ML20080G875
| ML20080G875 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1983 |
| From: | PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20080G869 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8309200378 | |
| Download: ML20080G875 (463) | |
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1 f CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT , T AND PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS 9 4 I 10 CFR 50 APPENDIX R lit.h f i .
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d W PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT AND PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 AND 3 Table of Contents Volumes 1 and 2 e SECTION PAGE EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
xi-xiii SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Objective 1-1 1.2 Background 1-1 1.3 Scope 1-2 1.4 Criteria 1-3 1.5 Report Overview 1-4 1.6 Results of Analysis 1-5 1.7 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 1-6 TABLES 1-1 Appendix R Summary Compliance Table SECTION 2 IDENTIFICATION OF FIRE AREAS 2.1 Objectives 2-1 2.2 Identification of Fire Areas 2-1 TABLES 2-1 Fire Area / Fire Zone Identification Table 2-2 Existing Protection for Fire Areas i
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Table of Contents (continued) FIGURES
- 2-1 Units 2&3 Plant Arrangement 91.5 ft Elevation 2-2 Units'2&3 Plant Arrangement )
116 ft Elevation 2-3 Units 2&3 Plant Arrangement 135 ft Elevation ] 2-4 Units 2&3 Plant Arrangement 165 ft Elevation 1 2-5 Units 2&3 Plant Arrangement j 195 ft Elevation 2-6 Units 2&3 Plant Arrangement 234 ft Elevation 2-7 Units 2&3 Recombiner Building, ] Diesel Building and Emergency Cooling Towers 1 2-8 Units 2&3 Intake Structure J l SECTION 3_ SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 3.1 Objectives 3-1 3.2 Definitions 3-2 3.2.1 Safe Shutdown 3-2 3.2.2 Hot Shutdown 3-3 1 3.2.3 Cold shutdown 3-4 1 3.2.4 ' Alternative Shutdown Capability 3-4 3.2.5 Associated Circuits of Concern 3-5 3.2.6 Fire Area 3-5 3.2.7 Fire Barrier 3-6 j 3.2.8 Safe Shutdown Equipment (and Circuits) 3-7 ! 3.2.9 Spurious Operation 3-7 3.3 Fire Damage 3-8 3.3.1 Assumptions 3-8 13.3.2~ Basis for Fire Damage Assumptions 3-9 3.4 General Analytical Assumptions 3-10 3.4.1 Fire Scenario 3-11 3.4.2 Transfer From Normal Safe Shutdown to Alternative Shutdown 3-12 3.4.3 .Section III.G.2 Separation Analysis 3-13 3.4.4 Spurious Operation. 3-14 t ii
- Figures are in Volume 2
d ~ r gable of Contents (continued) 3.4.5 Alternative Shutdown 3.4.6 3-14 Manpower Capability 3-15 3.4.7 Off-site Power 3-16 l 3.4.8 Repairs 3.5 3-17 Safe Shutdown Systems I 3.5.1 Safe Shutdown Performance Goals 3-18 3.5.2 3-18 Safe Shutdown Functions 3-20 3.5.2.1 Reactivity Control Function 3-20 1 3.5.2.2 Reactor Coolant Make-up Control Function 3-21 3.5.2.3 3.5.2.4 Reactor Coolant Pressure Control Function 3-24 Residual Heat Removal Function 3-26 1 3.5.2.5 Process Monitoring Function 3-28 3.5.2.6 Support Functions 3.5.3 3-28 Safe Shutdown Systems 3-31 3.5.3.1 High Pressure Coolant Injection System 3.5.3.2 3-32 3.5.3.3 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System 3-37 3.5.3.4 Nuclear System Pressure Relief System 3-40 Residual Heat Removal System 3-42 3.5.3.5 Core Spray System 3-46 3.5.3.6 Process Monitoring Instrumentation 3-47 3.5.3.7 Emergency Service Water System 3.5.3.8 3-49 I 3.5.3.9 High Pressure Service Water System 3-51 AC Emergency Power System 3-52 3.5.3.10 DC Emergency Power System 3.6 3-55 Analysis of Safe Shutdown Systems 3-57 l 3.6.1 Obj ectives 3-57 3.6.2 Identification of Safe Shutdown System Components 3-57 l 3.6.3 Identification and Cables of Safe Shutdown Circuits ;' 3-59 3.6.4 Appendix R Section III.G Evaluation l Diagrams and Separation Analysis 1 3 6.5 3-60 2 3.6.5.1 Associated Circuits of Concern 3-64 Introduction 3-64 3.6.5.2 Identification of Associated Circuits by 1 Common Power Supply and Common Enclosures 3-64 3.6.5.3 Identification of Associated Circuits by I Spurious Operation 3-66 3.6.6 Suppression Effects j 3.6.7 3-68 Identification of Areas of Conformance/ - Nonconformance with Appendix R
- Section III.G 3-69 '
iii l L l f __ __ _ - _--_ --- - f
9 J Table of Contents (continued) TABLES
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3-1 Appendix R Essential Safe Shutdown Components 3-2 Appendix R High-Low Pressure Interfaces 1 FIGURES
- 1 3-la Safe Shutdown Functions RCS Makeup Control 3-lb Safe Shutdown Functions RCS Pressure Control 3-Ic Safe Shutdown Functions Reactor Heat Removal 1 3-1d Safe Shutdown Functions RCS Reactivity Control J 3-le Safe Shutdown Functions Support Systems 3-1f Safe Shutdown Functions Support Systems 3-2 Safe Shutdown Functions Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis ]
3-3 Evaluation Diagram Example M0-23-016 3-4-la Unit 2 - HPCI Safe Shutdown Flow Path 3-4-lb Unit 2 - HPCI Safe Shutdown Flow Path 3-4-2a Unit 2 - RCIC Safe Shutdown Flow Path 3-4-2b Unit 2 - RCIC Safe Shutdown Flow Path 1 3-4-3 Unit 2 - SRVs and NSPRS Safe Shutdown Flow Path J 3-4-4 Unit 2 - RHR Safe Shutdown Flow Path 3-4-5 Unit 3 - RHR Sefe Shutdown Flow Path 3-4-6a Unit 2 - CS Sa e Shutdown Flow Path ] 3-4-6b Unit 3 - CS 1.re Shutdown Flow Path 3-4-7 Unit 2 - ESW and HPSW Safe Shutdown Flow Path 3-4-8a Unit 2 - 125/250V DC Safe Shutdown Flow ] Path (One-line diagram) 3-4-8b Unit 2 - 125/250V DC Safe Shutdown Flow q Path (One-line diagram) J 3-4-9a Unit 3 - 125/250V DC Safe Shutdown Flow Path (One-line diagram) 3-4-9b Unit 3 - 125/250V DC Safe Shutdown Flow ] Path (One-line diagram) 3-4-10 Unit 2 - 4kV Safe Shutdown Flow Path (One-line diagram) 3-4-11a Unit 2 - 440V AC Safe Shutdown Flow Path ] (One-line diagram) 3-4-11b Unit 2 - 440V AC Safe Shutdown Flow Path (One-line diagram) ) 3-4-lle Units 2&3 - 440V Emergency Auxiliary Power System (One-line diagram) _ IV 1
- Figures are in Volume 2 1
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L ( [ l Table of Contents (continued) 3-4-12 Unit 2 - 120V AC Safe Shutdown Flow Path ( 3-4-13 (One-line diagram) Unit 3 - 4kV Safe Shutdown Flow Path (One-line diagram) 3-4-14a Unit 3 - 440V AC Safe Shutdown Flow Path { (One-line diagram) 3-4-14b Unit 3 - 440V AC Safe Shutdown Flow Path / (One-line diagram) 3-4-15 Unit 3 - 120V AC Safe Shutdown Flow Path (One-line diagram) 3-4-16 Unit 2 - DG Fuel Oil Transfer Safe Shutdown Flow Path 3-5-1 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram for RCIC System ( 3-5-2 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram for HPCI System 3-5-3 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram for NSPRS ( 3-5-4 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram for RHR System 3-5-5 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation ( Diagr6m for CS System 3-5-6 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram for ESW System { 3-5-7 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram for HPSW System 3-5-8 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram for ac Emergency Power System ( 3-5-9 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram for dc 125/250V Emergency Power System 3-5-10a DG Circuit Breakers Control { 3-5-10b DG Circuit Breakers Control 3-5-10c DG Circuit Breakers Control 3-5-10d DG Circuit Breakers Control r 3-5-10e DG Circuit Breakers Control l 3-5-10f DG Circuit Breakers Control 3-5-10g DG Circuit Breakers Control 3-5-10h DG Circuit Breakers Control { 3-5-10i DG Circuit Breakers Control 3-5-10j DG Circuit Breakers Control 3-5-11 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram for Process Monitoring Instrumentation v t - - _ - - - - - -
Table of Contents (continued) SECTION 4 APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS 4.1 Compliance Status 4-1 4.2 Nonconformance Summary 4-2 4.3 Areas Requiring Alternative Shutdown 4-3 4.4 Exemptions 4-3 TABLES 4-1 Appendix R Fire Area Nonconformance Summary SECTION 5 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY 5.1 Introduction 5-1 l 5.2 Alternative Shutdown Method 5-4 l 5.2.1 Introduction to Alternative Shutdown Systems 5-5 5.2.2 Alternative Shutdown Systems Controls Locations 5-8 l 5.2.3 Alternative Shutdown Safety Functions 5-13 5.2.J.1 Reactivity Control During Alternative Shutdown Operation 5-13 5.2.3.2 Reactor Vessel Level Control During Alternative Shutdown 5-14 5.2.3.3 Support Functions for the Alternative l Shutdown Method 5-16 l 5.2.3.4 Decay Heat Removal During Alternative Shutdown 5-20 5.3 Alternative Shutdown Modifications 5-23 l 5.3.1 HPCI System Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-24 5.3.2 RHR System Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-26 l 5.3.3 HPSW System Alternative Shutdown l Modification 5-27 5.3.4 Diesel Generators Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-27 vi l l 1
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s Y s I L Table of contents (continued) [ 5.3.5 ESW System Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-29 S.3.6 AC Emergency Power System Alternative { Shutdown Modification 5-29 5.3.7 DC Emergency Power System Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-32 5.3.8 Emergency Shutdown Panel Alternative [ Shutdown Modification 5-33 5.3.9 Process Monitoring Instrumentation Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-33 ( 5.4 Response to NRC Generic Letter 81-12 5-35 5.4.1 Section 8 of Enclorure 1 to Generic Letter 81-12, Information Required for Staff Review 5-35 [- 5.4.2 Detailed Response to Enclosure 2 of Generic Letter 81-12, Request for Additional Information (Request 1) 5-44 TABLES ( 5-1 Appendix R Alternative Shutdown capability . Proposed Modifications and Method of Operation 5-2 Appendix R Alternative Shutdown Capability [ Proposed Modifications for Emergency Diesel Generators 5-3 Vital Alternative ShutdoVn Components and ( Corresponding Essential Cables for all Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Systems (excluding DGs) 5-4 Appendix R Alternative Shutdown Methods ( and Control Locations FIGURES
- 5-1 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation f.' Diagram for HPCI System Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-1-la Modified HPCI Components through
{ 5-1-lq vii
- Figures are in Volume 2 i _- --
Table of Contents (continued) 5-2 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram for RHR System Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-2-1 RHR Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation ) 5-2-2 RHR Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-2-3 RHR Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-2-4 RHR Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-2-5 RHR Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation ] 5-2-6 RHR Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-3 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation 1 Diagram for ESW System Alternative J Shutdown Modification 5-3-1 ESW Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-3-2 ESW Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation ) 5-3-3 ESW Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-3-4 ESW Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-4 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation 1 Diagram for HPSW System Alternative J Shutdown Modification 5-4-1 HPSW Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-4-2 HPSW Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-4-3 HPSW Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-4-4 HPSW Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-4-5 HPSW Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-5 125/250V de Power System Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-5-1 NSPRS Modifications 5-5-2 NSPRS Modifications 5-5-3 Modification for valves 5-5-4 Modification for Valves 5-6 AC Power System Alternative Shutdown Modification ) 5-6-1 AC Power System Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-6-2 AC Power System Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation ] 5-6-3 AC Power System Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation ] 5-7a DG Circuit Alternative Shutdown Modification J 5-7b DG Circuit Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-7c DG Circuit Alternative Shutdown Modifications 5-7d DG Circuit Alternative Shutdown Modifications ) 5-7-1 DG Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-7-2 DG Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-7-3 DG Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation j 5-8 Post-Fire Manpower Loading for Fire in Main Control Room, Cable Spreading Room or Remote Shutdown Panel Area vrt t
e i F L. Table of Contents (continued) hI SECTION 6 DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS 6.1 Introduction 6-1
<6 . 2 Barrier Enhancements 6-2 SECTION 7 EXEMPTIONS AND THEIR BASES 7.1 Objectives 7-1 7.2 Fire Protection Features 7-1
[ 7.2.1 Fire Areas 05 and 12 7-1 7.2.2 Fire Areas 06 and 13 7-11 7.2.3 Fire A ea 29 7-21 ( 7.2.4 Fire Areas 47 and 48 7-27 L 7.2.5 Fire Area 25 7-35 h TABLES 7-l' Fire Areas 05 and 12 Summary Evaluation Table (includes proposed modifications) 7-9 { 7-2 Fire Areas 06 and 13 Summary Evaluation Table 7-19 r 7-3' . Fire Area 29 Summary Evaluation Table 7-25 l 7-4 Fire Areas 47 and 48 Summary Evaluation Table 7-33 7-5 Fire Area 25 Summary Evaluation Table 7-40 FIGURES
- 7-la Equipment Location for RHR System
-(Unit 2) 91.5 ft Elevation 7-lb Equipment Location for HPIC and RCIC c Systems (Unit 2) 91.5 ft Elevation 7-2a Equipment Location for RHR System (Unit 2) 116 ft Elevation 7-2b Equipment Location for HPCI and RCIC Systems (Unit 2) 116 ft Elevation 7-3a Equipment Location for RHR System 1 .
(Unit 3) 91.5 ft Elevation 7-3b Equipment Location for HPCI and RCIC-Systems (Unit 3) 91.5 ft Elevation iX
- Figures are in Volume 2
]
Table of Contents (continued) 7-4a Equipment Location for RHR System (Unit 3) 116 ft Elevation ] 7-4b Equipment Location for HPCI and RCIC Systems (Unit 3) 116 ft Elevation 1 7-Sa Equipment Location for RHR System J 7-Sb (Unit 3) 135 ft Elevation (Unit 2 is Similar) Equipment Location for HPCI, RCIC and NSPRS Systems (Unit 3) 135 ft Elevation ) (Unit 2 is Similar) 7-Sc Equipment Location for Core Spray System 7-6 (Unit 3) 135 ft Elevation (Unit 2 is Similar) ] Equipment Location for HPSW and ESW Systems (Unit 2 and 3) 112 ft Elevation
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s i3 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
In accordance with the guidance given in Appendix R, "
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( licensees should re-examine those previously approved configurations of fire protection that do not meet the requirements specified in Section III.G to Appendix R...", a detailed, re-examination and re-analysis of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station safe shutdown capability has been performed. The results.of that re-examination and re-analysis, included in this report, build upon the previous fire protection activities performed under the guidelines of Branch Technical Position (BTP)
~APCSB 9.5-1 and under the guidelines
{ of Appendix R. The re-sponse.to BTP 9.5-1 was submitted in 1977, and the response to Appendix R was submitted in the Fire' Protection Safe Shutdown j Report of June 1982. The re-analysis l also considers other N subsequent fire protection improvements incorporated into the P Peach Bottom' facility. This report reviews Philadelphia Electric Company's Peach [_ Bottom Atomic Power. Station Units 2 and 3 (Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278) safe shutdown systems and their associated circuits for j compliance'with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.G. This report f also includes the description of a proposed alternative shutdown i
. method and provides sufficient technical information to permit NRC Staff review and L approval of proposed plant modifications.
Finally, those areas of noncompliance with the provisions of xi
i Appendix R are identified, a substantive basis for equivalent 9 public health and safety is demonstrated protection to the detailed analysis, and appropiate exemptions are through requested. This report is the result of an extensive evaluation and systems basis. First, the safe conducted on a functional shutdown performance goals and requisite safety functions were Power Station . The safe identified for the Peach Bottom Atomic shutdown systems necessary for achieving the performance goals and ensuring safe shutdown in the event of a postulated exposure Once the necessary systems were fire were then defined. related components and circuits (including identified, the were reviewed for compliance with the associated circuits) specific separation criteria of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.G.2. For those fire areas not in compliance, studies were completed to determine whether: (1) Modifications or changes to plant fire protection or safe shutdown system features were required to bring f the area into compliance; or (2) Alternative shutdown capability was required to bring the area into compliance; or, An exemption was justified for the specific fire area l (3) J in question. of these activities are listed in Summary The results Table 1-1. The table identifies the fire areas at Peach Bottom and the technical approaches selected to achieve the appropriate levels of protection. xii l
s The results of this re-analysis and re-examination can be
, summarized as follows:
L. Separation between required safe shutdown circuits (1) which meets the specific requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 presently exists in h five of the fire areas reviewed. (2) Separation between required safe shutdown circuits which meets the specific requirements of Section { III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 will exist in an additional forty fire areas pending fire protection and raceway protection modifications. (3) Alternative shutdown capability, which meets the requirements of Section III.G.3 and III.L of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, will exist for one fire area. (4) Exemptions from the specific requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R are requested for four fire areas where existing features and proposed modifications provide equivalent protection. h' (5) Exemptions from the specific requirements of Section III.G.3 of Appendix R are requested in four fire areas where features provide equivalent protection. (6) Associated circuits having a separation less than that required by Section III.G.2 of Appendix R 10 CFR 50, and having a common power source with the shutdown equipment, will be electrically protected from the post-fire shutdown circuit of concern by coordinated circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices. (7) Associated circuits having a separation less than that required by'Section III.G.2 of Appendix R and having common enclosure, e.g., raceway, panel, junction box, ( , have been adequately resolved by being electrically protected from the post-fire shutdown circuit of ( concern (by circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices) L and by the non-propagating characteristics of the proposed or existing fire area boundaries. f (8) Associated circuits that have a separation from the fire area less than that required by Section III.G.2 of Appendix R and have a connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation could adversely affect the shutdown capability have been adequately resolved by app- nr riate action pre- or post-fire. xiii I. __ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J
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- 1. INTRODUCTION
/ L 1.1 Objective This report describes the fire protection features for the (. safe shutdown systems and their associated circuits at Peach { Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 (Peach Bottom) and the relationship of these features to the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. As a result of this evaluation, an alternative shutdown system is determined to be necessary to achieve [ regulatory compliance in three plant areas common to both units. Conceptual designs for such a system and fire protection modifications are presented to outline the methods selected to achieve compliance. i In those instances where proposed modifications and/or existing plant design features provide a level of fire protection
' safety commensurate with that of 10 CFR 50.12 Appendix R,
{ exemptions are requested and necessary technical justifications are provided.
1.2 Background
By letter dated June 29, 1982, Philadelphia Electric Company (PECo) requested exemptions from the requirements of Section III.G of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R for four areas in Unit 2, four areas in Unit 3, and three areas common to both units. Information to justify such exemption requests was Page 1-1
r provided in the Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, dated June, 1982. 00 January 20, 1983, the NRC formally communicated its position concerning the Philadelphia Electric Company requests for exemption as follows: The.information currently available does not allow us to make a judgment on your exemption requests. If the requirements of Section III.G will be met with modifications, exemptions are not needed. If, after final details of the configuration are known, an exemption is necessary and justifiable, then you should file a request for the provisions of 10 CFR 50.12.gxemption under i In response to the NRC review, PECo initiated a re-review of the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis and the existing plant configuration in order to assess the feasibility of providing an j alternative shutdown capability for Peach Bottom Atomic Power
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Station Units 2 and 3. This report describes the methodology, conclusions and proposed modifications which resulted from this effort. 1.3 Scope This report presents the results of the analyses that were s performed to address the requirements for protecting safe shutdown systems and their associated circuits as specified in 10 v 1/ Letter from Darrell G. Eisenhut (NRR/DL) to Edward G. Baver, Jr. ,
SUBJECT:
" Request for Exemption from the Requirements of Appendix.R to 10 CFR Part 50, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3."
Page 1-2 I (
CFR 50 Appendix R and NRC Generic Letter 81-12. These ) requirements are intended to limit damage to safe shutdown systems resulting from an unmitigated fire to the extent that the , ability to achieve safe shutdown is assured. The analysis { presented in this report evaluates the conformance of Peach ( Bottom to these requirements and provides the necessary technical basis to support configurations which differ from those specified in the rule. The report describes a three-fold analysis: (1) Using Commission guidelines and criteria, redundant systems and equipment necessary for safe shutdown, including their associated circuits of concern, are
' identified; (2) The location of the redundant systems and equipment
( within fire area boundarles of Peach Bottom is reviewed against the design basis protective features of Appendix R to determine the availability of a means to achieve safe shutdown in the event of a fire; and (3) Wherever the requisite separation between safe shutdown ( systems does not exist, modifications are proposed to e protect the safe shutdown capability. 1.4 Criteria The criteria used in this analysis are based on the following: (1) 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Sections III.G and III.L; (2) NRC Generic Letter 81-12 and associated clarifications; (3) NRC Staff guidelines, especially: (a) SECY 82-13, (b) IE Appendix R audit procedures, Page 1-3
. _ _ _ _ _______ ______ )
(c) Internal Staff memoranda addressing safe shutdown H capability , and J (d) Appendix R SERs issued for other plants; and (4) Peach Bottom licensing bases and operating practices as documented in the FSAR, Technical Specifications, and plant procedures. 1.5 Report Overview This report contains seven sections. Section 2 presents the fire areas identified to support the Appendix R analyses 1 performed. Criteria for establishing fire areas are discussed as well as the process used to determine the associated fire hazard severity. The plant's active fire protection features are summarized in Table 2-2, which identifies the detection and suppression systems for each fire area on an area-by-area basis. Section 3 describes the process used to identify safety functions, safe shutdown systems, components and circuits, and associated circuits of concern. Related assumptions and considerations are also discussed. Section 4 identifies plant areas not in compliance with Appendix R III.G.2 and presents feasible options for achieving j compliance. s Section 5 provides a discussion of the proposed alternative shutdown systems. The systems modifications necessary to achieve the alternate shutcown capbility are detailed in Section 5.3. In f addition, Section 5 provides responses to the relevant questions contained in Generic Letter 81-12 and the NRC Staff's s clarifications dated March 22, 1982. Page 1-4
~ m Section 6 describes the fire bondary and supression modifications proposed at Peach Bottom which are considered L necessary to: (1) Bring each identified fire area into compliance with (. the specific criteria of 10 III.G; or, CFR 50 Appendix R, Section (2) Meet the requirements for equivalent protection (- considered in the exemption applications contained in Section 7.0. Section 7 presents a detailed analysis for each fire area (. identified in Section 4 as not being in compliance with Section III.G of Appendix R, and for which an exemption is sought. Each of the areas is described in detail and an individual fire hazards analysis is provided. Tables and drawings summarizing significant fire area information are also provided at the end of ( each subsection. 1.6 Results of Analysis (- Table-1-1 highlights the results of this re-analysis for each fire area. The table identifies the fire areas at Peach Bottom, the applicable Appendix R- provisions, and the technical (' approaches selected to achieve the appropriate levels of protection. The results of the analysis confirm the adequacy of the existing fire protection features in some fire areas when
- compared with the specific criteria of Appendix R Section III.G.
L Page 1-5 q
For those fire areas not in conformance with the specific criteria of Appendix R Section III.G, proposed modifications will achieve the necessary level of protection by upgrading of fire barriers, installing suppression and detection systems, modifying circuits, rerouting cables, encapsulating conduits and providing alternative shutdown stations. For eight fire areas, similar modifications are proposed to achieve an equivalent level of protection where verbatim compliance with Appendix R is not achieved. For these areas, applications for exemptions are presented on the basis of detailed fire hazards analyses. 1.7 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations The following acronyms and abbreviations have been used in this report: ACS - Alternative Control Station APCSB - Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch BOP ~ Balance Of Plant BRK - Breaker BTP - Branch Technical Position CS - Core Spray System CST - Condensate Storage Tank CT - Circuit Transformer DG - Diesel Generator EGM - Engine Governer Monitoring ESW - Emergency Service Water System FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report HPCI - High Pressure Coolant Injection System HPSW - High Pressure Service Water System HVAC - Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning LOCA - Loss Of Coolant Accident LPCI - Low Pressure Coolant Injection System MCA - Maximum Credible Accident MG - Motor Generator MSIV - Main Steam Isolation Valve NFPA - National Fire Protection Association Page 1-6
t J l L J L NPSH - Net Positive Suction Head NSPRS - Nuclear System Pressure Relief System NTS - New Transfer Switch PFSAR Preliminary Final Safety Analysis Report ( P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram RB - Reactor Building RCIC - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (- RHR - Residual Heat Removal System RPS - Reactor Protection System RWCU - Reactor Water Clean-Up ( RX SDC Reactor Shutdown Cooling SPC - Supression Pool Cooling SRV Steam Relief Valve ( SWGR - Switchgear USAR - Updated Safety Analysis Report ( [ [ [ [ l
}
- f. Page 1-7 r
L TABLE l-1 J PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R
SUMMARY
COMPLIANCE TABLE I l l* Where modifications are indicated, such modifications will 1 [- l include upgrading penetration seals and fire dampers to a l I rating commensurate with the hazard in the fire area. l I I l ** Refer to Table 4-1 for a summary of the proposed ( I modifications and exemptions. l l I I ( l l Safe Shutdown l III.G Compliance Method
- l 1 l Components andl l I I Fire Area l Cables in Areal III.G.2 l III.G.3 l l l l l l l 1 I Yes l With modifications l l l 1 I I I l 2 l Yes I With modifications l l
[ l l i l l L l 3 l Yes l With modifications l l l l l 1 l L l 4 I Yes l With modifications ** l l 1 1 I I I I I I I I l 5 l Yes l With modifications l I l l l and exemption ** l l l 1 I I l l 6 I Yes l With modifications l I l l l and exemption ** l l I I I I I l 7 l Yes l With modifications ** l l
! I I I I
( l l 8 l I Yes I l With modifications I l I l l l 1 I I l 9 i No l With modifications i I { I I I I I l 10 I Yes l With modifications l l l l l l l l 11 I Yes l With modifications ** I I I I I l l Page 1 of 3 f
TABLE l-1 (continu:d) .
'l l Safe Shutdown l III.G Compliance Method
- I I l Components andl l I I Fire Area l Cables in Areal III.G.2 l III.G.3 I i 12 l Yes I With modifications l l l l l and exemption ** l l l l l l l l 13 l Yes l With modifications l l l l l and exemption ** I I I I I I I l 14 l Yes l With modifications ** l l l 1 I I I i 15 l Yes I With modifications l l l l 1 1 I I 16 l No l With modifications l l l l l l l l l l l l l 17 l Yes l With modifications l l l l l l l l 18 l Yes l Yes i I I I I I I i 19 l No l Yes l I I I I I I I 20 l Yes I With modifications l l l l l l l l 21 l Yes l Yes l l l 1 I I I l 22 l No l Yes l l l l 1 I I l 23 l Yes l With modifications l l l . I I I I l 24 l Yes l With modifications l l l l l l l l 25 I Yes l lWith modifica- l l l l ltions and exemp- l l l l ltion ** l I I I I i ]
l 26 l Yes l With modifications l l / I I I I I l 27 I Yes l With modifications l l l l 1 I I l 28 I Yes l lWith modifica- l l l l ltions ** I I I I I I I I I I I ( l 29 l Yes l lWith modifica- l { l l l ltions and exemp- l I I I Ition ** I I I I I I l 30 I Yes l With modifications l l l l 1 1 I I 31 l Yes l With modifications ** l l Page 2 of 3
) L TABLE l-1 (continued) - l l Safe Shutdown l III.G Compliance Method
- l l
l l Components andl l l l Fire Area l Cables in Areal III.G.2 l III.G.3 I I I I I l [. I ~32 I Yes l With modifications l I ' I I I I I I 33 l Yes l With modifications l I I I I I r I L .1 34 I Yes l With modifications l l l l 1 1 I I 35 l Yes I With modifications I l [ l l 36 i l Yes I l With modifications I l l 1 1 I I I I [ l 37 l Yes l With modifications l l L I I I I I l 38 l Yes l With modifications l l
- 1. I I I I
( l 39 ! Yes l With modifications 1 l I l l l I I 40 l Yes l With modifications l l I I ( l 1 41 I I Yes l With modifications ** l I l l l 1 l l ( l 42 l No l With modifications l l l l I I I I i 43 l Yes l With modifications l I I I I I I l 44 1 Yes I With modifications l l (l' l l 45 l l Yes 1 l With modifications I i I I I I I I I l 46 I Yes l With mcdifications l I I I I I l l 47 I Yes l With modifications ** l Exemption ** l [ l l 1 I I I 48 l Yes l With modifications ** I Exemption ** I I I 1. I I 49 No (' l I I I l With modifications I l I l I I 50 l Yes l With modifications ** l l l l 1 I I I 51 i No l Yes l l l l 1 I I l 52' i No l With modifications l I I I I I I l 53 l No l With modifications l l I I I I I l 54 l Yes l With modifications i I {. I I I I I p Page 3 of 3 I
F L 2. IDENTIFICATION OF FIRE AREAS 2.1 Objectives This section provides the r riteria and methodologies used to { develop fire area and zone definitions for Peach Bottom Atomic ( Power Station, Units 2 and 3. The methodology used to develop equivalent fire severities for the zones in each fire area is (_ also discussed. Section 6 of this report provides detailed descriptions of those fire areas for which modifications are proposed. Section 7 documents the fire hazards analyses performed for those fire areas and details the bases by which exemptions from the specific requirements of Appendix R Section III.G are justified. 2.2 Identification of Fire Areas L On May 11 and September 27, 1976, the NRC requested a ( comparison between PECo's fire protection program and Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1 for Peach Bottom. In March 1977, PECo responded to this request with the Fire Protection Program Report. The report included the following information: (1) A comparison of the existing fire protection program provisions with the guidelines of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1; f (2) A fire hazards analysis of all identified fire areas; and {' 1
?
Page 2-1 i
(3) A safe shutdown analysis to evaluate the capability for providing decay heat removal and cooling to the reactor Core. In the report, PECo identified fire areas and fire zones based on the -capability of existing boundary fire barriers to resist the spread of fire. Fire areas were defined as completely l I enclosed areas separated from adjacent areas by fire-rated walls. l Fire zones were defined as areas not completely separated from ( adjacent zones by fire-rated walls. The fire ratings of doors, dampers, and penetration seals were not addressed in this analysis. However, the combustible loadings for each fire area and fire zone were determined and the existing detection and suppression capabilities were quantified. The PECo report identified 146 fire areas. A majority of the areas consisted of individual rooms bounded by three-hour-rated walls. Where large open hatches and numerous unsealed penetrations were present in walls and floor / ceiling assemblies, multiple floors and rooms were combined into single fire areas, and each room of the fire area was identified as an individual fire zone. Principal fire areas include the individual reactor buildings, Radvaste Building, drywell, Cable Spreading Room and Main Control Room. The June 1982 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report provided an analysis for each fire area and fire zone identified in the March 1977 report, using the criteria of Section III.G of Appendix R. Those zones and areas containing equipment and cables used-for the identified- methods of safe shutdown, and Page 2-2 l,
+ ) L ( which required either modification or an exemption to meet the l requirements of Appendix R, were addressed in detail. Following the NRC Staff review of the June 1982 submittal, PECo has re-evaluated the methods by which safe shutdown of either. Unit 2 or Unit 3 at Peach Bottom can be achieved. Revised safe shutdown procedures have been developed, and fire areas were ( redefined with the objective of ensuring that at least one path
. of safe shutdown systems is free of fire damage. Based on this re-evaluation, the original fire areas were redefined into 54
( areas. These fire areas are listed in Table 2-1, Figure 2-1 and ' f Figure 2-8. (_ The only fire areas discussed in this report are those in ; which modifications to meet Appendix R safe shutdown criteria
.are necessary or exemptions are requested. Table 2-2 identifies
( the fire areas for which exemptions are requested, list: the automatic detection and suppression capabilities, and the { equivalent fire severities. Unless otherwise indicated, the ( rating of the boundary fire barriers for each fire area identified in Table 2-2 is the minimum fire rating of the ( barriers which form the boundaries of the area. The equivalent fire severities discussed in Table 2-2 are based on the- calculated combustible loading and were estimated f using a strict interpretation of the criteria presented in the Fire Protection Handbook, 15th edition, Section 5, Chapter 9, l Page 2-3 e
Table' 5-9B. These criteria relate- the fuel loading of
}
combustible material to the estimated minutes of fire severity ba' sed on'the area'under the standard time-temperature curve. The . values contained in Table 5-9B are based on materials with an average heat of combustion of 8,000 Btu /lb. t
TABLE 2-1 7 I PHILADELPHIA-ELECTRIC COMPANY L PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 FIRE AREA / FIRE ZONE IDENTIFICATION TABLE lFIREl FIRE l. IDENTIFICATION I ELEVATION l h: l AREAL ZONE l l (FEET) l I , I I I
-l 01 1 001 l Unit 2 2A RHR Pump Rm. l 91.5, 116 l 1 I I I I
[- l- l 002 l Unit 2'2C RHR Pump Rm. I 91.5, 116 l l 1 l 1 l l l' 026 l Unit.2 Stairway 26 SW Corner l 135, 165, I l l l of RB l 195, 234 i L I I I l l 1 1 I I I ( l 02 1 003 I Unit 2 2B RHR Pump Rm. l 91.5, 116 l l l l l l i l l 004A l Unit 2 2D RHR Pump Rm. I 91.5, 116 I (.- 1 I I . I I L
'l l 059 l Unit 2 HPCI Turb. & Pump Rm. I 91.5 l 1 I I I I l l 062- 1 Unit 3 HPCI Turb. & Pump Rm. l 91.5 l k ' g' l l l l l l l 070 l Standby Gas Treatment Rm. I 91.5 I
-1 I I l l
(! :
-l I
03 1 I 004B I l Unit 2 RB Cooling Wtr. Rm. I l 116 I l 1 I I I I l l I I I [1 l 04 l 004C l Unit 2 Recirc. Pump MG Set Rm. I 135 l l l l l l l l' 006 l Stairway 24 SW Corner Radwaste 1 91.5, 116 l (- l .I l Bldg. I 135 l l :l l l l l l l l l
'l 05 1 ~005A l Unit 2 2C Core Spray Pump Rm. I 91.5 l l l l l 1
-l 1 005B l Unit 2 2C Core Spray Pump Rm. l 91.5 l l .I I I I l l 005C l Unit 2 Torus l 91.5, 116 l I I I i l l l .005D l Unit 2 2B Core Spray Pump Rm. I 91.5 I
( l l 1.
'l Unit 2 2D Core Spray Pump Rm, 1 I l l 005E I 91.5 l l l .l l l L l l 005F l Unit 2 RB Inst. Racks I 116 I I l l l l l l 005G l Unit 2 RB Inst. Racks I 116 I l l l l l l l 007 l Unit 2 Stairway 18 SE Corner l 91.5, 116 I I l l of'RB l l l 1 l l 1 f' Page 1 of 13
TABLE 2-1-(continued) 1FIREl FIRE I IDENTIFICATION I ELEVATION I IAREAI ZONE I l (FEET) l I I I. I i 1106 1 005H I Unit 2 RB General Area l 135 l l l l . I l l -l 019 l Unit 2 RB Outboard Isol. Valves! 135 l l l l l 1
-l- l 020 l Unit 2 RB Neutron Monit. Rm. I 135 l
'l. I I l i I I 022 .1 Unit 2 RB Drywell Access i 135 l l l I I i
- 1. 1 023 -l Unit 2 RB Outboard Isol. Valvesl 135 l -
l l I I I I I I I I l 07 l 005J l Unit 2 RB General Area- l 165 I I I I I I I l 005M l Unit 2 RB Backwash Tank & l 165 l l 'l l Transfer Pump Rms. l l l l l l l
.I l 041 - l Unit 2 2B Reactor Wtr. Clean-upl 165 l l l l Heat-Exchanger I I I I I I I l l 042 l Unit 2 2A Reactor Wtr. Clean-up! 165 l l' l l ' Heat Exchanger- l l l- I l- 1 I
'l 1- 043 l Unit 2 Reactor Wtr. Clean-up I 165 1
-l l l Heat Exchanger l l l l l- 1 l l l 044 i Unit 2-2A Reactor Wtr. Clean-upl 165 l l 1- I Pump l l l l l l l l l 045 l Unit.2 2B Reactor'Wtr. Clean-upl 165 l
-l 1 I Pump l l l l 1 I I i- l 046. .I Unit 2 2C' Reactor Wtr. Clean-upl 165 1 I I l Pump .l I ]:
I .I I I I l l 047A l Unit 2 Reactor Wtr. Clean-up I 180 l .] 1 I I Valves l I J 1 I ~~ I I I I .1 047B l Unit 2 Reactor Wtr. Clean-up l 180 1 1 l l' I l I Valves l I l I
)
I I . I I .I l 08 -l .005K l Unit 2 RB General Area l 195 l
)
-l 'l l I I
'l I 005L l Unit 2 RB Source Storage & I 195 l l' I l Calib. ~ Rra. l I I I -1. I I
'l. I -051 i Unit 2 RB HVAC Filter l 195, 214 l
- l. l l Compartment & Equip. Rm. I l' I I I I I Page 2 of 13
s f TABLE 2-1 (continutd) f lFIREl FIRE I IDENTIFICATION I ELEVATION l L IAREAl ZONE l l (FEET) l I I I I I l 08 1 052 l Unit 2 RB HVAC Personnel i 195 l ( l l l Access Air Lock i l I I I I I l 1 057 l Unit 2 RB Refueling Floor l 234 I ( l l l l 058 l Unit 2 RB Refueling Floor l l 234 l l l l l l l Shower l l l l I I I {- 1 I I I I l 09 1 008 l Unit 2 Stairway 19 NE Corner 191.5, 116, 1351 l l l of RB l165, 195, 234 l ( l l I l l l l 018 l Unit 2 Elevator NE Corner 191.5, 116, 1351 l l l of RB l165, 195, 234 l l l I I I [ I I I I I I 10 1 009 l Unit 3 3D RHR Pump Rm. 191.5, 116 l [ l i I I I L I I 010 l Unit 3 3B RHR Pump Rm. 191.5, 116 l l l 1 I I I l 034 l Unit 3 Stairway 27 NW Corner 191.5, 116, 1351 (; l I l I I I of RB l165, 195, 234 l I I I l 011 I Unit 3 3C RHR Pump Rm. 191.5, 116 l [, l l l l l l l 012A l Unit 3 3A RHR Pump Rm. 191.5, 116 l l l l l l ri l l 012B l Unit 3 RB Cooling Wtr. Rm. 1116 i L ' i I I I I l l 012C l Unit 3 Recirc. Pump MG Set Rm. I135 l l' I I I I ( l l l l 014 l Stairway 25 NW Corner Radwaste 191.5, 116, 1351 l Bldg. I l I I I I I [ l l 060 l Unit 2 RCIC Pump & Turbine Rm. 191.5 l t l l l l 1 l l 063 l Unit 3 RCIC Pump & Turbine Rm. 191.5 l r I I I I I ( l l 065A l Radwaste Bldg. Tank & Pump 191.5 l l l l Area l l I I I I I f- l l 065B I Radwaste Bldg. Chemical Waste 191.5 l l l l Tank Rm. l I I I I . I I ( l l 065C l Radwaste Bldg. Future Resin 191.5 l
- l. l- l l Tank Rm. l l l l l 1 I
.. l l 066A l Radwaste Bldg. Sludge Pump Rm. 191.5 l l 1 1 I l
[ Page 3 of 13
.=.
TABLE 2-1 (continu:d) IFIREl PIRE I IDENTIFICATION l ELEVATION l l AREAL ZONE l l (FEET) l l I I I l l 11 1 066B l Radwaste Bldg. Sludge Pump Rm. 191.5 l l l. I I I l l 067- l Radwaste Bldg. Spent Resin 191.5 l l l l Pump Rm. l l l l l 1 I I l 068 l Radwaste Bldg. Spent Resin 191.5 l l l l Tank Rm. I I I I I I I I l _069A l Radwaste Bldg. Core Pump Rm. 191.5 l l l l l l l l 069B i Radwaste Bldg. Collector Tank 191.5 l l l l Rm. l I I I I I I I I 071 .I Stairway 34 Center Radwaste 191.5,116, 135 l l l l Bldg. 1150, 165 l l l l l l l l 072A l Radwaste Bldg. Center Section 1116, 135, 150 l l l l 1165 I I I I I I I I 072B l Radwaste Bldg. Filter Holding 1116 l l' l l Pump Rm. & Clean-up Tank & l l l l l Pump Rms. l l l l l l l l l 072C l Radwaste Bldg. Condensate 1116 l l l l Pump Rm. l l l l l l l l l 072D l Radwaste Bldg. Condensate 1116 l l l l Tank Rm. l l l 1 -l 1 I I l- 072E l Radwaste Bldg. Condensate 1116 l l l l Tank Rm. I I I I I I I l l 072F l Radwaste. Bldg. Condensate 1116 l l l l Pump Rm. l l l l l l l l l 072G l Radwaste Bldg. Hopper 1150 l l l l Compartments l l l ". I l l l I 072H l Radwaste Bldg. Solid Waste 1165 l l l l _ Disposal System l l l 1 1 I I l l 072J l Radwaste Bldg. Solid Waste 1165 l l l l Disposal System l l l l l l 1 l l 073 l Radwaste Bldg. Clean-up 1116 l 1- 1 I Tank Rm. 1 I I I I I I I l 074 I Radwaste Bldg. Waste Surge I116 l l l l Tank Rm. l l l l l l l Page 4 of 23 f
I .) TABLE 2-1 (continurd) u lFIREl FIRE l IDENTIFICATION l ELEVATION I L ZONE (FEUT) IAREAl l l l
- l. I ! I I p l 11 1 075 l Radwaste Bldg. Radwaste I135 i L- l I l Control Rm i I I I l l I l l 147 l Corridor between Radwaste Bldg.ll35 I
( l l l & Emergency SWGR & Battery Rms.l l l I I I I I I I I l l 12 I Ol3A l Unit 3 3B Core Spray Pump Rm. 191.5 l [- 1 I I I l l l .013B l Unit 3 3D Core Spray Pump Rm. 191.5 l l l l l l ( l 1 I 1 013C l Unit 3 Torus I 191.5, 116 I l I l l 013D l Unit 3 3C Core Spray Pump Rm. 191.5 l l l l l l [ l l Ol3E l Unit 3 3A Core Spray Pump Rm. 191.5 l l l l 1 I r l l 013F l Unit 3 RB Inst. Racks 1116 I L I I I I I l l 013C l Unit 3 RB Inst. Racks 1116 i l l I I I ( l l 015 l Unit 3 Stairway 23 NE Corner 191.5, 116 l l l 1 RB l l l l l l l l l l l l [ l 13 1 013H l Unit 3 RB General Area 1135 I I I I I I l 1 027. I Unit 3 RB Outboard Isol. Valves l135 I (. I I I I I l l 028 l Unit 3 RB Drywell Access 1135 l l l l Hatch l l ( l l-l l 030 l l Unit 3 RB Neutron Monit. Rm. I135 l l I I I I l [, . l l 031 l Unit 3 RB Outboard Isol. 1135 l I l l Valves l l l l l l l r I I I I I ( l 14 1 013J l Unit 3 RB General Area 1165 l l l l 1 I l l 013M l Unit 3 RB Backwash Tank 1165 1 { l I l & Transfer Pump Rms. l l l l l l l r I i 035 l Unit 3 3B Reactor Wtr. Clean-upil65 1 ( l l l Heat Exchanger I I L i I I I l Page 5 of 13
TABLE 2-1 (continued) l lFIREl FIRE l IDENTIFICATION l ELEVATION I IAREAl ZONE l l (FEET) i l i I i i l 14 1 036 i Unit 3 3A Reactor Wtr. Clean-upil65 l l l l Heat Exchanger l I I I I I I l l 037 l Unit 3 Reactor Wtr. Clean-up 1165 l l l l Heat Exchanger l l l l 1 I I l l 038 l Unit 3 3A Reactor Wtr. Clean-upl165 I I I I Pump l l l l l l l l l 039 l Unit 3 3B Reactor Wtr. Clean-upil65 l l l l Pump l l 1 I I I I l l 040 i Unit 3 3C Reactor Wtr. Clean-upll65 I l l l Pump l l l l l l l l l 048A l Unit 3 Reactor Wtr. Clean-up l180 l l l l Valves l I I I I I I I l 048B l Unit 3 Reactor Wtr. Clean-up l180 l l l l Valves l l l l l 1 I I I I I I l15 1 013K l Unit 3 RB General Area 1165 l l l l l l l l 013L l Unit 3 RB Source Storage 1165 l l 1 l & Calib. Rm. I I I I I I l l l 049 l Unit 3 RB HVAC Filter l195, 214 l l l l Compartment & Equip. Rm. I I I I I I I l l 050 1 Unit 3 RB HVAC Personnel 1195 l l l l Access Air Lock l l I I I I I I I 055 l Unit 3 RB Refueling Floor 1234 I I I I I I l l 056 l Unit 3 RB Refueling Floor 1234 l l l l Shower l l l- 1 I I l l l l l l l 16 1 016 l Unit 3 Stairway 22 SE Corner 191.5,116,135 I l l l RB 1165,195,234 l l 1 I I I l i 017 I Unit 3 Elevator SE Corner RB 191.5,116,135 l l' l l 1165,195,234 l l l l l 1 I I I I I l .17 1 021 I Unit 2 RB Main Steam Isol l135 I I I I valves l l l l l l l Page 6 of 13
TABLE 2-1 (continu:d) )~ IFIREI FIRE I IDENTIFICATION l ELEVATION I lAREAl ZONE I l (FEET) l I I I I I I l 18 l 024 l Unit 2 Drywell 1116,135,165 l L l l l 1195 I I I I I I I l- 1 I I ( l 19 1 025 l Unit 2 Reactor Vessel & l116,135,165 l l l l Control Rod Drives 1195 l l l 1 I I (. 1 l 20 1 I 029 I l Unit 3 RB Main I i135 i l l l l Steam Isol. Valves ! l r I I I i i l I i I I I l 21 1 032 l Unit 3 Drywell 1116,135,165 l l l l 1195 l ( l l l I l I i I l l l 22 l- 033 l Unit 3 Reactor Vessel & l116,135,165 l l l l Control Rod Drives 1195 l [ l l 1 1 I I I I I l r i 23 1 061 i Unit 2 RCIC Turbine & Pump Rm. 191.5 i L i l~ l l I I I I I I l 24 1 064 l Unit 3 RCIC Turbine & Pump Rm. 191.5 l l 1 [ l l l l
! l l l l 25 1 072A I Radwaste Bldg. Emergency l165 l l l l Shutdown Panel l l
{ -l l I I I I I I I I l 26 1 076 i Radwaste Bldg. Unit 3 Reactor 1165 l { l l l Recirc. Pump MG Set HVAC I I I I I I I I I I I I ( l 27 1 077 l Radwaste Bldg. Unit 2 Reactor l165 l l -l l Recirc. Pump MG Set HVAC l l l l l l 1 l l I I I ( l 28 1 078H l Cable Spreading Rm. I150 l l l l l l i I I I I r l l 29 l 108 l Main Plant Control Rm. 1165 l l l l 1 I I I I I l l 30 l 117 l Unit 3 3B & 3D Emergency 1135 l l l l Battery Rm. l l l- I l- 1 I l l I I I l 31 l 118 l Unit 3 3A & 3C Emergency 1135 l l l l Battery Rm. l I I I l- 1 I i Page 7 of 13
TABLE 2-1 (continued) IFIREl FIRE I IDENTIFICATION I ELEVATION l l AREAL ZONE l l (FEET) l I I I I I l 32 l 119 l Unit 3 4KV Emergency SWGR 1135 l l l l (30A17)' l l l~ l i I l l 1 I I l l 33 l 120 l Unit 3 4KV Emergency SWGR l135 I l l l (30A18) l l l l l l l l l I I l l 34 l 121 l Unit 3 4KV Emergency SWGR 1135 l l l l (30A18) l I I I I I I I I I I l l 35 l 122 l Unit 3 4KV Emergency SWGR 1135 l l l l (30A16) l I I I I I I I I I I I l 36 l 123 I Unit 2 4KV Emergency SWGR 1135 I I l l (20A18) l l l l l l l l l l l l l 37 l 124 l Unit 2 4KV Emergency SWGR 1135 l l l l (20A16) l I I I I I I I I I I I l 38 l 125 1 Unit 2 4KV Emergency SWGR l135 l l l l (20A17) l I I I I I I I I I I I l 39 l 126 I Unit 2 4KV Emergency SWGR l135 I I l l (20A15) l l i i l I i l i I I l l 40 1 127 l Unit 2 2B & 2D Emergency 1135 I i l l Battery Rm. l I I I I I I l- 1 I I I l 41 l 128 -l Unit 2 2A & 2C Emergency 1135 l l l l Battery Rm. l I I I I I I l l l l l l 42 l 129 i Plant Computer Rm. I150 l I l I I I I I I I I l 43 l 132 l D Emergency Diesel Generator 1127,151 l l l l & Support Equip. Cell l l l l l l l l I I I I l 44 l 133 l C Emergency Diesel Generator 1127,151 l l l l & Support Equip. Cell I l l l l l l Page 8 of 13
r r! TABLE 2-1 (continuhd) L I- lFIREI. FIRE- l IDENTIFICATION I ELEVATION l lAREAI ZONE -l l (FEET) l
-I I I 1 I L
- l'45 l 134 l B Emergency Diesel Generator i127,151 l I l l & Support Equip. Cell l l l l l l l l l l l l
(-. l 46 1. 135 I A Emergency Diesel Generator l127,151 l
-l .l l &-~ Support Equip. Cell l l l l 1 l l 1 I I I l
[-. l'47 l' 143' I Unit 3 Pump Structure ESW l116 l l l l & 3A-3D HPSW Pumps l l
'1 I I I i
[. - l l I I l
- l '48 l 144 I Unit 2 Pump Structure ESW' l116 I l' l l & 2A-2D HPSW Pumps l 1
(- l l l l l l l l l l l 49-l 145 l Pump Structure Diesel Driven I116 l
.l l l Fire Pump l -l
[. _ LI- 1 I I l l l l l l r 1 50 1 078A 'l Turbine Bldg. General Area 191.5, 116, i L l- l l & Corridors l135, 165 I l -l l l l l- l 078AA l Unit 2 Turbine Bldg. 2A 1116 l l l l Steam Packing Exhauster & 1 l [ l l l Air Ejector l l l l l l l
- r. 'l l 078B l. Turbine Bldg. Hatchway l116, 135, 165 l l l l l General Area l l l l l . l l l l' '078BB -l~ Unit.2 Turbine Bldg.-2B
~
l116 l [ l 1. I Steam Packing Exhauster l l l l l & Air Ejector l l _I 1. I I l 078C- l Turbine Bldg. Rad. Chemistry 1116 (t l 1: l l 1 -Lab. l l l l l l l 1 [- l l 078CC l Unit 2-Turbine Bldg. Mechan- 1116 1 0 l _l I ical Vacuum Pump l l
- 1. l l -l I l l -078D l' Turbine Bldg. Conventional l116 I
- h. l l l Chemistry Lab.- l l
-l l l l l
.I_ l '078DD l Unit 3 Turbine Bldg. 3A i116 l
.1 - l l Steam Packing Exhauster l l
{ l l l & Air-Ejector l l l l l l 1 i l l 078E l Turbine Bldg. Counting Room 1116 l l' I l l l l {i Page 9 of 13
TABLE 2-1 (continutd) lFIREl FIRE l IDENTIFICATION I ELEVATION l l AREAL ZONE l- l (FEET) l
! l .
