program in 1982.
This audit, conducted by Data-Design Laboratories (DDL), -
MM-
resulted in an Assessment Report which was provided to the Ap-peal Board and the parties on October 5, 1982.
The Report contains a detailed review and assessment of the TMI training-program,.as well as recommendations for future improvements.
Overall, however, DDL concluded that "GPU Nuclear has made sig-
.nificant progress in the past three years to expand the TMI training capability and to improve the quality of the TMI-1 training _ programs."
DDL Assessment Report, Sept. 1982, at 1-29.
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Issues Raised By The Cheating Incidents D.
Training and Testing Program 2.
Is licensee committed to improving the quality of its training program?
RESPONSE II.D.2.
Resolved.
Licensee's commitment to improve the quality of its train-
-ing program was covered in depth in the original management hearing.
See Management PID, 1 276 (14 N.R.C. at 478) (".
Licensee has in place at TMI-l a comprehensive and acceptable training program.
Since the accident, Licensee has substan.
tially augmented its training department
.")
As noted in response to II.D.1, supra, following the discovery of cheating, the Licensing Board was confident that Licensee could and would improve upon the admitted deficiencies associated with the ad-ministration of the training program.
With regard to the sub-stantive aspects of the training program, the Board stated:
We remain satisfied that Licensee was unstinting in the resources devoted to the training program.
It cannot be faulted in the selection of the advice it sought for its training program, the credentials of its training managers or on the general design of its training program.
The cheating episodes are not a reflection on upper-level manage-ment's competence, good intentions and ef-forts.
-Reopened PID, 1 2400 (16 N.R.C. at 379). ___..
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II.
Issues Raised By The Cheating Incidents E.
Licensee's System for Certifying Candidates 1.
Is licensee's system for certifying competency of operator candidates seeking to obtain or renew licenses sufficient?
RESPONSE II.E.1.
Resolved:
The Board found that proper implementation of the propcsed
. formal written certification procedure "should eliminate the possibility of certifying candidates for the NRC examination who-cheated on internal examinations on one or more occasions,"
'and "will enhance the credibility of Licensee's certification
~
process."
Reopened PID, 11 2350, 2351 (16 N.R.C.
at 366); see also discussion of certification procedure in Response I.B.5, supra; NRC Inspection Report 83-10 (May 17, 1983) at 13-1 to 13-2.
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2 II.
Issues Raised By The Cheating Incidents
-E.
Licensee's System-for Certifying Candidates
. y 2.
Did management improperly certify VV to the NRC
- in11979?.
3.
If VV was improperly certified, who was respon-
'sible for-making the certification d.ecision?
Was upper management involved?
RESPOdSE II.E.2, 3.
Resolved.
The Licensing Board concluded that Mr. Miller, with Mr.
'Herbein's knowledge _and' assent, falsely certified VV's training scores to the NRC in August, 1979 and recommended that tne
~
Staff perform a full investigation of the issue.
Reopened PID, 11 2305-15 (16 N.R.C..at 352-54).
The Board also noted that lthe VV matter was first brought to the Staff's attention by Mr.
' Arnold and'"found no evidence that there was any improper con-ducc mt an:s level higher than Mr. Herbein's level."~
Id.,
1 2320-(16 N.R.C.-at 355).
Messrs; VV; Herbein and Miller no longer.. work-for'GPU Nuclear.
Since the close of the record, I
the' Commission authorized the assessment of a $100,000.00 civil
~.
penalty against Licensee for the material false statements as-
.sociated with the VV certification. issue.
See CLI-83-20, 18 N.R.C. 1 (1983).
Licensee has requested a copy of the investi-E
- -gation1 report'on which'this fine was based before responding to the' proposed civil-penalty.
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Issue also addressed in:
Licensee's Comments on Immediate Effec-4 tiveness of Partial' Initial Decision (Re-cpened' Proceeding) Dated July 27, 1982 (Aug. 20, 1982), at 6-7.
Transcript. of November 9, 1982 Oral Argu-ment on Immediate Effectiveness at 26-33.
