ML20080A871
| ML20080A871 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1984 |
| From: | Edelman M CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| RDC-82(83), NUDOCS 8402060378 | |
| Download: ML20080A871 (3) | |
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a P o. DoX 5000 - CLEVELAND. oHlo 44101 - TELEPHONE (216) 622-9800 - lLLUMINATING BLOG. - $5 PUBLIC SQUARE Serving The Best Location in the Nation MURRAY R. EDELMAN January 31, 1984 VICE PRESloENT NUCLEAR Mr. James C. Keppler Regional Administrator, Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 RE:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441 Incident Involving Danage to the Dryer / Separator Strongback
[RDC 82(83)]
Dear Mr. Keppler:
This letter serves as a final report pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) on any potential damage which resulted from the failure to follow procedure during an attempt to remove the Unit 1 shroud head / separator from the reactor pressure vessel by the use of a strongback and polar crane.
Mr. P. R. Pelke of your of fice was first notified on September 16, 1983, by Mr. E. Riley of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) that extensive evaluation will be required to assess the significance of any damage.
Our interim report on this subject was dated October 12, 1983.
This report contains a description of the incident which resulted in this deficiency, an analysis of safety implications, the corrective action taken and the corrective steps to prevent reoccurrence.
Description of Incident On September 15, 1983, a Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) contracter was attempting to remove the Unit 1 Shroud Head / Separator from the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) by the use of a strongback and the Polar Crane. The a t temp t ceased when the strongback suffered damage. The damage was caused because the contractor had not removed the studs holding the Shroud Head / Separator to the Shroud flange. This was contrary to procedural requirements.
Analysis of Safety Implications Before the strongback suffered damage as described above, those reactor pressure vessel components that were in the direct line of the lift along with the Polar Crane could have been subjected to higher than normal stress. The potentially affected reactor pressure vessel components were part of the core shroud and the shroud head / separator.
If the core shroud had been damaged, the result could be a loss in the capacity to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
8402060378 840131 DR ADOCK 05000 g jg84 Ild
n' Mr. James G. Keppler January 31, 1984 Corrective Action Taken The polar crane was examined using recommendations of the crane manufacturer and certain designated components were examined by NDE specialists. No damaged j
coniponents were found.
The polar crane was recabled with certified cable as a precautionary measure, even though no damage to the original cable was found.
A replacement strongback was obtained and load tested.
Based on the recommendations of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) manuf acturer General Electric NEBO, 'ertain designated parts of the reactor pressure vessel internals and shroud head / separator were examined by Nondestructive Examination (NDE) In accordance with approved procedures. No damage was found. The shroud head / separator was successfully removed from the vessel on October 5, 1983.
Af ter the shroud head / separator was removed from the RPV, more extensive lists of recommended NDE examinations were received from the respective manufacturers for the polar crane, reactor pressure vessel internals and shroud head / separator.
These were implemented and no damage was found. The final reports from the crane and reactor pressure manuf acturers are on file for your review. All physical work is now completed and documentation review is expected to be complete by February 10, 1984.
i Corrective Steps Taken To Prevent Reoccurrence On September 21, 1983, CEI amended previous acceptance of the handling and lif ting procedure in correspondence PY/S0-38/39-19866. This letter changed the acceptance to conditionally acceptable noting changes needed to be implemented i
in the procedure.
In response, the contractor has now formally revised his procedure as follows:
To ensure full QA/QC coverage, the contractor's handling and rigging procedure CEP-CR-001, paragraph 4.1.5.1, " Category A Classification", was revised to explicitly state that all lif ts of the moisture separator, dryer, reactor vessel head, and drywell head are Class A lif ts.
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The controlling procedure also specifically states that...
... detailed rigging sketches and travelers for handling operations shall be required.
...a briefing shall be held prior to the lif t covering details of lif t including Insta11ation or removal of item being lif ted.
j The contractor has also made changes in his internal procedures to ensure that any safety-related travelers which are terminated prior to completion fully document the exact as-left condition. Prior to re-Initiation of the above travelers, the es-found component condition will be fully verified and documented.
i The contractor's handling and rigging procedure was further revised on January 18, 1984, to include reactor insulation lif ts as a Class A lif t and add the following statements.
J
- Mr. James G. Keppler January 31, 1984
" Prior to all Class A lifts the following requirements shall apply:
A visual examination to verify the load is free and clear or if the visual examination cannot be made or cannot verify the load is free and clear the lif t shall be conducted with an operable load cell.
The crane operator shall he notified which of the above conditions exist. This item shall be considered a hold point for CQS.
If a visual examination cannot be made and the load cell is not operable, then the lift shall. not be made.
The crane operator shall be informed of the estimated load prior to the lift.
This item shall be considered a hold point for CQS."
The load cell was calibrated on January 19, 1984, during the lift of the drywell head.
Please call if you have any questions.
Sincerely, Murray R. Edelman Vice President Nuclear Group MRE:pab cc: Mr. M. L. G11dner NRC Site Of fice Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm19sion c/o Document Management Branch Washingt;n, D.C.
20555 Records Center, SEE-IN Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 t
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