I I I i 50 ~ l 078EE .l Unit 3 Turbine Bldg. 3B l116 1 3 l l l ' Steam Packing Exhauster l l J l l~ -l & Air Ejector ' l I
.l l -l .
I I i l 078F, l. Unit'3 Turbine Bldg. 3A & 3B l135 l I l 'l Reactor Feed Pumps & Lube l l
]
I. l l . Oil Racks & Res. l I I 1. l I I
'l 078FF l116 l l Unit 3 Turbine Bldg. Machan- l .
.I l l ical Vaccuum Pump l l
.l l l . I I I l 078G l Unit'2 Turbine Bldg. 2A & 2B l135 l )
I .l l' Reactor Feed Pumps & Lube l I l l l Oil Racks & Res. l l l- I . l . I i l 1 078J. l Unit 2 Turbine Bldg. 2C l150 l l l l Reactor Feed Pump Turbine l l l l- l Lube Oil Rm. l l 1
-l I .I l l J l- 'l- 078K l Unit'3 Turbine Bldg.'3C 1150 I
.1- l' l Reactor Feed Pump Turbine ! l l l l Lube Oil Rm. l l ]
I l . l . l l l l- 078L l Unit 3. Turbine Bldg. 3A l165 l l .l l Reactor-Feed Pump Turbine l I I l~ .l l 1
'l- 1. 078M- l Unit 3 Turbine Bldg. 3B ~ l165 l l l~ l Reactor. Feed Pump Turbine l l
-1 l l l l l l 078N l Unit 3-Turbine Bldg. 3C l165 l l l l Reactor-Feed Pump Turbine l l 1 l I l l
]
l l- 078P l Unit 2 Turbine Bldg.:2C l165 l , Reactor Feed-Pump. Turbine
.1 -l- l l l I I I I l l l 078R l Unit 2 Turbine Bldg. 2B l165 l l l- 1 Reactor Feed Pump Turbine l l l l. I I I
'l l
-l l
078S .l-Unit.2 Turbine. Bldg. 2A l Reactor Feed Pump Turbine l165 I I ) I I I l I l l l 078T l' Unit 3 Turbine Bldg. Turbine / l165, l l l l ~ Generator & Ventilation 1195 l
]
l l 'l Equipment Rm. I l
.I l 'l . I I l l 1078U. 'l Unit 2~ Turbine Bldg. Turbine / l165, I l- l 'l Generator & Ventilation l195 l.
l- .- l . l Equipment Rm. l l l .1- l- l l l 'l :078V l Unit.3 Turbine Bldg. Condenser 191.5, 116, l 1 l l 1135 l l u Page 10 of 13
s J TABLE 2-1 (continuid) 4 3 i " l FIRE l FIRE l IDENTIFICATION l ELEVATION I l AREA l ZONE l l (FEET) l I I I I I l l 078W l Unit 2 Turbine Bldg. Condenser 191.5, 116, I [ l l l 1135 l l l l l l l l 078X l Unit 2 Turbine Bldg. Conden- 191.5, 116 I [ I l l sate Pump I l l l l l l
- l. l 078Y l Unit 3 Turbine Bldg. Conden- 191.5, 116 l l l l sate Pump l l l l l l l l l 079 l Unit 2 Turbine Bldg. Conden- 191.5 l l l l sate Backwash Receiving Tank l l l l l l l l l 080 1 Unit 3 Turbine Bldg. Conden- 191.5 l l l I sate Backwash Receiving Tank l l
[ I I I I 191.5, 116, I l l 081 1 Turbine Bldg. Elevator I l l l 1135, 165 l l ( l l l l 082 I l Turbine Bldg. Health Physics 1116 l l l l l Utility Rm. I I r I I I I I L l l 083 l Turbine Bldg. Toilet 1165 l l l l l l l l 084 i Turbine Bldg. Janitor's Closet 1165 l ( ' l l 085 l l Unit 2 Turbine to Reactor l l165 l I l l l l l Bldg. Personnel Access Lock l l l l I l l [ I l 086 I Unit 3 Turbine to Reactor 1165 l l l l Bldg. Personnel Access Lock I I r I I I I I L l l 087 i Turbine Bldg. Lube Oil Storage 1116 l l l l Rm. I I I I I I I ( l l l l 088 l Unit 2 Turbine Bldg. Lube Oil l Storage Tank 1116 I l I I I I I I l I 089 l Unit 3 Turbine Bldg. Lube Oil 1116 l { l l l Storage Tank l l I I I I l [ l l 090 l Unit 2 Turbine Bldg. Turbine / 1135 l l- l I l Generator Lube Oil Reservoir l l l l l & Equipment l I I I I I I l l 091 I Unit 2 Turbine Bldg. Turbine / l135 l l l l Generator Emergency Bearing l I l l l Oil Pump Battery l 1. l l l l l l Page 11 of 13
- j. -
TABLE 2-1 (continu d) lFIREl FIRE I IDENTIFICATION l ELEVATION I IAREAl ZONE l l (FEET) l I I I l 1 l 50 1 092 l Unit 2 Turbine Bldg. Motor 1135 l 1 l l l Control Center l l ) l I I I I l l 093 I Unit 3 Turbine Bldg. Turbine / l135 l l l l Generator Lube Oil Reservoir i l i l l & Equipment l l l l l l l l l 094 l Unit 3 Turbine Bldg. Turbine / 1135 l l l l Generator Emergency Bearing l l l l l Oil Pump Battery l l l l 1 1 l l l 095 l Unit 3 Turbine Bldg. Motor l135 l l l l Control Center i l I I I I l l l 096 ! Unit 3 Turbine Bldg. 3A 1135 l l l l Feedwater Heater I l l l 1 I I I l 097 I Unit 3 Turbine Bldg. 3B 1135 l ] J I l l Feedwater Heater l I l I I I I i l 098 l Unit 3 Turbine Bldg. 3C 1135 l l l l Feedwater Heater l l ) i I I I I l l 099 l Unit 2 Turbine Bldg. 2C 1135 l l l l Feedwater Heater i I i l I I l l l 100 I Unit 2 Turbine Bldg. 2B 1135 l , I l l Feedwater Heater l 1
-l l I l i l I 101 l Unit 2 Turbine Bldg. 2A 1135 l l l l Feedwater Heater l l l l l l l )
l l 102 l Unit 2 Turbine Bldg. 2A 1165 l l l l Feedwater Heater i l l l l l l l l 103 l Unit 2 Turbine Bldg. 2B l165 I l l l Feedwater Heater l l l 1 I I I l l 104 l Unit 2 Turbine Bldg. 2C 1165 I l l l Feedwater Heater l l 1 I i I i l l 105 l Unit 3 Turbine Bldg. 3A 1165 l l l l Feedwater Heater I l i I i l l l l 106 I Unit 3 Turbine Bldg. 3B 1165 l l l l Feedwater Heater i I I I I I I l l 107 l Unit 3 Turbine Bldg. 3C 1165 l l l l Feedwater Heater i l l I I I l Page 12 of 13
/ TABLE 2-1 (continu:d) w IFIREl FIRE I IDENTIFICATION I ELEVAT' ION I i l AREAL ZONE l l (FEET) l l l l l l [ l l 109 l Unit 3 Turbine Bldg. HVAC I195 I L l l l Prefilters & Hepafilters l l l l l ! I I l 110 l Unit 2 Turbine Bldg. HVAC 1195 I ( l l l l l l Prefilters & Hepafilters l l l l l l 111 l Unit 3 Stairway 5 NE Corner 1116, 135, 150 l l I l Turbine Bldg. 1165 I [ I I I I I I I 112 l Unit 2 Stairway 1 SE Corner I116, 135, 150 l l l l Turbine Bldg l165 l l l l l l l l 113 l Stairway 3 East Wall Turbine 1116, 135, 165 l l- l 1 Bldg. I I (. l I l I 114 l ! l Turbine Bldg. Clean Clothes Rm.I116 I l
, I I I I I l I 115 i Turbine Bldg. Toilet 1116 I
{ I I I I I l l 116 I Turbine Bldg. Janitor's Closet 1116 l l- 1 I I I ( l I 130 l Turbine Bldg. Pipe Tunnel 191.5 I I I I I I l l 131 1 Turbine Bldg. Pipe Tunnel 191.5 l l i I I 1 [ l l l l l l 51 l 136 l Emergency Cooli..g Tower i136 I l l l Stairway 2 l l ( 1 l l l l l l 137 l Emergency Cooling Tower Pump 1153 l l l l Rm. I I ( l I I I I I l 138 l Emergency Cooling Tower A 1153 l l l l Load Center l l l l l l l [ l l 139 1 Emergency Cooling Tower B 1153 l l l l Load Center I I f -l l I I I l I l 140 l Emergency Cooling Tower C l153 I I I l Load Center l l l l l l l { l i I I l l 52 l 141 I Unit 3 Pump Structure 3A-3C l116 l l l l Circulating Water Pumps l l l i I I l { l 53 l 142 I Unit 2 Pump Structure 2A-2C 1116 l l l l Circulating Water Pumps l l l l l 1 I ( l 54 l 146 l 5th Diesel Bay 1127, 151 l 1 I I I I k Page 13 of 13
r TABLE 2-2 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY [: PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3
. EXISTING PROTECTION FOR FIRE AREAS l l l Existing l Existing l Minimum Rating l Area Fire l l Fire l Fire l Area l Area l Of Fire l Severity l
{ l-Area l Zone i Detection l Suppression l Area Boundariesl (Minutes) l l l l By Zone l By Zone I (By hours) l l l l I I I I I [ l 05 1 005A l 1 Ionization l None l l 1.5 l l l 005B l 1 Ionization l None l l 1.5 l l l 005C l 8 Ionization l None l l 0.5 l [ l l 005D l 1 Ionization l None l 3 1 3.0 l l l OOSE I 1 Ionization l None I (see Notes 1 1 7.0 l l l 005F l 1 Ionization l None l and 3) l 6.0 l l l 005G l 2 Ionization l None l l 9.0 l {- l l 007 l None I None l l 1.0 l l l l l l l l r l 12 1 013A l 1 Ionization l None l l 1.5 l ( l l Ol3B l 1 Ionization l None l l 2.5 l l l 013C l 8 Ionization l None l I 0.1 l l l 013D l 1 Ionization l None 1 3 I 3.0 l ( l 1 013E.l'l Ionization l None l (see Notes 1 l 6.0 l l l Ol3F l 1 Ionization l None I and 3) l 6.0 l l l 013G l2 Ionization l None l l 9.0 I l l 015 I None l None l l 1.5 l { l l l l l l l l 06 1 020 l.1 Ionization l None l l 2.0 l l l 019 l 1 Ionization l None l l 0.0 l ( l l 022 l None l None l l 0.0 l l l 023 l 1 Ionization l None l l 0.0 l l l 005H l 15 Ionizationi Partial l 3 l 29.0 l l I(#205,l l(see Note 4)l(see Notes 1,2, I { l l l 212, I l l 3 and 4) l l l l 209) 1 I I I I l l l l l l j l l l-Page 1 of 3 I - -
TABLE 2-2 (continued) l I I Existing l Existing l Minimum Rating l Area Fire l l Fire l Fire l Area l Area l Of Fire l Severity I l Area l Zone l Detection l Suppression i Area Boundariesl (Minutes) l ] l l l By Zone l By Zone I (By hours) I l I i I I I I I l 47 l 143 l 1 Ionization l None i 1 1 0.5 l l l l 1 Heat l l (see Note 1) l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l 48 l 144 l 1 Ionization l None l 1 1 1.5 l l l l 1 Heat l l (see Note 1) l I l 1 l i I I I I I I I I I I l 13 1 028 i None l None l l 3.0 l
'l l 027 l 1 Ionization l None l l 0.5 l l l 030 l 1 Ionization l None l l 1.5 l l l 031 1 1 Ionization l None l 3 1 0.2 l l l0013H I 15 Ionization! Partial l(see Notes 1,2, l 30.0 l l l(#250,1 l(see Note 4)l 3 and 4) l l
]
I I 252, I I I I I l l 257) l l l l l l l 1 I I I I a l l I I I I l J l 25 1 072A l 4 Ionization l None l 3 l 25.0 l l l(#381)] l l(see Notes 1,5) l l l l l I l I l I l I l I l l
)
l 29 l 108 l 9 Ionization l None l 3 l 5.0 l l l(#422,1 l l (see Note 1) l l ] I I 423, I I I I I J l I 424, I I I I I l l 425, I l l l 1 l l 426, I I I I I ) i I 427, 1 I I l l l l 428,)I I I I I I I I I I I I Page 2 of 3 s
s ?' L L TABLE 2-2 (continued) i NOTES: r 1. All penetrations in fire barriers will be sealed and/or l dampered to achieve a level of protection commensurate with the hazard in the area. [- 2. An open equipment hatch will be upgraded with a closed head, close-spaced sprinkler system or a lightweight hatch cover around its perimeter.
-3. Two grate openings in the floor at the 135 ft elevation are to remain open for water drainage and pressure relief purposes in design basis accidents.
- 4. A deluge water curtain protects the area between the west side mid-section of boundary and drywell walls of Units 2
( -and 3.
- 5. A three-hour-rated door assembly- will be provided for the
[ west' boundary wall leading to Room No. 377. The wall will l be. completed on this area with three-hour-rated construction. f'. { p l l F Page 3 of 3 {: I (
k. ( L
- 3. SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
(
' 3 .1 Objectives This section describes the methodology used in the revised
( Safe. Shutdown Analysis for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3. Definitions and assumptions used.throughout the
' analysis are presented in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, respectively; where applicable, the technical and/or regulatory bases for these
{. ~ concepts are provided. Section 3.4 presents the assumptions and (1 criteria for selected safe shutdown functions and scenarios used in the safe shutdown systems analysis. Safe shutdown performance goals are stated.in Section 3.5. ' The' Appendix R ' safety functions identified for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 are .then introduced, and are represented in safe shutdown sequence diagrams. Section 3.5 also introduces the Peach Bottom ( safe shutdown systems in their. safe shutdown operating modes. (' The analysis methodology is then described in Section 3.6, along with the process followed to define essential shutdown f_ components and electrical cables (including potential associated [ circuits of concern) and to develop an Appendix R separation analysis. The Appendix R Evaluation Diagrams, which are the f basis for the separation analysis, are introduced. Finally, the methodologies applied in resolving the issue of associated Page 3-1 I .
circuits of concern, and the process used to identify instances of nonconformance with Appendix R separation criteria are presented.
]
3.2 Definitions This section establishes the principal definitions of terms used in the safe shutdown analysis of Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3. These terms are based on industry standards and/or regulatory criteria. ) 3.2.1 Safe Shutdown Definition ] A condition which exists when the plant is being controlled in a hot shutdown or a cold shutdown condition. Basis ) The requirements for safe shutdown are defined in 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III.L. These requirements specify conditions ] which must exist, based on technical specifications, for the
]
plant in hot and cold shutdown conditions. The NRC Standard Review Plan Section 7.4 (" Systems Required ) for Safe Shutdown") defines safe shutdown systems as those that must function to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition in the plant. These include systems used to maintain subcriticality and provide adequate core cooling to achieve and maintain both hot and cold shutdown conditions. The term safe Page 3-2 )
s ., P l-shutdown, as used throughout 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, applies to { both hot and cold shutdown functions. Based on NRC Regulatory Goide 1.139 (Published For Comment), the safe shutdown of a nuclear power plant following an event not related to a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) has typically been interpreted as hot shutdown. During hot shutdown, heat removal is achieved by the main steam system and either the normal feed f- system in conjunction with the main condenser, or the high-pressure injection systems in conjunction with the condensate s'orage tank, RHR heat exchangers (in the suppression pool cooling mode), and the suppression pool. In accordance with these previous definitions, the safe ( shutdown of a nuclear power plant is a condition which exists when the reactor is subcritical and adequate core cooling is maintained. It may be the achievement and maintenance of a hot shutdown condition, the achievement of a transition to cold shutdown, or the- achievement and maintenance of cold shutdown conditions. Any of these conditions an acceptable ( is non-operating condition and therefore safe shutdown is defined as the achievement of hot shutdown or cold shutdown. 3.2.2 Hot Shutdown Definition A condition which exists when the plant meets the criteria { for hot shutdown as specified in the technical specifications for
' Peach Bottom:
1 Page 3-3 I -- -
]
A plant condition in which the reactor is in the shutdown mode and the reactor coolant temperature is ] greater than 212 0F. J Basis ] Peach Bottom tomic Power Station Technical Specifications. 3.2.3 Cold shutdown Definition A condition which exists when the plant meets the criteria ) for cold shutdown as specified in the technical specifications for Peach Bottom: A plant condition in which the reactor is in the 1 shutdown' mode, the reactor coolant temperature is equal J to or less than 212 F, and the reactor vessel is vented to atmosphere. Basis Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Technical Specifications -3.2.4 Alternative Shutdown Capability Definition ] Alternative shutdown capability is a means to safe shutdown provided by rerouting, relocating or modifying existing safe shutdown systems to assure the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions independent of the equipment associated with certain fire areas. Basis 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.G.3. t Page 3-4 j
s . ? L [ 3.'2.5 Associated circuits of concern Definition (' Safety-related and nonsafety-related cables that have a separation from the fire area less than that required by Section [ III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 and have either: (1) A common power source with the shutdown equipment and [- the power source is not electrically protected from the post-fire shutdown ' circuit of concern by coordinated r circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices; or L (2) A' connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation will adversely affect the shutdown capability, e.g., RHR/RCS isolation valves; or (~ (3) A common enclosure, such as a raceway, panel or [ junction box, with the shutdown cables and are not L electrically protected from the post-fire shutdown circuits of concern by circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices, or will allow propagation of the fire [ into the common enclosure. Basis ( Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees with Plants Licensed Prior to January 1, 1979, from Mr. D.G. Eisenhut (NRR/DL),
SUBJECT:
" Fire Protection Rule (45 FR 76602, November.19,
(' 1980)", Generic Letter- 81-12, dated February 20, 1981, and Clarification of Generic Letter. 3.2.6 Fire Area Definition A fire area is defined as that portion of a building or l_ plant that is separated from other areas bf boundary fire barriers (walls, floors and ceilings with any openings or penetrations protected with seals or closures having a fire t-Page 3-5
s 1 resistance ~ rating equal to that required of the barrier). Unprotected open stairwells and hatchways in ceilings and floors are not fire area boundaries. Basis This definition of a fire area is based on Appendix A of BTP 9.5-1, as is the rating required of a boundary fire barrier. This requirement mandates that the rating of the boundary or barrier must exceed with margin the fire loading in the area and need not~be three-hour rated unless the fire loading in the area warrants a boundary with such a rating.
]
These fire protection requirements are based on sound fire protection engineering principles, and are intended to provide reasonabit: assurance that at least one safe shutdown system is
]
free of fire damage after a postulated fire in any fire area. 3.2.7 Fire Barrier Definition A fire barrier is a continuous vertical or horizontal membrane, such as a wall or floor / ceiling assembly, that is designed and constructed with a specified fire resistance rating. Fire barriers limit the spread of fire and restrict the movement
]
of smoke. Such barriers may have protected openings. Basis ] National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), Life Safety Code Handbook, Second Edition, 1981 Chapter 3. Page 3-6 ) J
/ L. r 3.2.8 Safe Shutdown Equipment (and Circuits) L
' Definition r
L Equipment (and circuits) which may be used for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown in the event of an unmitigated fire in (' a plant area. Basis { Redundant methods of achieving safe shutdown conditions are f .available to the operator in the event of a fire. Section III.G to Appendix R recognizes this inherent redundancy and requires ( that at least one such method be sufficiently protected so as to remain free of damage (hot and cold shutdown) or be repairable to allow for timely achievement of cold shutdown in the event of a ( fire. Verification and demonstration that at least one path of safe shutdown systems is free of fire damage for each fire area demonstrates compliance with the rule. Where a safe shutdown path cannot be shown to meet the reqcirements of Section III.G~to Appendix R and where the technical basis to support an exemption [ request cannot be demonstrated, fire protection and/or safe shutdown system modifications are proposed to assure availability of the method. 3.2.9 ' Spurious Operation Definition The maloperation of electrical or electromechanical l components caused by circuits energized or de-energized as a result of fire damage. Page 3-7 I
L Basis
. Cables that are not part of safe shutdown circuits may be
-damaged by the. effects of postulated fires. This cable damage
]
-consequently may prevent the correct operation of safe shutdown
-components or result in the maloperation of other equipment which )
-would directly prevent the proper performance of a safe shutdown system. The effects of spurious operation may be conceptually divided'as follows:-
}
(1) Maloperation of safe shutdown equipment due to control circuit interlocks between hot shutdown circuits and other circuits;
)
(2) Maloperation of equipment which is not defined as part of the safe shutdown systems, but which could prevent the accomplishment of a safe shutdown function. 3.3 . Fire' Damage
-This section describes the basic assumptions made with . regard to fire damage. These assumptions are utilized in the safe shutdown' analysis of Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 ]
and'3.
- 3. 3.1: -Assumptions )
'(1) Electrical Cables Two modes of electrical cable failures are assumed in the event of a fire:
Integrity of ele'ctrical cables is considered lost
-(a) . -when exposed to postulated fires if cables are essential in supporti'ng safe shutdown equipment operability; and }
)
Page 3-8 1
L f i [ (b) Electrical cable degradation, as a result of exposure to. postulated fires, is assumed to result in spurious component actuations by failure of the associated electrical circuits. (. Three types of cable short conditions which are of ( sufficiently low likelihood that they are considered not credible for this analysis are: CASE 1) 3-phase ac power circuit cable-to-cable faults { (4kV and 480V) CASE 2) 2-wire ungrounded de power circuit cable-to-h- cable faults (250V and 125V)
. CASE 3) 2-wire ungrounded dc control circuit cable-to-
[ cable faults (125V) (2) Fire Brigade Commitment-l- Brigade commitment to the fire is considered to be one hour. 3.3.2 Basis for Fire Damage Assumptions ( _(1) Electrical Cables r (a) The loss of electrical cable integrity after L exposure to'any fire regardless of its intensity is a conservative assumption. f ' (b) . With respect to Cases 1) and 2), no conductor-to-conductor faults within the same power cable can cause spurious powering of the associated device. Only cable-to-cable connections between one [ de-energized and one energized power circuit could cause spurious operation. In the case of the g three-phase ac circuits, three electrically l independent cable-to-cable shorts must occur without grounds in order to power the associated device. Similarly, for the two-wire ungrounded dc l: circuit, two electrically independent cable-to-cable shorts without grounds must occur. With respect to Case 3), such cable-to-cable j faults causing spurious operation are excluded 4 based on similar technical considerations. b Page 3-9
The NRC Staff has acknowledged that the events ) described in Cases 1), 2,) and 3) have a sufficiently low probability of. occurence to permit exclusion of such conditions from consideration-(Federal Register Vol. 48, No. 36 at ] 19963). The basis for excluding the cable short conditions listed in Cases 1), 2), and 3) is that it is necessary to have multiple cable-to-cable ) electrically independent faults in order for spurious operation to occur. - (2) Fire Brigade Commitment Plant areas containing safe shutdown equipment are 1 equipped with automatic detection systems, which J provide warning of a fire within the first minutes of fire initiation. This analysis is conservative in its estimate of brigade response time and does ) not take credit for early suppression, automatic or otherwise. 3.4 General Analytical Assumptions In order to perform the systems analysis and interpret the ) results, certain assumptions, general criteria, and objectives were established. Some of these are not tied to any one specific regulatory requirement but are identified in order to facilitate
}
the technical review of the safe shutdown and alternative shutdown capabilities at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station.
'Section 3.4.1 describes the fire scenarios to be utilized in the analysis, and summarizes the events that will be assumed to occur as a result of the postulated fires. Section 3.4.2
]
discusses the- normal safe shutdown- control locations and the conditions under which the operators would cease using the normal ) safe shutdown methods and proceed to use the alternative shutdown l s 1 Page 3-10 J i
i methods and locations. Section 3.4.3 relates selected assumptions and definitions used in the systems analysis to b specific Section III.G.2 requirements. The objectives of preventing spurious operation of safe shutdown components and the assumed limitations on simultaneous occurrence of spurious events are presented in Section 3.4.4. The modifications that will and will not be considered as providing alternative shutdown capability are described in Section 3.4.5. Finally, assumptions regarding manpower and off-site power and repair-considerations are discussed in Sections 3.4.6, 3.4.7 and 3.4.8, respectively. 3.4.1 Fire Scenari6 To demonstrate the safe shutdown capability of Units 2 and 3, a spectrum of postulated fire exposures is assumed to occur in given-plant areas. These fires involve either in situ or transient combustibles. The postulated fires may affect adversely those systems, structures or components essential to { safe plant shutdown. The most limiting condition with respect to the availability of off-site power is assumed. No failures other than those which occur as a direct result of the postulated fires are assumed. Credit is taken post-fire for the tripping of breakers and other electrical protective devices prior to reaching an unrecoverable plant condition. 1 Page 3-11 t .
Local manipulation of equipment (motor-operated valves, etc.) is not considered alternative' shutdown if this equipment is locally aligned as a result of unavailability of conventional control from the Main Control Rcom. Credit is taken for reactor trip and verification of control rod insertion in.the Main Control Room. Reactor trip can be initiated and verified prior to evacuation, should it be necessary. The reactor could also be scrammed by opening the output breakers for the Reactor Protection System. Valves are assumed to be in their normal position. In the event of damage .to motor-operated valve power cables, it is assumed that the valve position does not change. Operating personnel are expected to use normal procedures to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition when a fire is detected. The alternative shutdown equipment outlined in this report will be available for -use according to emergency procedures, if operating personnel determine that the normal procedures cannot be completed due to fire-induced equipment failures. 3.4.2 Transfer From Normal Safe Shutdown to Alternative Shutdown Safe shutdown is normally accomplished from the Main Control Room by utilizing the safe shutdown equipment along with other available equipment. Limited operator actions may be taken outside the Main Control Room for fires in specitic fire areas. Page 3-12 i N
J 1 This is the preferred shutdown method and is defined as " normal safe shutdown". If there is a fire in the Main Control Room, Cable Spreading RoomorEmergencyShutdown}anelArea,whichharthepotentialto interfere with safe shutdown from the Main Control Room, the operators will proceed to the alternative shutdown stations. The alternative shutdown method is described in detail in Section 5. 3.4.3 Section III.G.2 Separation Analysis , Section III.G.l(af specifies the separation requirements for (-
" hot shutdown conditions". The analysis assumes that safe shutdown conditions are achieved when the safe shutdown functions described in detail in Section 3.5 are met.
After the safe chutdown functions are defined, a subset of systems and components necessary to perform these functions is also defined. Circuit separation in accordance with section III.G.2 is verified in order to demonstrate that one train is free of fire damage. Sections III.G.2 Parts (a), (b), and (c) specify the i separation requirements which will ensure that one train of safe shutdown circuits is free of fire damage. This analysis assumes that any circuit which ' meets any of these three scparation requirements will have one train free of fire damage and that no further analysis of those circuits is necessary. Page 3-13
l l Sections III.G.2(d), (e), and (f) specify the separation requirements for safe shutdown components inside noninerted containment. This portion of the regulation is not applicable to Peach Bottom because the containments are inerted during reactor operation. 3.4.4 Spurious Operation As part of this safe shutdown analysis, safe shutdown system , components were reviewed to assess the effects of potential spurious operations. The initiation of fire-induced spurious operations does not cause an instantaneously occurring unrecoverable plant condition; if such a condition develops, it develops over time. Therefore, in those cases where Section t III.G.2 protection is not provided, sufficient time must be available for the operator to stop spurious operation before it causes permanent equipment damage and/or an unrecoverable condition in the plant. The time required for the operator to terminate spurious operation- prior to components experiencing permanent damage will be verified. 3.4.5 Alternative Shutdown Section III.G.3 specifies that alternative or dedicated shutdown capability must be provided for areas where Section III.G.2 separation cannot be achieved. This analysis assumes that alternative shutdown capability will be defined as s modifications which ;hange the circuit characteristics of safe shutdown components. For example, rerouting of a cable to avoid Page 3-14 I
s a specific fire area will not be considered as an alternative shutdown capability modification. However, modification of a safe shutdown electrical circuit to allow isolation of a component with a spurious operation potential following q initiation of the fire will be defined as providing an alternative shutdown capability. For the purpose of this safe chutdown system review, alternative shutdown is defined as one of
~
the following: (1) Control of safe shutdown systems or components from the ( new alternative shutdown stations; and (2) Modifica+ ion of snfe shutdown circuits such that circuit characteristics have been affected. This could involve installation of a transfer switch or isolation device. Local operator actions in lieu of control from the Main Control Room is not considered to be alternative shutdown, i 3.4.6 Manpower capability This analysis assumes that any manual capability credited as part ref the safe shutdown system for the purposes of this review, will be based on verification that, at minimum, sufficient numbers of operating shift personnel will be available to fight the fire and perform the necessary operator actions. The only requirement is that sufficient time must be available to restore the affected safe shutdown system function prior to the occurrence of an unrecoverable plant condition. For this analysis, a time-line/ manpower concept is utilized to establish that sufficient time is available for restoration of Page 3-15
the safe ' shutdown system function. The resulting time-line diagram shcws the number of personnel involved in performing each safe shutdown function and the time required to perform those functions. The time-line diagram demonstrates that sufficient time and personnel are available to perform the safe shutdown functions. All operators and fire brigade members are drawn from on-site personnel with the staffing level specified by current procedures. Although a recall procedure can be credited with increasing the number of operators available for repair and ) manual actuations after a fire, this analysis does not take credit for a recall procedure. 3.4.7 Off-site Power The analysis verifies that all safe shutdown systems and ccmponents which require electrical power are powered by on-site power sources, The post-fire survivability of on-site power sources is verified as part of the safe shutdown system review. Off-site power is considered a potential initiator of spurious component operation. The analysis verifies that the spurious re-introduction of off-site power will not have a detrimental effect on safe shutdown capability. Further, potential spuriously-operated components will not be dispositioned due to dependence on off-site power. In summary, Page 3-16
off-site power is not credited with providing any beneficial effects for 72 hours, while it is assumed to affect adversely safe shutdown capability. 3.4.8 Repairs The NRC Staff position regarding repair of hot and cold shutdown systems or components states, in part, tnat "all manual operations must be achieved prior to the fire or fire suppressant-induced maloperation reaching an unrecoverable plant condition". This position is contained in an NRC Memorandum. 1 The analytical approach used for the Peach Bottom alternative shutdown review is consistent with this NRC Staff position: { o ,As noted in the NRC memorandum, the removal of fuses for isolation of hot shutdown circuits is prohibited. The NRC Staff has mc3ified this position by granting exemptions for the removal of hot shutdown equipment fuses to prevent a spurious operation for low-voltage circuits. This pertains as long as the fuses are clearly marked, easily accessible, and do not involve ( any significant electrical threat to the operator when removing them. 1/ Memorandum to Mr. R.H. Vollmer (NRR/DE) from Dr. R.J. Mattson (NRR/DSI),
SUBJECT:
" Position Statement on Allowable Repairs for Alternative Shutdown and the Appendix R Requicement for Time Required to Achieve Cold shutdown", dated July 2, 1982.
p Page 3-17
The analysis addresses this position by assuming removal of fuses for isolation of components that are not part of safe shutdown systems. The analysis addresses the issue of post-72 hour maintenance of cold shutdown in the following manner: (1) Demonstrates the ability to maintain on-site power sources significantly longer than 72 hours; and (2) Assumes that repair of the Dalance of the Plant (BOP) power feeds to the lE buses is feasible during this extended time period without the necessity of having specially developed procedures, equipment, and training.
'These analytical assumptions allow for the repair of off-site power connections on an as-needed basis with materials on hand, utilizing ~ procedures developed post-fire for the specific repair tasks.
3.5 Safe Shutdown Systems This section establishes the basis for the safe shutdown systems analysis. The safe shutdown performance goals are discussed in Section 3.6.1. Next, the Appendix R-based safety functions and the safe shutdown systems selected to perform them are presented in Section 3.5.2. Finally, Section 3.5.3' briefly describes the safe shutdown systems in their normal. safe shutdown operating modes. 3.5.1- Safe Shutdown Performance Goals The performance goals 'areL the set of general objectives which are the basis for designing any safe shutdown method. This Page 3-18
section presents the performance goals as criteria for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions. These critcria are consistent with the requirements of the regulations for a plant licensed prior to January 1, 1979. Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 states that: ( One train of systems necessary to achieve safe shutdown from the Control Room or Emergency l l Control Station (s) should be maintained free of fire damage by a single fire... Further clarification of the Staff rule is indicated in the Fire Protection Rule Generic Letter 81-12 and was used in establishing the performance goals. ( The criteria are established to comply with the regulatory requirements, to ensure the integrity of the fuel rods, and to avoid pressurization of the primary system in excess of the safety limits after a single fire and shutdown. The performance goals to ensure ( the above requirements for Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3 with or without off-site power are: (1) Reactor shutdown. Insert sufficient negative reactivity to maintain the reactor in a subcritical condition. (2) Coolant inventory. Restore and maintain the reactor vessel water at a level which is sufficient to preclude fuel failure due to cladding heatup. ( (3) Overpressure protection. Prevent overpressurization of the reactor vessel beyond the safety limits. (4) Decay heat removal. Remove the decay heat and provide sufficient capability to allow the transition from hot to cold shutdown. 1 Page 3-19
1 (5) Process monitoring. Provide sufficient information to determine the status of the reactor vessel, suppression pool, and water inventories. 1 (6) Support services. Provide support to all of the above functions. 3.5.2 Safe Shutdown Functions The safe shutdown functions and the systems necessary to satisfy those functions are determined by considering the performance goals established in Section 3.5.1. Figures 1 3-1A,B,C,D,E and F present the safe shutdown sequence diagrams for this analysis. The functions and systems that satisfy those functions are identified and described below. 3.5.2.1 Reactivity Control Function Reactivity control will be accomplished by insertion of the l l control rods and will result from an automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip or from operator initiation of a manual trip. This action will de-energize the RPS to actuate a reactor scram. The effects of fires on the RPS are not considered to preclude the initiation of an automatic or manual reactor scram and control rod insertion. For the postulated fire events, the reactor vessel would be isolated by closure of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). Immediately following MSIV closure, decay heat generation would cause the reactor vessel pressure to increase to the setpoints of as many main steam relief valves as would be required to ( Page 3-20 l
e I-fA
. terminate the pressure increase. The affected relief valves
- would open to pass steam and its associated energy directly from the reactor vessel to 'the pressure ~ suppression pool. The emerging st'eam would be condensed by the mechanism of heat transfer to - the suppression pool water.-
( The. events up ~to this ' point all would have occurred automatically or by operator action, leaving the reactor vessel
. isolated behind the closed MSIVs. Decay heat generation would would have r add energy'.which to be removed. The two major
( objectives that would then require immediate operator attention means of-( - are the reactor vessel level control and pressure control. 3.5.2.2 Reactor Coolant Make-Up Control Function (Vessel Level Control) For the -postulated fire events, reactor coolant make-up
- control' can" be - achieved by
~
(~ - isolation- of the reactor coolant system and control of vessel ~ coolant level using water injected into the isolated reactor . vessel at -high pressure. Water can also be injected into the isolated reactor vessel at lower ( pressures (with the Core Spray System) after a manually-initiated { remote depressurization of the vessel using the main steam relief
. valves of the Nuclear' System Pressure Relief System (NSPRS).
In each u'ait , two independent sys'tems, the High Pressure Coolant Injection System- (HPCI) and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling-System-(RCIC) are provided for water injection at high
)
l I .Page 3-21 (
r-pressure into an isolated reactor vessel. Both systems require only de electrical power for operation and are comprised of steam turbine-driven pumps; the steam .is taken from the main steam piping upstream of the MSIVs and the turbine exhaust steam is discharged into the pressure suppression pool. Both systems are normally aligned to allow pumping of water from the condensate
]
storage tank to the reactor vessel. For this analysis, it is assumed that the immediate action ] following reactor scram and MSIV closure will be the operator manually initiating the HPCI or RCIC systems to restore and
]
maintain the reactor vessel level. The operator will achieve
]
this objective using intermittent remote-manual operation of these systems. Successful maintenance of pressure boundary integrity for the reactor coolant systems is also a necessary part of achieving inventory and pressure control. Thus, closure of MSIVs and main
]
steam line drains, residual heat removal shutdown cooling, reactor water cletan-up (RWCU) valve will be verified in order to ) assure the integrity of the pressure boundary. The likelihood of inadvertent opening of these boundary isolation valves is then reduced by using additional Safety Relays (detailed in Section 5) and by isolation of the power supply to these valves. Two sources of water are available to these high pressure systems in each unit. The source that is normally aligned to supply,these systems (condensate storage tank) contains enough Page 3-22
)
1 / l stored water to replace that lost from the reactor vessel for well over eight hours. The pump's suctions for each of the two high pressure systems can be remote-manually shifted to the suppression pool (torus) by the operator. For this analysis, { suction of HPCI and RCIC will be initially shifted from the ( condensate storage tank to the suppression pool by operator action, in order to take advantage of the initial lower water temperature in the suppression pool. When the suppression pool temperature reaches 140 F, the high pressure systems will be supplied from the condensate storage tank. This mode of ( operation (initial suction from the supression pool with subsequent suction from the condensate storage tank) maximizes the time during which the systems are supplied using low temperature suction sources. Ample time will be available for isolation of the suppression pool suction and automatic transfer to the condensate storage tank. ( As a related matter, the HPCI system is equipped with an automatic logic which will automatically shift the suction of the HPCI pump from the condensate storage tank to the suppression pool, if pool water level increases to a certain setpoint. Based on a previous station analysis, this water level setpoint is reached in approximately three hours. Ample time will be available in any of the Appendix R safe shutdown scenarios for L the operators to secure this suction path irt a closed position (by manually opening the respective valve circuit breakers), if necessary. ( Page 3-23
f For fire events that may render the high pressure injection systems unavailable for reactor vessel level control, this analysis takes credit for using a minimum of three main steam relief valves (of the 11 in the NSPRS) to achieve controlled, rapid reactor vessel depressurization to the point where one pump of the Core Spray System (CS) will provide make-up water to the
]
reactor vessel. The core spray pump will be taking suction from the suppression pool. Though the Core Spray system is identified as the source of make-up water once reactor vessel
]
depressurization is achieved, any low pressure system (such as LPCI) could be used at this point in order to supply make-up water to the reactor vessel. 3.5.2.3 Reactor Coolant Pressure Control Function Protection from overpressurization of the isola +.ed reactor vessel, prior to controlled cooldown and depressurization, is provided by 11 main steam relief valves (SRVs). These valves are located on the main steam lines upstream of the MSIVs and are capable of automatic actuation, requiring no external source of power other than reactor vessel steam pressure. The 11 SRVs are part of the Nuclear System Pressure Relief System (NSPRS). Each of these.ll primary relief valves can also be remote-manually operated. This requires the availability of pressurized control air and power for pilot solenoid actuation. Five of the 11 primary relief valves associated with the NSPRS are equipped with Page 3-24
l accumulators which maintain sufficient pressure for 100 days in the event that instrument air is unavcilable. For the postulated fire scenarios, sufficient stored drywell control air is available; this permits the desired number of { remote-manual relief valve actuations from the Main Control Room ( during the cooldown/depressurization period. The accumulators provided for five of the relief valves are sized to permit five operations per valve. This stored capacity will allow for depressurization of the reactor pressure vessel at 100 F/hr to between 125 and 150 psig by using remote-menual operation of the NSPRS relief valves from the Main Control Room. When reactor vessel depressurization is performed by using the six main steam relief valves for which no accumulators are provided, bypass of the Group II containment isolation and restoration of instrument air pressure will be verified. For this analysis, depressurization of the reactor vessel is performed in a manner that is in accordance with the particular fire scenario and according to equipment availability. However, since drywell cooling capability may be lost under some of the postulated fire scenarios, early depressurization of the reactor vessel will help to reduce the reactor coolant saturated-liquid temperature and thus reduce the driving potential for heat transfer into the drywell. Once depressurization is achieved, and depending on system availability, maintenance of reactor pressure may be attained by use of HPCI, RCIC or NSPRS. Under Page 3-25
the same conditions, maintenance of reactor vessel level may be achieved by using HPCI, RCIC or the Core Spray System. For achieving cold shutdown conditions, one SRV is operated at approximately 110 psig until reactor pressure is below the isolation setpoint for the shutdown cooling mode of the RHR (75 , psig) and the RHR shutdown cooling is in service. 3.5.2.4 Residual Heat Removal Function Following a postulated reactor trip for which off-site power loss is assumed, decay heat is removed initially by natural , circulation within the reactor pressure- vessel and operation of SRVs. The SRVs discharge steam from the reactor vessel to the pressure suppression pool. The emerging steam is condensed in this pool; heat is removed and transferred to the river by operation of the Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) in the ) suppression pool cooling mode, and by the High Pres 7re Service
~ Water System (HPSW).
The large heat sink provided by the suppression pool water can be effectively utilized only as long as the steam, which is being discharged into the pool from the SRVs, is condensed. For Peach Bottom, this requires a pool temperature of less than 200 0F. In addition, utilization of the suppression pool mode requires that the RHR pumps meet net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements (NPSH limit is 195 F). Page 3-26 s
s N ( Calculations performed for Peach Bottom have demonstrated that torus water temperatures will be within acceptable operating limits as long as at least one RHR heat exchanger loop per unit is placed in service for suppression pool cooling within three r hours after scram. This safe shutdown analysis verifies that at ( least one RHR heat exchanger loop in each unit is operable within one hour after scram if one high pressure injection system is available, and immediately after scram if high pressure injec-tion systems are unavailable because of fire damage. After reactor vessel temperature is reduced to approximately ( 300 F, the RHR system is operated in the shutdown cooling mode, which provides long-term core cooling in order to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions. For this safe shutdown analysis, one operating RHR heat exchanger loop in the shutdown cooling mode and the HPSW loop associated with the RHR loop, assure stable cold shutdown conditions by removal of decay heat ( in each unit. In this shutdown cooling mode, the ultimate heat sink is the river. Certain fire scenarios may result in unavailability of RHR operating capability in the shutdown cooling mode un'til the shutdown cooling isolation valves are opened. Should the shutdown cooling mode of RHR not be available, even for both reactors, the units can still be maintained in the safe shutdown J condition. In this situation, the NSPRS, HPCI or RCIC can be used for pressure control; HPCI, RCIC or CS for reactor inventory Page 3-27 J
l control; and the RHR in suppression pool cooling mode provides safe shutdown capability until shutdown cooling mode capability is restored. This approach (providing shutdown cooling using the SRVs to the torus) is approved in the Peach Dottom FSAR as a valid option for providing shutdown cooling if the shutdown cooling mode of operation for RHR is unavailable. 3.5.2.5 Process Monitoring Function The operator requires a means to ascertain the values of various plant parameters in order to perform required system transitions and essential operator actions. Various process monitoring functions must be available to adequately support the achievereent and maintenance of the reactor coolant make-up, pressure control and decay heat removal functions. For the postulated fire scenarios, the maintenance and control of safe shutdown conditions require that reactor pressure and water level, suppression pool temperature and condensate storage tank level instrumentation be available. The indicating ranges of these instruments cover the normal operating bands and will operate until ac power (on-site) is restored. Monitoring instrumentation will also include HPCI and RCIC diagnostic instrumentation (both turbine and pump). For other safe shutdown systems, sufficient instrumentation will be available locally to warrant no further analysis. 3.5.2.6 Support Functions Various plant systems are required to provide support to the
- systems selected to accomplish the previously defined safety.
Page 3-28 )
functions. The safe shutdown systems which accomplish a support function for the postulated fire scenarios are: AC Emergency Power System (AC) DC Emergency Power System (DC) Emergency Service Water System (ESW) ( - High Pressure Service Wa'er c System (HPSW) For a postulated fire with loss of off-sita power, the { Standby AC Power Supply and Distribution System (the AC Emergency ( Power System) is the source of ac electrical power to the other safe shutdown systems. Essential components of this system are the diesel generators and supporting equipment (control power, air-start system and diesel fuel supply), the 4kV emergency switchgears, and the 480V emergency load and motor control centers. Total loss of the off-site power to either unit's auxiliary switchgear buses does not affect safe shutdown because all ac-powered equipment required for safe shutdown is fed from the 4kV emergency switchgears. For the postult.ted fire scenarios, the diesel generators either start automatically upon loss of off-site power which resui.ts in automatic transfer, or all ac on-site power restoration is performed by operator action. Enough fuel oil is stored ir. each diesel generator's day tank and the combined diesel storage tank to provide sufficient fuel for seven days of operation of each diesel generator at full-rated load. Each day tank provides for two-and-one-half hours of operation of the associated engine at full load. Operation of at least one fuel oil transfer pump (to provide fuel transfer from Page 3-29 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .._O
1 l the storage tanks to the day tanks) is sufficient to support operation of two diesel generators. For the postulated fire scenarios, unavai1= hili ty of the area cooling equipment for the diesel generators will not result in a challenge to safe shutdown. Modifications to the existing power configurations, which are detailed in Section 5.2.3 will ensure that cooling equipment is available. The diesel generators are providad with starting air supply receivers which are adequately pressurized. Emergency station batteries are used for electrical control power to the air-start system. Cooling water to the diesel engines is provided from the Emergency Service Water System. For safe shutdown, the 125/250V and 250V DC Power Supplies and Distribution System (the DC Emergency Power System) will supply the safe shutdown loads for 125V and 250V de control power. For the postulated fire scenarios, at least one train of 125/250V generation (batteries) and distribution for each unit is required for safe shutdown. The systems and components supported by the DC Emergency Power System are: HPCI and RCIC power and control Process monitoring instrumentation Control power to 4kV breakers and diesel generators NSPRS control Page 3-30 1
w M L F-( For the postulated scenarios, stored battery energy is sufficient k to support safe shutdown until ac on-site power and battery charging capability are restored. The safety function of the Emergency Service Water System cooling water to selected safe ( (ESW) is to provide a supply of shutdown equipment. This system is common to Units 2 and 3. For safe shutdown of both units, operation of one ESW loop is sufficient to support cooling of the diesel generators. The safety function of the High Pressure Service Water System (HPSW) is to provide a supply of cooling water for the RER ( system during the achievement and maintenance of safe shutdown. Each HPSW pump is sized to accommodate the heat removal requirements of one RHR heat exchanger. The same operational considerations that apply for RHR are applicable to this system. A common tie exists between the supply piping of both unit's ( HPSW. Thus, the safe shutdown capability of both units can be assured by operating two pumps of the HPSW of either unit, provided that local valve alignments are performed. 3.5.3 Safe Shutdown Systems (- The safe shutdown systems necessary to perform the safe i shutdown functions discussed above are described in this section, Figure 3-2. These systems are the HPCI, RCIC, NSPRS, RHR, CS, Page 3-31
f .. Process Monitoring Instrumentation, ESW, HPSW, and Emergency Power Systems (ac and dc). 3.5.3.1 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) The HPCI system consists *of a steam turbine which drives a pump, and system piping, valves, control and instrumentation. The HPCI system safe shutdown flow path is shown in Figures 3-4-la and 3-4-lb.