Licensee Comments on Commissioner Gilinsky's' Tentative Conclusion (Aug. 4, 1983), at 23-26.
.III.
I,tems Raised Since Close Of Hearing A.
Hartman Matter 1.
Was leak rate data at TMI-2 falsified?
2.
Who was involved in any falsification?
3.
Did management have knowledge of, encourage or condone falsification?
If so, who in management was involved?
4.
Why didn't licensee thoroughly investigate mat-ter?
- 5..
What impact does the criminal indictment have?
RESPONSE III.A.1-5.
Unresolved, but need not be resolved prior to restart.
The Hartman matter is the subject of a pending OI investi-gation.
It is also the subject of a recent criminal indictment of Metropolitan Edison.3/
During the pondency of the grand jury investigation into this issue, Licensee was limited in its ability to investigate the Hartman allegations because key in-dividuals had been advised by their counsel not to discuss the matter.
See Faegre & Benson Report, Vol.
1, p. 13 (Sept. 17, 1980).
Until NRC has resolved the matter, Licensee has taken ac-
-tions to assure dhat.any person who was licensed on Unit 2 prior to the accident, with the exception of the TMI-1 Manager of Operations, will not operate TMI-1, and that any former Met
-3/
No individuals were named in the Department of Justice in-dictment based on the Hartman allegations.
l
~
Ed exempt employees with pre-accident involvement at Units 1 or 2 will not be assigned to any TMI-1 assessment, analysis or audit ~ activities.
See letter dated June 10, 1983 from H.
Dieckamp to Chairman Palladino; letter dated November 28, 1983
'from P. R. Clark to H. R. Denton (Transmitted by Licensee Coun-sel's. December.1, 1983 " Notice to the Commission, Appeal Board, Licensing Board and Parties").
With respect to the TMI-1 Man-ager of Operations, Mr. Ross was specifically endorsed by the Licensing Board, after repeated appearances before it.
See Management PID'at 1 155 (14 N.R.C.
at 439-40); Reopened PID at 1 2225 (16 N.R.C. at 333).
As the Supervisor of Operations at TMI-1, his duties were virtually all on TMI-1; while Mr. Ross was cross-licensed on TMI-2 prior to the accident, his in-volvement:at TMI-2 was very limited and largely~ administrative in nature.
See Transcript of November 28,.1983 Public Commis-sion Meeting.at 25-26 (Clark, Ross).
As Licensee has stated previously, the pendency of the Hartman allegations, which concern leak rate test practices at TMI-2,. do not provide any justification for an immediately ef-fective shutdown of TMI-1.
See Licensee's Response to Commis-sion Order of October 7, 1983 (Oct. 27, 1983), at 5.
The Staff also has consistently held the position that the issues raised by'the Hartman allegations should not, by t'. aselves, prevent restart of TMI-1.
See Memorandum to the Commissioners from W.
J. Dircks, dated January 3, 1984, at 1; Memorandum to the Commissioners from W.
J. Dircks dated May 19, 1983, at 3. i
III~.
Items Raised Since Close Of Hearing B.
TMI-1 Leak Rate Issue 1.
Was leak ratt data at TMI-1 falsified?
4 2.
Who was involved in any falsification?
3.
Did management have knowledge of, encourage or condone falsification?
If so, who in management was involved?
RESPONSE III.B.1-3.
Unresolved.
Licensee has no objec-tion to this issue being taken into consideration by the Com-mission in its restart decision.
Licensee is privy to no evidence developed to date which suggests malfeasant leak rate test practices at TMI-1 prior to the TMI-2 accident.
Licensee is aware that Inspection Report 50-289/83-20, provided to the Commission and Appeal Board (but
.not to'the parties or Licensee) by Board Notification 83-138B, October 6, 1983, deals with this issue.
Further, Licensee un-derstands that OI may have provided preliminary data to the Commission on the issue during closed briefings.
Licensee be-lieves that the OI investigation is essentially finished.
As stated in our Response to the Commission's October 7, 1983 Order, Licensee does not believe the mere pendency of these al-legations should be a bar to restart; i.e.,
the existence of unsubstantiated allegations do not constitute a sufficient legal basis for continuing to sucpend the TMI-1 license.
