ML20080A521
| ML20080A521 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 02/02/1984 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Adensam E, Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8402060100 | |
| Download: ML20080A521 (3) | |
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DUKE POWER COMPANY P.O. box 33180 CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242 HAL B. TUCKER TELapuown m a enmosnawr (yO4) 37.MM8
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February 2, 1984 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
-Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention:
Ms. E. G. Adensam, Chief Licensing Branch No. 4 Re: Catawba Nuclear Station Docket-Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 1
Dear Mr. Denton:
My letter of May 16, 1983 provided a revised response to Question 430.91.
In this response it was noted that the fire protection system in the diesel room had a seismically designed circuit. The attached revised response to Question 430.91 is provided to clarify the qualification status of the temperature detectors. The temperature detectors used in the diesel room fire protection system have been seismically qualified by Wyle Laboratories (Report CNM 1206.08-149).
Very truly yours, Hal B. Tucker ROS/php Attachment
.cc:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator l
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 NRC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station Mr. Robert Guild, Esq.
h Mlg9 Attorney-at-Law I
P. O. Box 12097 I
Charleston, South Carolina 29412
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l 8402060100 840202 PDR ADOCK 05000413 F
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3 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director-February-2, 1984-4 Page_2 t
cc: Palmetto Alliance 2135 Devine' Street Columbia, South Carolina-29205 Mr. Jesse L. Riley.
Carolina Environmental Study Group
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854 Henley Place Charlotte, North Carolina 28207 N
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m CNS 430.91 You state in Section 9.5.8.3 of the FSAR that A fire within one (9.5.8) diesel room, along with a single failure of the fire protection sys-tem, will be completely contained within that room.
The combustion products will be exhausted from the room by the ventilation system at the end of the building opposite from the end which contains the intake structure for the redundant diesel.
If the fire protection system operates as designed and extinguishes the fire, the gaseous carbon dioxide (extinguishing medium) will be contained in the same matter. " We disagree with this statement.
A fire within one diesel room along with the failure of the supply ventilation fire damper would allow the products of combustion and/or the carbon dioxide to go out the ventilation inlet which shares the same plenum as the combustion air intake.
If the design is as is stated above in Question 430.90 or if the outer air intake structures are separate, the gaseous products could be drawn into the other diesel generator's air intake.
Show by analysis that a potential fire in the diesel generator building together with a single failure of the fire pro-tection system will not degrade the quality of the diesel combustion air so that the remaining diesel will be able to provide full rated power.
Response
A Fire Hazards Analysis of the Diesel Generator Building is found in Duke's " Response to Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1" (submitted by W. O. Parker, Jr. letter dated October 23, 1981 to H. R. Denton).
Primary fire protection is provided by an automatic carbon dioxide system. The system is activated by temperature detectors (i.e., not smoke) which alarm and annunciate in the control room.
Ten lseismicallyqualifieddetectorsperdieselroomareprovided.
The l
circuit is seismically designed and supervised to annunciate control malfunctions.
actuation Each diesel room is provided with electrically separate CO2 l
systems to prelcude a common malfunction affecting both diesel rooms.
Thermal detectors have a 225 F setpoint and will actuate on rate of temperature rise.
Actuation takes 60 seconds during which visual / audible alarms are given, the CO
/ stem master 2
valve opens-charging the supply header, ventilacion systems shut down and the hazard selector valve opens discharging CO -
2 The CO System piping would not remain intact during a seismic event, 2
preventing discharge, although the diesel equipment will function during a CO release.
A " purge" switch located immediately outside 2
the diesel room will utilize the ventilation system to remove CO -
2 l
430-47 Rev. 9
.