'The HPCI controls automatically start the HPCI system upon receipt'of a low reactor vessel water level signal or primary containment high pressure signal. .The controls then function to provide make-up water flow to the reactor vessel until the amount of water delivered to the reactor vessel is adequate (vessel level is 45 inches), at which time the HPCI automatically shuts down, The controls are arranged to allow remote-manual startup, operation, and shutdown, if necessary. There is no impact on safe shutdown capability (within the context of this analysis) if automatic initiation is not available. A speed governor limits the turbine speed to maximum operating level. A control governor receives a HPCI flow signal from the Main Control Room controller and adjusts the turbine steam control valve so that the designed HPCI pump discharge fl.ow rate is obtained. The flow signal used for automatic control of the tucbine originates from a flow element in the HPCI pump discharge line, t
Page 3-32 l
L For this analysis, HPCI operation is based on the operability of the flow controller instrumentation loop. Hydraulic pressure is supplied for both the turbine control valve and the turbine stop valve by the dc-powered oil pump during { startup, and then by the shaft-driven hydraulic oil pump when the ( turbine reaches operating speed. The controls for the turbine auxiliary oil pump are arranged for automatic or manual operation. Upon receiving a HPCI initiation signal, the auxiliary oil pump starts and provides hydraulic pressure to open the turbine stop valve and the turbine control valve. As the turbine gains speed, the shaft-driven oil pump begins to supply hydraulic pressure. When the pressure supplied by the shaft-driven oil pump is sufficient, a high oil pressure signal is sent to the the auxiliary oil pump and it automatically stops. Operation of the gland seal condenser components (which are the gland seal condenser condensate pump, blower and water level 7 switch)' prevents out-leakage from the turbine shaft seals. Startup of this equipment is automatic. Since failure of these components will not prevent the HPCI system from providing water to the reactor vessel, the components and controls are not defined as essential for safe shutdown. Page 3-33 l
The. turbine is automatically shut down by tripping the turbine stop valve closed if any of the following conditions are detected: (1) Turbine overspeed, (2) Turbine high exhaust pressure, (3) Pump low suction pressure, (4) Reactor vessel high water level, and (5) Auto-isolation signal.
.The protection logic for safe shutdown is included only to
]
assess the' impact of. spurious- system trips by fire-induced fail-ures, since operator actions ensure HPCI system function. With
~the exception of the mechanical -turbine overspeed trip, all sig-nals can be isolated by de-energization of the turbine auxiliary trip solenoid.
All automatic valves in the HPCI are equipped with remote-manual test capability so that the entire system can be operated , from the Main Control Room. All essential components of the HPCI control operate independently of normal ac power. A .normally closed dc motor-operated isolation valve is
-located in the turbine steam supply line just upstream of the turbine stop valve. Upon receiving a HPCI manual or automatic
~
~ initiation signal, this valve opens and remains open until closed by operator action from the Main Control Room.
Page 3-34 I
s An inside-drywell and an outside-drywell isolation valve has been provided in the steam supply to the turbine. .These valves are normally open. Tha steam supply line isolation valve incide the drywell is controlled by an ac motor. The valve outside the drywell is controlled by a de motor. These valves automatically close upon receipt of a HPCI turbine steam line high flow signal, ( or a HPCI turbine steam supply low pressure signal or high steam line space temperature signal. For this analysis, securing those valves in their open position by opening the respective valve breakers is credited as a post-fire operator action. The HPCI turbine exhaust line is equipped with vacuum breakers to prevent suppression pool water from being sucked into the line. The line to the vacuum breakers is equipped with an automatic isolation valve. The isolation signal for the valve consists of a high drywell pressure signal and a low reactor _ pressure signal. (. For this analysis of fire scenarios, post-fire opening of f the associated valve's breaker (at the HPCI motor control center) and valve alignment verification can be performed locally by the k operators if necessary. The pump suction valves are part of the HPCI system. One valve provides pump suction from the condensate storage tank and the other two, in series, provide suction from the suppression chamber. The condensate storage tank is the initial source. If the water level- in the condensate storage tank falls below a Page 3-35
preselected level, the suppression chamber suction valves auto-matically open. When the suppression chamber valves are both fully open, the condensate storage tank suction valve auto-matically closes. Two level switches are used to detect the condensate storage tank low water level condition. The sup-pression chamber suction valves also automatically open and the condensate storage tank suction valve closes if a high water level is detected in the suppression chamber. Two level switches monitor the water level. For the postulated fire scenarios, this logic circuitry for the safe shutdown system is presented to help determine potential spurious valve actuations. Credit is taken for operator action regarding remote-manual suction valve alignments of the preferred path, and securing the other path by isolation of the associated valve's breakers if necessary. Two dc motor-operated HPCI pump discharge valves are pro-vided in the pump discharge line. The inboard valve is normally closed and will be opened by remote operator action. To prevent damage by overheating at reduced HPCI pump flow, a pump discharge minimum flow bypass is provided back to the suppression chamber. The bypass is controlled by an automatic, dc motor- operated valve. At HPCI high-flow, the valve is closed; at low flow, the valve is opened. A flow switch in the HPCI pump dis- charge-line provides the necessary signals. There is also an interlock provided to shut the minimum flow bypass whenever the turbine is Page 3-36
4 I w r L tripped. This is necessary to prevent drainage of the condensate storage tank into the suppression pool, which is at a lower elevation. For this analysis, this valve circuitry is essential in dealing with spurious HPCI system starts. The steam supply line drain isolation valves fail in their closed position on loss of control air. This will not pose a challenge to HPCI, which will be run intermittently. The con-densate drains for the turbine exhaust side are either manually 1 operable or are provided with de solenoid-operated valves. During test operation, the full HPCI pump discharge can be routed to the condensate storage tank. DC motor-operated valves are installed in the pump discharge test lines. These valves have been included for HPCI safe shutdown. During the HPCI injection phase, this path will be secured. However, this full flow test return line capability can be used for reactor vessel pressure control and depressurization to approximately 200 psig. Essential instrumentation for HPCI operation monitoring consists of turbine and pump suction and discharge pressure, discharge flow, flow controller and turbine speed indication in ( the Main Control Rorm.
,. 3.5.3.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) i The RCIC system consists of a steam-driven turbine pump unit, valves, associated piping and instrumentation. Figures
3-4-2a and 3-4-2b show the safe shutdown flow path of this system. All components necessary for initiating operation of the RCIC are completely independent of auxiliary ac power, plant service air and external cooling water systems, requiring only de power from the station battery to operate. The power source for the turbine pump unit is the steam generated in the reactor pressure vessel by the decay heat in the core. The steam is piped directly to the turbine, and the turbine exhaust is piped to the suppression pool. The RCIC turbine pump unit either
-starts automatically upon receipt of a reactor vessel low water level signal', or is started by the operator from the Main Control Room by remote-manual controls.
For this analysis, the RCIC automatic start logic is not essential for safe shutdown. RCIC is operated intermittently under operator reraote-manual contrui. The monitoring instrumentation required for RCIC operation includes both pump and turbine supply and discharge pressure, discharge flow (flow controller) and turbine speed. The turbine control system is positioned by_the-demand signal from the RCIC flow controller, which is- under Main Control Room operator supervision. The turbine controls provide for automatic shutdown of the RCIC turbine upon receipt of the following signals: Turbine overspeed, Turbine high exhaust pressure, Page 3-38 I
L f L Pump low suction pressure, Reactor vessel high water level, and ( - Auto-isolation. Since the steam supply line to the RCIC turbine is a primary containment boundary, certain signals automatically isolate this line, causing shutdown of the RCIC turbine. Although the automatic trip logic circuitry is not deemed essential for this analysis of fire scenarios, it is included in the subsequent assessments of RCIC operability in order to address the issue of . potential fire-induced spurious operation. The steam supply to the turbine comes from the main steam line upstream of the isolation valves, and it exhausts to the suppression pool. The pump can take suction from the condensate . storage tank or from the suppression pool. The pump discharges either to the feedwater line or to a full-flow return test line , to the condensate storage tank. A minimum-flow bypass line to thc suppression pools is provided. Cooling water for the RCIC
',urbine lube-oil ccoler is supplied from the discharge of the pump.
For this analysis of fire scenarios, all RCIC valve operations are under operator remote-manual control from the Main Control Room. Credit is taken for the operator securing the desired flow paths in the open or closed positions by opening necessary motor control center breakers (post-fire). Vacuum Page 3-39
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breakers are connected between the RCIC turbine exhaust line " yJ.
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'i. upstream of the penetration through the torus shell, and the M ?, ,% Q :p.y. % torus air space. The vacuum breakers are arranged to prevent a .; 2"'J.-
- , + . g&.. . .
;; negative pressure in the section of turbine exhaust piping i.U . 5
.o& J.. .:W t .:.:. . between the torus and the upstream stop-check valve. TC* f.;.g,
.n. k For this analysis, the vacuum breaker isolation . . .
,,,<1p.gs .H M motor-operated valves can be secured and locally realigned (if ;2 ",, ., .-
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# necessary).
1d.%.- .T* gn :%N, TM: ?,Q Lack of instrument air pressure is assumed for this . '.". ..
.g. s. :. .:.; .J. N analysis. If the RCIC system is operated normally, there should .k N ;[
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0.1 3.5.3.3 Nuclear System Pressure Relief System (NSPRS) W Ej
, .c. % '.
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26 . The Nuclear System Pressure Relief System includes two 6. . . . .5 : ' ' i
. s[:- - ?,.qr y .T s safety and 11 relief valves, all of which are located on the main M. '
d '. ;/.-
'.; y steam lines within the drywell, between the reactor vessel and l .>
>- '~G.h. ;;.
, .. c ... . , it. .% the first isolation valve, Figure 3-4-3. The safety valves MM.) z :s . ..n i:Nk provide protection against overpressurization of the nuclear h..h,.$ [ . ti. .s,. - k>+ system and discharge directly to the interior space of the 9 Q .:
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drywell. SMi.
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4,,. }.% For this analysis, the relief valves, which discharge to the pno,,
, +,
fe i d. suppression pool, servr two main protection functions: g:. ;.ic- {-ij e, j
"$; (1) Overpressure relief operation. The valves are opened [
(by overpressization or by remote-manual operation) to $'@ [f[f l.; limit the pressure rise and preclude safety valve 7-5~ i.7.. ,' - opening. -
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[ (2) Depressurization operation. When required, the relief valves operate to provide manual or automatic depressurization. Each valve is self-actuating at its pre-set relief pressure, but may also be actuated by indirectly operated devices which exist to permit remote-manual or automatic opening at lower ( pressures. For depressurization operation, each relief valve is provided with a power-actuated device capable of opening the { valve at any steam pressure above 100 psig, and capable of ( holding the valve open until the steam pressure decreases to approximately 50 psig. All of the relief valves can be operated by remote-manual controls located in the Main Control Room via energization of a pilot solenoid (de). Remote-manual controls are also provided f for three relief valves at the emergency shutdown panels.
- The-automatic depressurization logic of the NSPRS uses the ,
solenoid-actuated capability of five of the eleven main steam relief valves. Each of these five relief valves is equipped with { an accumulator and check valve arrangement. These accumulators (' are provided to assure that the valves can be held open followirig failure of the supply to the' accumulators, and they are sized for '. a minimum of five valve operations. Additionally, the accumulators are airtight; therefore there -is sufficient air pressure to provide a valve operating capability of 100 days. h The-automatic depressurization logic of the NSPRS is not essential for safe shutdown. ( Page 3-41
]
3.5.3.4 Residual' Heat Removal System (RHR) Figures 3-4-4 and 3-4-5 show the safe shutdown flow paths for the RHR system of. each unit. The equipment which comprises this systea. and which requires operation and control, includes: (1) RHR pumps and heat exchangers, (2) Pump suction valves, (3) Pump minimum-flow bypass valves, (4) Shutdown cooling valves, (5) Injection valves connecting RHR pumps to the reactor vessel, (6) Containment spray valves (7) Suppression pool test line, (8) Suppression pool spray header valve, and (9) RHR room coolers. Three modes of operation of RHR are identified for safe shutdown: suppression pool cooling mode, shutdown cooling mode and low
. pressure coolant injection mode. All operations for any of these RHR operation modes can be remote-manually or locally initiated.
Shutdown Cooling Mode This RHR system operation mode is used during safe shutdown once reactor vessel pressure is below 75 psig. Reactor coolant is pumped by one of the RHR pumps from one of the reactor recirculation loops, through the RHR heat exchanger where cooling is accomplished by heat transfer to the High Pressure Service 1 Page 3-42 m
s I c Water System. Reactor coolant is then returned to the reactor vessel by the recirculation loop. For this analysis, one RHR pump and its associated heat exchanger per unit are sufficient to complete the cooldown to cold shutdown conditions after the reactor vessel has been ( _depressurized below 75 psig. System initiation and operation is performed by operator actiori f rom the Main Control Room. For the postulated fire scenarios, credit is taken for operators securing the necessary recirculation paths by locking-open the respective valve alignments, if required. Process monitoring RHR instrumentation provide adequate ( instrumentation and local monitoring during this mode of operation. Logic circuitry for this mode of RHR is not essential for safe shutdown, since there will be ample time for operator action. In order to align at least'one RHR shutdown cooling path, stroking of six valves and l confirming alignment at least five additional valves are ( of necessary. For this analysis of safe shutdown, the RHR vessel head spray and loop cross-tie valves are assumed locked-closed with their associated breakers in the open position. Suppression Pool Cooling Mode This mode of RHR operation is used to limit the temperature of the water in the suppression pool to ivis than 195 F (the NPSH limit for RHR pump operation). In tne suppression pool cooling mode, one RHR pump is aligned to pump water from the f i Page 3-43 1
L suppression pool through one RHR heat exchanger, whtre cooling takes place by heat transfer to the High Pressure Service Water. i- . System. The flow returns to the suppression pool through the full flow test-line. . Water pumped through the RHR heat exchanger may be diverted to spray headers located in the drywell for containment cooling purposes, if necessary. The drywell may heat up during cartain fire scenarios if containment coolers are not operational. In this event, operator action may be required to align the RHR system to allow operation of the containment sprays. Operation and alignment of this P system is under operator remote-manual control from the Main Control Room. Under certain fire scenarios, this system may be operated by performing local valve alignments after verifying
' that the respective valve breakers are open.
To initiate the supression pool cooling mode of cperation, three valves will be stroked, and correct alignment will be
. verified for two additional valves (assuming one RHR pump in
- shutdown cooling mode). No additional instrumentation is )
essential for safe shutdown. Process monitoring functions and local:RHR instrumentation are sufficient for this mode of RHR operation. No interlock logics are essential for safe shutdown. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Mode This mode of RHR operation is used to restore water level in
' the. vessel during cold shutdown in the event that core spray is Page 3-44 l
L ( not available. This is accomplished using one RHR pump taking suction from the torus and injecting into the reactor vessel. Valve alignment requirements are similar to those specified for the supp"ession cooling mode. No additional instrumentation or interlock logics are essential for safe shutdown. RHR Pumps RiiR pump operation will be accomplished from the Main Control Room under remote-manual operator control. In the shutdown cooling mode, a throttling valve located in the discharge of the A and D pumps (before the associated heat exchanger) is used to regulate RHR coolant flow as cooling 1 requirements diminish. A mininum-flow bypass 1ine, which routes water from the pump's discharge to the suppression chamber, is provided for each pump in order to protect the pump from overheating at low flow rates. A single motor-operated valve controls each bypass line; this valve opens automatically upon sensing low flow in the discharge line from the associated pump. The valve also closes automatically whenever the flow from the f associated pump is above the low-flow setting. The RHR minimum flow bypass valves are controlled by differential pressure switches across each RHR pump. For the postulated fire scenarios, these valves are credited with protecting the RHR pumps until they can be secured by operator action, in the event that a spurious start condition develops. Page 3-45 i
. Support equipment for the RHR pumps includes 4kV generation and distribution equipment.
3.5.3.5 Core Spray System (CS) For each unit, the Core Spray- System consists of two independent loops. lEach loop includes two electric motor-driven centrifugal pumps, a spray sparger- located in the reactor vessel above.the core, piping and valves to convey water from the suppression pool .tsr the sparger, and the associated controls and instrumentation. Figure 3-4-6A,B shows the safe shutdown flow . -paths for the CS system. The four CS pumps are- powered from the 4kV emergency switchgear. Each CS pump motor and its associated automatic motor-operated valves receive ac power from separate buses. Similarly, control power for each loop of the CS system comes
- from separate dc buses.
The CS pumps. and all automatic valves can be operated individually .by manual switches in the Main Control Room. Operating information is provided- in the Main Control Room by pressure indicators. flow indicators, and indicator lights. For this safe shutdown analysis of postulated fires, only one- pump and its associated valves are essential for safe
~s hutdown. -This system performs the reactor coolant makeup function in the event that both high pressure injection systems (HFCI.and RCIC) are unavailable due- to fire damage; this system Page 3-46
L will be used once manual depressurization of the reactor vessel results in vessel pressures below 330 psig. All operations are performed by operator remote-manual action from the Main Control Room. When the system is operated, water is taken from the suppression pool through a normally open motor-operated valve. In addition, two motor-operated valves are provided in each loop to isolate the CS system from the nuclear system. These valves { admit CS water to the reactor when signalled to open. The outboard valve is normally open and the inboard valve is normally closed. The inboard valve can be opened remote-manually when reactor (. vessel pressure drops below a pre-selected value. A low-flow bypass line is provided from the discharge of each pump, to below f the surface of the suppression pool. The bypass valve opens automatically on a low flow signal and closes automatically on a high flow signal. The bypass flow is required in order to ( prevent the pump from overheating when pumping against a closed discharge valve. { Flow-measuring instrumentation is provided in each CS pump ( discharge line, and provides flow information in the Main Control Room. 3.5.3.6 Process Monitoring instrumentation The plant process parameters which are essential for supporting safe shutdown are: ( Page 3-47 l
(1)- Reactor vessel pressure (2) Reactor vessel water level (3) Torus water temperature (4) Condensate Storage Tank (CST) water level
.There are- two types of instruments which support safe shutdown:
(1) Instruments which sense and indicate the process parameters without the need for electrical power; and (2) Instruments based on transducers / transmitters, and indicating devices for which electrical power is necessary (typically 24V de-fed from the 125V dc Emergency Power System through 125V dc/120V ac static inverters). i The firstEtype indicate the sensed parameters using a local gauge or meter and thus require local operator action. The second type of instrument channels have remote indication in the Main Control Room. With the exception of torus water temperature, the safe shutdown parameters have mechanically based monitoring instruments which provide information locally. These instruments, the corresponding process variables, the indicating range, and their locations are shown below: Page 3-48
=-
h I l l l l L - 1: l : Process' i Indicating I l 1 Instrument -l Variable -l Range l Location l
.1 l- 1 I i 1 . I I l l l LIS-2(3)57,- -l1 Reactor Level'l +50-165ft l Reactor Bldg.l l-58A and 58B l' l l El 165' l I 'l i I I l PI-2(3)60A l Reactor 1 1500 psig iReactor Bldg.I
(. - l and 60B' l1 Pressure- l l El 165' I t l . l . I I I lLLIS-2(3)216 I. CST Level l 0-40ft ITurbine Bldg.l l I l l.El 116' I h I' l l l l l In.' addition ~ to 'these gauges, monitoring instrumentation
- loops are selected to support: safe. shutdown at Peach Bottom for Main ~ Control' Room readout.
(' 3.5.3.7.- Emergency Service Water System (ESW)- This' system-providesithe essential coolin'g water supply for l- the emergency diesel generators. The. ESW system.is common to r both units.- The . system consists of two full-capacity pumps, [ installed in parallel in the pump structure, and associated heat (; , exchangers, valves and controls. The normal water-supply for the
- emergency. service water pump is- the pond. The pump discharge
- piping consists"of two.1 headers, with service- loops to ensure
. vater supplyfto the ' diesel-engine coolers and selected equipment-diagram for the two ESW pumps and
~
coolers. A' safe shutdown flow (; - normal safe shundown ESW system paths is presented in Figure 3'-4-7.- 'A common discharge- header routes the system effluent to g:
- l. the pond.. For -this; analysis of- safe shutdown, the ESW pump's
[ Page 3-49
L; discharge path to the emergency cooling water pumps is isolated
. by remote-manual or local' operator . action.
The preferred return
. path- cans be ' secured in an open condition by opening the respective ~ valve breaker-at the respective motor contro1' center
.(this will be'a post-fire action).
For safe shutdown, one ESW pump is started automatically whenever the : emergency diesel generators are started or by operator' remote-manual action from the Main Control Room. One operable ESW pump is sufficient 'to . satisfy the cooling J requirements for both units simultaneously. For each unit, one. normdlly open motor-operated valve is provided; it connects the
- ESW path'to the RHR/CS' room- and seal coolers. For this analysis of safe shutdown, re-alignment of this valve is performed locally if' required.
To avoid ESW pump run-out conditions when the pumps are
. supplying cooling water to the Emergency Core Cooling System room )
-coolers,; isolation of selected and unnecessary heat exchangers
~
can De performed' locally. The: pumps breaker; position indicator is thefonly instrumentation essential .for safe ~ shutdown. . The
. pumps'!4kV power is~ supplied by. Diesel Generators B and C, and i'
ithe: respective breakers'are located'at the Unit 2 switchgear. i n .
L t p. L F 3.5.3.8 High Pressure Service Water System (HPSW) L The safe shutdown objective of the High Pressure Service Water System (HPSW) is to provide a supply of cooling water for the RHR. system. The HPSW system for each unit consists of four pumps installed in parallel in the pump structure. This system's safe shutdown paths are indicated in Figure 3-4-7. The water supply for the pumps is the pond. f Each pump's discharge is provided with a manifold and a normally closed, motor-operated gate valve. This configuration ( separates the four pumps into groups of tvo. The gate valve can be secured in its closed position by opening the respective motor i control center breaker (post-fire), if required. Two parallel (. headers run from the pump structure to the Reactor Building. Each header delivers the discharge from two pumps to two RHR heat exchangers which are in parallel. Normally closed, motor-operated isolation valves on the HPSW pump discharge side of each of th.e RHR heat exchangers are provided. Remote-manual operation from the Main Control Room, or [ local stroking of at least one of-these valves will be required when the respective RHR loop is operated. Isolation of the unnecessary HPSW paths can be performed locally by securing the motor-operated valves in their closed positions, or by closing the manually-operated isolation gate valves at the inlet piping to the RHR heat exchangers. Page 3-51 l h
An inter-tie is provided between the Unit 2 and 3 HPSW pump discharge headers. Two manually-operated isolation gate valves (normally.closeu) are provided in the inter-tie, one in each unit's HPSW pump structure. In the event that one unit's HPSW pumps are inoperable, the other unit's HPSW pumps can supply the RHR cooling needs of both units simultaneously. Both inter-tie gate valves require local manual operation. Other HPSW valves can be remote-manually or locally aligned in accordance with the selected RHR heat exchanger loops. The pump 4kV breaker and local process instrumentation are the
]
indicators only instrumentation necessary for safe shutdown. 3.5.3.9 AC Emergency Power System The plant's standby AC Power Supply and Distribution System
-(AC Emergency Power System) sincludes an on-site, independent, automatically or manually started emergency ac power source which supplies power to essential safe shutdown equipment in the event that off-site power sources are unavailable.
The ac emergency power source for both units consists of four diesel generators. Each diesel engine is equipped with its own auxiliary componentr.. These include compressed starting air, fuel oil, lube oil, cooling water, voltage regulator and controls. Cooling water is provided by the Emergency Service Water Syntem (ESW). Page 3-52 E
s, Ik i L
- Starting power for.each diesel engine is supplied from cach
[. respective high-pressure starting air system. Energy for h ; starting a diesel-- engine is derived- from two air accumulators
'(receivers); each contains enough .high pressure compressed air
{; for five' starting. sequences. There are' four diesel generator -fuel-oil- day tanks, { physically separated from each other. The supply piping is h arranged so that each day tank supplies fuel to one emergency i diesel generator. Four fuel . oil transfer pumps provide transfer capability from.the underground storage. tanks.to each' individual
. diesel generator's day tank. Each day tank contains sufficient fuel to operate the diesel engine at full load for two-and-a-half
(? hours. Each storage tank holds enough fuel to support a diesel' engine operating at full load for seven . days. The valving ( configuration allows-one fuel oil transfer pump to feed fuel oil _to.each individual-day tank from any of the underground storage
-tanks'(Refer-to Figure'3-4-16). One operable. transfer pump can
[ - support continuous operation of two diesel . generators at full p load,; provided that local valve alignments are performed.
- Existing local (automatic and manual) transfor switches allow operation ef the fuel ' oil transfer . pumps-independently of the Main Control. Room, provided that ac . power is -present at the
[ . corresponding local motor control center. Page 3-53
)
4.16kV (4kV) Emergency Switchgear Each diesel generator is capable of supplying ac power to
-one path of safe shutdown equipment through its respective 4kV emergency switchgear (Figures 3-4-10, 3-4-13).
Loss of voltage to the 4kV emergency switchgear buses is sensed by undervoltage relays. Upon sensing that condition, master relays start the diesel generators automatically, trip the normal and the feed circuit breakers and trip all motor feeder breakers on the emergency buses. The em'ergency generator circuit breakers which connect each ' diesel generator's output to the corresponding emergency switchgear for each unit are closed when rated voltage is obtained. For this safe shutdown analysis, start and sequence-loading of the diesel generatet, when off-site power is lost can be performed remote-manually under operator supervision in the Main Control Room. The 4kV emergency buses supply the ac power
]
required for safe shutdown. All 4kV emergency switchgear are the metal-clad indoor type equipped with three-pole circuit breakers ) having stored-energy closing mechanisms. Circuit breakers are electrically operated. Control power for all 4kV breakers is 125V de, supplied from the station emergency batteries. Each 4kV i emergency switchgear'is. housed in separate Emergency Switchgear Rooms (four per unit, eight total). For this safe shutdown analysis, the essential 4k breakers at the emergency switchgear can be operated remote-manually from- the Main Control Room. If Page 3-54
L 1 L necessary, and depending on the particular fire scenario,-opening ( of nonessential 4kV circuit breakers can be opened locally by f mechanical (stored-energy) trip. These non essential breakers
'can.be isolated by removing the respective cubicle's 125V dc
( control power fuses. The 120V ac power system provides power for necessary services for which interruption should be avoided but [ is not vital for plant safety (Figures 3-4-12, 3-4-15). ( 480V AC Emergency Power Distribution The 480V ac emergency distribution system satisfies all low { voltage ac station safe shutdown demands. The power source is the 4kV ' emergency switchgear via 4kV/480V ac load center transformers. Power from the 480V emergency load center ( switchgear buses is fed to the emergency motor control centers for distribution to support safe shutdown loads. There are four { load center switchgear buses in each unit. The corresponding f circuit breakers feed the essential motor control centers. Figures 3-4-lla, 3-4-11b, 3-4-llc, 3-4-14a, and 3-4-14b indicate the safe shutdown paths for the AC Emergency Power System. 3.5.3.10 DC Emergency Power System The 125/250V DC Fower Supply and Distribution System (DC Emergency Power System) supplies power for operation of 4kV l emergency switchgear, HPCI, NSPRS, RCIC, diesel generator logic and control circuits, and essential instrumentation-(through static inverters). There are two, independent 125/250V, un-grounded three-wire, de systems for each unit. Each system is Page 3-55
)
comprised of two 125V batteries; each has its own battery charger. .The safe shutdown de system for Unit 2 and the loads on each battery are shown in Figures 3-4-Sa and b. The system for Unit 3 is shown in Figures 3-4-9a and b. The chargers operate from 480V sources supplied from separate 480V motor control centers, Each of these motor control
]
centers is connected to an independent emergency ac bus. The 125V chargers are-capable of carrying the normal dc system load and, at the same time, supplying charging current to keep batteries in fully charged condition. The battery distribution system for each unit consists of two main distribution panels, each having a 125/250V dc, three-vire ungrounded main bus equipped with three-pole manually operated fuse disconnecting switches. These distribution panels in turn feed the respective HPCI and RCIC 125/250V de motor control centers in the Reactor Building, and two distribution panels located in the common Cable Spreading Room During normal operation, the 125/250V dc loads are fed from ) the battery chargers, and the batteries float on the system. Upon loss of ac power, the entire -dc load is drawn from the batteries. The batteries are sized to provide six to eight hours of operation for continuous operation of all de emergency equipment after a-loss of ac power. However, when the emergency diesel generators start', the battery chargers are energized to assume the load and recharge their associated batteries. ! Page 3-56 1
s f k 3.6 Analysis of Safe Shutdown Systems 3.6.1 Objectives This section discusses the methods used. to analyze safe ( shutdown systems, demonstrate compliance wit! 10 CFR 50 Appe.. dix R, and respond to Generic Letter 81-12. The methodologies outlined include those necessary to identify or determine the following: (1) Safe shutdown components, circuits, electrical cables, and their locations in the plant; (2) Separation of redundant safe shutdown methods; f (3) Associated circuits of concern; (4) Fire suppression effects ana).ysis; and (5) Instances of Appendix R nonconformance. 3.6.2 Identification of Safe Shutdown System Components Subsection 3.5 describes the specific safe shutdown systems which will be used to achieve safe shutdown. This subsection ( discusses the method used to select safe shutdown components at Peach Bottom for Units 2 and 3. For each system, plant flow diagrams (hereafter referred to as P& ids), system descriptions, and one-line diagrams are used to identify the safe shutdown flow paths and operational characteristics that must be established to accomplish the { desired safe shutdown functions. From this information, a list was compiled which identified the components that participate in Page 3-57
)
each safe shutdown system's performance of its safe shutdown function. These components can be categorized as follows: (1). Active components that need to be powered to establish or assist in establishing the primary flow path and/or the system's operation; (2) Active components in the primary flow path that normally are in the proper position and whose power loss will not result in a change of position, but may be affected by opens, shorts, or grounds in control cabling; (3) Power-operated components which need to change position to establish or assist in establishing the primary flow path and whose loss of electrical or air supplies result in the component adopting the required safe shutdown position but which may be affected by opens, shorts, or grounds in control or power cabling; (4) Components which control system components and monitor process variables; and (5) Major mechanical components which support safe shutdown. From the analysis of the safe shutdown flow paths, those components whose spurious operation would threaten safe shutdown
]
system operability were also identified. This identification included those branch ilow paths which must be isolated and ) remain isolated to assure that flow will not be diverted from the primary flow path. See Subsection 3.6.5 for the detailed discussion of spurious operations. Refer to Figures 3-4-la through 3-4-16 for a highlighted set of P& ids and single-line diagrams.- A list was generated which identified safe shutdown devices, t their required electrical supporting services, and plant Page 3-58
v locations. The safe shutdown component list developed for Peach Bottom includes the components- required to protect the safe ( shutdown capability from the exposure fire damage postulated in
-Appendix R. This list is provided as. Table 3-1 for both units.
3.6.3 Identification of Safe Shutdown Circuits and Cables The safe shutdown component list developed during the safe shutdown analysis was the basic input for the identification of electrical circuits essential to ensure adequate equipment performance. All electrically dependent devices in Table 3-2 were evaluated in order to identify the corresponding safe shutdown electrical circuits. The circuits identified included ( power (4160V ac, 480V ac and 125/250V dc), centrol (120V ac and (. 125V dc) and instrumentation. The identification and analysis of the above essential ( electrical circuits were based on one-line diagrams, elementary circuit drawings, and cable block diagrams. Based on this analysis, all of the necessary circuit cables were selected for (. the later phase of cable routing and separation analysis. For each electrical circuit, all circuit cables that ensure f component operability with no detrimental failure were iden-tified; these circuit cables were defined as required for safe shutdawn. The only exceptions to the above criteria were those annunciator, computer, motor station heaters and external { monitoring circuits that are electrically isolated from the k . electrical circuits of concern. Page 3-59
l
-The Peach Bottom conduit 'and cable raceway schedules were then used.to identify the individual cable's physical routings.
For each safe shutdown system, a package was also developed which contained the following information: (1) Safe shutdown component data sheet; (2) Mark-up of cable block diagrams with identified essential cables; and, (3) Cable and raceway output with cable routing information. This routing information was extracted and used to identify the location of these cables in electrical layout drawings. 3.6.4 ' Appendix R Section III'.G Evaluation Diagrams and Separation Analysis In order to complete an evaluation of the separation of safe shutdown components and cables, Appendix R Section III.G evaluation diagrams were developed. The purpose of these diagrams is to present, on a safe shutdown system basis, all the information necessary to conduct a ' safe shutdown equipment separation analysis in accordance with the regulatory requirements. For Peach Bottom, these diagrams were prepared for the following safe shutdown systems: (1) High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) - Figure 3-5-2 (2.) Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) - Figure 3-5-1 (3) Nuclear System Pressure Relief System (NSPRS) - Figure 3-5-3 (4) Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Figure 3-5-4 (5) Core Spray (CS) - Figure 3-5-5 Page 3-60 1
( (6) Process Monitoring Instrumentation - Figure 3-5-1 (7) Emergency Service Water (ESW) - Figure 3-5-6 (8) High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) - Figure 3-5-7 (9) AC Emergency Power System - Figure 3-5-8 ( (10) DC Emergency Power System - Figure 3-5-9 In order to complete an evaluation of the separation of the ( safe shutdown components and cables for Emergency Diesel Generators were developed cable block diagrams Figures 3-5-10a through 3-5-10f. These evaluation diagrams provide the following information for both units ( (1) Major plant fire areas contained within rated fire barriers, by plant elevation. These areas are not represented to scale nor do they necessarily correspond [ to contiguous rooms. Major plant boundaries for which t no fire rating is assumed are also indicated. r (2) Equipment location and identification, including ( instrument racks and electrical distribution and control panels. ( (3) Safe shutdown power, control and instrumentation cables interconnecting various system components, and their location within fire areas. To explain the contents of the evaluation diagrams, a sample for one safe shutdown component is presented along with all elec-trical circuit information. (Refer to Figure 3-3.) First, the component is located in its proper fire area. For this example,
-a single fire area is shown. The component is shown as a square labeled MO 2316. This component is identified in Table 3-1 for HPCI.
Page 3-61 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ )
The power and control cables to this device are identified by referring to the appropriate single-line diagram and cable block diagram, respectively. (Excerpts from these documents are presented at the bottom of Figure 3-3.) These cables are located in the cable and circuit schedule (excerpt at the top of Figure 3-3) which identifies the cable route. This cable is identified on the evaluation diagram, indicating those fire areas through which the cable is routed. The information contained in the evaluation diagrams facilitates: (1) An area-by-area (fire area approach) evaluation of postulated fire effects on safe shutdown systems, and a determination of areas for which redundant safe shutdown methods are separated by rated fire barriers; (2) A dettrmination of which redundant system (or trains within a particular system) is the more appropriate candidate for modifications to achieve Section III.G.2 compliance; ] (3) Selection of adequately separated new cable routes or determination of areas where raceway fire protection is to be used; (4) A determination of these area (s) and system (s) which are candidates for an alternative shutdown approach, the required modifications, and the location for alternate control-station (s); (5) A graphic demonstration of these essential cables for alternative shutdown which are to be isolated from the fire area (s) of concern; (6) A graphic representation of the independence of the 3 selected equipment and cables (of the alternative shutdown method [s]) from the fire area (s) of concern; f (7) A determination, by fire area, of potential associated circuits and the resolution selected. Page 3-62 i
)
L p L { Using the evaluation diagrams, a separation analysis was ( -conducted for all safe shutdown- systems in accordance with the Appendix R separation criteria and the assumptions, definitions, criteria 'and safety functions defined for Peach Bottom. Preference was. given to the identification of safe shutdown methods which were independent of the individual areas under consideration. Modifications to provide Section III.G.2 [ separation in nonconforming areas were considered next (upgrading of. fire barriers, raceway fire protection modifications and cable rerouting). For those cases in which the existing plant f1 - configuration could not be brought into comp.iance with Section III.G.2, the evaluation diagrams were used to define an ( alternative shutdown method, selecting those components, systems ( and trains most suitable for proposing alternative shutdown modifications. When modifications for Appendix R specific ( compliance-in a particular' plant area could be detrimental to existing plant safety and/or would not result { in further enhancement.of the existing or proposed level of fire protection k safety, a specific exemption was identified. The subsequent fire hazards analyses and bases and the proposed exemptions are h included in Section 7. f g (- Page 3-63 ( l
)
3.6.5 Associated Circuits of Concern 3.6.5.1 Introduction The separation and protection requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R apply not only to safe shutdown circuits but also to " associated" circuits, those circuits which could prevent operation or cause maloperation of shutdown systems and
}
equipment. The identification of these associated circuits of concern was performed for Peach Bottom in accordance with NRC ] Generic Letter 81-12 and the Staff's Clarification to Generic Letter. The latter further defined these associated circuits of concern as those which have a physical separation less than that required by Section III.G.2 of Appendix R, and have one af the following: (1) A common power source with the shutdown equipment and the power source is not electrically protected from the circuit of concern by coordinated breakers, fuses, or similar devices; (2) A connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation would adversely affect the shutdown capability; (3) A common enclosure with the shutdown cables, and, (a) are not electrically protected by circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices, or ] (b) will allow propagation of the fire into the common enclosure. 3.6.5.2 Identification of Associated Circuits by Common Power Supply and_ Common Enclosures The AC and DC Emergency Power Systems consist of: , I (1) 4kV ac switchgear and emergency diesel generato s, _ / Page 3-64
L (2) 480V ac load centers and motor control centers, and (3) 125/250V dc distribution buses and emergency batteries. Electrical circuit fault protection was originally designed to provide. protection for plant electric circuits via protective relaying, circuit breakers, and fuses. This protective equipment was designed and applied to ensure adequate protection of al) electrical distribution equipment from electric faults and overload conditions in the circuits. The operation of these protective devices, when cables are affected by fire-induced failures, will result in isolation of the affected electrical circuit and thus will prevent the propagation of the fault to ( other portions of the electrical system. An integral part of the original electrical system protection was the proper coordination of all these devices. [- Such coordination assures that the protective device nearest to { .the fault operates prior to the operation of any " upstream" devices, and limits interruption of elecFrical service to a minimum amount of equipment. These design practices provided confidence that no circuits ( of concern associated with safe shutdown circuits by common power supplies, or associated with saf.e shutdown circuits by common { enclosures and not being electrically protected, would exist at f Peach Bottom. As an additional check, a review was conducted for the 1982 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis, which evaluated Page 3-65
)
)
the existing electrical protection and coordination for the safe
]
shutdown power supplies at Peach Bottom. 'As expected, most of-the circuit protective devices reviewed had been properly ] selected and were coordinated. Design changes were initiated to correct the. few ' remaining during the
]
deficiencies. identified review.. For circuits- of concern associated with safe shutdown circuits by common enclosures and which could allow fire propagation to the enclosure, the e'xisting design and the proposed modifications of the fire protection features at Peach Bottom will ensure that no such circuits exist. Associated
}
circuits by common enclosure of this type are not a concern since one or both-of the following characteristics exist: } (1) Non-propagating cable jacket materials and/or fire retardant coatings are used at Peach Bottom, and
]
(2) Fire areas are (or will be) sealed at their boundaries with fire stops equivalent to these required for the 1 wall. J 3.6.5.3 Identification of Associated Circuits by Spurious
- Operation )
Cables that are not part of safe shutdown circuits may also be damaged by the effects of postulated fires. This cable damage ,, -may prevent the correct operation of safe shutdown components, or ~ result in the maloperation of equipment which would directly prevent the proper performance of the safe shutdown systems. The effects of spurious operations may be conceptually 1 J divided into two subclasses as follows: l; Page~3-66 1 J
~
_______-____.m_ .m__ _ _ - - _ _ - _
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I 1'0 m l f m'llEM ii [= lilla l.8 1.25 1.4 1.6
< 150mm
< 6" 4% /+'b
/ $b}
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IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) (( $b
/(,4&g,4# ,
k///7 9 9, !xxN'k x I.0 lfM Bu U w m M UM-l,l # h=N=
- 1.8 1.25 1.4 1.6 15Cmm >
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s. l (1) Maloperation of safe shutdown equipment due to control circuit electrical interlocks -between safe shutdown circuits'and other circuits; and (2) Maloperation of equipment which is not defined as part of the safe shutdown systems, but which could prevent the accomplishment of a safe shutdown function. Cables to equipment that is not part of a safe shutdown { system but whose spurious operation would adversely affect safe shutdown capability were considered in this analysis to be safe
' shutdown cables, to allow both operational and non operational requirements to be considered. The separation of associated circuits in this category then was handled in a manner identical
{ to those circuits required for supporting system function. Associated circuits involving high-low pressure interfaces were handled separately. For these high-low pressure interface components identified at Peach Bottom, the following methods of analysis were followed: (1) A detailed circuit review to demonstrate that fire-induced spurious actuation is not credible; or (2) A detailed circuits review to determine that fire-induced spurious actuation occurrences are credible, but circuit modification can be proposed to prevent a fire-induced failure; or (3) -Redundant components provide the high-low pressure barrier function and Section III.G.2 separation is maintained at all times; or 4 (4) Passive barriers or cable reroutes can be accomplished to provide Section III.G.2 separation for redundant high-low pressure components; or Page 3-67 [ f - - - - - - --
~
(5) Pre-fire actions can be taken, such as opening circuit breakers, to prevent fire-induced spurious operation of a high-low pressure interface component (based on the electrical failure mechanisms assumed for this analysis). The analysis presented above resulted in a list of potential
]
spurious operation candidates for which a resolution was required to protect safe shutdown capability. l-The results of these analyses were tabulated and resolution was achieved by: , (1) Providing a means to isolate the equipment when not normally needed (i.e., remove power cables, open cir-
- cuit breakers ), or t
(2) Providing a means to detect spurious operations and then undertaking procedures to defeat the maloperation of equipment (i.e., opening of oreakers to remove spurious operation, actuation of a master switch, etc.). l l , For these potential spuriously-actuated circuits or compo-l i' nents, the-resolutions are shown in Table 3-2 and, to the extent necessary, will be incorporated into operating procedures. 3.6.6- Suppression Effects Section III.G requires that both normal and alternative safe shutdown systems address the issue of potential damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of both fixed and automatic fire suppression systems.