This is particularly true given the extensive personnel changes at _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
6 TMI-1 from the time-period under investigation.
See June 10, 1983' letter from H. Dieckamp to Chairman Palladino and November
.28, 1983 letter from P.R. Clark to H. Denton.
F.owever, Licen-see recognizes that the issue has potential significance.
Li-censee therefore believes that the Commission can and, in its discretion, should obtain OI's findings on this issue before reaching.its decision on restart.
This issue is also addressed in:
~ Letter dated August 18, 1983 from J.R.
Thorpe, GPU Nuclear, to R.W. Starostecki,
-Region I, attached to Board Notification
'I 83-138C (Oct. 27, 1983).
" Report of Investigation into Irregu-larities Found by the NRC for TMI-1 Leakrate-Tests," Atth hn, *nt 6 to Licensee's Response to Commission Order of October 7, 1983 (Oct. 27, 1983).
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-III. Items Raised Since Close Of Hearing C.
Parks / King /Gischel Allegations on Technical Viola-tions-and.Harrassment and Intimidation 1.
-Did licensee follow procedural requirements relating to clean-up?
RESPONSE'III.C.1.
Resolved.
The allegations raised by Messrs. Parks, King and Gischel.
relading'to procedural violations at TM1-2.have been the sub-
. ject of an investigation-performed by OI and of two investiga-
-.tions performed for Licensee.
See OI Interim Report (H-83-002) dated September.1, 1983 (publicly released September 13, 1983);
- Licensee counsel's letter of June 28, 1983 to the Appeal Board
- and parties, transmitting a report by Messrs. Lowe and Griebe; LLicensee counsel's Notificatio,n to the Commission, et al.,
- dated November 11, 1983, transmitting GPUN comments on OI Re-port;oLicensee counsel's Notification to the Commission, et i
'al.,
dated November 23, 1983, transmittin'g Mr. Stier's report, "TMI-2. Report: Management and Safety Allegations."
While dis-I
- agreeing with the general. conclusions;of.the cover memo trans-mitting the interim OI. Report, Licensee has found that some ac-l tivities at TM1-2 were not-conducted in conformance with applicable administrative requirements.
Appropriate steps have been undertaken to remedy these deficiencies.
See November 11, t
1983.Not'ification and letter dated January 16, 1984 from P.R.
I'
- Clark, GPUNi to H.R. Denton, NRC, attached to Licensee i
I :
I counsel's letter of January 27, 1984 to the Appeal Board and parties.
s a
g D.
4 III.-Items Raised Since Close-Of. Hearing
- C.
Parks / King /Gischel Allegations on Technical Viola-
.tions and Harassment and Intimidation
'2.
Was management-intending to' cut corners to the detriment of safety?
RESPONSE III.C.2.
Resolved.
This issue has been the subject of.the investigations identified in response to III.C.1, supra.
Licensee believes
.the evidence, as reflected in the factual' findings of all of the investigation reports, clearly establishes that management did not cut corners to the detriment of safety.
See summary discussion in January 16,.1984 letter from P.
R. Clark to H. R.
~
Denton'and attachment thereto (forwarded to the Appeal Board
-and parties by counsel for Licensee on. January 27, 1984.)
Mr.
Stier, based on his investigation into allegations, concluded
'"the allegations imply that the management of TMI-2 was headed
~
in the direction of increased tolerance of unsafe practices.
In contrast, the evidence shows that the trend was'toward tighter administrative controls to assure that safety standards were met."
Stier Report, Vol.
1, p.
- 13..The Staff' review of
.the'OI investigation report determined that "there really was no safety significance" to the identified documentary errors.
'Public Commission Meating with Advisory Panel on TMI-2 Cleanup,
'Feb. 3, 1984, at 9; see also Feb. 3, 1984 TMI-2 Notice of Vio-lation (without a fine) for Severity Level IV procedural -.
5 violations " considered to be, at most, of minor safety signifi-Cance."
