ML20080A312
| ML20080A312 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/21/1983 |
| From: | Weiss E HARMON & WEISS, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20080A303 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8307250368 | |
| Download: ML20080A312 (34) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COfEISSION BEFORE THE COtNISSION BEFORE THE A'IDMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of
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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
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Docket No. 50-289 (Restart)
('Ihree Mile Island Nuclear
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Station, Unit No.1)
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UNION OF COtCERNED SCIENTISTS COMMENTS ON
" INVESTIGATION OF W AND O INCIDENT"
'1he Union of Concerned Scientists has reviewed the " Investigation of W and O Incident" and supporting docunents prepared for General Public Utilities by the law finn of Pepper, Hanilton and Scheetz, subnitted to the Appeal Board on Jan. 31, 1983.
Prepared by attorney Frederick Speaker, it is hereafter referred to as the " Speaker Report".
'Ihis " incident" refers. to the events surrotuling the fact that on June 30, 1979, on an exanination required for his renewal of his operator's license, W,
MI Unit 2 Manager of Operations, submitted answers which were written by 0, a shift supervisor at the plant.
On Aug. 3,1979, Gary Miller, then MI Station Manager, with the knowledge and consent of John Herbein, Vice-President for Nuclear Operations at GPU, recertified W in a letter to the NRC, in which test scores were attributed to W which they, many other mI enployees, and then Senior Vice-President of Metropolitan B3ison Robert C. Arnold all knew were actually O's work.
'Ihese actions, coupled with inadequate response on the part of involved GPU personnel throughout this incident, indicates a grave lack of competence and integrity within GPU managenent, seriously calling into question its abilitiy to safely operate a nuclear reactor.
8307250368 830721 PDR ADOCK 05000289 G
. %e Speaker Report. was~an attmpt by the licensee to cleanse itself.
i However, contrary to these aspirations. this report only reinforces the allegations of managenent irresponsibility and false material statement to the NRC, including those detailed by the Special Master in his report dated April 28, 1982.
We major conclusions drawn by the Special Master included the finding that there was little connection between W's cheating and his subsequent reassigruent which GPU claimed was disciplinary, and no attempt on the part of the licensee to make one (Report of the Special Master, April 28, 1982, Sl. op: para.237, pp. 131-2, hereinafter, "SMR") and that "managenent's failure to disclose the cheating to the NRC was deliberate, improper, and resulted in a false statement in the letter upon which NRC relied in renewing W's license." (Id. at para.237, p.132)
Major findings by the Appeal Board in its Partial Initial Decision of July 27, 1982 included the determination that "W's statenent that he didn't know that he couldn't turn in another's work as his own is incredible" (Metropolitan Edison Co. (mI Nuclear Station Ubit No.
1, July 27, 1982, para. 22~ P y.ll2, hereinafter "PID") and that "Mr. Miller, with Mr. Herbein's knowledge and consent, falsely certified to the NRC that W had attained a score of 89.1% on Section A...when in fact each of them knew that W had not attained that score.
%is was a " material certification upon which the NRC acted in renewing W's operator's license" (Id. at para.2306, p.125)
We Board nevertheless would make no final determination but instead reemmended that the staff conduct another investigation into the event.
We staff has just informed the parties that it has concluded its investigation and forwarded its conclusions to the Connission. (Letter from Jack R.
Goldberg, Counsel for NRC staff, to Manbers of the Appeal Board, July 12, 1983. None of this material has been provided to the parties.)
Mr. Arnold, now President of GPU Nuclear, obviously felt that this incident had sufficiently severe implications for the credibility of his
. empany to warrent his cannissioning Speaker to produce the company's version
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of the event.
'Ihe report rdads as if Speaker were hired to rebut each accusation point by point, and resorts to trar.sparent rationalizations to achieve that end.
He gives those implicated one more chance to come up with a new story, and in those cases where they do, the ' stories become even more incredible.
Speaker concitxles that : 1.
W did not cheat because he did not intend to deceive; 2.
O could not have known he was answering questions for W's test because he answered questions designated for a IMactor Operator when W was a Senior Ibactor Operntor; 3.
Miller and Herbein are free of responsibility for the false material statenent because the inclusion of a grade of 89.1% for Category A in the recertification letter to Paul Cbilins of the NRC was the result of a " bureaucratic oversight".
It is also suggested that perhaps Miller and Herbein did not necessarily know that the 89.1% score was not W's; 4.
the NRC did not rely on the 89.1% score in recertifying W,~
rather it relied on the 98% overall score on the accelerated requalification exam; 5.
W never retook a seperate test on Section A as directed by Miller, instead Section A material was covered throughout the accelerated.
requalification exam; 6.