. Existing suppression rystems and suppression activities have been adequately reviewed for potential impact on existing safe shutdown systems. Where this analysis approach identifies any t Page 3-68 l ,n., -- +-u
k r L new alternative shutdown locations or suppression systems, a suppression system review will be conducted. This effort will determine the potential for detrimental impact of new or existing suppression systems on new alternative shutdown equipment or the [. impact of a new suppression system on existing safe shutdown For example, if this analysis specifies the ( components. installation of new transfer switches or a new local control station, then a review will be made of that specific area to determine whether existing or proposed suppression activities could affect the new local control station. 3.6.7 Identification of Areas of Conformance/ [ Nonconformance with Appendix R, Section III.G The results of the detailed separation analyses described in the preceding section indicate: (1) The fire areas which meet the criteria of Appendix- R, Section III.G, (2) The fire areas requiring modifications to meet the [_ criteria, and (3) The fire areas that incorporate equivalent protection ( and for which exemptions are requested. A summary of the results of that analysis for Peach Bottom (' Units 2 and 3 are documented in Table 4-1 of Section 4. [ Page 3-69 (
[ TABLE 3-1 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
, Unit 2 - HPCI System
( -l Component l I IElectrical l l I Description l Location l Power l l l l l(Fire Area)l Supply I ( l M04245 i l TURBINE EXHAUST VALVE I l 2 I I I I 20Dll I l (VACUUM BREAKER) l l I r I i i l l I'20P26 l AUXILIARY OIL PUMP l 2 l 20Dll I I l I I I I M02-23-020 l PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE l 2 l 20Dll I l ( l l M02-23-019 i 1 I I 1 PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE l 6 l 20D11 I I I I I ( l M02-23-057 l PUMP SUCTION FROM SUPP. I 2 l 20Dll I ( l l CHAMBER VALVE I I i I I I I I i l M02-23-058 l PUMP SUCTION FROM SUPP. 2 I (- l l CHAMBER VALVE I l l l 20Dll I l l 1 -l l I M02-23-017 I PUMP SUCTION FROM CST VALVE l 2 l 20Dll I l ( I l M02-23-014 I I I I l STEAM TO TURBINE VALVE l 2 l 20D11 I I I I I [ l M02-23-015 l STEAM SUPPLY LINE ISOLATION l 18 l 20D36 I L l I l VALVE (INBOARD) l I I I i 1 I l M02-23-016 l STEAM SUPPLY LINE ISOLATION l 6 l 20Dll l i f I. I VALVE (OUTBOARD) l l l l l l l l M02-23-025 l MIN. FLOW BYPASS TO SUPP. I 2 l 20D11 l I l l CHAMBER VALVE l l 1 l 1 I I I M02-23-031 1 FLUSH LINE SHUT-OFF TO l 5 1 20Dll I l l l SUPP. POOL VALVE l l l I I I I l M02-23-024 l SHUT-OFF TO CST VALVE I 5 1 20Dll I I I I I i l M02-23-021 1 TEST BYPASS TO CST VALVE l 5 l 20Dll 1 I I I I I I I I I i l Page 1 of 27
' TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Unit 2 - HPCI System i I I IElectrical I l Component I Description l Location I Power l l l l l(Fire Area)l Supply l l l l l l l 2 1 20C04B l l l 20S37 i HPCI TURBINE l I I I 1 - 1 l 2 1 20C04B l l SV-23-054 I CONDENSATE DRAIN POT DRI.IN I I l l VALVE l I I I I i I 29 l C18 I l PT-23-100 i PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE I I l l I I l 29 1 C18 l l 1 PI-23-ll6 l PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE I I I l l 29 l C18 l j l PT-23-89 l TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY PRESSUREl l l l { l l 29 l C18 I l PI-23-lll l TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY PRESSUREl I I I I I I 29 i C18 l i PT-23-95 l TURBINE STEAM EXHAUST l l l l l PRESSURE l 1 I l l l 29 i C18 l l l PI-23-ll2 I TURBINE STEAM EXHAUST l l PRESSURE I l 1 l l l l l l l 29 i C18 l g l PT-23-83 I PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE I I i I I l l 29 l C18 l 1 PI-23-109 I PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE I I I 1 I I HPCI FLOW CONTROLLER l 29 l 20C04B l I FC-23-108 1 I I l 1 l 29 l 20C04B l I FI-23.108-1 i PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW I I I I l 29 I 20C04B l l FT-23-82 i PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW l l l l i l 1 I I l I 1 I I I I )' I I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I i l i l i l i I f I I I I I I ( i l l l I Page 2 of 27 f i
L TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Unit 2 - RCIC System ( l I . l l Electrical l l Component l Description l Location I Power l l l l(Fire Area)I Supply I ( l l M02-13-018 I-i PUMP SUCTION FROM CST VALVE 1 I 11 I l 20D12 I l l l l l l r- I M02-13-131 l STEAM TO TURBINE ISOLATION l 11 l 20D12 l k l l VALVE I I l 1 I l i I l M02-13-132 l TURBINE COOLING WATER l 11 l 20D12 I ( l l SUPPLY VALVE l l l l l l 1 l l M02-13-039 l SUCTION FROM SUPP. CHAMBER I 11 1 20D12 l I VALVE (- 1 l l l l l l l l l M02-13-041 l SUCTION FROM SUPP. CHAMBER l 11 l 20D12 l ( l l VALVE l l l ( l l I I l l M02-13-020 l PUMP DISCHARGE OUTBOARD 1 11 l 20D12 l l l ISOLATIOT VALVE l l l (- 1 1 M02-13-027 I 1 MIN. FLOW BYPASS TO SUPP. I I 11 I l 20D12 l l l l CHAMBER VALVE l l l (- - 1 l 20S38 I l RCIC TURBINE I l 11 I l 20C04C I l l l l l l
-l M02-13-030 l TEST BYPASS TO CST VALVE l 5 l 20D12 l
{ l 1 1 I I l M04244 l TURBINE EXHAUST VALVE l 5- l 20D12 l 1 I I I I (- l M02-13-021 l PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE l 6 1 20D12 I I I I I I l M02-13-016 l STEAM SUPPLY OUTBOARD l 6 l 20D12 l [ l l ISOLATION l l l t i I I I I l M02-13-015 l STEAM SUPPLY INBOARD l 18 l 20B37 l r l l ISOLATION VALVE I l l t l- 1 I I I l PT-13-65 l PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE ^ l 29 l C19 l l l l l I f l PI-13-66 I PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE l 29 l C19 l l l . I I I I I I I I l l I I l [ Page 3 of 27 ( l ____ _ _- -_
TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Unit 2 - RCIC System I- l l l Electrical l l _ Component I Description l Location l Power l l l l(Fire Area)l Supply l l 1 I I I
}
l PT-13-68~ l STEAM SUPPLY PRESSURE l 29 l C19 l 1 I I I i 1 i PI-13-69 l STEAM SUPPLY PRESSURE I 29 l C19 l L. I I I I I l PT-13-60 l PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE I 29 l C19 l I I I I I l PI-13-59 I PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE l 29 l C19 l l 1 i l l I FT-13-58 l PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW l 29 i C34 l 1 I I I I l FC-13-108 I RCIC FLOW CONTROLLER I 29 l C34 l 1 1 I I I l FI-13-108 l PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW l 29 I C34 l l l l l l l l l 1 I Unit 2 - RHR System i I I IElectrical l l Component l Description l Location l Power I ] l l l(Fire Area)I Supply l I I I I I l 2AP35 l PUMP l 1 l 20A15 l l l l l l l M02-10-015A l SHUTDOWN COOLING VALVE I 1 l 20B36 l l l 1 I I I M02-10-016A l BYPASS VALVE I 1 1 20B36 l l l l l l l M02-10-025A I SUPPLY TO VESSEL VALVE l 6 l 20B38 l l 1 1 I I I M02-10-154A I SUPPLY TO VESSEL VALVE l 5 1 *20B38 l 1 I I I I I M02-10-017 i OUTBOARD REACTOR SHUTDOWN l 6 l 20Dll l l l COOLING ISOLATION VALVE l l l l 1 I I I I I I I I Page 4 of 27
L- . h TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Unit 2 - RHR System (
.l- l l l Electrical l l Component l~ Description l Location i Power l
{' -l l l(Fire Area)l Supply I I . I I I I l M02-10-018 l INBOARD REACTOR SHUTDOWN I 18 l 20B36 I ( l l COOLING ISOLATION VALVE l l l t i I I I l l M02-10-013A I SUCTION FROM TORUS VALVE I 1 l 20B36 l 1 I I I I ( -l M02-10-026A l CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE l l l 6 l 20B38 l I I I l M02-10-031A l CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE l 7 1 20B38 l l I I I [: I I M02-10-034A'l SUPPLY TO TORUS VALVE l 5 1 20B38 l 1 I I I I ( l M02-10-039A l SUPPLY TO TORUS VALVE l 5 l 20B38 I ( l l I I I l DPIS-10-121Al PUMP PRESSURE CONTROL LS l 1 l N/A I I I I I I ( l 2BP35 1 l PUMP
-l l
I 2 l 20A16 l I I l M02-10-015B I SHUTDOWN COOLING VALVE l 2 l 20B37 I (- 1 I I I I L
-l M02-10-016B l BYPASS VALVE l 2 l 20B37 l l l l 1 I I M02-10-025B l SUPPLY TO VESSEL VALVE l 6 l 20B37 I
(- 1 I I I l l M02-10-154B l SUPPLY TO VESSEL VALVE l 5 l 20B39 l 1 I I I I ( l M02-10-013B l-SUCTION FROM TORUS VALVE l 2 l 20B37 l 1 I I I I l M02-10-026B I OUTBOARD CONTAINMENT SPRAY l 6 l 20B39 l l l VALVE l l l l~ l' l I I l M02-10-031B l OUTBOARD CONTAINMENT SPRAY l 6 l 20B39 l l l VALVE l 1 I ( l I I I I l M02-10-034B l SUPPLY TO TORUS VALVE l 5 1 20B39 l 1 I I I I l M02-10-039B i SUPPLY TO TORUS VALVE l 5 l 20B39 l l l 1 I I ( Page 5 of 27 ( _.______m_.___.___._ _ _ _ . _ . __ - - . - -
TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Unit 2 - RHR System I l l l Electrical I I Component l Description i Location l Power l l l l(Fire Area)l Supply I I I I I l l DPIS-10-121BI PUMP PRESSURE CONTROL LS l 2 1 N/A I I I I I I l 2CP35 l PUMP l 1 l 20A17 l l l 1 I l l M02-10-015C I SHUTDOWN COOLING VALVE I 1 l 20B38 I I I I I I I M02-10-016C l BYPASS VALVE l 1 l 20B38 I I I I I I l M02-10-013C I SUCTION FROM TORUS VALVE I 1 l 20B38 l I I I I I l DPIS-10-121Cl PUMP PRESSURE CONTROL LS l 1 l N/A l l l l l l l 2DP35 l PUMP 1 2 l 20A18 l l l l l l l M02-10-015D l SHUTDOWN COOLING I 2 l 20B39 l l l l l l
. I M02-10-016D l BYPASS VALVE l 2 1 20B39 l I I I I I l M02-10-013D l SUCTION FROM TORUS VALVE I 1 l 20B39 I I I I I I l DPIS-10-121DI PUMP PRESSURE CONTROL LS l 1 I N/A l l l l 1 i Unit 2 - HPSW System I I I IElectrical I l Component I Description l Location l Power l l l l(Fire Area)I Supply l I I I I I l 2BP42- l PUMP l 48 l 20A16 I I I I I I I 2DP42 1 PUMP l 48 l 20A18 l l l l l l 1' l M02486 1 DISCHARGE TO RESERVOIR 1 54 l 00B53 l I I I I I I I I I l Page 6 of 27 i
r
L I TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) / PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Unit 2 - HPSW System l I l IElectrical l r I Component l Description i Location l Power I ( l l l(Fire Area)l Supply I I I I I I l M02-10-089B I HEAT EXCHANGER VALVE' l 2 l 20B37 I (. l l l M02-10-089D l HEAT EXCHANGER VALVE l l 2 l l 20B39 l l l l 1 I I ( l 516A l CROSS TIE VALVE I 48 l N/A I L I I I I I l 516B I CROSS TIE VALVE l 47 I N/A l l 1 1 I I ( l M02-10-089A l HEAT EXCHANGER VALVE l l l 1 1 1 1 20B36 l I l M02-10-089C l HEAT EXCHANGER VALVE I 1 l 20B38 I I I I I I I 2AP42 l PUMP l 48 l 20A15 l l l l l l ( l 2CP42 l PUMP I 48 l 20A17 I L i 1 1 I I I I I I I ( Unit 2 - ESW System [ l l l l Electrical I [ l Component l Description I Location l Power l l I l l(Fire Area)l Supply i I I I I I l OBP57 l PUMP I 47 l 20A17 l ( l l PS0240B l l PRESSURE SWITCH I I 47 I l N/A I l 1 1 I I I [ l MO-0498 1 DISCHARGE VALVE l 54 1 00B56 l t i I I I I l OAP57 l PUMP l 48 l 20A16 l l l l i I l PS0240A l PRESSURE SWITCH l 48 l N/A I I I I I I I I I I I ( l I I I l Page 7 of 27
)
TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Unit 2 - CS System l l 1 l Electrical l l Component ' l Description l Location l Power l I l l(Fire Area)l Supply l I I I I I l 2BP37 i PUMP l 5 1 20A16 I I l l l l l 2DP37 l PUMP l 5 1 20A13 I I I I I I l'M02-14-005B l MIN. FLOW BYPASS VALVE l 5 l 20B37 I
'l l I I I I M02-14-007B I SUCTION VALVE l 5 1 20B37 I
. I I I I I l M02-14-005D I MIN. FLOW BYPASS VALVE l 5 1 20B39 I I I I I I l M02-14-007D.I SUCTION VALVE l 5 l 20B39 l 1 I i i I I M02-14-OllB l OUTBOARD VALVE I 6 l 20B39 I I I I I I l M02-14-012B I OUTBOARD VALVE l 6 ! 20B39 I I I I I I l M02-14-012A l OUTBOARD VALVE I 6 l 20B38 I I I I I I I M02-14-Olla l OUTBOARD VALVE I 6 l 20B38 l l l 1 1 I l M02-14-026B l TEST BYPASS VALVE l 5 ! 20B36 I I I I I I I I I I I Unit 2 - NSPRS System l I I IElectrical l I Component i Description I Location l Power l l l Fire Area)l Supply I I *I . I I l RV2-02-071A l-SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE l . I 2AC43 l l 1 I l RV2-02-071B*1 l SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE I 18 l . I I I I l RV2-02-071C*I I SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE l 18 l 2AC43 i i l I I I l l l l l Page 8 of 27
]
[ i
L f I TABLE 3-1 (Cont.)
=
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Uni't 2 - NSPRS System l l l l Electrical l l Component l Description I Location i Power l I l l(Fire Area)l Supply I ( l I RV2-02-071D,1 SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE I l 18 I l 2AC43 I l l I I I l RV2-02-071E,1 SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE l 18 1 2AC43 l l 1 I I l RV2-02-071F,1 SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE l 18 l 2AC43 l l l l l l-l RV2-02-071G*l SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE I 18 l 2AC43 l l I I I I RV2-02-071H,1 SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE l 18 l 2AC43 l l I I I { l RV2-02-071L,1 SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE I 18 1 2AC43 l l I I I ( l RV2-02-071J,1 SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE l 18 l 2AC43 l ( l I I I I RV2-02-071K*l l SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE I 18 I 2AC43 1 1 I I I I (- l I l I I I I I I I I I I I I [ [ This valve is supplied with an air accumulator. These valves are also provided with remote-manual control switches at the emergency shutdown panel. p ( Page 9 of 27 (
.]
TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Unit 2 - AC. Emergency Power System I . l l l Electrical I
'l Component l Description 1 Location i Power !
l l l(Fire Area)l Supply i I I I I I l OAG12 l DIESEL GENERATOR I 46 I N/A l l l l l l l OBG12 1 DIESEL GENERATOR l 45 l N/A l l l l l l l OCG12 l DIESEL GENERATOR l 44 l N/A l-1 I I I I l ODG12 l DIESEL GENERATOR l 43 l N/A l i I I I I I OAG13 l REGULATOR l 46 l N/A I I I I I I l OBG13 i REGULATOR l 45 l N/A I 1 I I I I l OCG13 l REGULATOR l 44 l N/A I i l i I I l ODG13 l REGULATOR l 43 l N/A l l l l l 1
'l 20B39 l 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 3 l 20B13 l I I I I I l 20B37 I 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 6 l 20Bil I ]
2 I I I I I J l 20B38 I 480" AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 6 l 20B12 I
- I I I I I
! I 20B36 l 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 7 l 20B10 l ) ! I I I I I l l 20B12 l 4.16-0.48 KV AC LOAD CENTER l 7 l 20A17 1 I I I I I i l 20B10 1 4.16-0.48 KV AC LOAD CENTER I 7 l 20A15 l l l l l l l 1 20B13 l 4.16-0.48 KV AC LOAD CENTER l 7 l 20A18 l l l l l 1 I i l 20B11 1 4.16-0.48 KV AC LOAD CENTER l 7 l 20A16 l l l l 1 1 I 00C26A l DIESEL-GENERATOR RELAY PANEL l 29 l 20D21 l l l l l l
'l 00B53 1 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 46 1 20B10 l l l l 1 I I l 00B54 1 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 45 l 20Bil l I I I I I I I I I I Page 10 of 27 I
I L . . _ _
L. TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Unit 2 - AC Emergency Power System ( l l l l Electrical i I Component l Description I Location I Power I i l l l(Fire Area)I Supply I I I I I I l 00B55 l 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER I 44 l 20B12 l l l I I I [ I 00B56 1 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 43 1 20B13 l l l I I I r 1 00C26B I DIESEL-GENERATOR RELAY PANEL l 29 l 20D22 l L I I I I I l 00C26C l DIESEL-GENERATOR RELAY PANEL l 29 l 20D21 I I I I I I l 00C26D I DIESEL-GENERATOR RELAY PANEL l 29 I 20D22 I I I I I I l 00C29A l DIESEL-GENERATOR RELAY PANEL l 29 l 20D21 1 I I I I I l 00C29B l DIESEL-GENERATOR RELAY PANEL l 29 I 20D22 l l l l l l l 00C29C l DIESEL-GENERATOR RELAY PANEL l 29 I 20D21 I [ I I I I I l 00C29D l DIESEL-GENERATOR RELAY PANEL l 29 l 20D22 I I l' I I I l 20A17 I 4.16 KV AC SWITCHGEAR 38 0CG12 ( I I l I 1 I I I l 20A18 l 4.16 KV AC SWITCHGEAR l 36 l ODG12 I l l I I I [ I 20A15 1 4.16 KV AC SWITCHGEAR I 39 l OAG12 I I I I I I l 20A16 l 4.16 KV AC SWITCHGEAR l 37 I OBG12 I I I I i 1
-l 20B59 l 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTERI 39 l 20B10 l l l 1 I I l 20B60 1 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 37 20Bil
( I I I l I I I l 00B61 1 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 48 l 20Bll I I I , I I I I 00B62 l 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 47 l 20B10 l I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I i ( l l Page 11 of 27 (
TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Unit 2 - AC Emergency Power System l I l l Electrical l l Component l Description l Location l Power I l l l(Fire Area)l Supply I I I I I I l OAP60 l FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP l 46 1 00B53 l l l l l l l OBP60 l FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP l 45 1 00B54 l l l 1 1 I l OCP60 l FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP l 44 1 00B55 l l l ODP60 l l FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP l l 43 1 1 00B56 I I
)
I I I I I I I 1 I I Unit 2 - DC Power Distribution System i I l l Electrical l l Component l Description l Location l Power l l l l(Fire Area)l Supply l I I I I I l 20D12 l 250V DC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 3 l 2AD18 l 1 I I I I I J l 20Dll l 250V DC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 6 l 2BD18 l l 1 I I I l 20DllA l 250V DC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 7 l 20Dll l I I I I I l 20D21 l 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL l 28 l 2AD19 I I I I I I l 20D22 l 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL I 28 l 2BD19 l l l l l l l 20D23 l 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL I 28 l 2CD19 I I I I I I I 20D24 l 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL l 28 l 2DD19 l l l 1 I . I I 2BD25 l 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL l 28 l 20D22 l l l l l l l 2AD19 e l 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL I 41 l 2AD17 l l l l l l 1 l 2AD17 l 250V DC FUSE PANEL l 41 l 2AD01 l l l 1 I I 1 I I I I i Page 12 of 27 j
L TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPSNDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Unit 2 - DC Power Distribution System ( l l Electrical l I l l Component l Description l Location l Power l l(Fire Area)l Supply ( I - l l 1 I I I I I 2AD01 1 125V DC BATTERY l 41 l N/A I l I I I I [ L I 2CD01 l 125V DC BATTERY l 41 l N/A l l 1 I I I I 2AD18 l 250V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL l 41 l 2AD17 I [' l I 1 250V DC FUSE PANEL I 41 I 2CD01 I l 2CD17 l 1 1
! I I I I l 2CD19 l 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL l 41 l 2CD17 I I I I I I I 2CD03 1 125V DC BATTERY CHARGER l 38 l 20B38 l l 1 I I I I 2AD03 l 125V DC BATTERY CHARGER l 38 l 20B59 l l l l l l I 2BD03 ! 125V DC BATTERY CHARGER I 36 l 20B60 l
(' l l 2DD03 l l 125V DC BATTERY CHARGER I l 36 I l 20B39 I I I I I I I l 2BD18 l 250V DISTRIBUTION PANEL l 40 l 2BD17 l { l .I I I i l 2BD01 1 125V DC BATTERY I 40 l N/A l l l I I I { l 2DD01 l 125V DC BATTERY l 40 I N/A I I I I I I I 2BD19 l 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL l 40 l 2BD17 I ( l l 2BD17 i l 250V DC FUSE PANEL l l 40 l l 2BD01 I l l 1 - 1 I I l 2DDl9 l 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL l 40 1 2DD17 I { I I I I l-l 2DD17 I 25,0V DC FUSE PANEL l 40 1 2DD01 l 1 1 I I I ( l i I 1 I I I I I i I I I I I l i I I I [- 1 I I I I I I I I I l l I I I { Page 13 of 27 (
TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL" SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS UNIT 2 - PROCESS MONITORING l l l l Electrical I 1.-Component I ' Description I Location i Power l l l l(Fire Area)l Supply i I I I I I l LISH-72A l REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL l 7 l 20C04A I I I I I I l PT-6-105 i REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE l 7 1.20C04A I I I I I I l l NEW REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL l 7 l 20C04A I I I I I i l PT-6-53A l REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE l 7 l 20C04A l 1 I I I I I TT-2442A l TORUS TEMPERATURE ! 5 l 20C04A l l 1 I I I I TT-2442B l TORUS TEMPERATURE l 2 1 20C04A I I I I I I l LI-2216 I CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LEVELI 50 . I I I I I I I l LI-3216 l CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LEVELI 50 l I i 1 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I
)
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I J I I I I I I I I I I , I I I I I I I I I I r I I I I I [ l l I I l Page 14 of 27 J s
s f TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) ) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY l PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS {. Unit 3 - HPCI System l l l l Electrical l l Component I Description l Location l Power l l l l(Fire Area)l Supply I ( l l M05245 l i TURDINE EXHAUST VALVE I I 11 l 1 30Dll l I l l (VACUUM BREAKER) l I I l I I ( l 30P26 l AUXILIARY OIL PUMP l 2 I l 30Dll I l I I I I l l M03-23-020 l PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE l 2 l 30Dll i I I I I I l M03-23-019 l PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE I 13 I 30Dll l I I I I I l M03-23-057 l PUMP SUCTION FROM SUPP. I 2 l 30Dll l l l CHAMBER SUCTION VALVE l l l. I I I I I ( l M03-23-058 l PUMP SUCTION FROM SUPP. I 2 1 30Dll I L I l CHAMBER SUCTION VALVE I I I I I I I I l M03-23-017 l PUMP SUCTION FROM CST VALVE I 2 l 30Dll I ( l i I I I l M03-23-014 l STEAM TO TURBINE VALVE l 2 l 30Dll I I I I ! l [ l M03-23-015 l STEAM SUPPLY LINE ISOLATION I 21 1 30B36 l l l VALVE (INBOARD) l I l l l l l l l M03-23-016 l STEAM SUPPLY LINE ISOLATION l 13 l 30Dll l [ I I VALVE (OUTBOARD) l l l I I I I I l M03-23-025 l MIN. FLOW BYPASS TO SUPP. I 2 l 30Dll I (' l 1 l CHAMBER \ LVE I l I l I l I l M03-23-031 l FLUSH LINd SHUT-OFF TO l 12 1 30Dll I l l SUPP. POOL VALVE l l l { l l l 1 I I M03-23-024 l SHUT-OFF TO CST VALVE l 12 1 30Dll l I I I I I I M03-23-021 l TEST BYPASS TO CST VALVE I 12 I *- 30Dll I I I I I I I I I I l k Page 15 of 27 ( 1
TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Unit 3 - HPCI System l l l IElectrical l l Component I Description l Location i Power I l l l(Fire Area)I Supply I I I I I I l 30S37 l HPCI TURBINE l 2 l 30C04B l l I I I I l SV-23-054 I CONDENSATE DRAIN POT DRAIN l 2 1 30C04B l l l VALVE I I I I I I I I l PT-23-100 l PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE l 29 l C18 l l 1 I I i l PI-23-116 l PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE I 29 I C18 l l l l l l l PT-23-89 l TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY PRESSUREl 29 I C18 I I I I I I l PI-23-lll l TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY PRESSUREl 29 l C18 l l l l 1 I l PT-23-95 l TURBINE STEAM EXHAUST l 29 l C18 l l l PRESSURE l l l l l l l l l PI-23-112 l TURBINE STEAM EXHAUST l 29 l C18 l l l PRESSURE l l l l l l l l l PT-23-83 l PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE l 29 I C18 l l 1 1 I I l PI-23-109 i PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE l 29 I C18 l l l l l l l FC-23-108 l HPCI FLOW CONTROLLER I 29 1 30C04B l l l l l l l FI-23-108-1 l PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW l 29 I 30C04B l l l 1 I l l FT-23-82 1 PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW l 29 l 30C04B l l 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I l l Page 16 of 27
L-f TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) l F PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY , L PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Unit 3 - RCIC System { l I l l Electrical l l Component l ' Description l Location l Power l l I l(Fire Area)l Supply i I I I I I I M03-13-018 l PUMP SUCTION FROM CST VALVE I 11 l 30D12 l I I I I [ l 11 30D12 I M03-13-131 i STEAM TO TURBINE ISOLA
- ION I 1 I I I VALVE l l l l l i l l l M03-13-132 i TURBINE COOLING WATER I 11 1 30D12 l l l SUPPLY VALVE l l l l l l l l l M03-13-039 l SUCTION FROM SUPP. CHAMBER l 11 l 30D12 I I l VALVE I l l l l 1 1 I l M03-13-041 l SUCTION FROM SUPP. CHAMBER 11 30D12
( l l VALVE I I 1 l l l l 1 1 I I l M03-13-020 I PUMP DISCHARGE OUTBOARD l 11 1 30D12 l l l ISOLATION VALVE I I I I I I I l l M03-13-027 l MIN FLOW BYPASS TO SUPP. I 11 1 30D12 l (. l 1 l CHAMBER VALVE I l I l I l I I 30S38- l RCIC TURBINE I 11 1 30C04C l l I I I I [ l M03-13-030 1 TEST BYPASS TO CST VALVE I 13 1 30D12 I I I I I I l M05244 l TURBINE EXHAUST VALVE l 13 1 30D12 I l- I I I I I l M03-13-021 l PUMP-DISCHARGE VALVE l 13 1 30D12 l l l l l l f l M03-13-016 l STEAM SUPPLY OUTBOARD l 13 1 30D12 l l l ISOLATION VALVE l 1 I I I I 1 l l M03-13-015 l STEAM SUPPLY OUTBOARD I 21 1 30B37 l { r l l ISOLATION VALVE l l l l l l l l r i I I I I
- l. I I I I I k
Page 17 of 27
]
l TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Unit 3 - RCIC System
.1 I I l Electrical l I Component l Description I Location l Power i I l l(Fire Area)l Supply i I I I I l
.l PT-13-65 l PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE l 29 l C19 I I I I I l l PI-13-66 l PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE l 29 l C19 i
'l i I I I l PT-13-68 l STEAM SUPPLY PRESSURE l 29 l C19 l l l l l l l PI-13-69 l STEAM SUPPLY PRESSURE l 29 l C19 l l l l l l l PT-13-60 i PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE l 29 l C19 l l l l l l l PI-13-59 l PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE l 29 l C19 I I I I I I l FT-13-58 l PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW l 29 l C34 I I I I I l l FC-13-108 l RCIC FLOW CONTROLLER l 29 l C34 l l l . I I I l FI-13-108 l PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW l 29 l C34 l l l l l l l
l l I l I l I l I
)
Unit 3 - RHR System l l l l Electrical l l Component l Description l Location l Power 1
-l l l(Fire Area)l Supply I I I I I I l 3AP35 l PUMP l 11 1 30A15 l 1 I I I I l M03-10-015A l SHUTDOWN COOLING VALVE I 11 1 30B36 l l l l M03-10-016A l BYPASS VALVE l
l 11 l 1 30B36 l l
)
1 I I I I I M03-10-025A l SUPPLY TO VESSEL VALVE I 13 1 30B38 l I I I I I ] l M03-10-154A l SUPPLY TO VESSEL VALVE l 12 l 30B38 I I I I I I
)
Page 18 of 27
L TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Unit 3 - RHR System l l l l Electrical l l Component I^ Description l Location l Power I ( l l l(Fire Area)l Supply l l 1 I I I I M03-10-017 l OUTBOARD REACTOR SHUTDOWN l 13 I 30Dll I l I COOLING ISOLATION VALVE l l 1 {- 1 I I I l l M03-10-018 l INBOARD REACTOR SHUTDOWN I 21 1 30B36 I l l COOLING ISOLATION VALVE I l l [ l l I I I l M03-10-013A l SUCTION FROM TORUS VALVE I 11 1 30836 I I I I I I l M03-10-026A I CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE 13 30B38 ( l l l l l l l l l M03-10-031A l CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE I 13 1 30B38 l l I I I I [ l M03-10-034A l SUPPLY TO TORUS VALVE l 12 1 30B38 l l 1 1 I I I M03-10-039A I SUPPLY TO TORUS VALVE l 12 l 30B38 l [. l i I I I l DPIS-10-121Al PUMP PRESSURE CONTROL LS l 11 l 30B36 l
-l I I I I
{ l 3BP35 l PUMP l 10 l 30A16 i L I I I I I I M03-10-015B l SHUTDOWN COOLING VALVE I 10 l 30B37 l l l l l 1 f l M03-10-016B l BYPASS VALVE l 10 1 30B37 I I I I I I l M03-10-025B l SUPPLY TO VESSEL VALVE l 10 l 30B37 I I l l f l l l M03-10-154B i SUPPLY TO VESSEL VALVE I 12 l 30B39 i l 1 I I l l M03-10-013B l-SUCTION FROM TORUS VALVE l 10 l 30837 l [ l l l l l l M03-10-026B l OUTBOARD CONTAINMENT SPRAY l 13 1 30B39 I I l VALVE l l l { l I I I I l M03-10-031B I OUTBOARD CONTAINMENT SPRAY l 14 1 30B39 I I l VALVE l l l l 1 I I I l M03-10-034B l SUPPLY TO TORUS VALVE I 12 l 30B39 l 1 l i I I f Page 19 of 27
TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Unit 3 - RHR System I l l l Electrical I l Component I Description l Location i Power I l l l(Fire Area)! Supply i I l I l l l M03-10-039B l SUPPLY TO TORUS VALVE l 12 l 30B39 l l 1 1 I I I DPIS-10-121BI PUMP PRESSURE CONTROL LS l 10 l N/A I I I I I I l 3CP35 i PUMP l 11 1 30A17 I I I I I I I M03-10-015C l SHUTDOWN COOLING VALVE l 11 1 30B38 l l' I I I I l M03-10-016C l BYPASS VALVE I 11 1 30B38 I I I I I I l M03-10-013C l SUCTION FROM TORUS VALVE I 11 1 30B38 l 1 - 1 I I I I DPIS-10-121Cl PUMP PRESSURE CONTROL LS I 11 l N/A I I I I I I l 3DP35 I PUMP l 10 1 30A18 I I I I I I I M03-10-015D l SHUTDOWN COOLING VALVE I 10 l 30B39 I I I I I I I M03-10-016D l BYPASS VALVE I 10 1 30B39 i I I I I I
]
l M03-10-013D I SUCTION FROM TORUS VALVE I 10 1 30B39 l l 1 1 I I I DPIS-10-121DI PUMP PRESSURE CONTROL LS l 10 l N/A I I I I I I Unit 3 - HPSW System l l l lElectrical l I Component i Description I Location l Power l l 1 l(Fire Area)l Supply I l l l 1 l l 3BP42 i PUMP l 47 1 30A16 l l 1 I I I l 3DP42 l PUMP l 47 l 30A18 l 1 1 I I I I I I I l Page 20 of 27
L. TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY f L PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 r= 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Unit 3 - HPSW System f I l l l Electrical I , I Component i Description i Location l Power l* ' I I l(Fire Area)l Supply I (. I I M03486 I l DISCHARGE TO RESERVOIR I l 54 I l 00B54 I l l l l l t ( l M03-10-089B l HEAT EXCHANGER VALVE I 10 l 30B37 l t i I I I I I M03-10-089D l HEAT EXCHANGER VALVE I 2 1 30B37 l l l l l 1 { l 516A l CROSS TIE VALVE I 48 i N/A l l l l 1 l l 516B l CROSS TIE VALVE I 47 i N/A I [ l I I I I L l M03-10-089A l HEAT EXCHANGER VALVE l 11 l 30B36 l l l l 1 I e I M03-10-089C l HEAT EXCHANGER VALVE I 11 1 30B38 I (- I. I I I I l 3AP42 l PUMP l 47 l 30A15 l l l l l l [ l 3CP42 l PUMP 'l 47 l 30A17 l 1 I I I I Unit 3 - ESW System l l l l Electrical I f I Component l Description I Location l Power I i l l(Fire Area)l Supply l l l l l l l OBP57 i PUMP 47 (' i 1 l I l I 30A17 l I l PS0240B l PRESSURE SWITCH l 47 l N/A l [ l l I I I L l MO-0498 I DISCHARGE VALVE I 54 1 00B56 l 1 1 I I l l OAP57 l PUMP l 48 1 30A16 I [ l i I I I l PS0240A I PRESSURE SWITCH l 48 i N/A l 1 I l l 1 (. I I I I I ( Page 21 of 27 ( 1 {.. _ - _ _ - - - - -
TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3
, APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS l
Unit 3 - CS System l l l IElectrical l l Component l Description l Location l Power l l l l(Fire Area)l Supply I I I I I I l M03-14-012A l OUTBOARD VALVE I 13 I 30B38 l l 1 I l l l M03-14-Olla l OUTBOARD VALVE I 13 I 30B38 l l 1 1 I l 1 3AP37 l PUMP l 12 l 30A15 l l l 1 l l l 3CP37 l PUMP l 12 1 30A17 l l l l l l l M03-14-005A I MIN. FLOW BYPASS VALVE I 12 l 30B36 l l l l l l l M03-14-005C I MIN. FLOW BYPASS VALVE i 12 l 30D38 l l l l 1 l l M03-14-007A l SUCTION VALVE I 12 1 30B36 l 1 I I I I l M03-14-007C 1 SUCTION VALVE I 12 1 30B38 l l i I I I I M03-14-026A l TEST BYPASS VALVE I 12 1 30B36 l l 1 1 l l l 1 ! l l Unit 3 - NSPRS System ] I I I l Electrical I
.I Component I Description l Location l Power l l l l(Fire Area)l SuppJy 1 l I I I I RV3-02-071A*i l SAFETY /R3 LIEF VALVE I 21 l 'AC43 I I I I I l RV3-02-071B*I ] SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE l 21 1 3AC43 I I I I I l l RV3-02-071C*l SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE l 21 l 3AC43 I I I I I I I Rv3-02-071D l SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE l 21 1 3AC43 l 1 I I I i Page 22 of 27 l
TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3
,. APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Unit 3 - NSPRS System l l 1 IElectrical l I Component l ,
Description l Location i Power I (. 1 I I(Fire Area)l Supply l l I I l l RV3-02-071E,1 SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE l 21 l 3AC43 i l l l i I I I [ I RV3-02-071F l SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE l 21 1 3AC43 l l 1 I I l RV3-02-071G*1 l SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE I 21 1 3AC43 l [ l I I I I RV3-02-071H,1 SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE I 21 1 3AC43 I I I I I { l RV3-02-071L*1 SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE l 21 1 3AC43 l l 1 ! I l l RV3-02-071J l SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE I 21 l 3AC43 l [ l I I I t I RV3-02-071R*i l SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE l 21 l 3AC43 I I 1 l l l l l 1 I I This valve is supplied with an air accumulator. (
** These valves are also provided with remote-manual control switches at the emgergency shutdown panel.
Unit 3 - AC Emergency Power System l l l l Electrical l l Component l Description l Location l Power l I l . l(Fire Area)l Supply 1 I I I l l t l OAG12 l DIESEL-GENERATOR l 46 l N/A. I I' I I I I I l'0BG12 1 DIESEL GENERATOR l 45 l N/A l 1 I I I I f l OCG12 , 1 DIESEL GENERATOR I 44 l N/A l l l l l l l Page 23 of 27 ( .
. TABLE 3-1 (Cont.)
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 4 PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS ] Unit 1 - AC Emergency Power System l l l l Electrical l I Component l Description l Location I Power I l l l(Fire Area)l Supply I I I I I I l ODG12 l DIESEL GENERATOR l 43 l N/A l 1 I I I I l OAG13 1 REGULATOR l 46 l N/A I I I I I I l OBG13 l REGULATOR l 45 I N/A I I I i l l l OCG13 l REGULATOR l 44 l N/A l l 1 I I I l ODG13 l REGULATOR I 43 l N/A I I I I I l l 30B39 I 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 13 I 30813 l l l l l l l 30B37 I 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER I '13 l 30B11 I I I I I I l 30B38 I 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 13 1 30812 l l 1 1 I I l 30B36 1 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER I 11 1 30B10 l l l l l l l 30B12 l 4.16-0.48 KV AC LOAD CENTER I 14 1 30A17 I I I I I I l 30B10 1 4.16-0.48 KV AC LOAD CENTER I 14 1 30A15 l 1 I I I I l 30B13 1 4.16-0.48 KV AC LOAD CENTER l 14 1 30A18 I I I I I I I 30Bil I 4.16-0.48 KV AC LOAD CENTER I 14 1 30A16 l l l 1 1 I l 00C26A l DIESEL-GENERATOR RELAY PANEL l 29 I 30D21 l l l l l l l 00B53 l 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 46 1 30B10 l l 1 1 I I 1 1 00B54 l 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 45 1 30B11 l ) l I I I I I 00B55 1 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER I 44 1 30B12 l l l l l l l 00856 1 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 43 1 30813 l l l l l l / Page 24 of 27 9
TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY ( PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Unit 3 - AC Emergency Power System l Component I I l Electrical l l I Description l Location l Power I { l I I(Fire Area)i Supply I I I I I I l 00C26B l DIESEL-GENERATOR RELAY PANEL l 29 l 30D22 l [ l i I I I L l 00C26C l DIESEL-GENERATOR RELAY PANEL l 29 1 30D21 I I I I I I l 00C26D l DIESEL-GENERATOR RELAY PANEL l 29 l 30D22 l [ l l I I I l 00C29A I DIESEL-GENERATOR RELAY PANEL l 29 1 30D21 l l i I i l l 00C29B l DIESEL-GENERATOR RELAY PANEL l 29 30D22 { I I l I I I I l 00C29C l DIESEL-GENERATOR RELAY PANEL i 29 l 30D21 l t 1 I I I I t- l 00C29D 1 DIESEL-GENERATOR RELAY PANEL l 29 1 30D22 I i 1 1 I I , l 30A17 l 4.16 KV AC SWITCHGEAR l 32 1 0CG12 l I { l i I I I l 30A18 l 4.16 KV AC SWITCHGEAR I 34 i ODG12 l l 1 1 I I [ l 30A15 1 4.16 KV AC SWITCHGEAR I 35 l OAG12 I L I l l I I l 30859 l 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTERI 39 l 30B10 l l l l l l l 30860 1 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 35 1 30B11' l 1 I I I I l 30A16 l 4.16 KV AC SWITCHGEAR l 35 l OBG12 l { l l l I i l 00B61 1 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 48 l 30Bil l l I I I I l 00B62 l 480V AC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER I 47 1 30B10 l l l l l l l l 1 Page 25 of 27
TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS Unit 3 - DC Power Distribution System l I I l Electrical l .I Component I Description l Location l Power l I I l(Fire Area)l Supply i I I I I l l 30D12 l 250V DC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l 11 1 3AD18 l 1 1 I I I l 30Dll l 250V DC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER I 13 1 3BD18 l l l l 1 I l 30D21 1 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL l 28 1 3AD19 l l 1 1 I I I 30D22 l 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL l 28 l 3BD19 I I I I I I l 30D23 l 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL l 28 1 3CD19 l 1 1 I I I l 30D24 1 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL l 28 1 3DDl9 l l l 1 28 I 30D22 I [ l 3BD25 l 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL l 1 l 1 I I I I l 3AD19 1 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL I 31 1 3AD17 l 1 -l i I I l 3AD17 l 250V DC FUSE PANEL l 31 1 3AD01 l l 1 I I I l 3AD01 l 125V DC BATTERY l 31 1 N/A l 1 I I I I l 3CD01 l 125V DC BATTERY l 31 1 N/A I I I I I i l 3AD18 l 250V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL l 31 1 3AD17 I I I I I i 1 3CD17 1 250V DC FUSE PANEL l 31 l 3CD01 l 1 1 I I l l 3CD19 l 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL l 31 1 3CD17 I I I I I I I 3CD03 l 125V DC BATTERY CHARGER l 32 1 30838 I I I i i l l 3AD03 l 125V DC BATTERY CHARGER l 32 l 30B59 l l 1 I I I l 3BD03 l 125V DC BATTERY CHARGER l 35 1 30B60 l l 1 i l l l 3DD03 l 125V DC BATTERY CHARGER l 35 l 30B39 l 1 1 I I I { [ Page 26 of 27 l
k TABLE 3-1 (Cont.) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS ( Unit 3 - DC Pow 9r Distribution System I l l l Electrical I
'l Component l Description l Location i Power I I l l(Fire Area)I Supply l fl l l 3BD18 l
l 250V DISTRIBUTION PANEL l l 30 l l 3BD17
'l l l
l l l 1 I I l 3BD01 l 125V DC BATTERY l 30 l N/A I { I I I I I l 3DD01 l 125V DC BATTERY l 30 1 N/A l i l I l I r( l 3BD19 l 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL l 30 l 3BD17 I I I I I I l 3BD17 l 250V DC FUSE PANEL l 30 l 3BD01 l (. I l'3DD19 I l 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL I I 30 I 1 3DD17 I l l 1 I I I [ l 3DD17 l 250V DC FUSE PANEL l 30 l 3DD01 l t i I I I I Unit 3 - PROCESS MONITORING I l l l Electrical l [ l Component l Description I Location l Power i l l l(Fire Area)l Supply i I I I I I [ l LISH-72A,D,Cl REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL l 14 1 30C04B l l i I I I l l PT-6-105 I REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE l 13 I 30D23 l l l l l I l PT-6-53A I REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE I 14 1 30D23 l l l l l l l PT-52A,B,C,DI REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE l l NEW l 1 l I I I I LISL-13-170 1 CST LEVEL l 50 l 30C722A I I I I I I l~LIS-13-171 l CST LEVEL l 50 l 30C722A I I i l i I l LT-110B l REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE I 13 1 30D23 l l l l l l f l TT-3242A l SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE I 12 1 30C04A I I I I I l l TT-3242B l SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE I 11 l 30C04B l l l l l l {- Page 27 of 27
- - - - ~ ,-- - - - , . - - - _ _ -_ __- m - - - - m_ - - -
TABLE 3-2 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANV PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNIT 2 APP.ENDIX R HIGH-LOW PRESSURE INTERFACES POTENTIAL j SPURIOUS SYSTEM EFFECTS OF MALFUNCTION RESOLUTION COMPONENT Inboard and outboard RHR Loss of the vessel inventory These two valves are in series and shutdown cooling are normally closed. Simultaneous isolation valve spurlous opening of these two (MO-lO-IB & MO-IO-17) l valves is not credible. Spurious l l opening of both ac and de MOV6 will be amellorated by circuit modifica- l tions (Isolation relaysl for both ' valves. l Relief Valves NSPRS Loss of the vessel inventory There is present capability for and pressure reduction isolation of all relief valves in the Cable Spreading Room. ! Installation of an alternative de l control station at the Units 2 & 3. B/D Battery Rooms will provide a i single fuse-disconnect switch to l de-energlre SR/V circuits (8 train power). Isolation of battery A/C l will provide isolation of the redundant power train to the SRVs. I MO-53 and MO-56/MO-57 RWCS Loss of the vessel inventory The Breaker for MO-53 will be to the condenser locked open pre-fire. Note Components with potential spurlous operation have been considered in the analysts as the safe shutdown components. Page I
f 4. APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS 4.1 Compliance Status j This section identifies plant areas not in compliance with l Appendix R Section III.G separation criteria and the methods for achieving conformance. For the areas identified, the following l options are considered in meeting the objectives of Section III.G: (1) Three design basis protective features as specified in Section III.G.2; (2) Alternative shutdown capability per Section III.G.3; or (3) Exemption under 10 CFR 50.12. ( For most plant fire areas not in compliance with Section III.G.2, modifications are identified to bring these areas into compliance [ with the regulation. Implement (tion of modifications to meet Section III.G.2 criteria in eight plant areas where adequate separation does not exist is not considered feasible for the following reasons: (1) Construction of three-hour-rated barriers, though physically possible in these areas, has potentially serious ramifications for other plant systems and { structures and overall plant safety (e.g., seismic loading, HVAC, etc.), and is an expensive process; and (2) Rerouting of cables outside a fire area or to achieve more than 20 feet of open space from a redundant
. circuit is either not possible or not cost effective.
l { f Page 4-1 ( .
As a result of these considerations, there are two feasible options for achieving compliance in those areas where Appendix R separa- tion is difficult to achieve: (1) An alternate shutdown approach relying on remote operation of equipment from new local control stations; or (2) Exemptions based on either existing protection or } proposed modifications. For each plant area not in conformance, the proposed methods
]
for achieving compliance are described in Table 4-1. Section 4.3 identifies those areas requiring an alternative shutdown method ) in order to achieve compliance with Section III.G. Section 4.4 identifies those areas for which an exemption is requested. Section 5 presents the alternative shutdown methods identified
]
for the fire areas of concern and describes the safe shutdown systems chosen to provide the alternative shutdown capability. ) Sections 6 and 7 contain the proposed fire protection system modifications and exemption requests, respectively. 4.2 Nonconformance Summary Table 4-1 contains a summary of the areas at Peach bottom
]
currently not in conformance with Appendix R Section III.G.2 criteria. Each identified fire area containing a nonconformance
]
is listed, including the safe shutdown function which may be affected by an unmitigated fire in that area. A description of the nonconformance and of the methods selected for achieving l conformance are also provided. l Page 4-2 1
N f L 4.3 Areas Requiring Alternative Shutdown ( For a few areas common to both units, unmitigated fires may preclude achievement of most safe shutdown functions accord ng to the criteria of Appendix R. These areas are: Fire Area 25, Emergency Shutdown Panel Area, [ Radwaste Building Fire Area 28, Cable Spreading Room, Turbine Building ( Fire Area 29, Main Control Room, Turbine Building For these three common plant fire areas, an alternative ( shutdown approach is proposed for compliance with the requirements of Appendix R Section III.G.3. For two of these areas-(Main Control Room and Emergency Shutdown Panel Area), although an alternative shutdown method is proposed, an exemption [. is also identified regarding the installation of a fixed fire suppression system. Section 5 includes a detailed description of the proposed Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station alternative shutdown methods and modifications. 4.4 Exemptions Of all the fire areas where nonconformances with Appendix R were. initially detected, eight plant areas exhibit conditions which do not wa'rrant further modifications for specific compli-ance-with the regulation. These fire areas are: ( Page 4-3
Fire Area 05, Torus Compartment, Reactor Building, Unit 2 ]
- Fire Area 12, Torus Compartment, Reactor Building, Unit 3
]
- Fire Area 06, General Area, Reactor Building, Unit 2, Elevation 135' Fire Area 13, General Area, Reactor Building, Unit 3, E.levation 135'
- Fire Area 29, Main Control Room, Turbine Building, Common Fire Area 47, High Pressure Service Water Pump Bay, Intake Structure, Unit 3 Fire Area 48, High Pressure Service Water Pump Bay, Unit 2 Fire Area 25, Emergency Shutdown Panel Area, ]
Radwaste Building 1 In all instances, exemptions are requested regarding ] installation of full area suppression systems (automatic or s fixed) as prescribed in Appendix R Section III.G. For some of these areas, exemptions are deemed necessary regarding fire area boundaries with limited penetrations (e.g., hatchways). The exemptions requested for these areas apply to nonconformances for which corrective modifications will not result in further enhancement of fire protection safety. Page 4-4 -
- m. W N-TAELE 4-1 ,
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R FIRE AREA NONCONFORMANCE SUMbARY SAFE FIRE SHUTOOWN DESCRIPTION III.G.2 ALTERNATIVE EXEMPTIONS COMMENTS AREA FUNCTION (S) OF MODIFICATIONS SHUTDOWN AFFECTED NONCONFORMANCE 29 All Multiple control No Provide alternative Exemption from. Refer to panels and associa- shutdown modifica- fixed suppression Section 7 ted devices and tions for both system on the basis for details of cabling within the units of Continuous mann- this exemption Main Control Room ing, alternative
- Provide HPCI Al- shutdown capability terntalve Control and existing level Station (ACS); of fire protection
- Provide 4kV
-Switchgear/DGs local stations;
- Provide HPCI and process instru-mentation at HPCI ACS for monitor-ing essential plant parameters;
- Provide 125V de power to switch-gear and DGs I independent from l MCR/CSR-l l
- Provide 125V de l l power to remote l shutdown panels i for three S/RVs independent from MCR/CSR; l
- Provide isolation '
modifications from NCR/CSR for three S/RVs at i remote shutdown panels PAGE 1 of 7
TACLE 4-1 PHILADELPHIA ELECTOIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R FIRE AREA NONCONFORMANCE
SUMMARY
SAFE FIRE SHUTDCWN DESCRIPTION III.G.2 ALTERNATIVE EXEMPTIONS COMMENTS AREA FUNCTION (S) OF MO31FICATIONS SHUTDOWN AFFECTED NONCONFORMANCE 25 Inventory Multiple HPCI and No Provide fire pro- Exemption from Refer to Control NSPRS control and taction wrap for fixed suppression Section 7 for (HPCI) power cables are HPCI cables in system on the details of this Pressure routed through this area basis of alterna- exemption Control this area tive shutdown (NSPRS) capability and existing fire protection 28 All Multiple logic No Same modifications panels. dc distrib- indicated for ution panels. and Fire Area 29 safe shutdown system cables in Cable Spreading Room 6 Inventory RCIC/HPCI Relocate RCIC in-Control redundant control board steam supply-circuits in the valve starter and area cables to south side of Reactor Building Not Intervening Installation of Exemption from Refer to Applicable combustibles partial water total automatic Section 7 for (open cable trays) suporession system suppression system details of (Water curtain)cnd coverage based on this exemption coating of open proposed modific-cable trays using ations. flame retardant materials in the j west corridor. Water s t op:r will be added to the cable trays in the west corridor Open hatches con- Installation of Exemption from Refer to necting 6 to upper water curtain or 3-hour rated fire Section 7 for and lower lightweight fire area boundaries details of elevations resistive cover in based on proposed this exemption the open hatch modifications 13 Inventory RCIC/HPCI Relocate RCIC Control redandant control inboard steam circuits in the supply valve area starter and cables to south side of the RX Building PAGE 2 of 7 m m A - - -
m - v .-m m m m v .m .e TABLE 4-1~ PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATIONS UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R FIRE AREA NONCONFORMANCE
SUMMARY
SAFE FIRE SHUTDOWN DESCRIPTION 'III.G.2 ALTERNATIVE . EXE.MPT I ONS COMMENTS-AREA FUNCTION (S) OF MODIFICATIONS. SHUTDOWN AFFECTED NONCONFORMANCE 13 Not Intervening Installation of Exemption from Refer to Applicable combustibles partial water total automatic Section 7 for (open cable trays). suppression system suppression system details of (Water curtain) coverage based on this esemption and coating of proposed modific-open cable trays attons. using flame re-
-tardent materials in the west cor-
, ridor.. Water ( stops will be i added to the cable I trays in the west corridor Open hatches con- Installation of Exemption from Refer to necting Fire Area water curtain'in 3-hour rated Section 7 for 13 to upper and open hatch area fire area bound- details of lower elevations artes based on pro- this exemption posed modifications 47 Supporting Redundant HPSW Exemption from Redundancy for function pumps are in this flued suppression HPSW pumps (HPSW) area system on the basis exist in Unit 2 of alternative HPSW. Cross-tie shutdown capabil- valves (2 local ity and existing . manual valves) fire protection. have to De locally.ali0ned (opened) Refer to Section 7 for details Not No suppression Refer to Applicable' in this area Sectt3n 7 for details of this exemption PAGE 3 of 7 9 e _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ . - e
-TABLE 4-1 PHILADELPHIA ELECTPIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATIONS UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R FIRE AREA NONCONFORMAt4CE
SUMMARY
SAFE FIRE SHUTDOWN DESCRIPTION 111.G.2 ALTERNATIVE ETEMPTIONS COMMENTS AREA FUNCTION (S) . 0F MODIFICATIONS SHUTDOWN AFFECTED NONCONFORMANCE 48 Supporting Redundant HPSW/ESW Encapsulate power Exemption from Redundancy for function pumps and power feed to ESW pump fined suppression HPSW pumps (HPSW) cables are in this: OBP57 iocated in system on the esist in Unit 3 , area Fire Area 47 basis of alterna- HPSW. Cross-tie i l tive shutdown valves (2 local capability and manual valves) existing fire have to be protection . locally aligned (opened) Refer to Section 7 for details Not No suppression Refer to Applicable in this area Section 7 for details of this exemption 5 Residual Redundant RHR Exemption from Refer to heat removal valves and cables automatic suppres- Section 7 for
& Process and pool tempera- ston based on low details of Monitnring ture transmitters combustible loading this exemption in this area and lack of inter-
! vening combustibles and spatial sep-I aration of greater l- than 20 feet components f between redundant components l 1 PAGE 4 of 7 i { 1 [ . _ _ _ . _
s N < w '
.~ v m . m v...- _ .m v w N]
TA LE 4-1 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATIONS UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R FIRE AREA NONCONFORMANCE
SUMMARY
SAFE FIRE SMUTDOWN DESCRIPTION III.G.2 ALTERNATIVE EXEMPTIONS COMMENTS AREA FUNCTION (S) OF MODIFICATIONS SHUTDOWN AFFECTED NONCONFORMANCE 12 Residual Redundant RNR Exemption from Refer to heat removal valves and cables automatic suppres- Section 7 for
& process and suppression ston based on low details of monitoring pool temperature intervening com- this exemption transmitters in bustible loading this area and spatial sepa-ration of much greater than 20 feet between re-dundant components 4 Inventory NPCI System cables Fire Protection Control Modification to protect the CS cables in this area.