4 F
~ ~
-e III. Items Raised'Since'Close Of Hearing
.C.
' Parks / King /Gischel Allegations on Technical Viola-tionscand' Harassment-and. Intimidation 3..
Did management or others attempt to intimidate or harass individuals who questioned whether procedures were being followed?
If so, who in management was involved?
RESPONSE III.C.3.
Resolved.
The issue of harassment / intimidation of employees at TMI-2 was not discussed in OI's September 1, 1983 interim report; OI is presently investigating this issue.
However, -the matter. was investigated at Licensee's request by Mr. Stier, a former pros-ecutor, who reached the following conclusions:
The evidence gathered in the course of this investigation clearly demonstrates that the allegations, in their broadest sense, are unfounded.
That is, the claims that the man-
.agement'of TMI-2 is' unconcerned about the
. safety of the recovery. effort and retaliated against employees who attempted to call these deficiencies-to - management's attention are contradicted by the weight of the evidence.
The allegations that accused manage-ment of following a policy of ignoring prob-lems brought to its attention and of pun-
'ishing employees who raised the issues are untrue.
Stier-Report, Vol.
1, p. 13; see Licensee's Notifications to the Commission of November 11, 1983 and November 23, 1983; see
'also, P.
R._ Clerk letter of January 16, 1984.
Four individual employees at TMI-2, three of whom worked for Licensee, expressed concerns about harassment.
Three of these four com-plaints'have been settled by the employers and employees.
One. _. -
...., _ _. _. - _ -.. _, _. _ -. ~ _, _,- - _. -
~
complaint, that of Mr. King, remains pending on appeal before the Department of Labor after'an initial determination that Mr.
1.
King was properly discharged by Licensee for matters unrelated to safety concerns. _ See Attachment 5 to Licensee's Response to Commission Order of October 7, 1983.
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III. Items Raised Since Close.Of Hearing D.
Timely Reporting of Documents 1.
Did 'GPU provide the NRC on'a timely basis with copies of the RHR/ BETA Reports, Keaten Report and the Hartman investigation report (Faegre and Benson Report)?
RESPONSE III.D.1.
Resolved.
The issue raised here :is not whether. Licensee should have provided the BETA, RHR, Keaten or Faegre & Benson reports toLthe NRC earlier than it did but, rather, whether Licensee's provision of these materials to the NRC at the time the reports were provided (and not earlier) establishes a lack of integri-
- ty. - The commission has sufficient information available to it to-decide.this question.
It has the reports so as to judge their-significance, and is aware of the circumstances of their disclosures.
In Licensee's opinion, the answer clearly is that there is no evidence that Licensee deliberately failed to dis-close any of these-documents so as to suggest a lack of integ-rity.
In any event, Licensee believes that the immateriality el the reports supports the timing of Licensee's disclosure of these documents, i.e.,
Licensee had no affirmative obligation to 'isclose them earlier.
d The Keaten Report was provided to the Commission and parties in November, 1981 in response to Commissioner Gil'insky's request.
Its submission has not given rise to a single comment-by any party in the more than two intervening _
years'that it contains significant new safety information that would impact on the Licensing Board's decision on restart.
This is not surprising since the subjects addressed in the Keaten Report were also addressed in far greater detail in a host of reports on the TMI-2 accident, including-those by Esmeny, Rogovin and the Hart Committee, which were available to
-the Commission and parties.
'See Licensee's Response to Commis-sion Order-of October 7, 1983 (Oct. 27, 1983), at 7-8, and At-tachments-7 and 8.
Licensee's decision not to disclose this report earlier was based on the absence of information in it otherwise. unavailable to the NRC and the public, an apparent lack of interest in such. reports in the proceeding, and the fact that the report was no more than an internal company "les-sons learned". report, a self-evaluation not intended to be pub-licly disseminated.
Certainly, the preparation'of such reports is. appropriate as.long as this practice is not used to cover up
.information to which the Commission is entitled.
See Tran-script of Commission Meeting, at 71-77 (Kuhns, Dieckamp).