W partook in an infonnat oral question and answer session; 7.
licensee managenent did not mention the " handwriting incident" (i.e. the cheating) in the letter to NRC because it ~was not relevant to the letter; S.
there is evidence that W was told that his reassigrrnent was disciplinary and that several enployees believed this as well; 9.
one must take into account W's feelings, which included not feeling that the tests were important.
Speaker's rationales are at best implausible and at worst preposterous.
1 In fact, the evidence supports the following conclusions:
1.
W intended to deceive the training departsnent; he felt that by using O's answers he could aviod loss of his license even though he might later get in trouble for it; 2.
., f Speaker's RO-SRO rational (that O did not know it was W's test because he answered questions designated for an RO) is contradicted many times throthhout Speaker's investigation; 3.
It is absurd to suggest that the 89.1% score for Section A ms a bureaucratic oversight.
'Ihis category had been the focus of a cheating incident, and the wording of the letter had been heavily deliberated; 4.
if the NRC were to rely on the 98% score in recertifying W, Section A should have been covered in the accelerated requalification exm.
- However, Speaker's report indicates that W may never have been retested on Section A; if he waa, noone may have known this at the time the letter ws sent to the NRC, and if they did know, they likely concealed it in order to avoid mentioning the handwriting problen; 5.
'Ibe evidence put forward by Speaker to support the conclusion that Section A was covered is very weak and conflicts with previous testimony to the ASLB; 6.
Speaker's claim that failure to mention the " handwriting incident" (i.e. the cheating) was irrelevant to the letter to NRC, or that it was an oversight, is refuted by the fact that the letter ~incitried an elaborate history of W's test results, previous testimony of staff witness Crocker to the Board that it was highly relevant to i
recertificabion, and Miller and Herbein's need to consult their attorney on precisely this question before sending the letter.
7.
the evidence suggests that W was never properly recertified according to standard procedure because to have done 'so might have revealed the cheating; 8.
W said himself that he did not - regard his reassignnent as disciplinary, and Speaker offers no evidence whatever to the contrary.
Speaker's " investigation" reveals that even some training department anployees intimately involved with the case did 2
i
_ not know that W's reassiganent was supposed to be a pun shnent.
9.
tests are the primary means of assuring that the operators know the material necessary for carrying out their jobs, and W's repeated failure did not lend that assurance.
GPU managenent has done nothing to promote respect for the 2
t~ i training progran, instead it has " cheated" along with many of its enployees, by making a false material statenent to the NRC.
@e Speaker report manifests disdain on the part of the licensee for this entire proceeding.
It is renarkable that GPU would subnit a docment so rife with bias, transparent rationalizations, erroneous references, internal inconsistencies, and explanations inconsistent with the testimony previously given to the Board.
Wese appear in virtually every argunent that Speaker advances.
Of course, this report cannot be considered an " independent investigation", as GPU characterizes it.
It is our understanding that the law firm of Ibpper, Hanilton and Scheetz has represented GPU in a variety of matters.
Werefore, the " investigation" is hardly independent.
Nor is it truly an investigation.
We " interrogations" of his witnesses are more characteristic of a tea party.
Speaker asks leading questions, often g
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attenpting to elicit his own preconceived responses even when they are not I
what the witness believes. (See p.6 of this docunent)
He informs the witnesses of what those before him said, disuisses important questions as insignificant without waiting for answers (see p.14 of this docunent), and makes it clear to the witness at the outset that he believes there has been no wrongdoirag. - For exanple, when questioning Miller about W's requalification on Section A, Speaker states:
l
[5t me say that in our investigatio-A
- this thing. to date, we have detennined conclusiveN tc ur satisfaction that W was exanined in a canprm4V:ve,<anination that covered all of the four categor. y..i co't know what the fuss is all about because I relieve that be... gave both written and oral answers.
Can you tell us anything that would address that problen?
(Miller interview, Sept. 27,1982, pp.23-4)
Were is little incentive for a witness to tell the truth if he belQves the invesigator does not want to hear it.
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. -IT IS CLEAR THAT W CHEATED
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W previously claimed in sworn testimony that he did not believe that handing in smeone else's answers was wrong, claiming that " subject matter, not handwriting was significant". (PID, para.2278, p.ll2)
Similarly, the Special Master's Report concluded that "...W believed there was nothing wrong in what he did-be told Mr. Miller that he believed that he had satisfactorily empleted the assigreent simply by looking at what O had written- " (SMR, para.226, p.124).
Now, in the Speaker report, W has changed his stopy altogether, stating that by using O's answers he intended to " buy time".
It was the only way he could meet his family obligations (i.e. go on his vacation), and though "he knew he would have to go into full time training...he knew he would have to take a new examination...He knew he would get into trouble with the capany..." (Speaker Report, p.62), he smehow believed that he could keep his license.
Yet there is no basis for this belief.
It is illogical.