1 . l Residual Power to RHR I Manual Oper-Heat Inboard valve in ation or re- ) Removal this area pair to open (RHR) the valve for shutdown cooling Process Redundant suppres- Fire protection Monitoring sion pool temper- modifications to ature transmitters protect one train in the area of suppression pool temperature monitoring 7 Inventory There are two RCIC Relocate one of Control level switches the RCIC level to trip the RCIC switches to fire turbine of Unit 2. area 6 HPCI cables in (elev. 135) this area R6sidual RHR Isolation Manual oper-Heat shutdown cooling atton or re-Removal inboard valve pair as neces-(RHR) cable is in this sary to open area. the RHR valve for shutdown cooling PAGE 5 of 7
TABLE 4-1 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATIONS UNITS 2 & 3-APPENDIX R FIRE AREA NONCONFORMANCE
SUMMARY
SAFE EXEMPTIONS COMMENTS FIRE SHUTDOWN DESCRIPTION III.G.2 ALTERNATIVE AREA- FUNCTION (S) OF MODIFICATIONS' SHU(DOWN AFFECTED NONCONFORMANCE j 7 Process Redundant supp. Provide fire
- cont, Monitoring chamber tempera- protection.
ture transmitter modifications cables are routed as necessary to through this area assure avail-ability of one transmitter Implementation Supporting Loss of of permanent Function 480V ac load plant fim to i centers for enable power- ! Unit 2 ing of two OG MCCs from Unit 3 load centers 11 Makeup Multiple CS, Provide fire Residual- RHR, HPSW, protection mod-Heat cables are routed ifications to Removal in this area assure oper-Support ability of train B/D of both units for RHR, HPSW, CS power and con-trol and HPCI 14 Makeup RCIC/HPCI are af- Provide fire facted by a fire protection mod-in this area ifications to assure oper-ability of RCIC Supporting Loss of 480V ac Function load centers for for Unit 3 for a fire in this area PAGE 6 of 7 m m m m m , , m - - M ___ m . . m , - w a
- m .
m_ m m _m m 1 - w- -- - -
. TABLE 4-1 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY -
PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER-STATIONS UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R FIRE' AREA NONCONFORMANCE SiMMARY SAFE FIRE SHUTDOWN . DESCRIPTIUN' III.G.2 . ALTERNATIVE , EXEMPTIONS . COMMENTS AREA FUNCTION ($) OF MODIFICATIONS SHUTDOWN , AFFECTED. NONCONFORMANCE 14' Process The suppression Provide fire pro-cont. Monitoring chamber tempera-' taction modifica- i ture trains A&B tions to assure I transmitter of availability of Unit 3 are routed suppression pool through this area temperature mon-itoring 31 Inventory Power cable to the Provide fire pro-Control MPCI MCC of Unit 3 tection modifica-as well as RCIC tions for the batteries are lost power. feed from B/D batteries to distribution l panels l l
+ U 41 Inventory . Loss of A/C Provide fire pro- l Control batteries power- tection modifica-ing the RCIC MCC 'tions for the
- and power cables power feed from from B/D batteries B/D batteries to the DC load to distribution centers of Unit 2 panels l 50 Decay Heat Power cables to Provide fire. pro-Removal all B/D and A/C tection modifica-Supporting loops of HPSW. ESW tions to assure Functions and RNR of both operability.of units are in this A/C trains of area RHR. HPSW. and train A of ESW.
and DG to switchgear and CST level in-strumentation of both units PAGE 7 of 7
k [
- 5. ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY 5.1 Introduction For three Peach Bottom plant fire areas, compliance with the
-provisions of Section III.G.2 cannot be achieved effectively due to the configuration and congestion of safe shutdown equipment,
{- cables, and associated circuits in these areas. The areas, which are common to both Units 2 and 3, are: (1) Cable Spreading Room (Area 28), (2) Emergency Shutdown Panel Area (Area 25), and (3) Main Control Room (Area 29). For these three areas of concern, Philadelphia Electric Company has determined that the appropriate technical approach to be used to achieve compliance with the provisions of Section III.G of_ Appendix R is to provide an alternative shutdown capability. This section describes the alternative shutdown methods to L be implemented in order to achieve compliance in these plant areas. This section also provides the NRC ( with sufficient information to review and approve the proposed plant system f modifications necessary to ensure alternative shutdown capability. In addition, this section responds to the ( information requests contained in the NRC Staff's Generic Letter 81-12 dated March 22, 1982,
SUBJECT:
Fire Protection Rule - Appendix R, and subsequent Clarification Letter. Page 5-1
~
f .. -- - - - - - -
The alternative shutdown method proposed by Philadelphia Electric provides these Peach Bottom with the capability to: (1) Achieve and maintain cold shutdown reactivity conditions; (2) Maintain reactor coolant level above the top of the active fuel; (3) Achieve and maintain decay heat removal during hot shutdown and cold shutdown; (4) Provide monitoring of the appropriate process ] parameters necessary to control alternative shutdown l equipment; and (5) Provide the associated supporting fonctions necessary to permit the operation of the other equipment used for safe shutdown; in the event of a fire in any of the fire areas of concern. The proposed alternative shutdown method for the Cable Spreading Room, Emergency Shutdown Panel Area, and Main Control Room is based on portions of the safe shutdown systems described in Section 3.5 of this report. Since the postulated fire events would be likely to have similar effects on the safe shutdown capabilities of either unit, no dedicated alternative shutdown method is identified for each unit. Instead, the alternative shutdown approach for Peach Bottom demonstrates that the proposed modifications will ensure the safe shutdown capability of either unit by fulfilling all necessary safe shutdown safety functions in any of the areas of concern. I Page 5-2 L
s f L All equipment and cables associated with this alternative shutdown method are separated from the fire areas of concern in ( cccordance with Section III.G.2; specific exemptions from the provisions of Section III.G.3 are identified in Section 7 of this report. The alternative shutdown method will operate regardless of the availability of off-site power, because the equipment and systems comprising this method are capable of being powered by either on-site or off-site electrical power systems. The equipment and systems provided to achieve hot shutdown are capable of maintaining such conditions until cold shutdown can be achieved. The number of operating shift personnel required to operate such equipment and systems will be on-site at all times; and fire brigade members are not considered available to perform these tasks. Within 72 hours of system initiation, the alternative shutdown systems will succeed in achieving hot shutdown conditions. Cold shutdown conditions will then be ( achieved and maintained. The following sections present a system-by-system discussion of the alternative shutdown operational sequences and the proposed modifications which will permit the selected safe shutdown systems to serve as the alternative shutdown method for ( the-three areas of concern. Page 5-3
Generic Letter 81-12 and subsequent Clarification Letter 4 request more information on specific parts of the safe shutdown systems; this information is supplied in Section 5.4. 5.2 Alternative Shutdown Method A major component of the proposed alternative shutdown system is the establishment of a coordinated series of operational and procedural manipulations of existing redundant safe shutdown systems. This system will provide independent control stations for the equipment and systems controlled from the Main Control Room, Cable Spreading Room, and the Emergency Shutdown Panel Area. The alternative shutdown method will provide an additional means to ensure the safe shutdown of Peach Bottom in the event of an unmitigated fire in any of these three areas of concern. This section describes the alternative shutdown method selected, identifies its specific systems and components, and relates the parts of the alternative shutdown system to the specific safety functions they perform. In order to clarify the basic differences between the normal safe shutdown systems and the alternative shutdown system, this section then addresses the required operations for the alternative system and specifies the locations of the alternative shutdown stations. Finally, Section 5.2 will demonstrate that Peach Bottom on-site shift personnel will be available in sufficient in numbers to both Page 5-4 l
+ r L ( perform the necessary firefighting activities and fulfill plant operational needs during alternative shutdown scenarios. l 5.2.1 Introduction to Alternative Shutdown Systems The footnote to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.G.3 states:
" Alternative shutdown capability is provided by rerouting, relocating or modification of
( existing systems; dedicated shutdown cap-L ability is provided by installing new structures and systems for the function of post-fire shutdown." The analysis of Peach Bottom safe shutdown systems, described in Section 3, indicated that, in the event of a fire in any of the three areas of concern, an alternative method of safe shutdown could be implemented which would perform the safe shut-down safety functions outlined in Section 3.5.2 of this report. The provisions of this alternative shutdown method would also { cchieve compliance with the separation requirements of Appendix R Section III.G.2. [ The three areas of concern, the Cable Spreading Room, the Main Control Room and the Emergency Shutdown Panel Area, share some common features that were from the safe shutdown apparent { cnalysis, and PECo focused attention on these areas in developing cn alternative shutdown capability. Briefly, the areas of f concern all have control circuit cables for a redundant safe chutdown system component within the same fire area as the component's redundant partner. The alternative shutdown system ( Page 5-5
L will address this situation by providing independent alternative control stations for all three areas. These stations will i satisfy -all safe shutdown functions in the event of an
]
unmitigated fire in any of these areas and provide an alternate control pathway for a redundant counterpart of each safe shutdown system component. Though the areas of concern share some common features, there are naturally some features that are specific to each area. Generally, an unmitigated fire in the Emergency Shutdown Panel Area would have the least effect on the normal safe shutdown method because some of the control functions provided by the Cable Spreading and Main Control Rooms would still be available. An unmitigated fire in either the Main Control or Cable Spreading Room would have a greater effect on the normal safe shutdown method than one in the Emergency Shutdown Panel Area because the control functions provided by the affected area may be un-available. Therefore, the alternative shutdown system manipula-tions available in the event of an unmitigated fire in the Emer- - gency Shutdown Panel Area are more similar to the normal safe shutdown system manipulations than those available in the event of an unmitigated fire in.either of the other two areas of con-cern. In order to further illustrate the features of the three areas of concern, the following characterizations are provided: - l Page S-6 s
)
(1) Main Control Room. This area is located at elevation { 165' and is in the Turbine Building. It contains the ! control panels for both Unit 2 and Unit 3. No power ' (.- cables'for safe shutdown components are present in this
-area. At minimum, a fire within the Main Control Room may require- evacuation and temporary loss of this centralized control location.
(2) Cable Spreading Room. This area is located at elevation 150' in the Turbine Building and is common to ( both units. In . addition associated with the control of all safe shutdown system to containing cables components, the Cable Spreading Room houses the 125V dc (- l' panels essential for.. safe shutdown.
. process monitoring instrumentation, dc/ac inverters, It also contains and emergency core cooling system logic cabinets for RHR, NSPRS, CS, HPCI, and RCIC circuits. The only high
( (4kV ac) or medium (480V ac) voltage cable routed through the Cable Spreading Room is the 480V ac feed to the computer HVAC, which is routed through this area in (. its own conduit. In the event of an unmitigated fire in this area, normal safe shutdown systems may be unavailable and spurious maloperations of equipment may
-occur.-
(3) Emergency Shutdown Panel Area. . This area is located at elevation 165' in the Radwaste Building and contains the remote shutdown panels. for Units 2 and 3. Safe shutdown and process monitoring instrumentation control cables, and some of the. ac power cables leading-to and from the emergency load centers are routed in this (- area. Also, ESW, HPCI and RCIC cables,-as well as ac off-site power and feeds to load center breakers are l
-routed in this are'a. The potential' effects of a fire-in this area would require fewer additional operator manipulations in the a]ternative shutdown mode than those of the other two areas of concern.
[ The' alternative shutdown method selected for Peach Bottom was designed using-the same safety function and performance goal I boses identified:for the normal safe shutdown systems. In addi-h . tion to'these bases, the following specific alternative shutdown objectives and criteria were integrated into the planning process: Page 5-7
(1) Using as many of the Appendix R safe shutdown systems or parts of these systems, which are described in Section 3 as possible; (2) Minimizing the number and use of alternate control sta-tions by using as many of the existing plant configura-tions as possible; (3) Isolating potentially spurious operations that may affect the reactor coolant pressure boundary at g locations independent of the areas of concern; l (4) Isolating the necessary ac and de loads at locations independent of the areas of concern; (5) Isolating the control and control power circuit cables of alternative shutdown system components which were { routed through the areas of concern; I (6) Establishing remote-control capability for alternate shutdown system components from alternate control stations; (7) Providing alternative control power to alternative shutdown components which presently are dependent on the areas of concern for this power; (8) Rerouting and/or encapsulating cables which are presently within the areas of concern, to provide Section III.G.2 separation for those cables which are essential to the alternative shutdown method; f (9) Providing process and essential diagnostic monitoring instrumentation, circuit isolation, and alternative power supplies for this instrumentation which are independent of the areas of concern; and (10) Utilizing the definitions and criteria for safe shutdown systems identified in Section 3. 5.2.2 Alternative Shutdown Systems Controls Locations In the event of fires in general plant areas (plant areas other tha1 the areas of concern), safe shutdown is accomplished utilizing the safe shutdown systems from the Main Control Room Page 5-8 i
5 ( and other available equipment. This preferred safe shutdown method for Peach Bottom is defined as " normal safe shutdown". In the event of an unmitigated fire in the Main Control Room, Cable Spreading Room, or Emergency Shutdown Panel Area which has the potential to interfere with safe shutdown from the Main Control Room, the operators will proceed to the alternative ( shutdown stations. Next, adequate communications will be estab-lished between operatorr who are at the alternative shutdown stations and the coordinating operator. The alternative control stations for Peach Bottom are in the following locations: ( (1) HPCI Alternative Control Stations. These will be [ located in the Reactor Building at elevation 135' in b the vicinity of the existing HPCI motor control centers, which are 20Dll and 30D11 for Units 2 and 3, respectively (Fire Areas 06 and 13). (2) Units 2 and 3 DC Power Distribution Alternative Control Stations. These will be located in Battery Rooms B/D of the Turbine Building at elevation 135', which are at dc distribution panels 2BD19/2DD19 and 3BD19/3DD19 for Units 2 and 3, respectively (Fire Areas 40 and 30). (3) Diesel Generators B/D Alternative Control Station. This station will be located in Battery Room B/D in Unit 2 (Fire Area 40). (4) 4kV Emergency Switchgear Alternative Stations. These are not actual control station location changes, but rather are proposed modifications of existing 4kV switchgear cubicles which will enable the present locations to serve as alternative control stations, j These are located in the 4kV Emergency Switchgear Rooms
% B and D, at Switchgear Panels 20A16/20A18 and L 30A16/30A18 for Units 2 and 3, respectively (Fire Areas 37, 36, 35 and 34).
Page 5-9
(5) Emergency Shutdown Panels, These are located at 2AC43, 2BC43, 3AC43 and 3BC43. This is not a control station location change, but rather a proposed modification at the existing location which will enable it to serve as an alternative control station. This is located in the Radwaste Building at elevation 165' (Fire Area 25). The Peach Bottom alternative shutdown control locations descrioed atmve have protective features in common. These features ensure that the locations will be operable as alternative shutdown stations in the event of an unmitigated fire in the three areas of concern and are detailed in the following paragraph. First, the alternative control locations will be electri-cally isolated, using manual control switches, relays, breakers or fuse-disconnect switches. This will provide isolation for all cables which could affect the operation of alternative shutdown components as a result of fire-induced failures (open circuits, short circuits or shorts to grounds). Circuit isolation will be provided for control, power and instrumentation cables, as i required, to ensure that no electrical connection will exist between the alternative shutdown circuits and those circuits that could be affected by a fire in one of the three areas of concern. This feature will provide protection for potentially existing cases of associated circuits by common enclosure or common power supplies, and against potential spurious operations. This protection will be the result of a combination of electrical isolation and protective coordination, and separation of the Page 5-10
s ( 1 5 alternative shutdown circuits and cables from the fire-affected (. circuits and cables by fire-rated barriers. Second, the re-establishment of safe shutdown equipment operations, controls, and monitoring functions will be ensured by providing alternative control power, as necessary. This will be accomplisned using fuse-disconnect switches or breakers, and/or control switches, indicating lights and monitoring instruments. (I Once the operability of an alternative control station is assured by the protective features described above, the specific features of each station can be utilized to control the safe shutdown components associated with the station. Table 5-1 lists { the safe shutdown systems selected to serve as alternative ( shutdown systems, the fire-affected safe shutdown components that the alternative shutdown systems can substitute for, the applicable alternative shutdown stations and their locations, and ' the alternative .mhutdo,wn functions served by each component. { The alternative shutdown stations at Peach Bottom will have h the following characteristics: (1) HPCI Alternative Control Stations (one for each unit) (. (a) Transfer switches to isolate control circuits of essential motor-operated valves (MOVs) and ( auxiliary oil pumps, and corresponding control ( switches and indicating lights; (b) Circuit breakers to restore control power (125V de) ( to essential circuits while avoiding the need for fuse replacement; ( Page 5-11
(c)' Control switch to isolate the auxiliary trip solenoid, which.then cancels the turbine protective interlocks signals; (d) Transfer switches and alternative power supplies for the alternative HPCI turbine and pump diagnostic instrumentation (indicates pressures, flow, and speed), the alternative HPCI flow controller, and the alternative process monitoring instrumentation (indicates vessel pressure and level, torus temperature and CST level) at this station; and (e) 125V dc control power from HPCI motor control centers. (2) DC Power Distribution Alternative Control Stations (one for each unit) t (a) Fuse-disconnect switches to isolate existing feeds to Cable Spreading Room 125V dc distribution panels; (b) Separate fuse-disconnect switches for power feeds to SRVs at the Emergency Shutdown, Panels; and
. (c) Separate fuse-disconnect switches for alternative 125V de control power to alternative shutdown 4 switchgear breakers and diesel generators.
(3) Diesel Generators B/D Alternative Control Station (common to both units) (a) Transfer switches to isolate all Main Control Roor control circuits; (b) Alternative local diesel generator start, stop, speed and voltage control; (c) Alternative diesel generator diagnostic instrumen-tation; and (d) Control power transfer switch to alternative 125V dc power source. Page 5-12 l o
) L (4) 4kV Emergency Switchgear Alternative Stations (a) Assured power for ESW, RHR, HPSW, and motor control centers resulting from modifications to be k provided at each essential 4kV breaker for ESW, RHR, HPSW and 4kV/480V load center feeder breakers; ( (b) Isolation switches for control power circuits and transfer to alternative 125V de power source; and ( (c)-Transfer' switches for alternative local control and status indication. (5) Emergency Shutdown Panel Area. ( (a) Controls for three NSPRS main steam relief valves for each unit; [ (b) Transfer switches to isolate the Main Control-Room circuitry; and ( (c) Alternative 125V de control power independent of the Cable Spreading Room, l-5.2.3 Alternative Shutdown Safety Functions The alternative shutdown safety functions and the systems necessary to perform these functions are a subset of those described in Section 3.5.2. The safe shutdown functions, the operator actions which support them, and the systems which per-form them are described in this section. ( 5.2.3.1 Reactivity Control During Alternative Shutdown Operation In the event that the alternative shutdown method is to be used instead of the normal shutdown methods, the. operator will
- verify or m:tuate a reactor scram, and verify the proper positioning of the Group I isolation valves (inboard and/or out-( board MSIVs and main steam line outboard drain valve). The
)
Page 5-13 q
-operator will perform these verifications prior to evacuaticn of the Main Control Room.
5.2.3.2 Reactor Vessel Level Control During Alternative Shutdown Within the framework of this analysis, the most demanding conditions for operating the alternative shutdown system would be a situation which coupled a loss of off-site power with the development of a major fire in any of the three areas of concern. The safety functions that would require immediate operator atten-tion und'er these conditions are reactor vessel level and pressure control and restoration of on-site ac emergency power. For alternative shutdown, the immediate' action following' reactor scram and MSIV closure will be manual initietion by the operator of the HPCI systems of both Units 2 and 3, in order to restore and maintain reactor vessel level. Two operators will achieve this objective using intermittent remote-manual operation of the HPCI systems at the HPCI alternative control stationn., Th'e.HPCI<~altgrnative control stations provide the necessary 125v dc control power', transfer ~ .and -control switches, control and
. . ,v.
' g.,l; di$ gnostic instrumentation fof' HPCI, :qnd reactor, suppression.
s ,. . pool and CST process parameter information to allow the operator to control the_ vessel level.. 7" System injection flow will beycontrolled by manually adjust- ,
?! .a .- .
-s inn the set point of the new' ulocal flowc controller, us'ing the b ' ~
s 7, , ,
7,
( '- <
- - v
~
~
-s G e 5-14 e
7 i s e ,
+
f
/' . IdibalLHPCI flow signal, received from the existing flow transmit-
,' C [ f[, t e -
located at the.HPC1' instrument rack. HPCI > pump suction. will be shifted from the condensate storage tank to the suppression pool by operator action, in order im . 9Y to takeLadvantage.of ,the initial low water temperature in the suppression pool. Successfubmaintenance of pressure boundary integrity for w.
^
t_ the.rea'ctor coolant systems is also a necessary part of achieving b. J ' vessel level and pressure control. Inadvertent opening of bound-
.ary isolation. valves will be precluded to assure safe shutdown.
s
., This will be achieved through design modifications to the RHR
, shutdown cooling isolation valves. These modifications will
- g. preclude the, development of a situation where hot shorts could r
g r,, result in a spurious and' simultaneous opening of both of these x e
$I ' valves in series (the valves are ac and de MOVs and are normally mg closed)[.
[ The, RHR _ head spray can be excluded from the list of
. potential spuriously breached pressure boundary' paths since one of the two normally-closed MOVs in the lino, will have its drespective power supply breaker locked open (pre-fire). The RWCU
-boundary can also be excluded because multiple failures mechanisms (such as spurious opening of normally-closed MOVs and hm o-Mot' shorts affecting dc fail-safe solenoid valves) would~have to H
~
s occur : simultaneously to result in loss of reactor coolant
- % ,. ~ '
'C .inventorytin this manner.
L
- Page 5-15 e
TA /-
, NI +
The previously described protective features allow the operator to concentrate solely on potential fire-induced spurious opening of the main steam relief valves in dealing with vessel pressure control during this first phase of the postulated fire event. Two additional operators, one per unit, would then be dispatched to Battery Rooms A/C and B/D of Units 2 and 3, where the modified A/C distribution panels and the alternative shutdown stations to be located there will allow isolation of de control power to all SRVs by throwing a single fuse-disconnect switches. The time frame for this operator action will be five minutes at most. If the magnetic card access system for security doors is not operable, operators will still be able to get through the door in th'e same amount of time. This due to the availability of key access to these doors. 5.2.3.3 Support Functions for the Alternative Shutdown Method In the event that unmitigated fires affect any of the areas of concern, and there is a potential for loss of the emergency supporting systems functions, the alternative shutdown support systems will be operated from Battery Rooms B/D of Units 2 and 3. This will require no additional operators to be dispatched be-cause there will be an operator at each of these locations al-ready, as described above. At the Battery Rooms, priority will be given to isolation of potentially spurious loads. These include dc (12SV) control power to NSPRS-SRVs and 4.16kV switchgear breakers. If required, isolation will be performed Page 5-16
~ i-p 1, for all.de control power circuits to the Cable Spreading Room distribution panels, since alternative shutdown' modifications to the 125V dc system will provide individual distribution feeders r .at the DC Power Distribution Alternative Control Stations for ( .' NSPRS-SRVs, 4.16kV alternative shutdown switchgear breakers, and (- ~a lternative shutdown. diesel generator control' circuitry, and will provide new. fuse-disconnect switches for the 125V de power
. feeders to the cable Spreading. Room. The isolation of the 125V dc-control power circuits to the 4.16kV emergency switchgear
( breakers will also prevent a spurious closure of the diesel gen- [ erator's switchgear. and off-site power tie circuit breakers. Furthermore, reduction and isolation of unnecessary de loads will ( .. extend the time period for 125/250V.dc battery operation follow-ing a loss of off-site power. (. Since separate 250V dc feeder circuits and associated cables are dedicated to feed the HPCI motor control centers and ( ~ alternative shutdown stations, all of which are independent from L any of the~'three areas of concern, no operator action at the
. Battery-Rooms will be required for HPCI and monitoring instrumen-tation. The two operators 'will then proceed from the DC Power Distribution Alternative Control Stations to the various Switchgear Rooms (four in each circuit) to perform and/or verify-k 'the correct alignment of all'4.16kV breakers before restoring the-necessary alternative shutdown on-site 4.16kV ac power. Special identification markings will be provided at the nonessential
{ Page 5-17
4.16kV breakers cubicles to facilitate pulling the respective 125V de control power fuses in order to eliminate spurious reclosings. Sufficient time will be available for local align-ment of the alternative shutdown 4.16kV switchgear and reestablishment of ac power, since both steps vill be performed at the same plant location. One alternative shutdown control panel for two diesel gener-ators (0BG12 and ODG12) will be installed in the corresponding . Unit 2 Switchgear Rooms B/D. This panel will have the transfer switches necessary to disconnect the diesel generators' control circuits from the Cable Spreading Room and Main Control Room. The alternative control panel will allow starting and stopping of the respective diesel generators, and opening and closing of DG circuit breakers. Sufficient diagnostic instrumentation will be installed to ensure that the diesel engine is brought up to its proper operating speed, and the diesel generator to its proper output voltage. The transfer switch, which isolates the generators' control circuit from the fire areas of concern, will not isolate the diesel generator circuits and diesel generator switchgear protective circuitry during the required periodic tests. These circuits will be isolated during an actual fire event, if necessary, but only after it has been determined that they are preventing diesel generator or switchgear operation. Before starting the diesel generators, one operator will assure room cooling for the diesel generators. Modifications to Page 5-18
j L r [ the existing power distribution configuration will ensure that at least two 4kv/480V load centers in each unit will be able to feed any necessary diesel generator auxiliary motor control center, and perform this task independently of the fire areas of concern. { As a result, the fuel-oil transfer pumps and diesel generator (. rooms' ventilation fans will be capable of supporting alternative shutdown. ( Operation of the diesel generators requires at least one ESW pump to be running within three minutes of the diesel generators' starts. Since both ESW pumps are powered from the 4.16kV ( Switchgears B and C of Unit 2 (20A16 and 20A17), and only one ESW pump is required for alternative shutdown (Pump B), priority will be given to starting diesel generator OBG12. One operator will proceed to start the ESW(B) pump (location 20A16). The new alternative control switches at the alternative shutdown 4kV switchgear will enable the operation of the respective ESW breaker. Once ESW operation has begun, no further operator actions will be required to maintain operation of this system, because modifications that are to be made to the circuitry of ESW Valve 0498 will eliminate the need to confirm ' SW E valve ( alignment. Diagnostic instrumentation for ESW is not necessary for alternative shutdown. Once the operator has established 4.16kV ac power, selective loading will be performed for the alternative 4.16kV loads. This will be accomplished by closing the feeder Page 5-19 (-
- breakers corresponding to HPSW, RHR, and 4.16kV/480V ac load centers. -These operations also will be performed at each unit's
--switchgear cubicles (20A16 and 30A18) where alternative shutdown ' controls are provided for each alternative shutdown load.
Battery charging capability will be required for battery bank B/D (125/250V de) in each unit. Battery charging capability for alternative shutdown will be ensured by providing 480V ac power from two load centers (30Bil and 30B13 for trains B and D, r espectively) in the Reactor Building for Unit 3, to power the battery chargers B/D-located in the Switchgear Room in each unit through the corresponding motor control centers. For both Units 2 and 3, these battery chargers will support operation of the alternative shutdown HPCI system and essential process monitoring instrumentation, and alternative shutdown switchgear, SRVs circuits and diesel generator circuits. A repair procedure will be used to ensure that there is power to the Unit 2 battery chargers (located in the Switchgear Room) from the Unit 3 Motor Control Center (30B60). 5.2.3.4 Decay Heat Removal During Alternative Shutdown
'At this point in the scenario, reactor vessel water level and process monitoring are under control at the HPCI Alternative Control Stations, and the alternative shutdown supporting func-tions are provided for both units. Cooldown of the suppression pool and depressurization and cooldown of the reactor vessel can now: proceed. Sufficient on-site shift personnel will be Page 5-20 J 1
1
4 r L available, and they will have started to perform the necessary valve alignments of the RHR and HPSW in the RHR suppression pool I cooling mode. This activity will have been initiated immediately after shutdown of the unit, and independent of fire-fighting activities and operator actions identified for alternative f shutdown safety functions up to this point. Shift personnel will have sufficient time to perform these ( . valve alignments. Calculations performed for Peach Bottom have demonstrated that torus water temperatures will be within acceptable limits as long as one RHR heat exchanger loop per unit ( is placed in service for suppress an pool cooling within three hours after reactor scram. This allows sufficient time for manual alignment of the valves required for the RHR suppression pool cooling mode of operation and HPSW operation. One RHR heat exchanger per unit (trains B and D for Units 2 and 3, respectively), along with its associated B and D RHR pump and B and D HPSW pump, will be used for suppression pool cooling. Three motor-operated valves will be stroked open in each unit to align trains of both systems used in the suppression pool cooling mode, assuming that RHR and HPSW motor-operated valves are in their normal operating positions. Verification of proper align-f ment of four additional motor-operated valves (associated with RHR) will be performed locally, securing them in their safe shut-down positions by opening the respective motor control center
. breakers in the Reactor Building.
Page 5-21 (
.One operator will then preceed to the alternative shutdown location specified for the RHR and the HPSW pumps, and start these pumps at this location in order to begin suppression pool cooling. The operator will then have the capability to operate the RHR and HPSW circuit breakers with the new control switches added at the front door of these alternative shutdown switchgear cubicles. During the suppression pool cooling mode, no addi-tional operator actions will be required to maintain RHR and HPSW system operation.
RHR will be maintained in the suppression pool cooling mode until such time as it is determined that it will be shifted to the shutdown cooling mode. This transition will occur when the reactor vessel has been depressurized to below 75 psig to allow
.. shutdown cooling mode operation.
Depressurization and cooldown of the reactor vessel will require additional operator action at the existing Emergency Shutdown Panel Areas for each unit, for fires affecting the Cable Spreading Room or Main Control Room. Modifications to the exist-ing circuitry will allow operation of three main steam relief valves,' since alternative shutdown power (125V de) will be provided. Until depressurization to 110 psig is achieved, maintenance of reactor pressure will be attained by using the NSPRS. Under the same conditions, maintenance of reactor vessel level will be Page 5-22 t
L ( achieved by using HPCI. In order to achieve cold shutdown con-ditions, the SRVs will be operated at approximately 110 psig k until reactor pressure is below the isolation setpoint (75 osig) for the shutdown cooling mode of RHR operation, and until the RHR shutdown cooling mode of operation is in service. ( Early depressurization and the availability of drywell sprays (by manual manipulation of two motor-operated valves) will provide the capability to reduce and maintain drywell tem-peratures if drywell cooling were to be unavaila."le. Shifting of the RHR system to the shutdown cooling mode of operation may involve repair procedures for the inboard ac shut-down cooling isolation valve. Sufficient time will be available to perform repairs if they become necessary, to provide power to the inboard shutdown cooling isolation valve. This method of shutdown cooling, using the SRVs and transferring decay heat to the supression pool, is a Peach Bottom FSAR-analyzed event. ( 5.3 Alternative Shutdown Modifications { Several modifications are required to allow for alternative ( control of the required safe shu Gown 3;=tems in the event of fires in the Main Control Room, Cable Spreading Room, or ( Emergency Shutdown Panel Area. The proposed modifications are presented below on a system-by-system basis. L {- Page 5-23 (
)
)
5.3.1 HPCI System Alternative Shutdown Modification Turbine Control and Power Circuitry Three cables essential for turbine speed control and monitoring will be modified. These cables are: (1) ZB2(3)Q1800C Control Room flow controller signal to the turbine speed controller, (2) ZB2(3)Q1800G 125V dc power from Control Room to turbine EGM box, and (3) ZB2(3)Q1800D Turbine tachometer signal to Control Room indicator. The modification will isolate the Main Control Room controller signal and add a local (alternate) flow controller. The modifications also will provide an alternative 125V dc feed from the HPCI motor. control center to the HPCI tube in the EGM box, and will transfer the tachometer signal to the local (alternative) station. The HPCI Evaluation Diagram (Figure 5-1) shows these cables and their present routing. Refer to Figures 5-1-la through 5-1-lg for details of modification. Auxiliary Oil Pump and Turbine Drain Pot Solenoid Valve The control cables for these devices are presently routed from the HPCI pump room to the Cable Spreading Room. This configuration will be changed such that these cables are first routed to the HPCI alternative control stations where electrical isolation and control transfer will be provided. The cables of concern are: ZB2(3)Q1801A and C, ZB2(3)Q1819A and B. The HPCI Evaluation Diagram (Figure- 5-1) shows the association between Page 5-24
,I
( ( , ( these--cables and their respective safe shutdown components. Refer to Figures 5-1-11 and 5-1-lm for details of this modification. Discharge Flow Transmitter The HPCI discharge flow transmitters (FT23-82) instrument ( cables are presently routed through the Cable Spreading Room to provide the flow input signal to the HPCI turbine flow controller circuitry located in the Main Control Room. These cables (ZB2(3)Q1799T) will be rerouted so that transfer to the alternative local flow controller and associated instrumentation is' performed at the HPCI alternative control location. This { modification (rerouting) is indicated on Figure 5-1. ( Turbine Trip Solenoid The HPCI turbine trip solenoid SV1 (mounted locally at the ( control power signal from the Cable turbine skid) receives its Spreading Room (Cable ZB2(3)Q1835A). To avoid inadvertent trips, ( the present cable route will be modified to allow isolation at w the HPCI alternative control location by a separate transfer g switch. I The normal HPCI main pump / turbine protection interlocks will not be affected by alternative shutdown modifications. However, (. the transfer switches provided at the HPCI alternative control stations to isolate the trip solenoid during " post-fire" operation will eliminate those control power signals in the alternative shutdown operation mode. Page 5-25
Motor-Operated Valves HPCI motor-operated valves which require operation during alternative shutdown system operation will have their control circuits modified. These modifications will isolate the control circuit from the fire areas of concern. New control switches will be added which will allow valve operation at the HPCI alternative control stations (see Table 5-1 for a listing of the affected valves). Refer to Figures 5-1-la through 5-1-lk for details in modifications. 5.3.2 RHR System Alternative Shutdown Modification Pump Switchgear Breakers One 4kV breaker will be modified in each unit for alternative RHR operation. The pumps selected are 2BP35 (RHR , train B in Unit 2) and 3DP35 (RHR train D in Unit 3). The respective 4kV emergency switchgear breakers are located at switchgear cubicles 20A16 and 30A18-(Unit 2 and 3, respectively). All control and control power cables from the respective 4kV breakers which are routed through the areas of concern are isolated with a local / remote transfer switch. A second switch isolates the normal 125V dc supply and repowers the dc control : circuit from the 125V dc alternative control station at the Battery Room. Finally, new control switches are included which allow closing or tripping the switchgear breakers. These new control devices are to be added to the front door of the Page 5-26
L I L switchgear cubicle. Refer to Figures 5-2 and 5-2-3 through 5-2-6 for details of these modifications. 5.3.3 HPSW System Alternative Shutdown Modification Pump Switchgear Breakers ( One 4kV breaker will be modified for alternative shutdown in [ each unit. The pumps selected for alternative shutdown are 2BP42 (HPSW train B in Unit 2) and 3DP42 (HPSW train D in Unit 3). The respective 4kV emergency switchgedr breakers are located in 20A16 and 30A18 (Units 2 and 3, respectively). All control cables from the respective 4kV breakers which are routed through the fire areas ( of concern are isolated with a local / remote transfer switch. A second switch isolates the normal dc supply and repowers the alternative dc control circuit. Finally, new control switches are included which allow closing or ( tripping the switchgear breakers. These new control devices are to be added to the front door of the switchgear cubicle. ( Refer to Figures 5-4, 5-4-1 through 5-4-5 for details of modifications. b 5.3.4 Diesel Generators Alternative Shutdown Modification The alternative shutdown diesel generators selected for ( modification are OBG12 and ODG12. Several modifications are { required to allow for local alternative control of two generators in the event of a fire in the areas of concern. The proposed k diesel generator modifications are presented, with the affected components. Refer to Figures 5-7a,b,c and d and 5-7-1 through tb 5-7-3 for details of modifications. Page 5-27 I
f Diesel Generator Circuitry Control and control power cables are interrupted by the transfer switch- located at the diesel generators alternative station-(Unit 2 only). These cables must be interrupted to prevent fire damage that could inhibit proper diesel control. Alternative controls and instrumentation at the station include an ampere meter, a volt meter, diesel generator speed indicator, voltage. adjuster, speed adjuster, and start and stop controls. The-function of each diesel generator cable and the resolutions adopted are presented in Table 5-2. Diesel Generator 4.16kV Circuit Breakers The control circuit which energizes the closing circuit is modified with an isolation switch contact; this will isolate any
, conductors running through the fire areas of concern. A new control switch is added at the respective diesel generator
]
alternative shutdown station to allow repowering of.the breaker control circuitry. The trip circuit control conductors are modified to isolate all conductors running through the fire areas of concern. The trip circuit is also modified with a new trip switch located at the diesel generator alternative shutdown
]
- station. New switches are added to supply new fused power to the control circuit.from the de alternative control station (Battery Room B/D in Unit 2).
Page 5-28 J
s ( 5.3.5 ESW System Alternative Shutdown Modification Pump Switchgear Breaker One ESW pump is used for alternative shutdown for both units. This pump is 0AP57', powered from 4kV emergency switchgear 20A16 (B train) in Unit 2. f All control cables running remotely frem the respective switchgear breaker are isolated with a local / remote transfer switch. A second switch isolates the normal 125V de supply and repowers the de control circuit from the alternative de supply (Battery B/D Unit 2). Finally, new control switches are included ( which allow closing or tripping the switchgear breakers. These new control devices are to be added to the front door of the switchgear cubicle. Motor-Operated Valve MO-0498 ( The starter circuit of this motor-operated valve will be l modified to preclude spurious closing as a result of hot shorts [ affecting the control circuit. Refer to Figures 5-3 and 5-3-1 ( through 5-3-4 for details of modifications. 5.3.6 AC. Emergency Power System Alternative Shutdown f Modification Alternative shutdown modifications for RHR, ESW, HPSW, and DG involve isolation and remote control. However, for the AC Emergency Power System, the modifications have to protect the following safe shutdown functions: k l Page 5-29
(1) DG fuel transfer capability by p oviding 480V ac for two auxiliary motor control centers (at the DG structure). (2) Battery charging capability by providing 480V ac for two battery chargers in each unit (located at the ) Switchgear Rooms). The battery chargers selected should support operation of HPCI alternative control station, alternate shutdown switchgear and instrumentation for both units. ] (3) Realignment of essential motor-operated valves by providing 4kV power to at least one selected train of one load center for one 480V ac motor control center in each unit. 4kV Load Center Feeder Breakers For alternative shutdown control at the 4kV emergency switchgears for two load centers in each unit, alternative 125V dc power, local / remote transfer switches and on/off local control capability will be provided for load centers 20Bil, 20B13, 30Bll . and 30B13. The affected breakers are 2(3)A1605 and 2(3)A1806 (train B and D respectively.) These modifications will allow energization of the load centers at elevation 165' in the Reactor Building of both units and supply of 480V ac power to motor control centers 2(3)0B39, 2(3)0B37, 00B54, 00B56 and 2(3)0B60. Motor control centers 2(3)0B39 and 2(3)0B60 will be used for battery charging of both units' Batteries B/D. Motor control centers 00B54 and 00B56 will feed the fuel-oil transfer pumps and ventilation fans in the diesel generator structure (for diesels 0BG12 and ODG12) thereby providing fuel-oil transfer capability and ventilation for alternative shutdown. Furthermore, energization of motor control Page 5-30
L I L ( centers 2(3)0B39 and 2(3)0B37 could support alignment of essential RHR motor-operated valves (trains B and D). RHR valve alignment can be achieved provided that starter operation is not effected at the motor control centers, since control circuitry [ integrity may be lost due to fire-induced failures. Refer to Figures 5-6 and 5-6-1 through 5-6-3 for details of modifications. { Power Cables for Load and Motor Control Centers To support energization of the , load centers and respective motor control centers, 4kV and 480V ac power cables at elevation { 165' in the Radwaste Building (Emergency Shutdown Panel Area) will be encapsulated in fire protection barriers. { The cables of concern and their associated functions are described below: f (1) ZB2A1605A, 4kV to load center 20Bll (2) ZB2(3)Blll4A, 480V ac to motor control center 2(3)OB60 (3) ZD2A1806A, 4kV to load center 2OB13 (4) ZD2B1313A, 480V ac to motor control center 20B39 [ . (5) ZD3B3983A, 480V ac to charger 3DD03 I In addition, modifications will include new power cables between the Unit 3 load centers 30B37 (train B) and 30B39 (train ( D) to the diesel generator motor control centers 00B54 and 00B56. Installation of locked-open tie breakers between motor control centers 00B54 and 00B53 (A and B) and 00B56 and 00B55 (D and C) at the diesel structures will provide flexibility to assure fuel transfer capability and diesel generator room ventilation ( irrespective of fires in other plant areas. To avoid concern ( Page 5-31 ( l __ - _ - - - -
regarding common mode failures or inadvertent closing of these breakers, the new tie breakers will be of the kirk-key c'ombination. 5.3.7 DC Emergency Power System Alternative Shutdown Modification DC Alternative Control Station For the three areas requiring alternative shutdown capability, only the Cable Spreading Room has direct impact on the 125V de distribution system. Furthermore, modifications ) indicated for HPCI provide alternative shutdown capability for this system (including the necessary 125/250V de distribution) independent of postulated fires in the areas of concern. However, operation of the 4kV load feeder breakers for RHR, ESW, HPSW and 4.16kV load centers, as well as operation of the diesel generator OBG12 and ODG12 circuits and supply breakers, depends on the availability of 125V de power at the various alternative switchgear panels. The existing 125V de emergency power distribution system for the above essential loads is located in the Cable Spreading Room at distribution panels 20P21, 20D22, 30D23, and 30D24. Two alternative distribution panels will be located in each unit in the Battery Rooms B/D. These distribution panels will provide separate feeds to each respective safeguard train of alternative switchgear breakers in each unit and to common diesel generators OBG12 and ODG12. Refer to Figure 5-5. Page 5-32 J
t L ( 5.3.8 Emergency Shutdown Panel Alternative Shutdown Modification Modifications to the existing Emergency Shutdown Panels of both units (located in the Radwaste Building El 165') are proposed to allow use of remote-manual control of three main steam relief valves (SRVs) for fires affecting the Main Control Room or Cable Spreading Room. The affected SRVs { are RV2(3)02071E, H, and L. Existing control and isolation switches will be used to modify the circuit routing so that SRV operation (y can be performed independently of the Cable Spreading Room and
' Main Control Room. Alternative 125V de power will be routed from the dc alternative control station in the respective units'
{ Battery Rooms B/D. (. t 5.3.9 Process Monitoring Instrumentation Alternative Shutdown Modification ( Alternative' shutdown process instrumentatic n at the HPCI alternative control stations will include reactor vessel water level and pressure, suppression pool temperature and condensate storage tank level. The following paragraphs describe the proposed modifications. ( Alternative Shutdown Instrumentation at Unit 3 HCPI Alternative Control Station Cable routing for TE/TT-3442A or B will be modified to [ provide supression pool temperature indication at the HPCI h alternative control station. A transfer switch will be utilized to isolate the alternative instrumentation loop from the portion of the existing loop that is subject to damage from a fire in one Page 5-33 (
l of the three areas of concern. Power for the alternative instrumentation loop- will be provided fron the alternative control station. For reactor vessel pressure and water level indication, spare outputs are available at the Emergency Core Cooling System Rosemount analog trip units mounted in the Reactor Building on instrument rack 3BC65 at elevation 135'. Spare outputs of RISL-3-52B (reactor vessel pressure) and LISH-3-72D (reactor vessel water level) will be used to drive indicating instruments at the HPCI alternative control station (Reactor Building, elevation 135'). Emergency Core Cooling System analog trip units provide an auxiliary output which is electrically isolated from the other instrument racks and relay logic circuitry. The HPCI . alternative control station will allow isolation of the existing power supply to 3BC65 (120V ac power from the Cable Spreading Room) and will provide 120V ac power to 3BC65 through a 125V dc/125V ac static inverter.
. Condensate stornge tank level indication will be provided by rerouting the cable (s) for level transmitter LT-3217 (located in the Turbine Building at elevation 135') to the HPCI alternative control station. The instrument loop will be modified as described for TE/TT-3442A or B.
1 Page 5-34 j 1
k ( Alternative Shutdown Modifications at Unit 2 HPCI Alternative Control Station Suppression pool temperature indication will be provided by l-performing modifications to either TE/TT2442A or B as specified for TE/TT3442A or B. Reactor vessel pressure and water level indication at the , HPCI alternative control station will be provided by two new { instruments which will be added to the 2AC91 instrument rack located in the Reactor Building at elevation 135'. Process instrument sensing lines will be extended to the new level and pressure transmitters mounted on 2AC91. New instrument cables will be routed between the 2AC91 instrument rack and the HPCI alternative control station to form the alternative instrumentation loop. Power will be provided from the HPCI f alternative control station. Condensate storage tank level indication will be provided by ( performing modifications to level transmitter LT-2217 as specified for LT-3217. { 5.4 Response to Generic Letter 81-12 5.4.1 Section 8 of Enclosure 1 to Generic Letter 81-12, Information Required for Staff Review The following information is provided as a detailed response to Enclosure 1 of the NRC Memorandum of March 22, 1983, for the fire areas at Peach Bottom Unit 2 and Unit 3 which require Page 5-35
1 alternative shutdown. As stated in Enclosure 1, the information request is merely a rewording of the Section 8 information request contained in Generic Letter 81-12. ] The responses provided below specify the characteristics of the Peach Bottom alternative shutdown method and plant ) configuration and the sections of this report that fulfill each Additionally, the systems descriptions, 1 information request. analytical assumptions, definitions and criteria presented in the report together with the safe shutdown system Evaluation Diagrams and typical sketches of proposed plant modifications provide a comprehensive view of Peach Bottom's safe shutdown capability. This information will allow NRC review of Peach Bottom safe shutdown systems, their physical separation, and the proposed alternative shutdown approach. Request 1 Identify those areas of the plant that will not meet the requirements of Section' III.G.2 of Appendix R and, thus alternative shutdown will be provided or an exemption from the requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R will be provided. Additionally provide a statement that all other areas of the plant are or will be in compliance with Section III.G.2 of Appendix R. Response 1 Table 1-1 provides a concise overview of the compliance status of all fire areas at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 with the requirements of Section III.G of Appendix R. The table clearly identifies those areas which are or will be ) Page 5-36
l. (- in compliance with III.G.2, those areas which require alternative shutdown, and those areas- which require some form of exemption from certain provisions of Section III.G. Request 1.a List the system (s) or portions thereof used to provide the shutdown capability with the loss of offsite power. Response 1.a Section 3.0 of this report describes the normal safe shutdown systems used to achieve safe shutdown for all fire areas. As discussed in these sections, the systems and equipment selected to be used in this analysis are a set of plant systems which can be used to achieve safe shutdown when there is no off-site power available. l Request 1.b For those systems identified in "la" for l which alternative or dedicated shutdown capability must be provided, list the equipment and components of the normal shutdown system in the fire area and identify the functions of the circuits of the normal safe shutdown system in the fire area (power to what equipment, control of what components and instrumentation). Describe the system (s) or portions thereof used to provide the alternative shutdown capability for the fire area and. provide a table that lists the equipment and components of the alternative shutdown-system for the fire area. For each alternative shutdown system, identify the function of the new circuits being provided. Identify the location (fire f zone) of the alternative shutdown equipment and/or circuits that bypass the' fire area and Page 5-37 I
verify that the alternative shutdown equipment and/or circuits are separated from j the fire area i: accordance with Section III.G.2. Response 1.b
. Sections 3.1 and 3.2, the Safe Shutdown System Evaluation Diagrams, and Table 3-1 provide the detailed information with regard to the safe shutdown system components, while Tables 5-1
'through 5 provide information on the alternative shutdown system components. l Section 5 provides detailed information on the proposed modifications which will ensure that the alternative shutdown circuits' are isolated from circuit cables located in areas requiring alternative shutdown. This section and its associated
-figures also contain information on all new circuits to be )
provided in order to achieve alternative shutdown capability. All alternative shutdown equipment and circuits are separated from the fire areas which they support, in accordance with Section III.G.2. Request-1.c Provide drawings of the alternative shutdown system (s) which highlight any connections to
-the normal shutdown systems (P& ids for piping and components, elementary wiring diagrams of 1 electrical cabling). Show the electrical }
-location of - all breakers. for power cables, and isolation devices for control and
. instrumentation circuits for the' alternative shutdown systems.for that fire area. f 1
3 Page 5-38 )
)
Response 1.c The highlighte.d safe shutdown P& ids (Figures 3-4-la through 3-4-16) and single-line diagrams coupled with the corresponding safe shutdown evaluation diagrams (Figures 3-5-1 through 3-5-9, and 3-5-11) supply the requested information. The safe shutdown evaluation diagrams indicate the power and control wiring which will be active during alternative shutdown system operation. No power or control wiring routed within the
~
Control Room, Cable Spreading Room, or Emergency Shutdown Panel Area will be electrically connected to any active alternative shutdown equipment circuits once transfer switches are in their
" local" positions.