The Faegre & Benson Report on the Hartman allegations voluntarily was provided to the Commisuion and parties in May, 1983.
Licensee has addressed the significance of the Hartman allegations to a restart decision in Item III.A.1-5, supra.
Licensee also has explained the basis for the timing of its submission to the Commission.
Licensee did not consider that fthis. report contained "new information.
. that the company
/
had.some obligation to provide."
Commission Briefing on Staff Review of GPU v. B&W, April 6, 1982, at 22-26 (Arnold).
The
' Staff also has provided its views on the significance of this report:
The Report and depositions (included in the Report] do not expand the scope of the al-legations, resolution of the allegations, or add substantially to the information of which the NRC was aware.
The Staff was also aware in 1980 that GPU initiated an investigation of the Hartman allegat s,
but did not seek a copy of the inves tion report.
Memorandum to Commission from William J. Dircks on Report-
. ability of GPU Investigation Report and Depositions Re Hartman allegations, June 29, 1983 (forwarded to parties by NRC counsel on July 12, 1983), at 5.
The RHR and BETA Reports also were volunteered to
'NRC.
During the course of an I&E inspection at TMI-1 in late April, 1983, Henry Hukill, Vice President of TMI-1, was dis-cussing with the NRC~ inspectors Licensee's recent management l
l activities.- At.that time,-Mr. Hukill called the Staff's atten-l tion to the BETA and RHR Reports, which had been received by GPUN management in February (BETA) and March (RHR) of 1983.
I Mr.1Hukill referred to these reports as evidence of responsive,
(:
interested management.
He provided copies'of the reports for the: inspectors' review.
Subsequently, in May, 1983, copies of these reports were furnished to the Appeal Board and the l
! i I
L
parties.
See Licensee's Response to Commission Order of
,0ctober 7, 1983 (Oct. 27,'1983), at Attachment 10.
Licensee has detailed its views on the immateriality and~reportability of the RHR and BETA Reports.
See id.
The LStaff,.too, has provided both its views on the significance of those reports and on their reportability.
Compare'NUREG-0680, Supplement 4 (forwarded by BN 83-173, Nov. 4, 1983) ("the BETA and RHR~ Reports (1) do not contain information of significant safety or regulatory interest and (2) do not raise any issues which would be a bar to the restart of TMI-1"); with Memorandum
- ~
-dated June 14, 1983 from G.H. Cunningham to H.R. Denton for-
' warded to Commission by Memorandum of William J. Dircks, June 22, 1983) (OELD' concluded the Licensee failed to meet its duty to make Board Notifications and its disclosure obligations under,Section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act).
In summary, there is no evidence of bad faith or lack of integrity in the timing of Licensee's disclosure of the RHR, BETA,-Keaten or-Faegre-& Benson reports.
In addition to the materials:already referenced, these reports also are addressed in1the following documents:
Transcript of Oral Argument on Immediate Effec-tiveness-(Oct. 14, 1981), at 89-90 ALAB-738 (Aug. 31, 1983), at 39-40.
. NUREG-1020, 5 10.2 (Sept. 1983).
NRC Staff's Reply to the Parties' Responses to the Commission's October 7, 1983 Order (Nov. 14, 1983), at n.3..
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6 -
III. Items Raised Since Close Of Hearing E.
Keaten Report Issue 1.
Did' management modify t'he draft Keaten Report
- for the purpose of projecting a more positive view of management?
2.
Do any such changes indicate an unwillingness on the part of management to accept responsibility and take corrective actions?
RESPONSE III.E.1-2.
Resolved.
Although the final OI in-vestigation of this matter is not yet complete, there is suffi-cient information available for the Commission to consider this matter resolved for restart purposes.
The Keaten Report issue has been raised as possibly im-pacting restart by Intervenor TM1A in-its " Interim Comments on
-B&W Trial Record" and by the Staff in NUREG-1020, $10.2.
Li-censee has responded to these two documents.
See Licensee's Response to Commission Order of October 7, 1983 (Oct. 27, 1983), Attachments 7 and 8.
