ML20080G440
| ML20080G440 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 01/27/1995 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20080G436 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9502070305 | |
| Download: ML20080G440 (3) | |
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wasuiuctou. o.c. 2osss-oooi SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED AMEN 0 MENT NO. 47 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-85 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY f
LIMERICK GENERATING STATION. UNIT 2 DOCKET NO. 50-353-
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated June 30, 1994, the Philadelphia Electric Company.(the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2, Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would remove the controls for a remote shutdown system control valve and the primary containment isolation valves from TS Tables 3.3.7.4-1 and 3.6.3-1 respectively, as a result of eliminating the steam condensing mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system.
2.0 EVALUATION The steam condensing mode of the RHR system has never been used at LGS, Unit 1 or Unit 2.
Currently, a portion of the components associated with the Steam Condensing Mode are abandoned in place, which renders this mode inoperable.
However, the routine preventive maintenance and surveillance tests are continually required to be performed. Hence, the licensee proposed to have the remainder of the steam condensing mode components removed from service at LGS, Unit 2 during the upcoming third Unit 2 refueling outage beginning on January 28, 1995, to eliminate the need to test and perform maintenance on these components.
Similar amendments have been issued to LGS Unit 1, as authorized by Amendment No. 65 and Amendment No. 74.
The following remote shutdown system control valves will be removed from TS Table 3.3.7.4-1:
RHR heat exchanger discharge line to suppression pool valve:
HV-51-2FollA RHR heat exchanger discharge line to Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system valve:
HV-51-2F026A Steam supply line to RHR heat exchanger valve:
HV-51-2F052A Steam supply line to RHR heat exchanger warm-up bypass valve:
HV-51-253A 9502070305 950127 PDR ADOCK 05000353 i
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. These valves will be abandoned in place, locked closed with its electrical power source removed. The valves' handswitches will be removed from the remote shutdown panel since they will not perform any TS related function.
The licensee has stated that the piping associated with valves HV-51-2F052A and HV-51-253A will be cut and steel plates will be welded at the ends, isolating the RHR system from the HIGH Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system steam supply line. Currently, these valves are not being used in Unit 2, hence the interfacing systems are not impacted.
In addition, the operation of RCIC, RHR or HPCI systems will not be affected by these changes.
The licensee has proposed to have the following RHR system, steam condensing mode, pressure safety (i.e. relief) valves (PSVs), physically removed from the plant and replaced by blank flanges:
PSV-51-201A(B)
PSV-51-2F055A(B)
PSV-51-2F097 Primary containment penetration X-240, associated with valve PSV-51-2F097, will be capped and incorporated as a part of the primary containment structure. The portion of piping between the primary containment and the flanges replacing the above PSVs will not be affected, and will continue to meet the original design requirements.
The following RHR vacuum relief suction valves, a portion of Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) in Table 3.6.3-1, will be removed:
HV51-230 HV51-231 The RHR vacuum relief suction inboard PCIV, HV51-230, and the associated piping leading up to the associated outboard PCIV, HV51-231, will be physically removed from the plant. Valve HV51-231 will be abandoned in place, in the closed position with the electrical power removed. The associated primary containment penetration, X-225, will be capped, as well as the piping upstream of HV51-231.
These valves are locked closed in their safety-related position with their electrical power source removed. These valves are no longer required to receive an isolation signal or meet valve closure time, but provide manual containment isolation. This valve will no longer be a PCIV following these modifications.
The components associated with the steam condensing mode of the RHR system are seismic Category I, but they are not safety related, based on the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, for this mode of the RHR. However, the RHR system piping and valves associated with this mode are safety related for pressure and structural integrity. All valves to be removed from service or abandoned in place were provided only for the RHR system steam
.3 condensing mode. The operation or safety-related function of the RHR or HPCI system will not be affected by these changes. The flanges and penetration caps, which will become part of the primary containment boundary, will be periodically tested for leakage in accordance with the primary containment Integrated Leak Rate Testing (ILRT) Program.
In addition, a typographical error in the heading of TS Table 3.6.3-1, page 3/4 6-29, will be revised to note the minimum isolation time.
It should have been made to note 26 instead of note 36 as currently shown.
Based on the above, the staff concludes that the proposed changes will not impact the performance of the safety-related function of the RHR system components, and are therefore, acceptable.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Comission's regulations, the Pennsylvania State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20.
The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Comission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment ir.volves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public coment on such finding (59 FR 42343). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
5.0 CONCLUSION
r The Comission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations, j
and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
T. Liu Date: January 27, 1995 l
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