Revised elementary diagrams depicting all control circuit
. modifications which facilitate alternative shutdown system operation are shown in Figures 5-1-la through 5-1-1q, 5-2-1 l through 5-2-6, 5-3-1 through 5-3-4, 5-4-1 through 5-4-5, 5-5-1 through 5-5-4, 5-6-1 through 5-6-3, and 5-7-1 through 5-7-3.
Request 1.d Verify that changes to safety systems will not degrade safety systems: (e.g., new isolation switches and control switches should meet design criteria and standards in the FSAR for electrical equipment in the system that the switch is to be installed; cabinets that the switches are to be mounted in should also meet the same criteria (FSAR) as other safety related cabinets and panels; to avoid inadvertent isolation from the L Control Room, the isolation switches should be keylocked or alarmed in the Control Room Page 5- 39
1 i if in the " local" or " isolated" position; periodic checks should be made to verify that the switch is in the proper position for normal operation; and a single transfer switch or other new device should not be a source of a failure which causes loss or redundant safety systems). Response 1.d All proposed modifications will undergo 10 CFR 50.59 reviews. Preliminary reviews verify that changes to the safety system will not degrade system performance during the spectrum of' design basis events for which they are required. Request 1.e Verify that licensee procedures have been or will be developed which describe the tasks to be performed to effect the shutdown method. Provide a summary of these procedures outlining operator actions. Response 1.e Plant procedures will be developed and will describe the post-fire operations to be performed. A brief summary of the anticipated operator actions is provided in Section 5.2 for three areas requiring alternative shutdown (refer to Figure 5-8). ) Although the described safety systems utilize a subset of the equipment identified in this analysis, equipment that is not involved in the fire will be utilized to the extent possible, in order to provide maximum operational flexibility. i Page 5-40 )
)
1
1 2 . i
' ~
4. s Request 1.f Verify that the manpower required to perform the shutdown functions using the procedures - of e. as well as to provide fire brigade members to fight the fire is available as required by the fire brigade technical , specifications.
.~ :
Response 1.f For the spectrum of operations required for the initial Mot shutdown period post-fire (approximately two hours), five operations personnel (assuming back shift staffing) are sufficient to achieve'and maintain safe shutdown; these personnel are available in addition to the fire brigade members.
. Additional station shift personnel (normally, at least four are available) will. assist operators in valve alignment operations as required.
Figure 5-8 is a time / manpower diagram which depicts the response of the on-site plant staff to fire postulated to ocqur in the Main Control' Room or Cable Spreading Room with a concomitant loss of off-site power. s t Request 1.g ,. si Provide a commitment to perform adequate s acceptance tests of the alternative shutdown , capability. These tests should verify that: ' -; equipment operates from the local control "
. station when the transfer or' isolation switch is-placed in the " local" position and that ,
the equipment cannot be operated from the Control Room; and that' equipment operates from the Control Room but cannot be operated Page 5-41 s
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1
*\
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, & D qc .- -s is N 13 d sv 3,7 *.t- . _
d V at the local control station when the transfer isolation switch is in the " remote"
, _ . _ s.
Position., , _ kQ Response 1.'q
- l V Acceptance tests'of,all modifications willlbe performed to-,'
ic 3 , r c: cu . O' ens &ure"alte.rnat.ive shutdown system performance requirements. P es -
.p.
^ ~
L a.
- Request'1.h -
(
; Provide / Technical Specifications of the. -
.., ", surveillance requirements and limiting M
~
N. , ,\ conditions for' operation for that equipment d > in r _ , - not already covered by existing Technical For. example,_ if new A; j 1 Specifications.',
, , isolation and control switches /are added to.a i thutdown systqm, the existing Technical
'M -
Specification surveillance requirements , 1 h- il? should be supplemented to verify , s,' , f.
*9 system / equipment ifunctions f ror. the alternate m p shutdown station- ' intervals l with the atguidelines
, testing . Regulatory consistent Guide 1.22 and, IEEE 338.
J
' ., Credits may be
'.s '
taken for other existing tests using group p
. overlap test concepts. '
, 5 Response 1.h .,
4 A An application to amend 'the Peach Bottom Technical !
)
[ :E . Specifications will ,.be made following NRC- acceptance of the 4* [
' i
~ alternative shutdown systems provided in this section.
r- m
..-h+ C /
L Request 1.i - L [h For new equipment comprising the alternative M " shutdown capability, verify that the. systems
- l' available are adequate to perform the necessary shutdown function.- The' functions 1 required ..should be based on previous j j analysesi.fif possible (e.g./- in the FSAR), y
! ' such as a . loss 'of normal ac power or shutdown !. .on Groijp 11 isolation (BWR)y The equipment l ! required ,;for the alterna'tive capability l- 4 x M Page 5942 , l *( , N? < x l , < l l
's '
i 2,% . . - . . _ . - _ _ - . . - _ , . . _ .
~
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( , [' O ya
~
should be- the .same or equivalent to that b . relied on in the above analysis. c ' 71 ~ Response-1.i., p " The[ systems and equipment which comprise the alternative k shutdoin?' method, as previously described, are identical in
. g A performance capability to the normal shutdown systems.
Request 1.i Verify that repair procedures for cold shutdown systems are developed and material ( for repairs is maintained on-site. Provide a summary of these procedures and a list of the material needed for repairs. n Response 1.i
- The only__ identified repairs that may be required in order to achieve long-term extended cold shutdown are:
( (1) Repowering of emergency switchgears from off-site power auxiliary buses. 4' The analysis demonstrates the ability to maintain on-site . power sources significantly longer than 72 hours. Repair of the Balance.of the Plant (BOP) power feeds-to the lE' buses is feasible during this extended
. time _ period (after 72 hours), without specially designed-procedures, equipment and training.
{' _(2) Repowering of the inboard shutdown cooling isolation valves when manual operation capability of these valves is not available due:to inaccessability of the drywell. The analysis indicatcs that. stable plant conditions can
' be achieved in the absence of RHR shutdown cooling mode
. availability. Plant emergency procedures address the condition _ of _
planti ' shutdown and cooling with a! ~
; . unavailability of shutdown cooling mode of operation of v^
j RHR (this situation can be resolved using alternative b i *
- shutdown cooling as described in Section 5.2). There
. will be sufficient time to restore the power supply to 1
Page 5-43 k +
- c. !
i y l' 6 -
the inboard shutdown cooling isolation valve if manual operation of the valve is not possible. 4 (3) Battery charging capability On-site plant procedures will be developoed to ensure the establishment of adequate battery charging capability before tne ce batteries are exhausted. Power to battery chargers of one unit will be supplied from the MCCs of the other unit. In accordance with the provisions of Appendix R, this analysis has demonstrated that Peach Bottom is able to achieve cold shutdown conditions in the event of all postulated fires
~
within the 72-hour time frame permitted by the rule. Philadelphia Electric Company recognizes that the provisions of $ Appendix R do not require plant operating personnel to attain cold shutdown conditions in the fire-affected unit within 72 hours should a fire occur at Peach Bottom. However, operating procedures and modificat-ions will be provided which permit the achievement of cold shutdown within this time period. Procedures h will be structured to provide the operating staff with flexibility in determining the appropriate post-fire activities and plant conditions which will maintain Peach Bottom in stable w t safe shutdown condition. 5.4.2 Detailed Response to Enclosure 2 of Generic Letter 81-12 Request for Additional Information (Request 1) In response to Enclosure 2 of NRC Generic Letter 81-12 of February 20, 1981, the following information is provided for the s Page 5-44
/
t
4 ( fire areas at Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3 which require citernative shutdown. RIquest 1 For each fire area where an alternative or (- dedicated shutdown method, in accordance with Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, is provided by proposed modifications, the following information required to ( is demonstrate that associated circuits will not prevent operation or cause maloperation of the alternative or dedicated shutdown method: A. Provide a table that lists all equipment including instrumentation and support f system equipment that are required by the alternative or dedicated method of achieving and maintaining hot shutdown. B. For each alternative shutdown equipment listed in 1.A above, provide a table that lists the essential cables (instrumentation, control and power) that are located in the fire area. C. Provide a table that lists safety related and non-safety related cables associated with the equipment and cables constituting the alternative or dedicated method of [ shutdown that are located in the fire area. r D. Show that fire-induced failures of the l cables listed in B and. C above will not prevent operation or cause maloperation of the alternative or dedicated shutdown ( method. E. For each cable listed in 1.B above, provide detailed electrical schematic drawings that { show how each cable is isolated from the fire area. l { Page 5-45 (
')
l-Resoonse to A and B
]
~This request'is fulfilled by the information provided in the Evaluation Diagrams and in Tables 3-1, 5-1, 5-2 and 5-3. In addition, highlighted safe shutdown paths are presented in ,
e J nccompanying figures on a safe shutdown system basis (safe shutdown systems are described in Section 3) and modified circuit
]
drawings are supplied. Response to C and D The various safe shutdown systems depicted in the Evaluation Diagrams include all components which are essential for system
. operation. The Evaluation' Diagrams also show the components'
]
corresponding power, control and instrumentation cables, electrical distribution and control panels, and the locations of
. all of this equipment (including cables).
These diagrams were then analyzed to provide sufficient information for resolving the issue of the potential threat to
]
the alternative shutdown capability- from fire-induced cable failures in the three areas of concern. The results of this ) analysis for-applicable cases, are presented below. Circuits Associated with Alternative ] Shutdown Components by Common
Enclosure:
~
No high voltage (4kV ac or greater) or medium voltage (480V ac) cables are routed within'the Cable Spreading and Main Control Rooms, except for the 480V ac feed to
-the ' computer- HVAC which- is' routed in the Cable Spreading Room in its own conduit. . Fire-induced short circuit currents could only affect 125V dc and 120V ac control power cables routed in these two areas of concern. For ~ these two types of control power Page 5-46
k' i L / [ circuits, the power distribution panels are at the Cable Spreading Room or at local motor control centers. Fire-induced faults in control power cables routed in ( the two areas will not propagate outside the Cable l Spreading Room, and will be cleared by the protective devices provided at the distribution panels. r Fire-induced faults in control cables of local motor (- ' control centers will be cleared at the motor control centers, since the control circuit for each load is individually fused by design. A similar situation exists at the remote shutdown panel area with 120V ac and 125V de power and control ( circuits. Furthermore, those 4kV and 480V ac power L ca' o les routed within this area which are not defined as essential for alternative shutdown are all terminated at distribution centers (motor control centers, load [ centers or switchgear. buses) where coordinated electrical power circuit breakers exist. The high voltage power feeds which lead from the ( alternative switchgear cubicle to the loads are routed in their own individual conduit. Therefore, there are [ no common enclosure circuits associated with these ( cables. Also, all of the switchgear control circuit conductors which leave this fire area are interrupted (. by the local / remote transfer switches. that no common enclosure wires run from this cubicle to another fire area. This ensures In summary, since the alternative shutdown equipment and switchgear cubicles are located in such a way that at least one rated fire barrier exists between the equipment and the fire ( areas of concern, sufficient measures have been provided to prevent propagation of the postulated fires. Response to Request E The drawings of the modified alternative shutdown circuits (referenced in Section 5.3) depict the manner in'which each cable { Page 5-47 (
a The is isolated from the. fire area. circuits are discussed ) below. Circuits Associated with HPCI Alternative Shutdcwn by Spurious Operation: No spurious circuits associated with HPCI exist, since the component and cable nelection process did not excludo-competents or. logic / instrumentation interlocks which have a functional impact on HPCI cperation. Thus,.the definition of alternative shutdown control for HPCI is based on isolation of all control cables which are dependent on the areas of concern and which could carry erroneous (fire-induced) commands to the local HPCI components. Circuits Associated with HPCI Alternative Shutdown by Common Power Sources: Modifications will be provided so that the turbine and flow control circuitry will receive alternate shutdown power at the HPCI Alternative Control Station. Thus, the only common power sources will be the HPCI motor ] control center, the batteries B/D, and the main ) 125/250V dc distribution panels in the Battery Room. Since .all loads at these distribution centers are adequately protected and coordinated by fuses, cable ] failure within the areas of concern could not result in loss of HPCI alternate shutdown power (125/250V dc). The same concept is applied for the process monitoring instrumentation to be installed at the HPCI Alternative Control Stations. The instrumentation will derive 24V dc power from a 125V dc/120V ac inverter (mounted at ) the stations) and will be powered from the HPCI motor
. control centers.
Circuits Associated with Diesel Generator Alternative Shutdown by Spurious Operation: The potential exists for spuriously starting a diesel generator as a result of a hot short in several conductors leading through the Cable Spreading Room and Main Control Room. For any spurious start, other than that generated by a spurious MCA (maximum credible accident) signal, the diesel generator will shut itself down as a' result of high temperature in the engine coolant. .Should a false MCA signal be generated, the
'Page 5-48 j
i
k I (- diesel generator self-protecting features are disabled. In order to address this situation, the ESW switchgear control circuit will be modified to guarantee ESW system flow following the start of any of the diesel ( generators. This trodification of the ESW control circuit will guarantee a pump start regardless of any r fire damage to the existing ESW control circuits which ( are routed through the Cable Spreading Room and the Main Control Room. (- The 4kV switchgear presently contains interlocks which prevent closure of the diesel generator breakers on the energized 4kV bus, if spurious starting of the generator occurs. { Circuits Associated with Diesel Generator Alternative Shutdown by Common Power Sources: The source of control power for both the diesel generator output breaker and the diesel generator ( control circuit will be relocated to a dc alternative control station. This distribution panel will power only alternative shutdown components following the [ fire. Any devices which are not required for L alternative shutdown and are powered from this panel will have their feeders opened following the fire. (- . ( - Circuits Associated with AC Power Distribution Alternative Shutdown by Spurious Operation: I No spurious circuits associated with this system exist, since the component and cable selection process did-not exclude the components or logic interlocks which may have a functional impact on the system operation. The s definition of alternative shutdown control is based on isolation of all control cables which are dependent on c the areas of concern and which could carry erroneous ( (fire-induced) commands to the local components. Circuits Associated with AC Power Distribution Alternative Shutdown by Common Power Sources: Excluding the diesel generator and 4kV breaker control ( circuitry, which are treated separately in this ( section, the only power source cables which could affect the operation of the AC Emergency Power System c for the alternative shutdown systems are 4kV and 480V ( ac cables in the Emergency Shutdown Panel Area. The only common power sources are the switchgear load h Page 5-49 (
center and motor control center. Since coordinated electrical protection and isolation capability exists in the power distribution buses, no associated circuits ' of concern by common enclosures are identified for the AC Emergency Power System. Furthermore, the 125V de system will be modified to provide alternative control power to the necessary 4kV switchgear breakers independent of the three areas of concern. ) Circuits Associated with DC Power Distribution Alternative Shutdown by Spurf3us Operation:
}
There are no existing associated circuits of this type which could affect the alternative shutdown systems. Circuits Associated with DC Power Distribution Alternative Shutdown by Common Power Sources: Fire in the areas requiring alternative shutdown cannot result in common failure of the 125V de system, since protective devices are provided in all supply and feeder circuits at the de alternative control stations. These stations are electrically coordinated. The only potential associated circuits of this type are the a power feeds from the Battery Rooms to the various Cable J Spreading Room distribution panels. No essential 125V de power feed for alternative shutdown will depend on these panels, and isolation capability will be provided at the de alternative control stations by the new ] protective devices. The new protective devices will be coordinated with the remaining portion of the system in ] the event of fire-induced cable failure. J Circuits Associated with RHR Alternative Shutdown by Spurious Operation: The most significant spurious operation that could occur in this system would 'be the spurious opening of both RHR shutdown cooling suction valves while the reactor vessel is still pressurized. Modifications of the starter circuitry of .both ac (inboard) and de ] (outboard) MOVs include an isolation relay that will J preclude spurious valve opening. Other RHR motor valves will have their breakers locked open, post-fire after correct valve position is verified. Spurious start of the RHR pump could lead to pump damage if a minimum flow path were not established. However, no modifications were deemed necessary to Page 5-50 1
[ f cover this situation for the following reasons. The minimum-flow bypass valve for each pump is normally open, providing a discharge path in case the discharge valves remain closed. If these were closed [ inadvertently during normal operation, the valves would open automatically as the pump differential pressure r reached the high setpoint. Therefore, these valves in k conjunction with the torus suction valves (which are normal y open) provide a minimum-flow path for a spuriously started RHR pump. c[ - Circuits Associated with HPSW Alternative Shutdown by Spurious Operation: The only HPSW valve movements which could constitute a problem during alternative shutdown operation would be r the closure of the valves located in the discharge line l flowing through each of the RHR heat exchangers. If, following the fire, a spurious closure signal should occur on any of these valves, system operation could be ( inhibited. This problem is resolved by post-fire opening of the breakers on these valves at their individual motor control centers. Circuits Associated with ESW Alternative Shutdown by Spurious Operation: h ESW flow through the emergency diesel generators could be interrupted by spurious closure of valves MO 0498. This problem will be resolved by providing a modification to the valve starter (isolation relay) (! which will preclude spurious valve opening.
- Circuits Associated with RHR, ESW and HPSW Alternative
(: Shutdown by Common Power Sources: r Excluding the diesel generator and 4kV breaker control ( circuitry, which are treated separately in this section, the only power source cables which could affect the operation of these systems for alternative ( shutdown are 4kV and 480V ac cables in the Emergency Shutdown Panel Area. The only common power sources are the switchgear load centers and motor control center. ( Since coordinated electrical protection and isolation 4 capability exist in all the power distribution buses, no associated circuits of concern by common enclosures are identified for the systems. Furthermore, the 125V (.- ac system vill be modified to provide alternative l' Page 5-51
control power'to the necessary 4kV switchgear breakers independent of the three fire areas of concern. Circuits Associated with NS?RS (SRVs) Alternative 1 Shutdown by Spurious Operations: J Potential spurious operations affecting the control and logi.c interlock (NSPRS) circuits of the SRVs exist. Operators will take immediate action, upon notification
)
of a fire, to verify isolation of the SRV control power ' sources at the Cable Spreading Room distribution panels (for fires in the Emergency Shutdown Panel Area) or at tha Dattery Rooms (for fires affecting the Cable Spreading Room or Main Centrol Room). Transit time between these locations is less than three minutes. Isolation of spurious control logics at the Cable Spreading Room or transfer to local control with alternative 125V de power (at the Emergency Shutdown Panels) will restore SRV operability. Circuits Associated with NSPRS (SRVs) Alternative Shutdown by Common Power Supplies: Fire in the areas requiring alternative shutdown cannot result in common failure of the 125V de power to the SRVs. Protective- devices are provided in all supply and feeder circuits at the de alternative control stations and dc distribution system. The de alternative control stations and de distribution system are electrically coordinated. The only potential associated circuits of this type are the power feeds from the Battery Rooms to the various Cable Spreading Room distribution panels. No essential 125V dc power feed for alternative shutdown will depend on these panels, and isolation capability will be provided at the de alternative control stations by the new protective devices. These devices will be coordinated with the remaining portion of the system in the event of fire-induced cable failure. Enclosure 2 of Generic Letter 81-12, Request 2
...It is our concern that this single fire could cause the two valves to open resulting in a fire-initiated LOCA high-low pressure system through the subject interface. To
)
assure that this interface and other high-low pressure interfaces are adequately protected from the effects of a single fire, we require the following information: Page 5-52
( (A) Identify each high-low pressure interface that uses redundant electrically controlled devices (such as two series motor operated [- valves) to isolate or preclude rupture of any primary coolant boundary. ( (B) Identify the device's essential cabling (power and control) and describe the cable routing (by fire area) from source to - termination. ( (C) Identify each location where the identified [ cables are separated by less than a wall l having a three-hour fire rating from cables for the redundant device. f (D) For the areas identified in item 2.C above (if any), provide the basis for justification as to the acceptability of the existing
. design or any proposed modification.
( Response to 2(A-D) ( Section 3.6 and Table 3-2 identifies affected high-low pressure interfaces and systems and components associated with (~ the' interfaces. Also, Section 3.6 and Table 3-2 present f resolutions for high-low pressure interface issues. L A t i f L Page 5-53 ( L
_ . . .- ..- .- ~_. . _- - . .m - - _ _- - .m _- - m - l Tcble 5-1 _1
-1 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 'l PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 '
APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVL SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS AND METHOO OF OPERATION
~--KEY: '
- 1. ACS - Alternative Control Station
- 2. CR -' Main Control Room
- 3. CSI - Isolation Control Switch 4 CSR - Cable Spreading Room
- 5. FSR - Fire Safe Relay
- 6. ISOC - Circuit Isolation. Alternative Power and Control l
- 7. ISORC - Circuit Isolation. Alternative Power and Control. Cable Rerouting
- 8. ISORCNI - Circuit Isolation. Alternative Power and Control.. Cable Rerouting. Alterr4tive Instruments
- 9. LMO - Local Manual Operation
- 10. LO - Motor Control Center Breaker Locked Open (pre-fire)
- 11. N/A - Not Applicable
.2. N/R - Not Required
- 13. NTS - New Transfer Switch 14 PSO - Protection of Spurious Operation
- 15. Rad. 165* - Radweste Building E1. 165d
- 16. R/G - Red / Green Light Indication
- 17. RO - Remote Operation from Main Control Room (Normal Safe Shutdown)
Page 1 of 21
Tcblo 5-1 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
- PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 -
APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS AND METHOD OF OPERATION SYSTEM - NSPRS (UNIT 2) i Alternative shutdown capability. proposed modifications and methods of operation used on normal shutdown equipment for fires affecting areas 29(CR). 28(CRS) and 25(Rad. 165') i I Motive Control Isolation Remote Control ? Indication Comments Component Description Resolution and Method Power Power and Station Instrumwn-of Opera- Control tation tion l Battery Room Rad. 165' Rad. 165*, 2AC43 2AC43 use for fire affecting RV2-02-071L Safety / Relief ISORC* h/A . I Valve A/C. 2AD19, 2AC43 02-071L switch, area 29(CR) and 28(CRS) 125V de 2AD19-New Fuses. New cable from 2AD19. Switch Reroute control and power cables.independ-ent from areas 29 & 28 N/A N/A N/A Use for fire affecting Safety / Relief. N/A N/A N/A Rv2-02-071K Valve area 25(Rad. 165'). Normal Control from CR N/A N/A N/A N/A Use for fire affecting RV2-02-071J Safety / Relief N/A N/A Valve area 25(Rad. 165*). Normal Control from CR Battery Room 2AC43 Rad. 165*, 2AC43 2AC43 Use for fire affecting RV2-02-071H Safety / Relief ISORC N/A Valve A/C. 2AD19 02-071H switch, drea 29(CR) and 28(CRS) 125V de 2AD19-New Fuses. New cable from 2AD19. Switch Reroute control and power caules independ-ent for areas 29 & 28 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Use, for fire affecting RV2-02-071G Safety /Rettef area 25(rad. 165'). Valve Nor mal Control from CR N/A N/A N/A Use for fire affecting RV2-02-0710 Safety / Relief N/A N/A N/A nrea 25(Rad. 165'). Normal Control from CR Battery Room 2AC43 Rad. 165* 2AC43 2AC43 Use for fire affecting RV2-02-071E Safety / Relief ISORC N/A Valve A/C. 2AD19 02-071E switch, area 29(CR) and 28(CRS) 125V dc 2AD19-New Fuses. New cable from 2ADI9. Switch Reroute contrni and power cables independ-ent for areas 29 & 28 N/A N/A N/A N/A Use foe fire affecting RV2-02-071D Safety / Relief N/A N/A Valve area 25 (R ad '. 165'). Normal Control from CR Page 2 of-21 w % w - u w
~ - n - - - - - - - n m r- <- r---, -
Table,5-1 (continusd) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ALTERNAT!vE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY PROPOSEO MODIFICATIONS AND METHOD OF OPERATION
. SYSTEM - NSPRS (UNIT 2)
Alternative shutdown capability, proposed modifications and methods of operation used on normal shutdomes equip % ant for fires. affecting areas 29(CR).,29(CRS) and 25(Rad. 165*) Component Description' Resolution Motive Control Isolation Remote Control Indication Onmments and Method Power Power. and Station Instrumen-of Opera- Control tation tion RV2-02-071C Safety / Relief N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Use for fire affecting valve ares 25(Rad. 165'). Normal Control.from CR
.RV2-02-071B Safety / Relief N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Use for firo affecting Valve area 25fRad. 165').
Normal Control from CR
- RV2-02-071A Safety / Relief N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Usa for fire affecting i
Valve area 25(Rad. 165'). Normal Control from CR Page 3 of 21
.Tcblo' 5-1 (continu2d)
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH EOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS AND METHOD.0F OPERATION SYSTEM - HPCI (UNIT 2) Alternative shutdown capability, proposed modifications and methods of operation used on normal shutdown equipment for fires affecting areas 29(CR). 28(CRS).and 25(Rad. 165')- Component Description Resolution Motive Control Isolation Remote Control Indication Comments and Method Power Power and Station Instrumen-of Opera- Control tation tion M04245 Turbine Exh LMO N/R N/R HPCI ACS, N/R N/R Use local realignment Valve. NTS operation. (Vacuume-Breaker) 20P26 Aux 011 Pump ISORC 20D11, 125V de, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, use remote alignment 250V de, 20D11 NTS Rx. 135' R/G operation. Reroute BRK.1117 cable to HPCI ACS M02-23-020 Pump Discharge ISOC 20011, 125V de, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, Use' remote alignment Valve 250V dc. 20011 NTS Rx. 135' R/G. operation. BRK.1102 M02-23-019 Pump Discharge ISOC 20D11, 125V dc, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, Use remote alignment Valve 250V dc. 20011 NTS Rx. 135' R/G operation. BRK.1101 M02-23-057 Pump suction ISOC 20D11, 125V de, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS. Use remote alignment from Sup. 250V dc. 20D11 NTS Rx. 135' R/G operation. Cham. Valve BRK.1105 M02-23-058 Pump suction ISOC 20D11, 125V de, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, Use remote alignment
.from Sup. 250V de, 20011- NTS Rx. 135' R/G operation.
Cham. Valve BRK.1106 M02-23-017 Pump suction ISOC 20D11 125V de, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, Use remote alignment from Cond. 250V dc. 20D11 NTS Rx. 135' R/G operation. Stor. Tank BRK.1110 Valve M02-23-014 Steam to Tur- ISOC 20D11 125V de, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, Use remote alignment bine Valve 250V dc. 20011 NTS Rx. 135' R/G operation, j BRK.1108 l l M02-23-015 Steam Sup. PSO NR NR 20836, FSR NR NR i New relay will be line Isol. Installed at the MCC j Valve 20836 l (Inboard) l Page 4 of 21 w u w -- w w - - - w -
.- - _~ * - -
_- .- _-. - .- M m_ e - - - s Table 5-1 (continutd)" PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC. COMPANY. PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY PROPOSED MODIFICATION AND METHOD OF OPERATION-SYSTEM - HPCI (UNIT 2) Alternative shutdown capability, proposed modifications and methods of. operation used on normal shutdsmo equipment f o'r fires affecting areas 29(CR). 28(CRS) and 25(Rad. 1E5*) Component Description . Resolution Motive Control' Isolation Remote Control Indication Comments and Method Power Power and Station Instrumen-of Opera- Control tation tion M02-23-016 Steam Sup. ISOC 20D11 125v de, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS. 1Jse remote alignment line Isol. 250V de, 20D11 NTS Rs. 135' R/G operation. Valve SRK.1109 (InDoard) l j M02-23-025 Min. Bypass ISOC 20D11, 125V de, HPCI ACS. HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, Use remote alignment i to Sup. Cham. 250V dc. 20011 NTS Rs. 135' R/G operation, Flow Valve. BRK.1104 M02-23-031 Flush _line ISOC 20011 125V de, HPCI.ACS, HPCI ACS, H6CI ACS. Una remote alignment shut-off to . 250V de, 20311 NTS Rx. 135' R/G cpsration. Sup. Pool BRK.1111 Valve M02-23-024 Shut-off to ISOC 20011, 125V de, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS. Use remote alignment Cond. Storage 250V de, 20011 NTS Rn. 135' R/G operation. Tank Valve. BRK.1107 M02-23-021 Test Bypass ISOC 20D11, 125v dc. HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, Use remote alignment to Cond. Stor- 250V de, 20D11 NTS Rs.135' R/G operation, age Tank Valve BRK.1103 20S37 HPCI Turbine ISORCNI N/A 125V dc. HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, Reroute cables to 20D11 NTS Or. 135' control HPCI ACS and Mon-itoring of HPCI Turbine SV2-23-054 Condensate ISOC N/A 125V de, HPCI ACS. HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS. Use remote alignment Dratnpot 20D11 NTS Rs. 135' R/G operation. Reroute Drain Valve cables to HPCI ASC Page 5 of 21 i
)
Tcble 5-1 (continu;d) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 &-3 APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS AND METHOD OF OPERATION
' SYSTEM - HPCI (UNIT 2)
Alternative shutdown capability, proposed modifications and eethods of operation used on normal chutdown equipment for fires. affecting areas 29(CR). 28(CRS) ana 25(Rad. 165*) Component Description Resolution Motive Control Isolation Remote Control Indicatico Comnants .
'and Method Power Power and Station Inst ruraen , I
'8 l of Opera- Control tation tion SV Auniliary ISOC' N/A N/R HPCI ACS. HPCI ACS, N/R Iselation for. Inter-
- Trip Sole- NTS Ra. 135* locks. Reroute cable nold .to HPCI ACS PT-23-100 Pump Suction ISOC N/A 125VDC.20011 HPCI ACS. HPCI ACS. HPCI ACS, Reroute cable to HPCI Pressure NTS Rs. 135' New PI ACS PT-23-89 Turbine Steam Supply Pres- ISOC N/A 125VDC.20D11 HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS. HPCI ACS, Raroute cable to HPCI sure NTS Rn. 135' New PI ACS PT-23-95 Turbine Steam ISOC N/A 125VDC.20D11 HPCI ACS. HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, Reroute cable to HPCI Exhaust Pres- NTS Ra. 135' New PI ACS sure PT-23-83 Pump Discharge ISOC N/A 125VDC.20011 HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS. HPCI ACS, Reroute cable to t*DCI I
Pressure NTS Ra. 135' New PI ACS FT-23-82 Pump Discharge ISOC N/A 125VDC.20011 HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS. HPCI ACS. Re.oute cable to HPCI Flow F4T S Ra. 135' New PI ACS Page 6 of 21 1 1 t Q w " '
% w H
- ~ - n. - m_ ~ m m m -~ . < ,
Teblo 5-1 (continuso) PHILADELPHIA-ELECTRIC COMPANY
-PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS AND METHOD OF OPERATION SYSTEM - HPSW'(UNIT 2)
Alternative shutdown capability, proposed modifications and methods of operation used on normal shutdown equipment for fires affectirg areas 29(CR). 28(CRS) and 25(Rad. 165') Component ~ Description Resolution Motive Control Isolation Remote Control Indication Comments and Method Power Power and Station Instrumen-of Opera- Control tation . tion 2BP42 ' Pump ISORC EDG- Battery Room SWGR. 'SWGR. 20A1607 SWGR. Alternative 125V oc OBG12 B/D. 28019 20A1607, 20A1607 l from 28019 SWGR 125V oc CSI-152- R/G l 20A1607, 1607 l 4.16kV I M02-10-089B Heat' Exchanger LMO N/A N/A 20B37,BRK. N/A N/A Local operaticn with Valve 3741 post-fire isolatton by opening SRK. 3741 M02486 Discharge to LO N/A N/A- 00853.BRK. N/A N/A Pre-fire isoir. tion by Res. Valve 5341 opening BRK. 5341 SYSTEM - ESW (UNITS 2 & 3) I l Component Description Resolution Motive Control Isolation Remote Control Indication Comments and Method Power Power and Station Instrumen-of Opera- Control tation tion l OBP57 Pump ISORC EDG- Battery Room l SWGR. SWGR. 20A1706 SwGR. Alternative 125V de 08G12 8/D. 20019 l 20A1700 CSI-152-1706 20A1706, from 20019 20A1706, 125V oc l CSI-152- A/G 4.1kV i 1706 M00498 Discharge PSO N/A N/A 00856 FSR 00856 FSR N/A New Fire Safe Relay Valve will be installed at the MCC 00856 P502408 Pressure 150 N/A N/A SWGR. SWGR, 20A1706 N/A Switch 20A1706, CSI-152-1706 Page 7 of 21
Tcble 5-1 (continued) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC power STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE-SHUTDOWN CAPABILITV
' PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS AND METHOD OF OPERATION SYSTEM - RHR (UNIT 2)
Alternative shutdown capability, proposed modifications and methods of operation used on normal shutdown equipment for fires affecting areas 29(CR). 28(CRS) and 25(Rad. 165") I
. Component -Description .l Resolution Motive Control Isolation Remote Control Indication Comments and Method Power . Power and- Station Instrumen-of Opera- Control tation tion Pump ISORC EDG- Battery Room SwGR. SwGR.20A1602 SWGR. Alternative 125V dc 2BP35 0BG-12, 28/D. 20D19, 20A1602 CSI 152-1602 120A1602 from 22D19 SwGR- 125V de CSI-152- R/G 20A1602, 1602 4.16kV Shutdown LMO N/A N/A 20B37 N/A N/A Local operation with M02-10-0158 post-fire isolation by Cooling Valve BRK.3732 opening BRK. 3732 l
l M02-10-0168 Bypass valve LMO N/A N/A 20B37 N/A N/A l i- BRK.3733 Supply to . LMO N/A N/A 20B39 N/A N/A Local operation with l M02-10-0258 Vessel Valve BRK.3922 post-fire isolation by ' opening BRK. 3922 M02-10-1548 Supply to LMO N/A N/A 20B39 N/A N/A Local operation with Vessel Valve BRK.3923 post-fire isolation by opening BRK. 3923
- M02-10-017 Reactor snut- LMO & PSO N/A - N/A 20011 20011 FSR N/A New fire safe relay down Cooling BRK.1100, will be installed at Isolation FSR the MCC 20D11 valve M02-10-018 Reactor Shut- LMO & P50 N/A N/A 20B36, 20B36 FSR N/A New fire safe relay down Cooling BRK.3613 will be installed at Isolation FSR the WCC 20836 Valve (Inboard)
Page 8 of 21
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n _ n_ _- - - - - Table 5-1 (continued) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3'
' APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS AND METHOD OF OPERATION SYSTEM - RHR (UNIT 2)
Alternative shutdown capability, proposed modificatioas and methods of operation used on normal shutdown equipment for fires affecting areas 29(CR), 28(CRS) and 25(Rad. 165') Component Description Resolution Wotive Control' Isolation Remote Control Indication Comments and Method Dower Power and Station- Instrumen-of Opera- Control tation tion M02-10-0138 Suction from LMO N/A .N/A 2C837 N/A N/A Local operation with Torus Valve BRK.3731 post-fire isolation by opening BRK. 3731 ! M02-10-0268 Outboard Cont- LMO- N/A N/A 20839 N/A N/A Local operation with l l alnment Spray BRK.3953 post-fire isolation-by valve opening BRK. 3953 l M02-10-031B Outboard Cont- LMO N/A N/A- 20839 N/A N/A Local operation with I ainment Spray BRK.3934 post-fire isolation by l Valve opening BRK. 3934 l M02-10-034B Supply to LMO N/A N/A 20B39 N/A N/A Local operation with Torus Valve 3RK.3933 post-fire isolation by opening BRK. 3933 M02-10-039J Supply to LMO- N/A N/A 20839 N/A N/A Local operation with Torus Valve BRK.3942 post-fire isolation by opening BRK. 3942 DPIS-10-121B Pump Pressure 150 N/A N/A 20B37, 20B37 N/A Control LS BRK.3733 Page 9 of 21
1 Tento'5-1 (centinusd) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC: COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER-STATION UNITS-2 & 3 APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS AND METHOD OF OPERATION SYSTEM - AC (UNIT 2)
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Alternative shutdown capability, proposed modifications and methods of operation used on normal shutdown equipment for. fires affecting areas 29(CR). 28(CRS) and 25(Rad. 165') Component Description Resolution Motive Control Isolation Remote Control Indication Comments and Method Power Power and Station Instrumen-of Opera- Control tation I tion OBG12 EDG ISORC N/A Battery Room SWGR. Battery Room Battery Alternative 125V de B/D. 2B019, 20A1606 B/D. New Panel Room. B/D. from 20019. Refer to 125V dc - CSI-152- SWGR. 20A1606 New Panel Table 5-2 for a?di-1606 CSI-152-1606 v.A. speed tional modifications control., R/G ODG12 EDG ISORC N/A. Battery Room SWGR, Battery Room Battery Alternative 125V de B/D 20019, 20A1807 B/D. New Panel Room. B/D from 20D19. Refer te 125V de CSI-152- SWGR. 20A1807 New Panel Table 5-2 for addi-1807 CSI-152-1807 v.A. speed tional modifications control., R/G 20B11 4.16-0.48kV ac ISORC EDG Battery Room SWGR, SWGR. 20A1605- SWGR. Alternative 125V dc Load Center OBG12 B/D 28019 '20A1605 CSI-152-1605 20A1605 from 20019. SWGR 125V dc CSI-152- R/G 20A1605 1605 20813 4.16-0.48kV ac ISORC EDG Battery Room SWGR SWGR. 20A1807 SWGR. Alternative 125V de Load Center ODG12 B/D. 20D19 20A1807 CSI-152-1807 20A1707 from 20019. SWGR 125V de CSI-152- R/G 20A1606 1606 20837 480V ac MCC N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 20B60 480V ac MCC N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 20B61 480V ac MCC N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 20854 480V ac MCC N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 20B39 480V ac MCC N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 20B56 480V ac MCC N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Page 10 of 21
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Tcbic 5-1 (continued) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
-PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS AND METHOD OF OPERATION SYSTEM - DC (UNIT 2)
Alternative shutdown capability, proposed modifications and methods of operation used on normal' shutdown equipment f or+ fires affecting areas 29(CR), 28(CRS) and 25(Rad. 165')
- Component Description Resolution Motive Control Isolation Remote Control Indication Comments and Method Power Power and Station Instrumen-of Opera- Control tatioa tion 2BD19 125V dc ISORC N/A 20D01.125V de 28019, 20019, New N/A Alternative 125V dc Distribution CSI Fuses. Switch f o r- SWGR 20A16 Panel 2DD19 125V dc ISORC M/A 2DD01.125V de 2DD19, 20D19 New N/A Alternative 125V de Distribution CSI Fuses, Switch for SWGR 20A16 Panel Page 11 of 21
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. Tcblo 5-1 (centinutd)
. . ' PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH EOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS AND METHOD OF OPERATION.
SYSTEM - NSPRS (UNIT 3) Alternative shutdown capaD111ty,. proposed modifications and methods of' operation used on normal shutdown eqJipment for. fires affecting areas.29(CR), 28(CRS) and 25(Rad.165') Component Description. . Resolution Motive Control Isolation Remote Control Indication Comments and Method Power Power' & Control Station Instrumen-of Opera- tation tion Safety / Relief ISORC* N/A Battery Room Rad. 165* Rad. 165', 3AC43 2AC43 Use for fire affecting Rv3-02-071L Valve A/C 3AD19, 3AC43 02-071L switch, area 29(CR) and 28(CRS) 125V-dc 3aD19-New Fuses, New cable from 2AD19 Switch Reroute Control & Power I Cables independent from areas 29 & 28 RV3-02-071K Safety / Relief N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Use for fire affecting valve area 25(Rad. 165'). Normal Control from CR l RV3-02-071J Safety / Relief N/A N/A N/A, N/A N/A N/A Use for fire affecting valve area 25(Rad. 165'). Mormal Control from CR Rv3-02-071H Safety / Relief 'ISORC N/A Battery Room 3AC43 Rad. 165*,3AC43, 2AC43 Use for fire affecting Valve A/C. 3AD19, 02-071H switch, area 29(CR) and 28(CRS) 125V de 3AD19-New Fuses. New cable from 2AD19. Switch Reroute Control & Power Cables independent from areas 29 & 28 RV3-02-071G Safety / Relief N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Use fcr fire affecting Valve area 25(Rad. 165*). Normal Control from CR RV3-02-071F Safety / Relief N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A use for fire affecting area 25(Rad. 165'). Normal Control from CR RV3-02-071E Safety / Relief ISORC N/A Battery Room 3AC43 Rad. 165*,3AC43, 2AC43 Use for fire affecting valve A/C, 3AD19, 02-071E switch, area 29(CR) and 28(CRS) 125V dc 3AD19-New Fuses. New cable from 2AD19. Switch Reroute Control & Power Cables independent from areas 29 & 28 RV3-02-071D Safety / Relief N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Use for fire affecting Valve a es 25(Rad. 165'). Normal Control from CR I
- See Notes
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- - - m .- . . , TEble 5-1 (continu2d) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAP 4BILITY PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS AND METHOD OF OPERATION SYSTEM - NSPRS (UNIT 3) Alternative shutdown capability.. proposed' modifications and methods of operation used on normal shutdown equipment for fires affecting areas 29(CR), 28(CRS) and 25(Rad.165') Component Description Resolution Motive Control Isolation . Remote Control Indication Comments and Method Power Power & Control Station Instrumen-of Opera- tation tion RV3-02-071C Safety / Relief N/A N/A N/A N/A fi/ A N/A Use for fire affecting Valve area 25(Rad. 165'). j Normal Centrol from CR RV3-02-0718 Safety / Relief N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Use for fire affecting Valve area 25(Rad. 165'). Normal Control from CR RV3-02-071A Safety / Relief N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Use for fire affecting Valve area 25(Rad. 165'). ! Normal Control from CR I Page 13 of 21
Tculo 5-1 (cantinutd)
. PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPLNY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS AND METHOD OF OPERATION SYSTEM - HPCI (UNIT 3)
I Alternative shutdown capability, proposed modifications and methods of operation used on normal shutdown equipment for fires affecting areas 29(CR). 28(CRS) and 25(Rad.165') l Component Description Resolution Motive Control Isolation Remote Control Indication Comments and Method Power Power & Control Station Instrumen-of Opera- tation j l tion M05245 Turbine Exh LMO N/R N/R HPCI ACS, N/R N/R Use local realignment l Valve (Vacuum NTS operation Breaker) 30P26 Aux Oli Pump ISORC 30011 125V dc. HPCI ACS. HPCI ACS HPCI ACS. Use remote alignment 250V dc. 30011 NTS Ra. 135' R/G operation. Reroute BRK.1117 cable to HPCI ACS M03-23-020 Pump Discharge ISOC 30D11 125V dc. HPCI ACS. HPCI ACS HPCI ACS. Use remote alignment Valve 250V dc. 30011 NTS Ra. 135' R/G operation BRK.1102 M03-23-019 Pump Discharge l ISOC 30011 125V dc. HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS HPCI ACS, Use remote alignment Valve 250V dc. 30D11 NTS Rs. 135' R/G operation BRK.1101 M03-23-057 Pump Suction ISOC 30D11 125V dc. HPCI ACS. HPCI ACS HPCI ACS, Use remote alignment from Sup. 250V dc. 30D11 NTS Ra. 135' R/G operation Cham. Valve BRK.1105 M03-23-058 Pump Suction ISOC 30011 125V dc. HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS HPCI ACS, use remote alignment from Sup. 250V dc. 30011 NTS Ra. 135' R/G operatton Cham. Valve BAK.1106 M03-23-017 Pump Suction ISOC 30D11, 125V dc. HPCI ACS. HPCI &CS HPCI ACS. Use remote asignment l from Cond. '250V dc. 30D11 NTS l Rs. 135' R/G operation Storage Tank 6RK.1110 Valve Page 14 of 21 N w
" p, v " v m .m m _m " "_ v v Table 5-1-(continusd)
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH EOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R. ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS AND METHOD OF OPERATION SYSTEM - 'HPCI ~ (UNIT 3) l
'Alternasive thutocwn capability, proposed modifications and methods of operation used on normal shutdown equipment for fires l affecting areas 29(CR). 28(CRS) and 25(Rad. 165*) l Component Description- Resolution Motive Control Isolation Rwmote Control Indication Comments and Methcd Power Power & Control Station Instrumen-of Opera- tation tion M03-23-014 Steam to ISOC 30011 125V oc. HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS HPCI ACS. . Use remote alignment Turbine Valve 250V oc. 30011 NTS Rn. 135' R/G operation BRK.1108 L
[ M03-23-015 Steam Sup. Line '.PSO N/R N/R 30836 FSR I N/R. N/R New relay will be Isol Valve installed at [ ! (Inboard) the MCC 30e36 K03-23-016 Steam Sup. Line ISOC 30D11 125V dc. HPCI ACS. HPCI ACS HPCI ACS, Use rcmote alignment Isol Vuluo 250V dc. 30011 NTS Rs. 135' R/G operation (Inboard) BRK.1109 M03-23-025 Min. Bypass to ISOC 30D11, 125V dc. HPCI ACS. HPCI ACS HPCI ACS. Use remote alignment Sup. Cham. 250V dc. 30D11 NTS Rs. 135* R/G operation l 81om Valve BRK.1104 M03-23-031 Flush line ISOC 30D11, 125V dc. HPCI ACS. HPCI ACS HPCI ACS. Use remote alignment shut-off to 250V de, 30011 NTS Rs. 135' R/G operation Sup. Pool BRK.1111 Valve M03-23-024 Sh at-of f to ISOC 30D11 . 125V dc. HPCI ACS. HPCI ACS HPCI ACS, Use comote alignment Cond. Storage 250V oc. 30011 HTS Rs. 135* R/G operation Tank Valve BRK.1107 i M03-23-021 Tent Bypass to ISOC J0011 125V de. HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS HPCI ACS. Use remote alignment Cond. Storage 250V dc. 30011 NTS Ra. 135* R/G opersticn Tonk Valve SRK.1103 30537 HPCI Turbine ISORCHI N/A 125V oc. HPCI ACS. HCPI ACS, HPCI ACS, . Reroute cables to 30011 NTS Rn. 135* Control & HPCI ACS Monitoring of HOCI turbine SV3-23-05a Condensate ISOC .N/A 125V dc. HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS HPCI ACS, Lue esmote aligreent l Drainpot Dratn 30D11 NTS Rs. 135' R/G operation. Reroute Valve I cable to HPCI ACS I Page 15 of 71
Tculo 5 1 (ccntinuso)
' PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPfNY PEACH COT 70M ATOMIC POTER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY
- PROPOSED MOO!FICATIONS AND METHOD OF OPERATION SYSTEM - HPCI (UNIT 3) ,
Alternative shutdown wapability, propose 0 modificat"ons and methods of operation used on normal shutdown equipment for fires affecting areas 29(CR), 28(CRS) and 25(Rad.165*) Component ' Description Resolutfon Motive Control Isolation Remote Control Indication Comments and Method Powar Power & Control Station Instrumen-of Opera- tation tion SV-1 Auxiliary Trip 'ISOC ^ N/A N/R. HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, N/R Isolation for Inter-Solenoid NTS Rm. 135' . locks, Reroute j cable to HPCI ACS PT-23-!OO Pump Suction ISOC N/A 125V de, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, Feroute Cable to Pressure 30011 NTS Rs. 135' New PI HPCI ACS I PT-23-89 Turbine Steam ISOC N/A 125V de, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, Reroute cable to l Supply 30D11 NTS Rs. 135' New PI HPCI ACS l Pressure { PT-23-95 Turbine Steam ISOC. N/A 125V de, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACT, Reroute cable to l Enhaust 30011 NTS Rs. 135' New PI HPCI ACS l ' Pressure PT-23-83 Pump Discharge ISOC N/A 125V dc. HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, Reroute cable to i Pressure 30D11 NTS Rn. 135' New PI HPCI ACS 1 FT-23-82 Pump Discharge ISOC N/A 125V de, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, HPCI ACS, Reroute cable to Flow 30011 NTS Rn. 135' New PI HPCI ACS
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1 . PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC CO:!Pt.NY l ~y ,
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,i f PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATIGN UNITS 2 & 3 ,,
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APPENDIA R ALTERNATIVE SHUTtsOw?4 CAPABILITV # d E ' h3 Pl40POSCD MODI.FidATIONS AND METHOD OF OPERATION 5YSTEM'- HPSW (UNIT 3) f f' l' Alternative shutdown capability, proposed rnodif icat ions and methods of operation used cn norrr.41 shutdown equipment for fires affectin0 areas 29(CR), 28(CRS) and 25(Rad.165') .