As we point out in that response, the evidence does not demonstrate an improper management role
.in the development of the Keaten Report.
See id.,
at 8-9.
See also Transcript of Public Meeting on TM1-1 Restart (Nov. 28, 1983), at 71-77.
The Keaten task force effort, including the evolution of the Keaten Report and the substance of the Report itself, reflect a willingness on the part of management to carefully and thoroughly examine and criticize itself, and to take necessary corrective actions as a result of this in-depth -.
I'b ' '
.s;
'self-examination.
See Licensee's Response to Commission Order
- of October 7, 1983-(Oct. 27, 1983), Attachments 7 and 8.
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III. Items Raised Since Close Of Hearing F.
GPU v. B&W Trial Material Review
' 1.
'Does' Frederick's testimony reflect on'the suffi-ciency of his integrity to serve as supervisor of' operator training?
RESPONSE III.F.1.
Resolved.
Mr. Frederick, Supervisor of Licensed Operator Training (see Licensee counsel's letter dated May 6, 1983 to the Appeal Board and parties), testified and was subjected to cross-examination during the B&W trial regarding the timing of High Pressure Injection (HPI) actuations on the day of the TM1-2 accident.
A memorandum analyzing the trial evidence re-garding the HPI actuation, including a lengthy review of Frederick's testimony, was forwarded to the Appeal Board and parties via Licensee counsel's letter of September 29, 1983 (Enclosure 3).
As explained there, Mr. Frederick had not pre-
.viously testified that there had been a 5:41 a.m. HPI actuation and therefore his trial testimony is not inconsistent with his previous statements.
See id. at 9-10, 14-16.
This issue is also addressed in NUREG-1020, $10.7.
i Licensee has not been notified whether this issue is the subject of an ongoing OI investigation.
But see, Inside N.R.C.
(Vol.
6, No. 3), Feb. 6, 1984, at 5-6.
However, even if that
-ie the case, Licensee believes that the Commission has suffi-cient1information before it on this issue to permit a restart
' determination. _ _ _ _ _.. _.
III. Items Raised Since Close Of Hearing-F.
GPU v. B&W Trial Material Review
' ' 2 '.
Does Zewes change'in' testimony indicate suffi-cient integrity to serve as Radwaste Operations Manager?
RESPONSE III.F.2.
Resolved.
Mr. Zewe is no longer involved in GPU's nuclear activi-tios.
See Licensee counsel's letter to the Appeal Board and
. parties dated January 27, 1984.
In any event, Mr. Zewe's tes-timony is analyzed in-depth in a memorandum on HPI actuation prot.ded by Licensee's counsel to H.R. Denton, dated August 23, 1983 and provided by Licensee to the Appeal Board and parties on September 29, 1983. _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - - _ _
.n.
4
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III.7 Items Raised Since Close Of Hearing.
F.
GPU v. B&W Trial Material Review 3..
Does:GPU'.s. decision prior to the accident to re-duce operator training and thus possibly violate
. training program commitments reflect adversely on management integrity?
RESPONSE III.F.3.
Resolved.
Neither the substance nor the basis of this issue is clear.
However, because c2 the extensive changes in the TMI-1 training program and organization that have occurred since the accident, as well'as in.the TMI-1 management organization, Li-censee does not believe that this pre-accident inquiry is nec-
~
- escary to a restart decision.
For the Commission's benefit, however, Licensee notes the following discussions of the old training program at TMI'in materials provided to the Commission in the-course of this proceeding:
NUREG-lO20,.551.2.and 10.3;
"- GPU Response to TMIA Interim Comments on B&W Trial
' Record" (Sept. 21, 1963), at 43-61 (Enclosure 1 to Licensee counsel's letter of September 29, 1983 to the Appeal Board and parties);
" Response of GPU Nuclear Corporation to the Public Version of the NRC Staff's Report on GPU v. B&W Law-suit Review and Its Effect on TM1-1 (NUREG-1020)", at 11-15 (attached to letter dated October 14, 1983 from H. Dieckamp, GPU, to Commission and parties).
e
,e
-III'.