Either he would pass the test legally, not be in trouble, and keep his license, or cheat, get in trouble and lose it.
Typically, Speaker suggests that because he did indeed keep his license, what he did was legal, rather than the more plausible explanation that managment was equally ready to break the rules.
'No pages of the Speaker report are used to muse on the meaning of the word " cheat". We find the meaning of this word rather straightforward, but even using Speaker's definition (from a Pennsylvania Court decision): to "obtain smething of value fra another through intentional fratri or deception", W's actions fit quite well.
Speaker concludes that W did not cheat,because he did not intend to.
However, in order to obtain a renewal of his license, W intentionally had to deceive the training department, at least temporarily, according to W's own logic, and his stated purpose. W's
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. own words describe his actions as " marginal", "some tref view it as cheating and sme may not" (W interview, Aug. 27, 1982 p.28).
W's guilt is indicated by the fact that he felt he had "persoref.ly betrayed Miller by his actions." (Speaker Report, p.36)
In proclaiming W's honesty, Speabr argues, as did the licensee to the Appeal Board, that had W inteni:6 to cheat, he would have copied O's answers into his own handwriting.
But this would have entailed obtaining another blank copy of the test, smething W may not have had easy access to.
'Ihere may also not have been time for this; W was in a great hurry to leave on his vacation.
It is also less likely that he thotght " help" was allowed than that he knew it wasn't but asstaned that the training department might overlook it.
He was almost correct.
After all, noone has explained why Richard Zechuan (Supervisor of Training) instructed R! ward R. Frederick (Adninistrator of Nuclear Technical Training) to grade Sections A and H after it had been confirmed that the handwriting was O's, ascribing a score to W which was not his.
Speaker says that " Miller was unable to give an answer to this question."
(" Investigation of W's Qualifications 1979 to 1982", p.ll, hereinafter Speaker Report, #2)
In an excercise in obfuscation Speaker spends a page repeating the chronology of the grading episode, but does nothing towards answering the question.
(Id.)
If Speaker really wanted to hear the answer to this question, he would have at least asked Zechuan.
It is an insult to the intelligence of all concerned for Speaker to dedicate an entire section to the specious claim that "We find no stated requirenent in the " Operator Requalification Program" that an exaninee alone must couplete an exanination such as W subnitted on June 30, 1979" (Speaker Report, p.41) The Board already disnissed Miller's defense of W based on this notion as " incredible". (PID, p.ll2)
. We latest version of events, rather than exonerate W, renoves any
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vestigial doubt that W cheated. Speaker's sanantic circur. locutions flowing fran his definition of the word " cheat" are not only implausible, they constitute a convincing rebuttal to the proposition that this exercise was anything approaching an unbiased investigation.
W'S EXPEANATIONS; SPEAKER'S UNQUESTIONING ACCEPTANCE OF A TRANSPARENTLY ABSURD STATENENT The Special Master was concerned over W's statement that "O had the sane questions and answers".
%e Special Master interpreted this to imply that W knew O had alrea3y responded to the same questions in training.
(SMR, para.224, p. 123)
In response to speaker, W says that he meant:
"after I asked him for help by handing him a cheet of questions and saying
'Please answer these for me,' he then had the sane questions that I had" (Fpeaker Report, p.42, enphasis added). Speaker not only asks us to believe this, but offers no other reason to do so except that "in our view, a better way to establish the implication...is to consider the explanation of the author of the statenent - and to give that explanation the stature the credibility of the author warrants." (Id.)
This is a breathtaking illustration of the level of legal sophistication and intellectual honesty displayed in this investigation.
W's credibility is exactly what is in question here.
His post hoc equivocations should be rejected not only because they are facially nonsense but because W is the least likely witness to be truthful when the propriety of his own behavior is in question.
SPEAKER'S A'I"rEMPP TO EXONERATE O In the latest attengt to absolve O for cheating, and managenent for
. accepting O's denial, the new rationale goes as follows:
We first two questions in Section A were marked for a Reactor Operator (RO) to answer, not a Senior mactor Operator (SRO) such as W.
If O had known that it was W's test, he would not have answered these questions; since he answered then, he could not have known.
Were are a nunber of reasons why this does not withstand scrutiny.
Speaker notes earlier that "W gave 0 a page or a page at a time" (Speaker Report, p.18).
When W handed O a page with a question on it, he obviously meant O to answer it, regardless of the designation at the top of the page.
It is also far fran clear that W was not suppposed to answer questions for RQs.
Dennis Boltz (Adninistrator of Nuclear Technical Training), when questioned said "We combined categories so an SRO could take a partial RO and SRO in eight hours." (Boltz interview, Sept.1,1982, p.ll)
Note that W answered Section G, which also contained questions designated for P0s.
Speaker tried unsuccessfully to push Frederick into endorsing this argunent through asking leading questions.