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;ft Component Description l Resolution Moti e l Control Isolation Remote Control Indication l Comments /
and Method Power i Power & Control Station ' Ins t r um6n-i of Opera-
- tation I tion 3DP47 Pump l ISORC EDG- Battery Room 'SWGR, SWGR 30A1804 SWGR Alternatibn l 1 ODG12, B/D. 3DD19, 30A180a 30A1804 125V de from 32D19 l SWGR -{ 125V dc D ,'051-152-e l 30A804'i -
1607 4.1Giv I M03-10-0898 Heat Enchanger LMO N/A N/A 30037,BRK. N/A N/% Local operatlCn with Valve 3741 lpost-fire it.olation by e opening BRK. 3741
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M03486 Discharge to LO N/A N/A . 00853 BRK. N/A N/A Pre-fire isolation j Res. Valve I-5041 by crening BRK, 5341 , l I' f l SYSTEM - ESW ,c: ,' I I OBP57 Pump ISOC - EDG- Battery Room SWGRe ,.1 SWGR. 30A1706, SWGR, Alternative 125V dc OBG12 B/D. 38010, 30A1700, 'l CSI-152-1706 30A1706, from 3BD19 30A1706 125V de CSI-152- R/G 4.1kV 1706 New cable for alterna-
, tive 125V de M00498 Discharge PSO N/A N/A 00856 FSR 00856, FSR N/A New Fire Safe Relay Valve will be installed at the WCC 00856 ,
P50240B Pressure ISO N/A N/A SWGR, SWGR, 30A1706 N/A Switch 30A1706, i CSI-152-l 1706 l !
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n Tculo 5-1 (continued) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 's PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC P0wER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS AND METHOD OF OPERATION - SYSTEM - RHR (UNIT 3) . i [' Alternative shutdown capaDility, proposed modifications and methods of operation used on normal shutdown equipment for fires affecting areas 29(CR), 28(CRS) and 25(Rad.165*) Component Description Resolution Motive Control Isolation Remote Control Indication Comments and Method Power Power & Control Station Instrumen-of Opera- (tation tion l 3DP35 Pump ISORC EDG- Battery Room SWGR- SWGR 30A1802 SWGR Alternative ODG-12 B/D. 30D19, 30A1802 CSI-152-1802 30A1802, 125V de from 30019 l SWGR- 125V dc CSI-152- R/G l 30A1802 1802 l 4.16kV l M03-10-01SB Shutdown LMO N/A N/A 30B39. N/A N/A Local operation with
' Coo l i e.y valve BRK.3912 post-fire isolation by i opening BRK. 331r M03-10-016B Bypass Valve LMO N/A N/A 30839 N/A N/A Local operation with BRK.3913 pos*-fire isolation by opening BRK. 3913 M03-10-025B Supply to LMO N/A N/A 30839 N/A N/A Local operation with Vessel Valve BRK.3922 post-fire isolation by opening BRK. 3922 M03-10-1548 Supply to LMO N/A N/A 30B39 N/A N/A Local operation with Vessel Valve BRK.3923 post-fire isolation by opening BRK. 3923 M03-10-017 Reactor Shut- LMO & PSO N/A N/A 30011, 30011 FSR N/A New fire safe relay down Cooling BRK.1100, will be installed at Isolation FSR the MCC 30011 Valve M03-10-018 Reactor Shut- LMO & PSO N/A N/A 30836, 30836 FSR N/A New fire safe relay l down Cooling BRK.3613 will be installed at l Isolation FSR the MCC 30836 Valve (In-board)
M03-10-0138 Suction from LMO N/A N/A 30839. N/A N/A Local operation with Torus Valve BRK 3911 post-fire isolation by opening BRK. 3911 Page 18 of 21 m m c- - -- e mama .h
- - m m .. m v e---, m m m .m - rq Tcble 5-1 (centinuro)
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH COTTOM ATOMIC POTER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SMUTDOWN CAPABILITY PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS AND METHOD OF OPERATION SYSTEM - RHR (UNIT 3) Alternative shutdown capability, proposed modifications and methods of operation used on normal shutdown equipment for fires affecting areas 29(CR). 28(CRS) and 25(Rad.165') Component Description Resolution Motive Control Isolation Remote Control Indication Comments j Station Instrumen- , and Method Power Power & Control of Opera- tation ( tion l M03-10-0268 Outboard LMO N/A N/A 30839 N/A N/A Local operation with Containment BRK.3953 post-fire isolation by i Spray Valve opening Bnx 3953 i M03-10-0318 Outboard LMO N/A N/A 30839 N/A N/A Local operation with Containment BRK.3934 post-fire isolation by Spray Valve opening BRK. 3934 M03-10-0348 Supply to LMO N/A N/A 30839 N/A N/A Local operation with Torus Valve BRK.3933 post-fire isolation by opening BRK. 3933 M03-10-0398 Suppply to LMO N/A N/A 30839 N/A N/A Local operation with Torus Valve BRK 3942 post-fire isolation by opening BRK. 3942 DPIS-10-1218 Pump Pressure ISO N/A N/A 30B39 30839 N/A Control LS BRK.3913 Page 19 of 2?
Table'5-1.(ctntinu:d)- .ll
' PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANYL PEACH COTTOM ATO';IC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPADILITY PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS.AND METHOD OF OPERATION SYSTEM - AC (UNIT 3)
Alternative shutdown capability, proposed modifications and methods of operation used on normal shutdown equipment for fires affecting areas 29(CR). 28(CRS) and 25(Rad.165') Component Description Resolution Motive Control Isolation , Remote Control Indication Comments and Method Power Power & Control Station Instrumen-of Opera- tation
' tion OBG12 ISORC N/A Battery. Room SWGR. Battery Room Battery Alternattve 125V de
.EDG S/D, 38D19, 30A1606 B/D New Panet Room. S/D from 38019 1 125V de CSI-152- SWGR 3A1606, New Panet Refer to Table 5-2 1 1606 CSI-152-1606 V,A, speed for additional R/G modifications ODG12 EDG ISORC N/A Battery Room SWGR, Battery Room Battery Alternative 125V de B/D 3DD19, 30A1807 B/D New Panet Room, B/D from 30019 CSI-152- SWGR 3A1807 New Panel Refer to Table 5-2 1807 CSI-152-1807 V A. speed for additional R/G modifications 30811 4.16-0.40kV ac ISORC EDG Battery Room SWGR. SWGR 2A1605 SWGR Alternative 125V de Load Center OBG12, B/D 38019, 30A1605 CSI-152-1605 2A1635 from 3B019 SWGR, 125V de CSI-152- R/G 30A1605 1605 30813 4.16-0.48kV ac ISORC EDG Battery Room SWGR, SWGR 2A1807 SWGR Alternative 125V de Load Center ODG12 B/D. 3DD19, 30A1807 CSI-152-1807 2A1707, from 3DD19 SWGR, 125V de CSI-152- R/G 30A1606 1606 30837 480V ac MCC N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 30860 480V ac MCC N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 30861 480V ac MCC N/A N/A N/A ti/ A N/A N/A 30854 480v ac MCC N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 30839 480V ac MCC N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 30856 480V ac MCC N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Page 20 of 21
m - v - v _m m . m . Trble 5-1'(centinued) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
, PEACH EOTTOM ATOMIC POTER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE' SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY
- PROPOSED. MODIFICATIONS AND METHOD OF OPERATION-
' SYSTEM - DC:(UNIT-3)
Alternative-shutdown capability, propcsed modifications and methods of' operation used on normal shutdown equipment for fires-affecting areas ~29(CR) 28(CRS) and 25(Rad.165') Component' Desc'ription Resolution Motive Control' Isolation Remote Cor ol Indication Comments
.and Method Power . Power & Control St a t iot Instrumen-of Opera- tation tion 3BD19 125V dc ISOHC N/A 3BD01.125V de 3BD19 38D19 N/A- Alternative 125V dc Distribution New Fuses. -for SWGR 20A16 Panel- Switch 3DD19 125V dc ISORC N/A 3DDDI.125V de 30D19 3DD19 N/A Alternative 125V dC Distribution' New Fuses, for:SWGR 20A18 Panel Switch l
I i I a Page 21 of 21
I TABLE 5-2 ( PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY ( PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 ( . APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS FOR EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS E Analysis of failure modes on essential cables of diesel generators (DG)l l l B&D for fires in areas 25, 28 and 29 l l l l l l l l l DIESEL GENERATORS' l l POTENTIAL FAILURE l RESOLUTION I I ESSENTIAL l FUNCTION l IN FIRE AREAS l l l- CABLES l l 25, 28, 29 l l l I I I I ( l l ZB2A1606A (DG B) i l 4.16kV I l Not Routed thru I I N/R I l l ZB2A1606B (DG B) l Power Cables l Areas 28, 29, 25 l l l ZB2A1606C (DG B) l l l l 1 I I I l l ZD2A1807A (DG D) l 4.16kV l Not Routed Thru l N/R I l ZD2A1807B (DG D) l Power Cables l Areas 28, 29, 25 l l k l ZD2A1807C (DGI D) l l l l l l l l l l ZB2D2206B (DG B) l 125V dc Power l Not Routed Thru l N/R l {- l ZD3D2406B (DG D) l Cables for DG l Areas 28, 29, 25 l l 1 I Control l I l l l l l l l ZB2D2206A (DG B) l 12SV dc Power l Fire in Fire Area l Alternative l [ l ZD3D2406A (DG D) l Cables for DG l 28 causes loss of l 125V de panell l l Control l 125V de power I in SWGR Area l l l l l and Transfer I ( l l l l Switch I. l I I I I I I ZA2D2206A (DG B) l 125V dc Power l Fire in Fire Area l Alternative l l ZA3D2406A (DG D) l Cables for DG I 28 causes loss of i 125V dc panel l l l Control i 125V de power I in SWGR Area l I i l l and Transfer I ( l l l l Switch l L l l I I I l OG08D (DG B) l Manual start of l Spurious operation! Isolation l l OG10D (DG D) l DG from Main I of the DG in case l switch & I ( l- l Control Room I of fire in Fire I manual start l l l l Areas 28, 29 l of DG in i l l l l SWGR area l { l l I I I l 5 l'OG12C (DG B) l Manual start of l Spurious operation! Isolation l l OG14C (DG D) I of DG from Main I of the DG in case I switch & l l l Control Room I of fire in Fire I manual stop l i l l Areas 28, 29 l of DG in l l l l l SWGR area l 1 I I I I k Page.1 of 4
TABLE 5-2 (continued) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 1 PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 I I I I I l I DIESEL GENERATORS' l l POTENTIAL FAILURE l RESOLUTION l l ESSENTIAL l FUNCTION l IN FIRE AREAS I l l CABLES l l 28, 29 l l l l l l l 1 I I i l l ZBOG04F (DG B) l Loss of off-sitel Spurious start of l Isolation l l l ZBOG04C (DG B) I power operation l DG in case of I switch in l I l ZBOG04K (DG B) I of the DG l fire in Fire I SWGR area l I ZBOG14G (DG B) l l Areas 28, 29 l l l l 1 1 I I ZDOG06F (DG D) l Loss of off-sitel Spurious start of l Isolation l I ZDOG06C (DG D) I power operation I DG in case of I switch in l I ZDOG06K (DG D) l of the DG l fire in Fire l SWGR area l l l ZDOG16G (DG D) l l Areas 28, 29 l l 1 l l l l l l OG20B (DG B) l Emergency shut- l Spurious operation! Isolation l l OG22B (DG D) I down of DG l of the DG in case i switch in l I l from Main 1 of fire in Fire l SWGR area l l l Control Room l Areas 28, 29 l l l l l l l l OG68B (DG B) l Governor speed I Spurious operation! Isolation l l OG70B (DG D) I control in Main 1 of the DG in case I switch and l l l Control Room i of fire in Fire I manual gov. l l l l Areas 28, 29 i speed controll l l l l switch in l l l l l SWGR area l l 1 1 I I I l l ZAOG16E (DG B) l Auto start sig- l Spurious operationl Isolation l l ODOG18E (DG D) I nal for DG in I of the DG in case I switch in l l l case of MCA in 1 of fire in Fire l SWGR area l l l Cable Spreading l Area 28 l l l l Room l l l-1 I I I I j l OG56C (DG B) l Auto voltage l Spurious signal l Isolation l I l OG56E (DG B) I adjustment from I (hot short) in I switch and l l l Main Control I case of fire in I manual volt- l 1 I l Room l Fire Areas 28, 29 l age adjust- 1 J l l l 1 ment switch l I l l l from SWGR I l l l l area l ) l I I I I l ZB3A16H (DG B) l Synch switch l Spurious operationi Isolation l l ZD3A18H (DG D) l in Main Control l in case of fire inl switch in l l l Room (125-SS) l Fire Areas 28, 29 l SWGR area l l I I I I l ZB3A16N (DG B) l A-Meter (CT) l Open Circuit in l Protective l l ZD3A18N (DG D) I in Main Control I current trans- I device (" Thy-l l l Room l former (CT) I rite") I j i I I I l Page 2 of 4
t TABLE 5-2 '( cont i nued ) ' PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY ( PEACH BOTTOM' ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 I I I I I l DIESEL GENERATORS' l l POTENTIAL FAILURE.I RESOLUTION l (l ESSENTIAL I FUNCTION l IN FIRE AREAS l l l CABLES l l 28, 29 'l l l l l l l l 1 I I l l ZB2A16C (DG B) l _Diff. protec- l Spurious opera- l Isointion l l ZB2A18C (DG. D) l~ tion relay . I tion in case of I switch in I ( l I (187-15) in Maini fire in Fire Area l SWGR area I l- l--Control Room l l l l l l l l [ l.ZB2A16D (DG 'B) l Synch Switch in i Spurious Closing l Isolation 1 ( 'l ZD2A18D (DG D) l Main Control I in case of fire I switch in l I l. Room (125-SS) l in Fire Area 29 l SWGR area l l I I I I l ZB2A16H (DG B) l Synch Switch l Spurious opera- l Isolation l I.ZB2A18H -(DG D) 'l in Main Control I tion in case of l switch in l
'l l Room (125-SS) I fire in Fire Area l SWGR area l l l l 28, 29 l l l 1 l l l l ZB2A16N (DG B) l A-Meter (CT) l Open Circuit in l Protective l
[' l ZD2A18N (DG D) l in Main Control l current trans- I device (" Thy-l U l l Room l former I rite") ("GE")l 1 1 I I l l' . I I I I h I ZB2A16I (DG. B) l'187-15 diff. I Spurious operation l Isolation l l ZD2A18I (DG D) i Prot. relay I in case of fire l switch in l I SWGR area l- l in Main Control I in Fire Area 29, l l Room 1 28 ( l l i I l I l l l ZBOBG12W. (DG B) l l Open Circuit in l Protective l I ZB03G12Y- (DG B) l A-Meter in Main I current trans- I device (" Thy-l [- l ZBOBG12Z (DG B) l Control Room I former I rite")("GE") l-l ZBOBG12Al (DG B) l (CT) l l 1 1 ZBOBG122 (DG. B) l l l l f l l l l l
.I ZDODG12W (DG D) .I l.Open Circuit in l Protective l 1 ZDODG12Y (DG D) l A-Meter in Main I current trans- I device (" Thy-l l ZDODG12Z (DG .D) l Control Room I former l rite")("GE") l
- f. '
;l ZDODG12A1.(DG D) 1-(CT) l l l l ZDODG122 (DG D) l l l l g l i I I I
( l.ZBOBG121 (DG B) l DG Directional l Spurious operation! Isolation l
.l ZDODG121 (DG D) l power relay in l in case of fire inI switch in l l l Main Control l Fire Areas 28, 29 l SWGR area I l l Room (CT) l l l fl -
i I I I l ZBOBG124 (DG B) l DG ground cur- l Spurious operationi Isolation I l ZDODG124- (DG D) l rent prot. relayl in case of fire ini switch in (- .I l (CT) l Fire Areas 28, 29 l SWGR area l l l l l l l ( Page 3 of 4
TABLE 5-2 (continutd) PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTCM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 I I I I I I DIESEL GENERATORS' l l POTENTIAL FAILURE l RESOLUTION l l ESSENTIAL l FUNCTION l IN FIRE AREAS l l l CABLES l l 28, 29 l l l 1 I I I I I I I I l ZBOBG12A2 (DG B) I DG current pro- l Spurious operation! Isolation l l ZDODG12A2 (DG D) l tection relay I of breakers (BRK) I switch in l l l (CT) l in case of fire inl SWGR area l l l l Fire Areas 28, 29 l l l l l 1 l l ZA3A1606G (DG B) I DG BRK closing l Spurious operationi Local controll l ZA3A1606M (DG B) i & trip from Maint of breakers in I of the BRK l 1 ZA3A1807G (DG D) i Control Room I case of fire in i from SWGR l l ZA3A1807M (DG D) l l Fire Areas 28, 29 l area. Isola- l l l l l tion Switch l l l l l in SWGR area l i I I I I l ZB3A1606F (DG B) l DG 4kV BRK I Spurious operationl Local controll .1 ZD3A1807F (DG D) l close through i of breakers in I of the BRK l l l Main Control I case of fire in I from SWGR l l l Room l Fire Areas 28, 29 l area. Isola- l l l l l tion Switch l I I I I in SWGR area l i I I I I
-l ZB3A1606N (DG B) l DG 4kV BRK l Spurious operation! Local controll l ZD3A1807N (DG D) I close through I of the breakers in) of the BRK l l l Main Control I case of fire in I from SWGR l l l Room l Fire Areas 28, 29 I area. Isola- 1 l l l l tion Switch I l l l l in SWGR area l l I I I I l ZB2BG121B (DG B) l DG overload l Spurious trip in l Isolation 1 I ZD2DG121B (DG D) l protection tripsl case of fire in i Switch in l l l DG 4kV circuit l Fire Areas 28, 29 l SWGR area l l l breaker (194) 1 I I l l (Unit 3) l l l l l 1 l I l ZB2BG121A (DG B) l DG overload l Spurious trip in l Isolation l l ZD2DG121A (DG D) I protection tripsl case of fire in l Switch in i l l DG 4kV circuit l Fire Areas 28, 29 l SWGR area l l l breaker (194) I l l l l (Unit 2) l l l 1 1
1 I I I I l ZB2A1606G (DG B) l DG BRK control l Spurious operation! Local controll l ZD2A1807G (DG D) I from Main I in case of fire inl of the BRK l } l l Control Room l Fire Areas 28, 29 1 from SWGR I ) l l l l area. Isola- l l l l l tion Switch I s 1 l l l in SWGR area l I I I I l Page 4 of 4
[ TABLE 5-3 Vital Alternative Shutdown Components and ( Corresponding Essential Cables for Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Systems (excluding DG's) UNIT 2 HPCI SYSTEM l COMPONENT I RELATED CABLES COMMENTS ( l l Free of Damage IIsolated by l l l l l l l Transfer Switch l l l i I l { 120S37 l l ZB2Q1800C,D,G l l l l l ZB2Q1799T l l r l l l ZB201835A l l ( l20P26 IZB2Dlll7A,B,C,Zl ZB2Q1801A,C l l 120P28 lZB2Dll16A,B,Z l ZB201803B l l l20K02 lZB2Dlll4A,B,Z, l ZB2Q1802B l l IM02-23-014 lZB2D1108A,B ZB2Q1806B ( lM02-23-107 lZB2D1110A,B l l ZB201811B,D l l l l lM02-23-019 lZB2D1101A,B ! ZB2Q18-7B,E l l [ lM02-23-020 lZB2D1102A,B l ZB2Q1812B,E l l t IM02-23-057 lZB2D1105A,B l ZB201815B,D l l lM02-23-058 lZB2D1106A,B l ZB2Q1320B,D l l lM02-23-025 lZB2D1104A,B l ZB2Q1814C,D l l ( IM02-23-021 lZB2D1103A,B l ZB201808B,D l l lSV23-054 l l ZB2Q1819A,B l l lM02-23-024-lZB2D1107A,B l ZB2Q1813B,D l l lM02-23-031 lZB2DllllA,B l ZB2Q1825B,D l (- lM02-23-016 lZB2D1109A,B l ZB2Q1825B,D l l l . lM0-4245 lZB2Dll24A,B l -ZB2Q1845A l l lM02-23-015 l l 1480V ac inboard l UNIT 2 HPSW SYSTEM l COMPONENT l RELATED CABLES l COMMENTS l l l Free of Damage IIsolated by l l l l l Transfer Switch l l l l l l l l2AP42 l ZA2A1507A l ZA2A1507E l Manual Operation l [ IM010-089A l N/A l N/A l Manual Operation l l lM02803 l N/A l N/A l Manual Operation l l2CP42 l ZC2A1707A l N/A iPump not running l lM010-089C l N/A l N/A l Manual Operation l { ~l2BP42 l ZB2A1607A l ZB2A1607E IManual Operation l IM010-089B l N/A l N/A l Manual Operation i 12DP42 l ZD2A1804A l N/A lThe Pump is not l l l l l l Running l
%- lM010-089D l N/A l N/A l Manual Operation l l l l l l I
Page 1
]
TABLE 5-3 (Cont.) - UNIT 2 ESW SYSTEM l COMPONENT l RELATED CABLES I COMMENTS I l l Free of Damage l Isolated by l l , I l l Transfer Switch l l l l 1 I I lOAP57 l ZB2A1603A l ZB2A1603H, P l Manual Operation l ) lOBP57 l ZC2A1706A l ZC2A1706H, P l Manual Operation I r IMO-0498 l N/A l N/A l Manual Operation l lPS-0240A l N/A l N/A l Manual Operation l lPS-0240B l N/A l N/A l Manual Operation l I l l I I UNIT 2 250/125V dc SYSTEM l COMPONENT l RELATED CABLES l COMMENTS l l l Free of Damage IIsolated by l l l l l Transfer Switch l l l- 1 I l l l 20A15 l l ZA2D2102A l l l 20A16 l l ZB2D2202A l l l 20A17 l l ZC3D2302A l l l 20A18 l l ZD3D2402A I l l 20D11 l ZB2D1802A,B l l HPCI MCC l l 20DllA l ZB2DllA, B l l HPCI MCC l l 2DD03 l ZB2BD01E I l Battery Chargers l l l l l for B-D Battery l l l l l for HPCI l l OAD13 l l ZA2D2106A l For Diesel l l OBD13 l l ZB2D2206A l Generators l l OCD13 l l ZC3D2306A I l l ODD 13 l l ZD3D2406A l l l l l I l UNIT 2 4.16-0.48kV ac SYSTEM l COMPONENT'l RELATED CABLES l COMMENTS l l IFree of Damage IIsolated by l l ) l l l Transfer Switch l l J l l I I l l 20A15 l l ZA2A1505D, G l 4.16-0.48kV AC l l 20A16 l l ZB2A1605B, G l Load Centers l
)
l' 20A17 ! l ZC2A1705D, G l l l 20A18 l l ZD2A1806D, G l l l 2DD03 l ZD2B3983A l l l 1 l 2BD03 l ZB2B6032A l l l l l l l 1 Page 2 {
TABLE 5-3 (Cont.) UNIT 2 RHR SYSTEM l COMPONENT l RELATED CABLES I COMMENTS l {- 1. l Free of Damage IIsolated by l l l l l Transfer Switch l l / 12AP35 l ZA2A1506A IZA2A1506F,H,J,K l l ( lM010-013A l N/A 1 N/A l Manually Operated I iM010-015A l N/A l N/A l l lM010-016A l N/A l N/A l l [ lM010-025A l N/A l N/A l l lM010-154A l N/A l N/A l l lM010-026A l N/A l N/A l l [ IM010-038A l N/A l N/A l l 0 lM010-034A l N/A l N/A l l lM010-039A l N/A l N/A l l lM010-031A l N/A l N/A l l f IDPIS10-121Al N/A l N/A l l lM010-17 l N/A l N/A l l lM010-18 i N/A l N/A l l l2CP35 l ZC2A1702A l N/A l Pump not running l l l ZC2A1702P l l l lM010-013C l N/A l N/A l Manually Operated l lM010-015C i N/A l N/A l l lM010-016C l N/A l N/A l l lDPIS10-121Cl N/A l N/A l l 12BP35 l ZB2A1602A lZB2A1602F,H,J,K l l ( IM010-013B l N/A l N/A l Manually Operated l lM010-015B l N/A l N/A l l lM010-016B l N/A l N/A l l IM010-025B l N/A l N/A l l {- lM010-154B l N/A l N/A l l lM010-2 l N/A l N/A l l lM010-038B l N/A l N/A l l l- lM010-034B l N/A l N/A l l lM010-039B l N/A l N/A l l lM010-031B l N/A l N/A l l lDPIS10-121Bl N/A N/A (. 12DP35 l ZD2A1802A l l N/A l Pump not running l l lM010-013D l ZD2A180SP l N/A l Manually Operated l lM010-015D l N/A l N/A l l { lM010-016 i N/A l N/A l l IDPIS10-121DI N/A l N/A l l [ l Page 3
- ~. ..~ m . - m.. m m . - - .- -
v TABLE 5-4 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM. ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS.2 & 3 APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN METt10DS & CONTROL LOCATIONS SYSTEM CONTROL LOCATION SYSTEM CONTROL LOCATION
]
)
FOR FIRE IN AREA 25 FOR FIRE IN AREA 28 OR 29 SAFETV FUNCTION (RADWAST5 165') (CABLE SPREAD ROOM AND MAIN CONTROL ROOM) Reactivity Control Scram RPS - Manual or Auto Main Control Room RPS - Manual or Auto Main Control Room Reactor Coolant Make-up. HPCI Reactor Building HPCI Reactor Building 135' 135' HPCI ACS HPCI ACS (Units 2 & 3) (Units 2 & 3) l l Reactor Coolant Boundary DC Distribution Cable Spreading DC Distribution DC Alternative Control I Isolation Room Station Battery Rooms l NSPRS B/D (Units 2 & 3) l Reactor Coolant Pressure NSPRS Main Control Room NSPRS Radmaste Buildino 165' l Control (at least 5 SRVs Panels (at least 3 SRV Emergency Shutdown i
- Pressure Control & available) (Normal Safe Shut- available) Panels C43 (Units 2 & 3) down)
Decay Heat Removal HPSW, RHR Main Control Room HPSW, RHR 4kV Switchgear
- Cooling Supp. Pool and (Normal Safe Shut- B (Unit 2) 20A16 (Unit 2)
Shutdown Cooling down) D (Unit 3) 30A16 (Unit 3) Alternative Control
- Shutdown Cooling Local Operation of Valves Station i
Valves as required (Switchgear Rooms) Local Operation of valves ' as Required Process Monitoring Reactor Building 135' Alternative Instru- Reactor Building ?35' HPCI ACS (Units 2&3) mentation HPCI ACS (Units 2 & 3)
- Reactor Vessel Level LISH-3-720 (Unit 3) LISH372D (Unit 3) l LT------ (New, Unit 2) LT------ (New, Unit 2) - Reactor Vessel Pressure PISL-3-520 (Unit 3) PI SL-3-52C (L'ni t 3)
PT------ (New, Unit 2) PT------- (New, Unit 2)
- Suppression Pool TT-2428 TT-2428 Temperature TT-32428 TT-32428 - Condensate Storage LISL-13-170(5) Unit 3 Tank' LT-2217 Unit 2 Page 1 of 2
l LTAGLE 5-4 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 & 3 APPENDIX R ALTERNATIVE SHUTOOWN METHODS & CONTROL LOCATIONS SYSTEM CONTROL' LOCATION SYSTEM CONTROL LOCATION. FOR FIRE IN AREA 25- FOR FIRE IN AREA 28 OR-29 SAFETY FUNCTION (RADwASTE 165') (CABLE SPREAD ROOM AND MAIN CONTROL ROOM) Support Functions (HPSW included in RNR) - Cooling for Diesel Gener- ESW Pump Train B 4kV Snitchgear 20A16 attors & RHR Pumps ESW Pump Train B 4kV'Switchgear 20A16 (Common) 20A16 (Unit 2) (Common) .(Switchgear Room Unit 2). (Tubine Building 116') Main Control Room & Battery Room ASD Station Diesel Generators Switchgear Isniation ' Diesel Generators - Diesel Generators B/D (Unit 2) & Switch-B&D (Common) (Off site Power) B&D (Common) gear Isolation (Off-site Power & Unnecessary Loads) - Load Centers B&D Load Centers Main Cont.ol Room B&D Load Centers 4kV Switchgear 20A16, Breakers (20811 & and 4kV Switchgear Breakers (20811 & 20A18, 30A16 30 A 18 . 20B13, 30011, & 20A1B & 30A1B 30013) 20013, 30811 & 30813) (Switchgear Rooms) 30B11 Units 2 & 3 Support Function DC DC B/D DC Cable Spreading DC B/D Battery Rooms B/D (Units 2 & 3) Room (Isolation (Units 2 & 3) Alternative Control of DC Circuits) Station for Alternative DC Power and Isolation Page 2 of 2
l
- 6. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS 6.1 Introduction PECo is in the process of a major fire barrier upgrade program. The program includes the examination of barrier
{ construction, integrity of penetration seal (s) and ventilation f dampers. It also includes the evaluation of major penetrations such as hatches and doors. This program will have addressed approximately 380 barriers and some 8000 penetrations when completed. Due to the nature and size of the program, it is { expected that individual penetrations will be identified which h will not meet three-hour fire resistance requirements and require an exemptiion for that barrier. All such cases will be ( documented. Nevertheless, in all areas, safe shutdown fire barriers will have a rating commensurate with the hazard. { L Substantial encapsulation of power cable for certain plant f systems is also planned. A similar program has been established for fire detection (~ which also includes a reevaluation of existing detector installation. Section 1 table 1-1 identifies all Appendix R compliance h -modifications by fire area. Page 6-1 (
L .I 6.2 Barrier Enhancements l Fire Area 25 That portion of the 165 ft elevation of the Radwaste J Building which contains the existing Emergency Shutdown Panels currently has an open walkway connecting it with Rooms 376 and 377 of Fire Area 11. This walkway will be provided with a fire-rated wall and door assembly in order to establish a new fire area (Fire Area 25) in the vicinity of the Emergency Shutdown Panels, and provide adequate separation between the two fire areas. Fire Areas 06 and 13 A large open hatch, used primarily during refueling operations, connects the 135 ft and 165 ft elevations of the Reactor Buildings in both units. In Unit 2, the hatch opening is located in the floor at the southeast corner of the 165 ft elevation. In Unit 3, the hatch opening is located in the floor at the northeast corner of the 165 ft elevation. The hatch openings are approximately 400 ft 2 in area. In order to justify defining the floor / ceiling assemblies separating the 135 ft and 165 ft elevations as boundary fire barriers, Philadelphia Electric Company will provide either a water curtain system, or a lightweight fire resistance barrier which will be installed in the hatchway when the hatchway is not in use. I Page 6-2
L
- 7. EXEMPTIONS AND THEIR BASES 7.1 Objectives A safe shutdown analysis has been completed for the Peach h Bottom' Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3. As a result of that analysis, eight fire areas were identified which require exemptions from the specific requirements of Appendix R Section III.G. Due to similarities between fire areas in Units 2 and 3 f
only five exemption requests are required. This section documents the fire hazards analysis on these eight fire areas and {
.provides the bases by which-the exemption requests are justified.
- 7 . 2 Fire Protection Features 7.2.1 Fire Areas 05 and 12 EXEMPTION REQUEST Per the provisions of- 10 CFR. 50.12, Philadelphia Electric Company (PECo) requests exemption from' the specific requirements of Appendix R Section III.G.2, i.e.,~ automatic fire suppression systems shall be. installed in both fire areas.
-Area Descriptions
( Fire Areas 05 and 12'are located at the 91 ft 6 in. and 116 ft elevations of the Unit-2 and Unit 3 Reactor Brildings, respec-tively. Each fire area is made up of: (1) ~ The torus compartment - 91 ft 6 in. elevation [ L Page 7-1 e
- Zone 005C for Unit 2
- Zone 013C for Unit 3 (2) The core spray pump rooms - 91 ft 6 in. elevation
- Zones 005A and 005B in the southeast corner J compartment for Unit 2
- Zones 005D and 005E in the northeast corner compartment for Unit 2
- Zone 007 in Stairway 18 in the southeast corner of Reactor Building, Unit 2
- Zones Ol3A and 0138 in the northeast corner compartment for Unit 3
- Zones 013D and 013E in the southeast corner compartment for Unit 3 (3) The vacuum breaker areas - 116 ft elevation
- Zone 005F ~in the southeast corner compartment in Unit 2
- Zone 005G in the northeast corner compartment in Unit 2
- Zone 013F in the northeast corner compartment in Unit 3
- Zone 013G in the southeast corner compartment in Unit 3
- Zone 015 in Stairway 23 in the northeast corner of the Reactor Building, Unit 3 Access to Fire Areas 05 and 12 is through two-hour fire-rated stair enclosures with one and one-half-hour-rated doors in the southeast and northeast corner compartments. These corner compartments are accessible from the 116 ft elevation of 1
N Page 7-2 1 1
L I L f the turbine /laydown area'through watertight metal doors. Typical watertight metal doors have been recognized by the NRC as f providing protection equivalent to three-hour fire rated doors. In. addition, the torus compartments on the 91 ft 6 in. elevation can be-accessed through watertight metal doors, designed for 28 (-. ft of water pressure, from ~ the southwest and northwest corner compartments at this elevation. Fire Areas 05 and 12 are 19,278 ft 2 in area, have clear floor-to-ceiling heights of approximately 42 ft and volumes of approximately 800,000 ft3 With the exception of the two steel grates for each fire area in the ceiling to the 135 ft elevation ( of the Reactor Buildings (which are provided for personnel access to the torus area, water drainage and pressure relief purposes in design basis accidents), all boundary fire barrier penetrations are or will be sealed and dampered to provide a fire rating commensurate'with'the hazard. The west wall corridor grates have manually activated deluge systems directly over them. Safe Shutdown Equipment Fire Areas 05 and 12 contain components for RCIC, HPCI and (' RHR systems of the respective unit as shown in Figures 7-la and 7-lb. A description of these components is included in the (- appropriate sections of Section 5. There are a total of eight RHR motor-operated valves in the redundant loop of each unit in the respective area, all of which are located in'the torus compartment. The horizontal distance f -: Page 7-3 ___ _______.m______..-_.-_.__m__--- _ . . . . -
between the redundant components or their control and power cables is in excess of 122 feet. The HPCI and RCIC systems have three and two motor-operated valves in this area, respectively; these valves are in their safe shutdown- operating positions during normal plant operation. HPCI signal (control) cables for level switches that transfer suction from the torus to the condensate storage tank (CST) on high suppression pool level are in the core spray pump room, Zones 005E and 013E. Also located in these areas are the redundant instruments and cables for monitoring the suppression pool temperatures. These instruments are 2242A,B and 3242A,B in Fire Areas 05 and 12, respectively. Fire Protection Systems A total of 15 smoke detectors are provided in the zones of each fire area which alarm both . audibly and visually in the con-tinuously-staffed Main Control Room. Automatic suppression is not provided; however, six portable extinguishers per unit are provided for manual firefighting purposes, two of which are ) located in each torus compartment and one on each level of each corner compartment. Fire Hazards Analysis The fixed combustible loadings for Fire Areas 05 and 12, when distributed evenly throughout the fire areas, are 1038 and 949 Btu /ft 2 with resultant equivalent fire severities of under J 1 J Page 7-4 1 1
l L-
'l'.0-minute. The equivalent fire severities, in minutes of burn time, for:the zones of these fire areas are:
.- Fire Area Fire Zone Fire Severity
'05 005A 1.5 005B 1.0 005C 0.5 l- 005D 3.0 005E 7.0 005F 6.0 005G 9.0
( 007 1.0 Fire Area Fire Zone Fire Severity 12 Ol3A 1.5 013B 2.0 f 013C 0.1 013D 3.0 013E 6.0 013F 6.0 { Ol3G 9.0 015 1.5 [ ' Except for the' vacuum breaker- areas on the'116 ft elevation, h radiological conditions in these fire areas are such that access _is. controlled by Health Physics. This minimizes the presence
~
and use of transient combustible' material'within these fire areas and'results in.the fixed combustible loadings being considered as the total combustible loadings. The-HPCI and RCIC valves located in the torus' compartment-are in the safe shutdown' position and a l-fire in the area will not result in maloperation, since the power and- control -cables in the area cannot fail in a manner
-detrimental to systems operation.
However there is a potential for fire-induced spurious signals from the two HPCI level Page 7-5 h
switches in this area to close the suction from the condensate storage tank while the torus suction valves (M0-23-057 and M0-23-058) are closed, thereby affecting safe shutdown capability using the HPCI system. Nevertheless, the preferred method of shutdown for a fire in these areas is accomplished by using the RCIC system which will be operable from the Main Control Room. Redundant valves and power control cables for the RHR sys-tems are located within the torus compartments (Zones 005C and 013C) of each fire area. The valves are located approximately 140 ft apart; however, the separation between power cables is less than 20 ft. Two factors mitigate the potential effects of any postulated fire damaging the control cables to both RHR valves. The first is that handwheels are provided on both valves for manual operation. The second is that, due to the significant time lag before the RHR systems would be required for safe shutdown and the minimal fuel loadings associated with these fire areas, several hours exist in which to manually extinguish any fire in these areas or allow the fire to burn itself out and then manually align the RHR valves, if remote control from the Main Control Room is not available. There are redundant suppression pool temperature monitoring instruments and cables in these areas. The temperature elements are separated by approximately 140 ft and the corresponding ) temperature transmitters for each unit are located in separate , fire areas; however, the horizontal separation between the power l Page 7-6 s
4 ( cables is approximately 90 feet. A fire in this area is not expected to affect the suppression pool temperature monitoring capability in this area primarily due to the present physical separations. Except for the two steel grates in each fire area to the 135 ft elevations of the Reactor Buildings, which are required for ( design basis accidents, all boundaries and penetrations either are or will be upgraded to achieve a fire rating consistent with that required for the barrier. The steel grates are not a significant violation of the boundary fire barrier to the 135 ft elevation due to their location (42 ft off the floor), size (10 ( sq ft each), and the low combustible loading in the torus ( compartment (0.5 min.). The grates in the west corridor have a manually ,ctivated deluge system directly over them. Automatic smoke detection systems that alarm in the continuously-staffed Main Control Room are located in each zone { of these fire areas. Their location ensures that any fire in these fire areas will be quickly discovered and that manual fire fighting operations will begin promptly. ( Conclusions Based on the previous analysis, an exemption is requested { from the requirement that fixed suppression systems be installed f in Fire Areas 05 and 12 as required by Section III.G.2 of Appendix R. The bases which justify the exemption are summarized as follows: {. Page 7-7 l
(1) Automatic detection is provided in each zonelof these ' fire areas. (2) The combustible loadings are minimal, consist almost entirely of IEEE-qualified cables, and have equivalent fire severities of under 1.0 minute in both Fire Areas 05 and 12. (3) Due to radiological conditions, access to the 91 ft 6 in, elevation of these fire areas is controlled by ( Health Physics, resulting in minimal use and storage of transient combustibles. (4) All boundary fire barriers and penetrations, except for the two steel grate openings to the 135 ft elevations above, are or will be fire-rated commensurate with the hazard. The west wall corridor grates have a manually activated deluge system directly over them. (5) The RHR valves can be inanually actuated and are not required until several hours after shutdown operations begin. l (6) HPCI and RCIC valves and cables in this area do not I threaten Main Control Room control of either system in the event of a fire. (7) Providing automatic suppression systems in Fire Areas 05 and 12 would not significantly enhance the protection provided by the current configuration and proposed modifications. The installation of automatic suppression may increase the risk of plant operation and safety due to potential spurious operation.
}
)
Page 7-8 l
i r I h
SUMMARY
EVALUATION TABLE 7-1 FIRE ZONE: 005C, 005A, 005B, 005D, OOSE, 005F, 005G, 007 (Unit 2), { 0013C, 0013D, 0013E, 0013A,. 0013B, 0013G, 0013F, 015 (Unit 3) DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 Reactor Building El 91 ft 6 in. and 116 ft Unit 3' Reactor Building El 91 ft 6 in. and 116 ft f EVALUATION PARAMETERS
SUMMARY
A. Area Description f-
- 1. Construction
- a. Walls -
f North - reinforced concrete in excess of 3-hr rating; South - reinforced concrete in excess of 3-hr rating; { East - reinforced concrete in excess of 3-hr rating; l-West - reinforced concrete in excess of 3-hr rating;
- b. Floor - reinforced concrete in excess of 3-hr rating;
(
- c. Ceiling - reinforced concrete in excess of 3-hr rating.
- 2. Ceiling height - approximately 42 ft in torus compartment approximately 23 ft on the 91 ft 6 in, el compartments
[' approximately 17 ft on the 116 ft el compartment
- 3. Room volume - approximately 800,000 ft 3 h '4. Access in zone - Unobstructed but restricted due to radiological considerations Page 7-9
l B. Safe. Shutdown Equipment See Figures 7-la, through 7-5
]
C. Fire Hazards (Note #1)
- 1. Type of combustibles in. area - ]
Cable insulation
- 2. Quantity of fixed combustibles -
10709 2 average, with maximum Unit 2 Btu /ft concentrated loadings of seven and nine minutes in Zones 005E and 005G, respectively.
-Unit 3 10155 Btu /ft 2 average, with maximum concentrated loadings of six and nine minutes in Zones 013E and 013G, respectively.
D. Existing Fire Protection
- 1. Fire detection systems -
15 smoke detectors in each fire area
- 2. Fire extinguishing systems - Manual 6 portable extinguishers per unit NOTE #1 Combustible loadings may be contrary- to those indicated in the 1977 Fire Protection Program report. Since that date, revisions have been made to heat release data to reflect actual conditions and more detail analysis being performed. The Fire Protection Program Report will be upgraded to reflect changes in plant conditions as modifications are completed.
s j 1 Page 7-10
i 7.2.2 Fire Areas 06 and 13 EXEMPTION REQUEST Per the provision of 10 CFR 50.12,
-Philadelphia Electric Company (PECo) requests exemption from the specific requirements of Appendix R Section III.G.2, i.e.,~ automatic-fire suppression systems shall be installed in both fire areas.
' Area Description
. Fire Areas 06 and 13 are located at the 135 ft elevations of
'the Unit 2 and, Unit 3 Reactor Buildings, respectively.
Each fire f ~ area is made up of the drywell access areas (Zone 022 for Unit 2
.and Zone 028 for Unit 3), the isolation valve compartments (Zones
(. 23 and 19 for Unit 2 and- Zones 027 and 031 for Unit 3), and the r neutron monitoring rooms (Zone 020 for Unit 2 and Zone 030 for [ Unit 3).
- f. Access to Fire _ Areas 06 and 13 -are through two-hour fire-rated stair enclosures with 1-1/2-hour fire-rated access doors. 'In Fire Area 06, the stairs are in the southwest and.
northeast corners of the area. In Fire Area 13, the stairs are in the southeast and northwest corners of the area.- In addition [ to.providing access to these fire areas from other elevations, all four stairs allow access to these fire areas from the 135 ft [. I elevation. The southwest stair in Unit 2 and the northwest stair
- in Unit 3 have access doors from the exterior into the stairways.
The northeast stair in Unit 2 and the southeast stair in Unit 3 h.' Page 7-11 ( _ - - l
; F q
, 1 -
s-
\
~
allow access from the 135 ft elevation of the turbine /laydown ) area through 1-1/2-hour fire-rated doors. Equipment lockSJ ith . s o 1-3/4 in. steel doors which run almost the entire' height of each fire. area are provided for equipment movement to and from the exterior in the southeast corner of Unit 2 and the northeast-corner of Unit. 3.1
\
Fire Areas 06 and 13 are 10,482 and 9802 ff2 in area, ,
~
respectively, with clear floor-to-ceiling heights of
- approximately 28 ft. This results in volumes of 290,000 and .
270,000 ft3, respectively. Due to the extension'of the steam
- 1 pipe tunnel out of the- eastern-most wall to both fire areas ~, e corridor is formed that ' is approximately 12 f t wide by 12 f t hihh '
-by 45 ft long. On either end of this corridor, the c'elling* "-
2 height rises from approximately- 12 ft to 28 ft. With the
.=
t- ? x exceptions of the two- steel grates .in the floor to the torus - compartment and the large.open hatch in the ceiling to the 165 ft , elevation of each Reactor Building, all boundary fire barriers are or will be sealed and dampered to provide a fire rating equal ) to that. required _of the barriers.
-Safe Shutdown Equipment ,
Fire Areas 06 and 13 located at the 135 ft elevation of the
\
Reactor Building contain components / cables of the following i j systems for the respective unit:- )
]
1 Page 7-12
]
i
I_ k , s f (1) RHR System'(all trains) , 7( (2) CS System (all trains) 1 , s g-) q , 1
'1
, (3) HPCI System .s ,!__
\
ss (4) RCIC System
.[' (5) NSPRS
' Q.r / u
\ (6) AC Emergency Power System (7) DC Emergency' Power System (only power to HPCI !!CC)
(8) Monitoring Instrumentation A description of the components is included in the appropriate tables of Section 5. Fire Protection Systems { A total of 18 smoke detectors are provided in the zones of these fire areas. The detectors alarm both audibly and visually in the continuously staffed Main Control Room. Automatic ( suppression capability is not provided in these fire areas. Manual suppression is provided in the form of deluge water ( curtains at the closest junction of the I e'st wall to each fire b area and the reactor drywell. TheWate'r curtains are arranged in t i g two branches 13 ft apart with applicatio@ rates of 0.3 gpm/ft3, ( Intervening combustibles are coated with a filarite retardant s
* ) t 1 g material. The manual trips for the deluge systemstare located in
(
; each stairway for these fire areas. Upon receipt of an alarm flom any detector in these areas, personnel will be sent to the area <
and, if a fire condition is discovered, will manually actuate the deluge system from either stairway. Nine portable ( Page 7-13
- - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - H
extinguishers and four hose stations, each with 100 ft of 1-1/2 in. fire hose, are located in each of these fire areas. Fire Hazards Analysis The large hatch opening in the ceiling of each fire area will provide either a water curtain system, or a lightweight fire resistance barrier which will be installed in the hatchway when the hatchway is not in use. This should provide a level of protection sufficient to justify defining the ceilin's of these fire areas as boundary fire barriers. The fixed combustible 1 adings t.o r Fire Areas 06 and 13, 7 when distributed evenly throughout the fire areas, are 32,109 and 33,403 Btu /ft 2 with resultant equivalent fire severities of 24
- and 25 minutes, respectively. The equivalent fire severities, in minutes of burn time, for the zones of these fire areas are:
Fire Area Fire Zone Fire Severity 06 020 2.0 019 0.0 022 0.0 023 0.0 005H 29.0 13 028 3.0 027 0.5
, 030 1.5 ]
4 031 0.5 .J 013H 30.0 y.