Items Raised Since.Close Of Hearing
'F.
GPU'v. B&W Trial Material Review 4.
Did'Iicensee recognize that prior to the acci-dent there were serious deficiencies in plant hardware and its training and maintenance pro-gram, yet' fail to take appropriate corrective actions?
RESPONSE III.F.4.
Resolved.
Again, as with issue III.F.3 above, Licensee is uncertain of the basis for an~ issue that management recognized " serious
. deficiencies" in plant hardware and its training and mainte-nance program, yet failed to take appropriate corrective ac-tion.
Assuming that Item III.F.4 refers to the issues raised by the. Staff in $10.4 of NUREG-1020 (GPU Preaccident Knowledge of Defective Plant Conditions), Licensee relies on its response t'o NUREG-1020, at-pages 15 through 19,-and 26 through 30, and on the Staff's discussion inL510.4.2 of NUREG-1020.
See also
' Management.PID, 11387-401'(14_N.R.C. at 514-18).
Licensee would~again. remind the Commission that the Licensing Board has passed favorably on the current' programs for the subjects ad-dressed in this issue.
See generally, Management PID, LBP-81-32, 14 N.R.C. 381 (1981); Design PID, LBP-81-59, 14 N.R.C.
1211-(1981); Reopened PID, LEP-82-56, 16 N.R.C. 281 (1982).
71-
__m_
\\
,s IIi. Items Raised Since Close-Of Hearing F.
GPU v. B&W Trial Material Review 5.
Did Arnold's. testimony before 'he Licensing t
Board mislead the Board by implying that the utility was improving its maintenance and training programs?
RESPONSE III.F.5.
Resolved.
Mr. Arnold could not have misled the Licensing Board by implying that GPU Nuclear has improved its maintenance and training programs since that is indeed the case.
Moreover, in his testimony before.the Board, while Mr. Arnold generally de-scribed the overall corporate and TMI site orge.nization changes which have occurred since the time of the accident, he did not testify in detail about the maintenance or training programs.
(Other witnesses did address the issues of maintenance and training in great detail.)
As-the Licensing Board pointed out, no evidence was presented which contradicted Mr. Arnold's (and
'others). testimony regarding the improvements resulting from the organizational changes.
Management PID, 167 (14 N.R.C.
at l
L 412); see generally, id. at 1147-67 (14 N.R.C. 403-12).
To the extent that this item relies on the improper inferences drawn
-by intervenor TMIA from Mr. Arnold's B&W trial testimony, Li-l censee refers the Commission to our response to TMIA's com-ments.
See "GPU Response to 'TMIA Interim Comments on B&W Trial Record'," at 61-72; see also ALAB-738, 18 N.R.C.
- 177, 195-96 (Aug. 31, 1983). s w-,-
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III. Items Raised Since Close Of Hearing F.
GPU v. B&W Trial Material Review 6.
Does licensee's decihion not to bypass the condensate polisher reflect on management integ-rity?
RESPONSE II.F.6.
Resolved.
This item was raised in the Staff's discussion of Finan-cial/ Technical Interface issues in NUREG-1020 (510.9).
Licen-see has addressed this issue in both its response to TMIA's in-terim comments,.at 24-28, and in its response to NUREG-1020, at 28-30.
See enclosures (1) and (3) to transmittal letter from Licensee counsel to the Appeal Board and parties dated September 29, 1983.
As pointed out therein, the decision not to bypass'the condensate polisher was based on sound engineer-ing judgment.
To Licensee's knowledge, there are other plants with similar condensate polisher systems that do not have such a bypass -- even today.
1 -
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III~. Items Raised Since Close Of Hearing
.G..
Boring Brothers Allegations I.
'Were welders with' inadequate. qualifications working at TMI?
2.
If'so, what was management knowledge and role?
RESPONSE'III.G.1-2.~ Resolved.
This allegation, _ raised during a June 29, 1983 U.S.
Senate Committee-on Labor and Human Resources oversight hearing, was the subject of a special inspection conducted by the Staff at Three Mile Island on July 26-29 and August 2-6, 1983.
See Com-bined Special Inspection Report Nos. 50-289/83-24 and 50-320-03-13 attached to letter dated September 2, 1983 from J.M. Taylor, NRC, to H.D. Hukill and B.K. Kanga.
In sum, no violations were noted and the allegations were determined to be unfounded.
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f.
III. Items Raised Since Close Of Hearing H.
Unattended Radiation Worker Examinations and Answer Keys 1.
Whether discovery of unattended-examinations and answer keys raised questions about licensee's training commitments?
RESPONSE III.H.1.
Resolved.
The Aamodts cited this incident as the basis for a Motion to Reopen filed with the Licensing Board in 1982.
The Appeal Board assumed jurisdiction over the motion (ALAB-699, 16 N.R.C.
1324 (1982)) and denied it.
Specifically, the Appeal Board found that this information was "neither significant nor likely to have affected the Licensing Board's decision."
ALAB-738, 18 N.R.C.
177, 193 (Aug. 31, 1983).
Rather, the events associated with this incident constitute " evidence that the system is working."
Id. at 194; see also N.R.C.
Inspection Report 50-289/82-07 (July 1, 1982), at 17. I
,W III. Items Raised Since Close Of Hearing I.
Psychological Testing Allegations (Quinn Allegations) 1.
bidmanagement.improperlyassistapotentialGPU employse to pass psychological. tests?
RESPONSE III.I.1.
Resolved.
The Board and parties received an initial notification of this issue by Board Notification 83-08 (February 1, 1983).
Both' Licensee and OI have conducted extensive investigations of this allegation.
The results of Licensee's investigation of this' issue were made available by letter from Licensee counsel dated September 16, 1983.
The results of OI's investigation have recently been made public, see Board Notification 84-002,
~
January 4, 1984, and reveal that OI did not find any improprieties in the pre-employment psychological testing pro-gram.~ ' OI Report of Investigation No. 1-83-003 (Feb. 25, 1983);
No. 1-83-003 Supplemental (Oct. 12, 1983). -
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.we,a III. Items Raised Since Close Of Hearing J.
Technical Issues 1.
Does'GPU's schedule of implementation of long-term items adversely reflect on management's character?
RESPONSE III.J.1..
Resolved.
Licensee, in its August 4, 1983 " Comments on Commissioner Gilinsky's Tentative Conclusion," at 36-64 and App. A, responded'in detail to what it considered to be the unreason-able charge.that it had improperly delayed implementation of NRC's post-accident requirements.
In summary, Licensee has pursued implementation of long-term action items in good faith.
Upon returv to service, TMI-1 will be comparable with the modi-fication status of other similar operating plants.
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III.
Items Raised Since Close Of Hearing J.
Technical Issues 2.
Do the apparent procedural violations in latest Region.I inspection reports indicate inadequate management attention?
RESPONSE III.J.2. Resolved.
Region I Inspection Reports 50-799/83-25 and 83-26 (atta-ched to Board Notification 83-177, Nov. 4, 1983) detail a num-ber of procedural. violations of NRC requirements.
In an en-closed cover memorandum of November 2, 1983, Mr. Starostocki, Director - Division of Project and Resident Programs, Region I,
~
stated, "[Bjased on our experience with facilities completing
~
extended outages, it is not unusual to encounter such problems as they resume: operations."
Subsequently, in order to better asses's the significance of these violations, the Staff held an enforcement conference with Licensee'on November 8, 1983.
By copy'of letter dated December 23, 1963, from R.W.
Starostecki
.to H.D. Hukill, the parties to the restart proceeding were ad-vised of the matters discussed during the conference.
In sum, Region I concluded that, while enforcement action was being considered, the violations "are considered to be isolated cases and not indicative of a programmatic problem" and that
"[c]orrective actions taken by the licensee appear to be ade-quate for the circumstances and their effectiveness will be T
followed by Region I."
Attachment at 4.
See also Transcript.
4 I
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l
- e,a of Public Commission meeting on TM1-1 Restart (Dec. 5, 1983),
at 145-46 (Murley).
O e.
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