}
, Due-to ,the large floor areas associated with these fire areas and the lack of travel routes to other plant areas, the impact of 1
_g - Page 7-14 1 4
L transient combustibles is considered to have a negligible effect on the estimated fire severities. (Over 13,000,000 Btus of transient combustibles are required to raise the fire severities by one minute.) { On the eastern wall of each fire area, the ceiling height f drops from 28 ft to 12 ft due to the extension of the steam pipe tunnel out to the east wall, thereby creating a 16 ft deep pocket which must be filled prior to heat and smoke spilling down into the 45 ft long corridor. In addition, each half of these fire areas is provided with a separate ventilation system. In ( combination with the open-head manually-actuhted deluge water curtain at the closest junction of the west wall and the reactor k drywell, the 16 ft deep pocket and the division of the ventilation system confines the products of combustion from any postulated fire to one-half of either fire area. There are no ( exposed cables in the 45 ft long corridor. As detailed in this report, redundant methods of achieving *
-safe shutdown exist on either side of the fire areas, with the minimum separation distance between components of the alternete methods being in excess of 100 ft (Figures 7-5b,c). Fire Areas
(. 06 and 13 are essentially divided in half from the water curtain 3 on the west wall to the corridor with the greatly reduced ceiling height on the east wall, effectively limiting the direct impact of a fire to one half of each fire area. Page 7-15 r . i
i t l l Two redundant methods of safe shutdown can be identified for l these areas in the Reactor Building, one based on the north side of the Reactor Building and another on the south side: (1) North Side Safe Shutdown Method (for fires in the south side) Based on the Main Control Room control of HPCI, NSPRS, RHR (B or D), ac Emergency Power System (B or D), dc Emergency Power System B/D, and instrumentation based on the 165' elevation of the Reactor Building. (2) South Side Safe Shutdown Method j (for fires in the north side) Based on the Main Control Room control of NSPRS, RCIC, RHR (A or C), ac Emergency Power System (A or C), and ] de Emergency Power System A/C, as well as 165' ] elevation instrumentation. To comply with these two methods, modifications will be provided to the RCIC system, in the form of encapsulation of safe shutdown { circuits where necessary, to allow for independence from the north side of the Reactor Building. ] These fire areas are not normal travel routes to other plant - areas; however, due to maintenance requirements inside secondary containment, it can be expected that site personnel will be in
]
the areas at frequent intervals. The combination of personnel to detect and fight fires and the presence of automatic smoke detectors within the fire areas provide reasonable assurance that any postulated fire would be quickly extinguished before spread could occur to the adjacent half of either area. Page 7-16
/
( Conclusions Based on the previous analysis, exemption is requested from f L the requirement that a fixed suppression system be installed in Fire Areas 6 and 13 as required in each fire area as prescribed in Section III.G.2 of Appendix R. The bases which justify the exemption are summarized as follows: { (1) The minimum separation distance between alternate shutdown methods located in separate halves of these fire areas is in excess of 100 ft. (2) The manually-actuated deluge water curtain along the west wall of each fire area, coating of any exposed cables between the two branches of the water curtain, effectively remove intervening combustibles from impacting on alternate shutdown methods. Smoke detectors are installed on each side of the deluge system along the west corridor. ( (3) The deluge water curtain and the 16 ft drop in ceiling elevation at the 45 ft long corridor present substantial obstacles which fire must overcome to adversely impact on alternate safe shutdown methods. (4) Automatic smoke detection systems are provided in each fire area which alarm in the continuously [ staffed Main Control Room. (5) Nine portable extinguishers and four hose stations with 100 ft of 1-1/2 in. fire hose are located in each fire area for manual fire fighting purposes by either brigade members or site personnel present in each area. (6) Either closely-spaced closed-head sprinklers will be placed around the ceiling hatch openings to the 165 ft elevation of the Reactor Buildings, or a lightweight fire resistive barrier will be placed over the hatch when the hatch is not in use. (7) Modification to the RCIC system to comply with the separation requirements. Page 7-17
l (8) Installing an automatic suppression system would not enhance the level of protection provided by the current configuration and proposed modifications. The installation of automatic suppression may increase-the risk of plant operation and safety due to potential spurious operation. l 1
)
l l 1 1
)
l Page 7-18
i-B
SUMMARY
EVALUATION TABLE 7-2 FIRE ZONE: 005H, 0019, 0020, 0022, 0023 (Unit 2) 0013H, 0027, 0028, 0030, 0031 (Unit 3) I DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 Reactor Building El 135 ft Unit 3 Reactor Building El 135 ft EVALUATION PARAMETERS
SUMMARY
h A. Area Description
- 1. Construction
- a. Walls -
North - reinforced concrete in excess of 3-hr rating; South - reinforced concrete in excess of 3-hr rating; East - reinforced concrete in excess of 3-hr rating; f- West - reinforced concrete in excess of 3-hr ra' ting;
- b. Floor - reinforced concrete in excess of 3-hr rating; l
- c. Ceiling - reinforced concrete in excess of 3-hr rating.
- 2. Ceiling height - approximately 28 ft
- 3. Room volume - approximately 300,000 ft 3
- 4. Access in zone - unobstructed B. Safe Shutdown Equipment See Figures 7-Sb and c Page 7-19
C. Fire Hazards
- 1. Type of combustibles in area -
Cable insulation
- 2. Quantity of fixed combustibles - (Note #1)
Unit 2 75,873 Btu /ft 2 average, with maximum concen-trated loading of 68 minutes in Zone 005H 2 Unit 3 77,265 Btu /ft average, with maximum concen-trated loading of 69 minutes in Zor.e 013H D. Existing Fire Protection
- 1. Fire detection system -
18 smoke detectors in each fire area
- 2. Fire extinguishing systems - Manual 9 portable fire extinguishers per unit 4 hose stations each with 100 ft of 1-1/2 in. line per ]
unit NOTE #1 Combustible loadings may be contrary to those indicated in the 1977 Fire Protection Program report. Since that date, revisions have been made to heat release data to reflect actual conditions and more detail analysis being performed. The Fire Protection Program Report will be updgraded to reflect changes in plant conditions as modifications are completed.
]
1 l Page 7-20
i 7.2.3 Fire Area 29 EXEMPTION REQUEST Per the provisions of 10 CFR 50.12, Philadelphia Electric Company (PECo) requests
- exemption from the specific requirements of I' Appendix R Section III.G.3, i.e., a fixed fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire' area.
Area Description Fire Area 29 is the Main Control Room which is shared by Units 2.and 3 and is located on the 165 ft elevation of the l Turbine Building. It contains all the control panels and power control systems for plant operations and is staffed on a 24-hour basis. The boundary fire barriers are of heavy reinforced concrete-construction with an inherent fire rating in excess of three ( hours. . All existing identified penetrations either have been or
'will be' sealed and dampered to provide a fire rating equal to
.that required of the barrier. Access to the Main Control Room is
- through .two three-hour-rated . door assemblies modified for security purposes and located on the east boundary wall. The
(; area above the drop ceiling contains a steel-grated walkway adjacent to. the' south wall of the Main Control Room which provides' access to. ventilation ductwork above the drop ceiling e .and an elevator machine room for the ' Turbine Building. This [ catwalk is accessed through a three-hour-rated door assembly from [ Page 7-21 { L _ _- _ _ _ -
the 165 ft- elevation of the Radwaste Building, Fan Room 381, where tha emergency shutdown panels are located. The floor-to-drop ceiling height above the operations area Lof the Main Control Room is approximately 11 ft with, the overall . height to the roof deck above the drop ceiling being 24 ft 4 in. creates a volume of approximately 170,000 ft 3 The This ventilation system for the Main Control Room was designed with a manual purge mode for smoke control. For the Main Control Room, the combustible loading, which is predominantly cable insulation, is 6,980 Btu /ft 2 and has a fire severity of five minutes. Manual fire fighting equipment is present in the Main Control Room. ]
-Sa'fe Shutdown Equipment The control ~ circuits for all safe shutdown systems of both' ]
' units are located in this' area.
. Fire Protection Systems There are nine~ smoke detectors which are located at the drop ceiling level. .These. provide audible and visual alarms within the continuously manned Main Control. Room. Fixed suppression is )
not provided; however, nine portable _ extinguishers and two CO2 hose st'ations, each equipped with 100 ft of one and one-half inch fire hose, are provided for ' manual fire fighting purposes. Line
. type heat detectors are protecting cable trays located in the concealed. space above the Control Room. ]
l 1 j Page 7-22 Y ___..__-__._m_ _ _ . _ - - _ ____.m. - . . _ _ - _ _ . _m_ _m_ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . -
t Fire Hazards Analysis The Main Control Room is a continuously manned fire area with trained operators and portable fire extinguishers. The fixed combustible loading is 6,980 2 with a resultant fire Btu /ft severity of approximately five minutes. Access to the area is strictly monitored and transient combustible material is minimized. The Main Control Room is separated from other fire areas by fire-barrier-rated floors, ceilings, and walls. Alternate shutdown capability will be available to the plant operators from outside the Main Control Room if a fire was to occur (refer to Section 5). Automatic detection is present in the area with audible and visual alarms. There is no fixed suppression system. Manual fire fighting capability is present with portable fire extinguishers and hose lines within the fire area. The automatic detection and manual fire fighting features provide reasonable assurance that any fire in this fire area will be quickly discovered and extinguished. Conclusions Based on the previous analysis, an exemption is requested
-from the requirement that a fixed suppression system be installed in Fire Area 29 where alternate shutdown capability exists as prescribed in Section III.G.3 of Appendix R. The bases which justify the exemption are summarized as follows:
Page 7-23
(1) Automatic detection is present in the area with audible and visual alarms. 1 l (2) The Main Control Room is a continuously-staffed area with trained operators and manual fire fighting equipment available. Hose reels are available outside l the Control Room access doors if required. (3) The combustible loading for the Main Control Room is low, with a fire severity of approximately five minutes.
-(4) The amount of transient combustibles allowed in the Main Control Room is extremely low and controlled.
(5) Alternate shutdown capability will be available outside the Main Control Room. (6) All barriers are fire-rated, with all penetrations upgraded to meet the fire resistant requirements of the barrier. (7) Installing a fixed suppression system would not enhance the protection provided by the current configuration and proposed modifications. i l l l l l l l l
/
Page 7-24 i j
SUMMARY
EVALUATION TABLE 7-3 ( FIRE AREA: 29 DESCRIPTION: Main Control Room k EVALUATION PARAMETERS
SUMMARY
( A. Area Description
- l. Construction
{
- a. Walls -
( North - reinforced concrete, 3-hr rating; ( South - reinforced concrete, 3-hr rating; East - reinforced concrete, 3-hr rating; ( West - reinforced concrete, 3-hr rating;
- b. Floor - reinforced concrete, 3-hr rating;
(
- c. Ceiling - Class 'A' built-up roof deck assembly.
- 2. Ceiling height - 24 ft 4 in.
( 3. Room volume - 170,000 ft 3
- 4. Access in zone - unobstructed B. Safe Shutdown Equipment All safe shutdown system components are affected.
[ Page 7-25 { _- - - - - - - - l
C. Fire Hazards
- 1. Type of combustibles in area -
Cable insulation Ordinary combustibles
- 2. Quantity of fixed combustibles - (Note #1) 6,979 Btu /ft 2 for a five minute fire severity D. Existing Fire Protection
- 1. Fire detection system -
9 smoke detectors
- 2. Fire extinguishing systems - Manual 9 portable extinguishers 2 CO2 hose stetions, each with 100 ft of 1-1/2 in. hose NOTE #1 Combustible loadings may be contrary to those indicated in the 1977 Fire Protection Program report. Since that date, revisions have been made to heat release data to reflect actual conditions and more detail analysis being performed. The Fire Protection Program Report will be upgraded to reflect changes in plant conditions as modifications are completed.
]
1
)
3 1 J Page 7-26 d'
I (- (- 7.2.4 Fire Areas 47 and 48 EXEMPTION REQUEST As per the provisions of 10 CFR 50.12, Philadelphia Electric Company (PECO) requests y exemption from the specific requirements of [ Appendix R Section III.G.3, i.e., fixed automatic suppression shall be installed in both fire areas. Area Descriptions Fire Areas 47 and 48 are located at the 112 ft elevation of the cooling water pump structure. The fire areas are similar, ( each containing high pressure service water pumps and an emergency service water pump. In Fire Area 49, the diesel fire pump room is adjacent to the east wall and is fully enclosed in three-hour-rated barriers. The access door to the diesel fire pump room has a 15 in. door sill to prevent spreading of spilled ( fuel. Access to Fire Area 48 is from the south and west walls through watertight doors. Access to Fire Area 47 is from the north wall through a watertight door. These fire areas are adjacent to each other-and additional access to each area can be ( made from the shared boundary wall through a watertight door. Fire Area 48 has a floor area of 300 ft2 while Fire Area 47 has a floor area of 400 ft2 The volumes are 4950 and 6500 ft3, respectively. ( l Page 7-27
Safe Shutdown Equipment Fire Areas 47 and 48 contain components of the ESW and HPSW systems for both units as shown in Figure 7-6. Fire Area 47 contains one ESW pump and four HPSW pumps of Unit 3, in addition to the cross-tie gate valve (5168) between the two HPSW systems. Fire Area 48 contains one ESW pump and four HPSW pumps, in addition to one cross-tie gate valve (516A) for Unit 2. The ESW system is a common system for both units. Two HPSW pumps and one ESW pump are needed for safe shutdown. The ESW power cable will be encapsulated in Fire Area 47. The cross-tie valve between HPSW systems must be manually operated for safe shutdown. Fire Protection Systems Each of these fire areas has one smoke and one heat detector, located at ceiling level, approximately equidistant from the boundary walls. These provide audible and visual alarms within the Main Control Room. Three portable extinguishers are provided in Fire Area 48 and two in Fire Area 47. There is also a hose station with 100 ft length of 1-1/2 inch hose located in ) Fire Area 47. In addition, the rooms adjacent to Fire Areas 47 and 48 are provided with hose stations, each of which can provide an effective hose stream throughout Fire Areas 47 and 48. Fire' Hazards Analysis Cable insulation not in conduit resulting in a combustible loading of 540 and 1977 btu /sq ft for Fire Areas 47 and 48, respectively which has a fire severity of less than two minutes. Page 7-28
L Most of the cables in these areas are in conduit and lubricating L oil is present in enclosed pump motor coolers. The lubricating ( oil is not pressurized and is considered combustible only if it is sprayed upon a hot surface which raises its temperature to above its flash point (approximately 4500 F). Such surfaces do not exist within these fire areas. Ignition of a contained floor spill by an external ignition source is also precluded by the f presence of water floor drains. For this reason lubricating oil is excluded from consideration as a potential fire source based on a low probability of ignition and is not included in the combustible loading calculation. Excluding the common wall between the fire areas, the [ boundaries are reinforced concrete or masonry construction. The common wall is fabricated of 1/4 in. and 3/8 in. steel plate set [. on wide flange columns, which although not tested for a specified fire rating, provides a level of protection in excess of the hazard in the areas. The barrier is water-tight. All access ( doors are of water-tight construction necessary for plant safeguards system flood protection. Although not fire tested, these doors are of substantial construction and are expected to provide adequate fire resistance (Peach Bottom SER pg. 5-36). The water-tight doors are electrically supervised to ensure that they are closed. { Page 7-29
A fire in~ either area would result in the loss of HPSW , capability for one unit and one ESW pump. The loss of one ESW l pump does not effect the safe shutdown capability of either unit because ESW is a common supporting function to both units and one operable ESW pump is sufficient to ensure safe shutdown capability for both units. The loss of complete HPSW capability for one unit can be compensated for by utilizing the HPSW pumps of the other unit. The tie between the HPSW systems of both units is accomplished by manually opening a cross-tie gate valve in each fire area. Since the HPSW system is not required for safe shutdown until at least three hours after the start of the fire, the cross-tie valves in both areas may be opened after the fire is extinguished. The 14 in, cross-tie gate valves are approximately 8 ft off the floor, are located a minimum of 7 ft
]
from any pump motor, and are fabricated of substantial steel construction. The minimal distance from the shared barrier of Fire Areas 47 and 48 to the most remote two HPSW pumps is approximately 10 feet with no intervening combustibles. The distance between the manually operated valves is approximately 10.5 feet. The distance from the ESW pump to the shared barrier is approximately two feet. Total distance between HPSW pumps is 20 feet with no intervening combustibles. The low probability of ignition of the lube oil in conjunction with the existing separation distance provided and Page 7-30 1 j s
f L I L the metal plate barrier between redundant systems provides reasonable assurance that the automatic detection and manual suppression will provide adequate protection to allow manual operation of the valves within a three-hour period. The fire areas are isolated from other plant structures and do not provide access to other plant locations. They are normally unoccupied and are not used for storage of combustible ( materials. Based on the low combustible loading and the size, location, and mass of the isolation valves, any postulated fire within these fire areas should not result in deformation of the valves { and render them inoperable after the fire is extinguished. A k minimum 'of three hours exist after the initiation of safe shutdown operations before these valves must be operated. Additionally, there is no credible fire in these areas which would jeopardize off-site power availability. Therefore, in the { event of a fire in these fire areas, conventional plant shutdown f equipment could be used. HPSW capability would eventually be required but in a period of days (at least three) not hours. ( Conclusions Based on the previous analysis, an exemption is requested { from the requirement that fixed automatic suppression systems be installed in Fire Areas 47 and 48 required by Section III.G.3 of Appendix R. The bases of the request are summarized as follows: ( k Page 7-31 ( l
(1) The exposed combustible loading in each fire area is less than two minutes of fire severity. (2) The probability of ignition of the oil in the pumps in each area is low because the lubricating oil has a high flash point (approximately 450 F) and that sufficiently hot surfaces do not exist in either area to cause ignition of the lube oil. (3) The existing separation distance provided and the metal plate barrier between redundant systems provides reasonable assurance that the automatic detection and manual suppression will provide adequate protection to allow manual operation of the valves within a three-hour period. (4) The valves are of substantial steel construction, are located well off the floor, and will not deform or be rendered inoperable by total consumption of the combustibles within either fire area. They are located approximately 5.5 feet from the boundary barrier.
]
(5) Three hours exist after initiation of safe shutdown before the HPSW pumps, and hence the manual isolation valves, must be operable. (6) Automatic detection is provided which alarms in the continuously-staffed Main Control Room. (7) Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations are available for manual fire fighting purposes. (8) Encapsulation of ESW power cable in Fire Area 47 is proposed. (9) There is easy access to each fire area from several entry points. (10) There are no intervening combustible pathways between fire areas. (11) There is no credible fire in these areas which would cause loss of off-site power. Therefore, conventional plant systems would be available to provide safe shutdown. (12) Providing fixed suppression systems in either or both fire areas would not enhance the protection provided by - the current configuration and proposed modifications. Page 7-32
L
SUMMARY
EVALUATION TABLE 7-4 FIRE AREAS: 48 (Unit 2) 47 (Unit 3) DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 High Pressure Service Water Pump Bay El 112 ft { Unit 3 High Pressure Service Water Pump Bay El 112 ft EVALUATION PARAMETERS
SUMMARY
l A. Area Description f 1. Construction
- a. Walls -
North - reinforced concrete in excess of 3-hr rating for area 47; 1/4 in, metal plate for Fire Area 48 South - reinforced concrete in excess of 3-hr rating for Fire Area 48; 1/4 in. metal plate for Fire Area 47 East - reinforced concrete in excess of 3-hr rating; ( (External Wall) [ West - reinforced concrete in excess of 3-hr rating; L (Exterior Wall)
- b. Floor - reinforced concrete in excess of 3-hr rating;
- c. Ceiling - reinforced concrete in excess of 3-hr rating.
- 2. Ceiling height - 16 ft 3 in.
f 3. Room volume - approximately 4875 ft 3
- 4. Access in zone - unobstructed B. Safe Shutdown Equipment See Figure 7-6 Page 7-33
l C. Fire Hazards
- 1. Type of combustibles in area -
Oil in enclosed motors Ordinary combustibles f
- 2. Quantity of fixed combustibles - (Note #1)
. Fire Area 47 - 540 Btu /ft 2 Fire Area 48 - 1977 Btu /ft 2 D. . Existing Fire Protection .
- 1. Fire detection system -
Each fire area has one heat and one smoke detector
- 2. Fire extinguishing systems - Manual Area 48 has 2 portable extinguishers Area 47 has 2 portable extinguishers and one hose (
station with 100 ft length of 1 1/2 in, hose line [ Adjacent areas contain portable extinguishers and have hose reels NOTE #1 s . Combustible loadings may be contrary to those indicated in the -1977' Fire Protection Program report. Since that date, revisions have'been made to heat release data to reflect actual conditions and more detail analysis being performed. The Fire Protection ( Program Report will be upgraded to reflect changes in plant conditions as modifications are completed. [- f Page 7-34
}
{
t I l 7.2.5 Fire Area 25 { Exemption Request ( Per the provisions of 10 CFR 50.12, Philadelphia Electric Company (PECo) requests an exemption from the specific requirements [ of Appendix R, Section III.G.3, requiring a fixed fire suppression system. Area Description Fire Area 25 is located at Elevation 165' of the Radwaste ( Building. The room contains the remote shutdown panels for both ( units as well as the control structure for mechanical ventilation equipment and associated control panel. ( The boundary fire barriers of Fire Area 25 are of heavy reinforced concrete construction having fire ratings in excess of three hours. Concrete block construction is used to narrow the width of the open walkway leading to Fire Area 11. Two unrated ( door assemblies lead to the adjacent MG set vent supply fan k r6 oms, Fire Areas 26 and 27, located at the northwest and southwest corners of this fire area respectively. All penetrations of the boundary fire barriers are either presently sealed and dampered to provide a fire rating or will be upgraded { to provide a level of protection commensurate with the hazard in the area. Access to this fira area is by enclosed stairways located in i the northeast and southeast corner compartments of the Unit 2 and 3 Reactor Buildings respectively. The stairs are of two-hour-rated cone'ruction with 1-1/2-hour-rated access doors. Fire Page 7-35
Area 25 can also be reached through the open walkway in the west wall from the 165 ft elevation of Fire Area 11. Fire Area 25 is 6,072 ft 2 in area with a clear floor to ceiling height of approximately 30 ft. The resulting volume is approximately 180,000 ft3, Safe Shutdown Equipment This area is located at elevation 165' in the Radwaste Building and contains the remote shutdown panels for Units 2 and
- 3. Safe shutdown and process monitoring instrumentation control cables, and some of the ac power cables leading to and from the emergency load centers are routed in this area. Also, ESW, HPCI and RCIC cables, as well as ac off-site power and feeds to load center breakers are routed in this area.
Fire Protection Systems This fire area is provided with four smoke detectors located in the main corridor passing through the Radwaste Building. Two detectors are situated in the vicinity of the remote shutdown panels. The area is provided with two hose reels with enough hose to apply an effective hose stream in all areas. Two dry chemical and two CO2 Portable extinguishers are also provided in the area. An additional hose reel and portable CO2 extinguisher are located outside the north access door and a portable CO2 extinguisher is located outside the south access door. There is no fixed fire suppression system. 3 Page 7-36 {
l L Fire Hazards Analysis
; The emergency shutdown panel area contains the emergency C .
b shutdown panels which provide limited shutdown capability should a fire occur in the Main Control Room. The fixed combustible i loading .is 32,640 Btu /ft2, which is predominately cable f insulation, with an equivalent fire severity of approximately 25 minutes. Fire Area 25 is or will be separated from other fire areas by boundary fire -barriers having all penetrations sealed and ( dampered to achieve a fire rating commensurate with the hazard in the area. Local automatic detection is present with audible and visual alarms in the Control Room. Manual fire fighting capability exists with portable fire extinguishers and manual hose stations-( and located in the -area in the immediate vicinity of access
. points-to the area. The automatic detection and manual fire
( fighting capabilities provide reasonable assurance that any fire b in this fire area will be quickly discovered and extinguished. The installation of a fixed suppression system was evaluated for (: 1 the area- and rejected for the following reasons. The ( installation of water suppression was deemed unacceptable because of the' control cabinets and safeguard mechanical equipment in the area (22 fans and their. motors). Due to the tray concentrations and ductwork above the floor, the installation of a preaction system would not assure that water would not propagate in some Page 7-37
{ way- throughout nonaffected plant areas. Therefore, the installation of' area ionization detection, a closed head spYinkler system, cable tray blocks and control cabinet shields to provide marginal increase in fire protection is considered unacceptable from a plant operations and cost effectiveness standpoint. The' installation of carbon dioxide or halon to provide effective flooding concentrations for this area was evaluated and deemed to be unwarranted and not cost effective. Either system would be very expensive to install, the CO2 from an equipment standpoint and the halon from an agent standpoint. A CO2 or halon installation will also present a personnel hazard due to the concentrations required for suppression of " deep-seated" fires. Alternative shutdown capability will be available to operate the safe shutdown systems by using a combination of the Control
]
Room and the HPCI alternative control panel. Proposed modifications include the installation of line-type heat detectors rated at 150 F in all cable trays in the area. A control panel indicating the general location of the circuit fault would be located outside the fire area. The open walkway to Fire Area 11 will be closed off and a rated door assembly provided. l Page 7-38 s
i conclusion Based on the previous analysis, an exemption is requested from the requirement that a fixed suppression system be installed in Fire Area 25 where alternative shutdown capability exists as prescribed in Section III.G.3 of Appendix R. The bases which justify the exemption are summarized as follows: (1) Automatic detection is present in the area with audible and visual alarms in the continuously staffed Control Room. Fire Area 25 is directly behind the Control Room, thereby enabling quick access to the area by fire brigade personnel. (2) The combustible loading for the Emergency Shutdown Panel Area results in an equivalent fire severity of I approximately 25 minutes. (3) Alternate shutdown capability will be available outside / of the fire area. t (4) Portable extinguishers and manual hose station are , available both in the area and immediately adjacent to the entrance access points to- the area for manual fire fighting. Ladders will be provided at the north and south accessways to enable ease in reaching the r overhead trays. L Boundary fire barriers have or will have all (5) . penetrations sealed and dampered to a fire rating commensurate with the hazard in the area. (6) Providing a fixed suppression system in Fire Area 25 { will not enhance the protection afforded by the current configuration. [ (7) A fixed water suppression system would not assure that I water would not propagate in some way throughout nonaffected plant areas (i.e., control cabinets and
. fans-motors).
-(8) A fixed gaseous suppression system would be very expensive to install from an equipment and agent standpoint. At required agent concentrations, there f will be a personnel hazard.
[ Page 7-39 h
l
, i
.. y
SUMMARY
EVALUATION TABLE
-:.Q _ l 1 FIRE AREA: 25 '
DESCRIPTION: Remote Shutdown Area for Unit 2 & 3 El. 165' Radwaste Building EVALUATION PARAMETERS
SUMMARY
A. Area Description
- 1. Construction -
- a. Walls -
North - reinforced concrete in excess of three-hour rating. South - reinforced concrete in excess of three-hour rating. m. t East - reinforced concrete in excess of three-hour rating. West - reinforced concrete in exc ss of three-hour rating with modifications, x, s s
- b. Floor -
reinforced concrete e in excess of three-hour rating. O x s
- c. Ceiling -
reinforced concrete ' in excess of three-hour rating. ,
- 2. Ceiling height - approximately 30} feet
- 3. Room volume - approximately 180/560ift3
- 4. Access in zone - unobstructed /
B. Safe Shutdown Equipment C. Fire Hazards
- 1. Type of combustibles in area '~
Cable insulation, ordinary combus'tibles Page 7-40 0
l l f i
- 2. -Quantity of fixed combustibles --
2 32640 Btu /ft D. Existing Fire Protection
- 1. Fire detection system, four smoke detectors
- 2. Fire extinguishing systems - manual
~n i ,
Two hose re.Els, four por' table extinguishers s i i
\. %, \
2 + ,, ,. , i , I t [ t ,- E s. [ t u . 1 r.- * [ _, s
,i s,
, 4
,s '
e y,
.' i Page 7-41
, s I , t
, 6 e y
s
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1~ l
r 9 l ERRATA
- 1. Page iv - Change name of Table 3-2 to " Appendix R Potential Spurious Operations". 1
- 2. tage 1-2, second line, typo "On January 20, ..." .
- 3. F' age 1-2, footnote, line 1, typo "... to Edward G. Bauer,".
- 4. Page 3-25, line 1 - Chaage to read: "... maintain sufficient pressure for a minimum of five operations per valve.
Additionally, those accumulators are backed up by a bottled air system that has sufficient capacity to provide valve operating capability for 100 days. For the postulated ..."
- 5. Page 3-29, line 22 - Change to read: " storage tanks to provide..."
G. Page 3-31, iine 21 - Change to read: "... this section. These systems ..."
- 7. Page 3 -- 4 2 , line 22 - Delete sentence " Additionally, ... of 100 days."; Add: " Additionally, these accumulators are backed up by a bottled air system that has sufficient capacity to provide valve operating capability for 100 days."
- 8. Page~3-59, line 9 - Change to read "... Table 3-l_ ..."
- 3. Page 3-61, item (6) - Change to read "... Figure 3-5-11".
- 10. Table 3-1, page 9 - Delete double asterisk (**) from valves RV2-02-071D, F & J.
- 11. Table 3 Title of table should be " Potential Spurious Operations" and now "fligh-Low Pressure Interfaces".
- 12. Page 4-2, line 3, typo separation" .
- 13. Table 4-1, page 3, Fire Area 13 - Change III. G.2 Modifications to read " Installation of water curtain or lightweight fire resistive cover in open hatch area."
- 14. Page 5-3, line 1, typo "... C'
- ust and fire brigade ...
- 15. Section 5, General - Alters. ( . down control locations for DC power distribution and contisl, diesel generator control, AC power distribution and control (for PSW, ItllR , JtPSW, diesel generator cell ventilation and diesel generator fuel transfer pumps), and the elimination of spurious operations are not in the is/D Hattery Itooms of each unit as specified throughout the report in the text, tableu, and drawings of Section S. It is intended that these alternative control stations will be located in the 9 and D emergency switchgear rooms of 60th units. Clarification of the text, tables and drawings will be forwarded in the near future.
4-f.
): {
[
' s,
- 16', 'Page 5-10, line;l' - Change-to: read "These are panels 2AC43, 2BC43, ,
3AC43, 3BC43." ,
- 17. Page 5-10,.line 5,~ typo ~ "re-establishment" 10~ Page 5-18, line 7 - Change first sentence to read "One alternative
~s hutdown control' panel for each diesel ~ generator (OBG12 and ODG12)
'will~be installed in the Unit 2B and Unit 3D Switchgear Rooms.
' 19. ; Page 18, ~ line 13 - Change to read ' " . . . respective diesel generators. Opening and closing of the DG circ 91t breakers will -
Ebe . performed at the respective switchgear rooms. Sufficient
= diagnostic..."
- 20. Page 5-19, line 12 - Change to read " . . . alternative shutdown (Pump ' A,) , ..."
- 21. Page 5-19, line 14 - Change to read "... stait the ESW (A,) pump..."
'22. Page 5-19, line-20,. typo - " Valve M_o-0498".
23. Page 5-25, last paragraph - Change to read "... shutdown
-modifications; however, the transfer switches ..."
- 24. ' Pages . 5-20, 5-30, 5-31 &.5 The discussions concerning re-establishing the battery charger feeds as well as other
" essential" . 480V ac powers needs . to be clarified. Firm decisions are pending further information on cables that could be rerouted b . or encapsulated to eliminate these repair procedures. Upon resolution, - the' text, tables and drawings will be revised as necessary to indicate the approach chosen.
;25. .Page 5-34,.line 8, typo "PISL-3-52B..."
- 26. : Table 5-4, page 1,- Process Monitoring, Change to read:
~
r System System Reactor _ Vessel Level LISii-3-72D (Unit 3) Reactor-Vessel Pressure PISL-3-52B (Unit 3) t-
. Suppression Pool' TE/TT 2442 ' A or B ' (U2) TE/TT 2442 A or B (U2) t- tTemperature .TE/TT 3442 A'or B (U3) . TE/TT 3442 A or B (U2)_
Condensate Storage LT-2217 (Unit 2) .LT-2217 (Unit 2) l- Tank Level - 1/2-3217 (Unit.3) I/r-3217 (Unit 3)
- 27. Table 4, - page 2, Safety. function, Support Function ' DC -
) .uliminate one "DC"-Irom block.
- 28. . Page 6-1,Eline 12, . typo "... exemption..."
t
- o.
kt.
~j .,
~
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' ' 29.
Page 7-10, paragpaph C.2. Chango to read " Unit 2 1038 Btu /ft ... y-Unit 3 949 Btu /ft . .
- 30. . Page'7-14,. lino 5 Change to road "will b_e e provided with oither 2
-31. Page 7-20, paragraph C.2. - Change to read " Unit ,2 32,109 Btu /ft
....-loading of 24 minutes ... Unit 3 33,403 Btu /ft ... loading of
_25_ minutes ..."
- 32. .Page 7-20, next to last lino, typo "... upgraded ..."
3 3. - Page 7-23, line 9 -- Change to read ". . . fire-rated-barrior floors
.34. Figure 7 The nositions of the ESW Pumps and the 516A and B are-
. reversed ~on this figure. The pumps are closer to the East wall than the valves.
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R PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT AND PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 AND 3 Table of Contents Volumes 1 and 2 SECTION PAGE EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
xi-xiii SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Objective 1-1 1.2 Background 1-1 1.3 Scope 1-2 1.4 Criteria 1-3 1.5 Report Overview 1-4 1.6 Results of Analysis 1-5 1.7 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 1-6 TABLES 1-1 Appendix R Summary Compliance Table SECTION 2 IDENTIFICATION OF FIRE AREAS 2.1 Objectives 2-1 4 2.2 Identification of Fire Areas 2-1 TABLES 2-1 Fire Area / Fire Zone Identification Table 2-i Existing Protection for Fire Areas i
e- , Table of Contents (continued) FIGURES
- 2-1 Units 2&3 Plant Arrangement 91.5 ft Elevation 2-2 Units 2&3 Plant Arrangement 116 ft Elevation 2-3 Units 2&3 Plant Arrangement 135 ft Elevation 2-4 Units 2&3 Plant Arrangement 165 ft Elevation 2-5 Units 2&3 Plant Arrangement 195 ft Elevation 2-6 Units 2&3 Plant Arrangement 234 ft Elevation 2-7 Units 2&3 Recombiner Building, Diesel Building and Emergency Cooling Towers 2-8 Units 2&3 Intake Structure SECTION 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 3.1 Obj ectives 3-1 i 3.2- Definitions 3-2 3.2.1 Safe Shutdown 3-2 3.2.2 Hot Shutdown 3-3 3.2.3 Cold Shutdown 3-4 3.2.4 Alternative Shutdown Capability 3-4 3.2.5 Associated Circuits of Concern 3-5 3.2.6 Fire-Area 3-5 3.2.7 Fire Barrier 3-6
.3.2.8 Safe Shutdown Equipment (and Circuits) 3-7 3.2.9 Spurious Operation 3-7 3.3 Fire Damage 3-8 Assumptions
~
3.3.1 3-8 I 3.3.2 Basis for Fire Damage Assumptions 3-9 l 3.4 General Analytical Assumptions 3-10 3.4.l' Fire Scenario 3-11 3.4.2 Transfer From Normal Safe Shutdown to Alternative Shutdown 3-12 3.4.3 Section III.G.2 Separation Analysis 3-13 L 3.4.4 Spurious Operation 3-14 e kk
- Figures are-in Volume 2 l
t
Table of Contents (continued) 3.4.5 - Alternative Shutdown 3-14 3.4.6 Manpower Capability 3-15 3.4.7 Off-site Power 3-16 3.4.8 Repairs 3-17 3.5 Safe Shutdown Systems 3-18 3.5.1 Safe-Shutdown Performance Goals 3-18 3.5.2 Safe Shutdown Functions 3-20 3.5.2.1 Reactivity Control Function 3-20 3.5.2.2 Reactor Coolant Make-up Control Function 3-21 3.5.2.3 Reactor Coolant Pressure Control Function 3-24 3.5.2.4 Residual Heat Removal Function 3-26 3.5.2.5 Process Monitoring Function 3-28 3.5.2.6 Support Functions 3-28 3.5.3 Safe Shutdown Systens 3-31 3.5.3.1 High Pressure-Coolant Injection System 3-32 3.5.3.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System 3-37 3.5.3.3 Nuclear System Pressure Relief System 3-40 3.5.3.4 Residual Heat Removal System 3-42 3.5.3.5- Core Spray System 3-46 3.5.3.6 Process Monitoring Instrumentation 3-47 3.5.3.7 Emergency-Service Water System 3-49 3.5.3.8 High Pressure Service Water System 3-51 3.5.3.9 AC Emergency Power System 3-52 3.5.3.10 DC Emergency Power System 3-55 i 3.6 Analysis of Safe Shutdown Systems 3-57 3.6.1 Objectives 3-57 _3.6.2 Identification of Safe Shutdown System Components- 3-57 Identification of Safe Shutdown Circuits 3.6.3 and Cables 3-59 3.6.4 . Appendix R Section~III.G Evaluation Diagrams and Separation Analysis 3-60 I 1 3. 6. 5 - Associated Circuits of Concern 3-64 L 3.6.5.1 Introduction 3-64 L 3.6.5.2 Identification of Associated Circuits by
' Common' Power Supply _and Common Enclosures 3-64 i
3.6.5.3 Identification of Associated Circuits by Spurious Operation 3-66 3.6.6 Suppression Effects 3-68 3.6.7' Identification of Areas of Conformance/ Nonconformance with Appendix R Section III.G 3-69 i: iii i e
, - , . , . . . - , , ~ . . . - - - - - - - . _ . - - . , - , - . - , , . - - - - , , , - , . . . . - . , - - - - - .- ,
- p. .
Table of contents (continued) TABLES 3-1 Appendix R Essential Safe Shutdown Components 3-2 Appendix R High-Low Pressure Interfaces FIGURES
- 3-la~ Safe Shutdown Functions RCS~ Makeup Control 3-lb Safe Shutdown Functions RCS Pressure Control 3-lc Safe Shutdown Functions Reactor Heat Removal 3-ld Safe Shutdown Functions RCS Reactivity Control 3-le Safe Shutdown Functions Support Systems 3-1f Safe Shutdown Functions Support Systems 3-2 Safe Shutdown Functions Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis 3-3 Evaluation Diagram Example M0-23-016 3-4-la Unit 2 - HPCI Safe Shutdown Flow Path 3-4-lb Unit 2 - HPCI. Safe Shutdown Flow Path
! 3-4-2a Unit RCIC Safe Shutdown Flow Path 3-4-2b Unit 2 - RCIC Safe Shutdown Flow Path 3-4-3 Unit 2 - SRVs and NSPRS Safe Shutdown Flow Path 3-4-4 Unit 2 - RHR Safe Shutdown Flow Path 3-4-5 Unit 3 - RHR Safe Shutdown Flow Path 3-4-6a Unit 2 - CS Safe Shutdown Flow Path 3-4-6b Unit 3 - CS Safe Shutdown Flow Path 3-4-7 Unit 2 - ESW and HPSW Safe Shutdown Flow Path 3-4-8a Unit 2 - 125/250V DC Safe Shutdown Flow _ Path (One-line diagram) 3-4-8b Unit 2 - 125/250V DC Safe Shutdown Flow ! Path (One-line diagram) 3-4-9a Unit 3 -125/250V DC Safe Shutdown Flow Path (One-line diagram) 3-4-9b Unit 3 - 125/250V DC Safe Shutdown Flow Path (One-line diagram) 3-4-10 Unit 2 4kV Safe Shutdown Flow Path ' (One-line diagram) ; 3-4-11a Unit 2 - 440V AC Safe Shutdown Flow Path (One-line diagram) ; 3-4-llb- Unit 2-- 440V AC Safe Shutdown Flow Path (One-line diagram) ] 3-4-11c Units 2&3 - 440V Emergency Auxiliary Power ; System (One-line diagram) iv 1
- Figures are in Volume 2
( ) l 1
Table of Contents (continued) 3-4-12 Unit 2 - 120V AC Safe Shutdown Flow Path
, (One-line diagram) 3-4-13 ~
Unit 3 - 4kV Safe Shutdown Flow Path
-(One-line diagram) 3-4-14a Unit 3 -440V AC Safe Shutdown Flow Path (One-line diagram) 3-4-14b- Unit 440V AC Safe Shutdown Flow Path
-(One-line diagram) 3-4-15 Unit 3 - 120V AC Safe Shutdown Flow Path-(One-line diagram)
- 3-4-16 Unit 2 - DG Fuel Oil Transfer Safe i Shutdown Flow Path 3-5-1 10_CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram for RCIC System 3-5-2 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram for HPCI System 3-5-3 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix-R, III.G Evaluation Diagram for NSPRS 3-5-4 10 CFR,'Part.50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram'for RHR System 3-5-5 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram-for CS System
+ 3-5-6 10 CFR, Part:50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation
. Diagram.for ESW System e'
3-5-7' 10 CFR, Part 50,-Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram for HPSW System
- 3-5-8 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R,-'III.G Evaluation
- Diagram for acl Emergency Power System 3-5-9 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram for de 125/250V Emergency Power System 3-5-10a- DG Circuit Breakers Control 3-5-10b DG. Circuit Breakers Control
! 3-5-10c DG Circuit Breakers Control 9 3-5-10d DG Circuit Breakers Control
'3-5-10e DG Circuit, Breakers Control-3-5-10f DG Circuit Breakers Control 3-5-10g DG Circuit Breakers Control' 5-10h DG Circuit Breakers 1 Control E
3-5-10i DG-' Circuit Breakers Control k' ' 3-5-10j' DG Circuit' Breakers Control 3-5-11 10 CFR, Part-50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram for Process Monitoring' Instrumentation l v
Table of Contents (continued) 1 SECTION 4 APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS 4.1 Compliance Status 4-1 l 4.2 Nonconformance Summary 4-2 ! 4.3 Areas Requiring Alternative Shutdown 4-3 4.4 Exemptions 4-3 I 1 TABLES 4-1 Appendix R Fire Area Nonconformance Summary SECTION 5 ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY 5.1 Introduction 5-1 5.2 Alternative Shutdown Method 5-4 5.2.1 . Introduction to Alternative Shutdown Systems 5-5 5.2.2 Alternative Shutdown Systems Controls Locations 5-8 5.2.3 Alternative Shutdown Safety Functions 5-13 5.2.3.1 Reactivity Control During Alternative Shutdown Operation 5-13 5.2.3.2 Reactor. Vessel Level Control During Alternative Shutdown 5-14 5.2.3.3 Support Functions for-the Alternative Shutdown Method 5-16 5.2.3.4 Decay Heat Removal During Alternative Shutdown 5-20 5.3 Alternative Shutdown Modifications 5-23 5.3.1- HPCI System Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-24 5.3.2 RHR System Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-26 5.3.3 HPSW System Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-27 5.3.4 Diesel Generators Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-27 '., vi .
Table of Contents (continued) 5.3.5 ESW System Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-29 5.3.6 AC Emergency Power System Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-29 5.3.7 DC Emergency Power System Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-32 5.3.8 Emergency Shutdown Panel Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-33 5.3.9 Process Monitoring Instrumentation Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-33 5.4 Response to NRC Generic Letter 81-12 5-35 5.4.1 Section 8 of Enclosure 1 to Generic Letter 81-12, Information Required for Staff Review 5-35 5.4.2 Detailed Response to Enclosure 2 of Generic Letter 61-12, Request for Additional Information (Request 1) 5-44 TABLES 5-1 Appendix R Alternative Shutdown Capability Proposed Modifications and Method of Operation 5-2 Appendix R Alternative Shutdown Capability Proposed Modifications for Emergency Diesel Generators 5-3 Vital Alternative Shutdown components and (Corresponding Essential Cables for all Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Systems (excluding DGs) 5-4 Appendix R Alternative Shutdown Methods and Control Locations FIGURES
- 5-1 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram for HPCI System Alternative Shutdown Modification s
5-1-la Modified HPCI Components through j 5-1-lg ,, vil
- Figures are in Volume 2
1 I Table of Contents (continued) l 5-2 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram for RHR System Alternative ! Shutdown Modification i 5-2-1 RHR Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-2-2 RHR Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-2-3 RHR Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-2-4 RHR Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-2-5 RHR Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-2-6 RHR Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-3 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram for ESW System Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-3-1 ESW Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-3-2 ESW Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-3-3 ESW Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-3-4 ESW Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-4 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix R, III.G Evaluation Diagram for HPSW System Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-4-1 HPSW Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-4-2 HPSW Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-4-3 HPSW Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-4-4 HPSW Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-4-5 HPSW Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-5 125/250V dc Power System Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-5-1 NSPRS Modifications 5-5-2 NSPRS Modifications 5-5-3 Modification for valves 5-5-4 Modification for Valves 5-6 AC Power System Alternative Shutdown Modification 5-6-1 AC Power System Alternative Shutdown Modification / I Isolation 5-6-2 AC Power System Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation l 5-6-3 AC Power System Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-7a DG Circuit Alternative Shutdown Modification
- 5-7b DG Circuit Alternative Shutdown Modification l 5-7c DG Circuit Alternative Shutdown Modifications l 5-7d DG Circuit Alternative Shutdown Modifications l 5-7-1 DG Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation I l 5-7-2 DG Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-7-3 DG Alternative Shutdown Modification / Isolation 5-8 Post-Fire Manpower Loading for Fire in Main
! Control Room, Cable Spreading Room or Remote l Shutdown Panel Area l viii i
Table of Contents (continued) SECTION 6 DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS 6.1 Introduction 6-1 6.2 Barrier Enhancements 6-2 SECTION 7 EXEMPTIONS AND THEIR BASES 7.1 Obj ectives 7-1 7.2 Fire Protection Features 7-1 7.2.1 Fire Areas 05 and 12 7-1 7.2.2. Fire Areas 06 and 13 7-11 7.2.3 Fire Area 29 7-21 7.2.4 Fire Areas 47 and 48 7-27 7.2.5 Fire Area 25 7-35 TABLES
'7-1 Fire Areas 05 and 12 Summary Evaluation Table (includes proposed modifications) 7-9 7-2 Fire Attac 06 and 13 Summary Evaluation Table 7-19 7-3 Fire Area 29 Summary Evaluation Table 7-25 7-4 Fire Areas 47 and 48 Summary Evaluation Table 7-33 7-5 Fire Area 25 Summary Evaluation Table 7-40 FIGURES
- 7-la Equipment Location for RHR System (Unit 2) 91.5 ft Elevation 7-lb Equipment Location for HPIC and RCIC Systems (Unit 2) 91.5 ft Elevation 7-2a Equipment Location for RHR System (Unit 2) 116 ft Elevation 7-2b Equipment Location for HPCI and RCIC Systems (Unit 2) 116 ft Elevation 7-3a Equipment Location for RHR System (Unit 3) 91.5 ft Elevation 7-3b Equipment Location for HPCI and RCIC Systems (Unit 3) 91.5 ft Elevation ix
- Figures are in Volume 2
k 1 Table of Contents (continued) 7-4a Equipment Location for RHR System (Unit 3) 116 ft Elevation 7-4b Equipment Location for HPCI and RCIC
]
Systems (Unit 3) 116 ft Elevation i 7-Sa Equipment Location-for RHR System 7-Sb (Unit-3) 135 ft Elevation (Unit 2 is Similar) Equipment Location for HPCI, RCIC and i NSPRS Systems (Unit 3) 135 ft Elevation ' (Unit 2 is Similar) 7-Sc Equipment Location for Core Spray System 7-6 (Unit 3) 135 ft Elevation (Unit 2 is Similar) Equipment Location for HPSW and ESW Systems (Unit 2 and 3) 112 ft Elevation 4 4 I l i l l
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l PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 AND 3 UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT pr.,. J
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{ l\ l y l\- i - ARJ .- FIGURE A-173 l I b ! INTAKE STRUCTURE t I
&) jj SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS j l n STATION FIRE
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, temperature J at or above U T
{ 1400 F l REACTOR PROCESS (2) Provided that COOLANT MONITORING pump NPSH re- MAKEUP quirement is CONTROL satisfied (- 1 ( FIGURE 3-la SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS RCS REACTIVITY CONTROL o ( - - _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ATION FIR o PLUS LOSS OF a OFF-SITE POWER t NSPRS SAFETY-RELIEF OVERPRESSURE VALVES PROTECTION SAFETY OR REMOTE MANUAL MODE If HIGH-LOW PRESSURE DEPRESSURIZATION INTERFACE PROTECTION ISOLATION Y RCS PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION MONITORING If IN m AL diso 1Tailable On PRESSURE Aperture Card CONTROL If Q i k 4 NSPRS REMOTE MANUAL MODE ,
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[ i VI -o i CAM J ,, LONG-TERM PRESSURE CONTROL . FIGURE 3-lb SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS RCS MAKEUP CONTROL ! ) a-.,-, - , , - - - - - - ---r -, e-.-nv.--,,,.- - - - - - -
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1 j SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS j STATION FIRE PLUS LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER l lf If 5 l NSPRS HEAT RELEASE RHR HEAT DECAY HEAT j SAFETY- PATH EXCHANGER IN REMOVAL TO RELIEF / VALVES SUPPRESSION RIVER POOL COOLING MODE
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i y y SUPPRESSION INITIAL ]j POOL REACTOR HEAT { REMOVAL ] .} if if 1 j RX WATER LEVEL MONITORING RHR (l OF 4) j RX PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION SHUTDOWN 9 MONITORING COOLING j MODE o i ] If V RHR PUMP PUMPING LONG-TERM l(* (l OF 4) CAPACITY HEAT REMOVAL 4 il 11 1 1 0 1
't 4
4 l 4 !1 0 < FIGURE 3-lc SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS RCS PRESSURE CONTROL o
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AC AUXILIARY PUMP POWER l SWITCHGEAR V CORE SPRAY EMERGENCY RHR PUMP SEAL SERVICE WATER WATER COOLER SYSTEM V PRESSURE SUPPRESSION POOL (PASSIVE) l V AC EMERGENCY HPCI AUXILIARY SWITCHGEAR U 125/250V DC CONTROL POWER POWER VALVE 125/250V DC OPERATION & POWER AUXILIARY OIL PUMP V CORE SPRAY EMERGENCY PUMP. MOTOR SERVICE WATER COOLING h%waM FIGURE 3-1f SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SUPPORT SYSTEMS f
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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH EDTTON ATONIC POWER STAT 10N l UNITS 2 AND 3 gym l UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPURT gg j UNIT 2 mm l
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