Although Frederick stated that W would have to answer questions 3-7, he would not accept Speaker's theory:
O [ Speaker]:
Would you therefore conclude that O who as you can see later on answered questions 1 and 2 and partially answered 3 did not know that he was answering questions that W was going to subnit because W would not have subnitted answers to questions 1 and 2?
A [ Frederick) :
Wat's a confusing question.
I believe that O was an S.R.O. at that time.
Q: Well, let's assune that he was an R.O.
A: All right.
Q:
...On that assumption...would that lead you to conclude that he was answering then for himself or as he was answering then for himself or as he would answer them rather than answering then for W or as W would answer then?
A:
I don't know that I can conclu3e why he was answering the questions.
(Frederick Interview #2, Nov.
2,
- 1982, pp.2-3) 4
. Speaker also says that "the exan did not say it was an exan - there
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was nothing to distinguish it from myriad other such papers which were i
routinely circulated..." (Speaker Report, p.61)
Yet at the hearing it was pointed out that the question sheets had the identifying marks of an exam:
"SRO 10.0 pts".
Still, the Special Master's reasoning in concluding that O must have known that he was answering W's exam is not adressed - much less refuted -
by Speaker. (SMR, Paras. 226-7, pp.124-5)
We believe that O must have known what was happening and that Miller should have adnitted this. Se treatment of O's culpability is further illustration that this so-called
" investigation" is better understood as an exercise in concocting rationales to exculpate GPU and its enployees.
LICENSEES' FALSE MATERIAL STATD4ENT RELIED UPON BY NRC IN RENEWING W'S LICENSE; NEW QUESTIONS REGARDING THE ADEQUACY OF W'S REQUALIFICATION Probably the most significant single charge against GPU is that a false material statenent was made to Paul (bllins of the NRC in a letter frau Miller dated August 3,1979, certifying W's successful completion of requalification requirenents.
Upper managenent is implicated in this episode.
Contrary to Speaker's conclusions, the new evidence only reinforces managenent's culpability.
We letter (Exhibit 1), which had been through a nunber of drafts (Exhibits lA and 1B), contained W's latest requalification history - the four original categories in which he was deficient and the grades he received upon being retested:
Section A:
89.1%, Section E: 75.6, Section G: 80.5, Section H: 64%.
We letter explains that since W received "two scores less than 80%", he entered.an accelerated requalification program in which he achieved a score of 99.8%.
Two issues are raised by this letter: We first relates to the false i
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statetents in the letter, including the 89.1% score recorded for Section A and the 64% score recorded for Section H (both scores were O's), the statenent that W " received two scores less than 80%" (there actually were three), and the anission of the cheating incident (which was relevant to his proper recertification).
'Ihe second, an issue that the board began to probe but concerning which the Speaker material suggests sane new answers, is the question of whether W was ever retested on Section A material. All parties agreed that this was vital to his requalification.
THE " SEPARATE TEST" ON SECTION A
'Ihe explanation offered to the Special Master was that W was given a " separate test" on Section A (in addition to the alleged " oral exam" on.
this section), because Miller did not feel that this section was covered in the accelerated requalification program /exan that W was given to make up the sections he had failed. Dated July 6,1979 (Exhibit 7), the meno to W read "You have received less than 80% on two (2) FSR [ Fundamentals and Systens Review] Ibqualification Quizzes".
In his interview with Speaker, Miller stated that "I
personally looked at the exans...I personally required that they include the third section because I didn't feel or I couldn't see from the menos issued by the training department that they had picked it up."
(Miller interview, p.24) Miller instructed Zechuan to give W a separate exan on Section A.
(Miller previously testified that he sent Zechuan a formal mano; as he now renenbers, there was no meno; instead he " talked to him", Id. at p.12)
Zechnan then drafted a memo to W dated July 11, 1979 (Exhibit 6),
instructing him to retake the " attached" exam on Section A.
Given the.
significance of this test to the adequacy of W's requalification, the Board wanted to know what happened to this test:
"'Ibe investigation should
. disclose W's response to Mr. Zechnan's meno of July 11, 1979, assigning him to " redo FSR assigrment for Category A".
What did W do with the exa[n Mr. Zechuan attached to his meno for W's use?" (PID, para.2313, p.127)
Speaker's material reveals that W never took this exan.
No attachnent to Exhibit 6 has been located anong Speaker's exhibits.
Duriag his interview with Speaker, W stated:
"I do not recall having received this menorandun" (W interview, p.20) thotqh be later volunteered a new recollection:
...I suspect Dick's memo to me which supposedly had an exam attached to the back of it which I had no recall of per se, I think he cane right down to the training trailer, wrote that mano, handed me the copy of it with the exan on the back.
And I probably sat down and took it right then and there.
Perchance I scored an 89.1 on that Section, Section A.
Awfully coincidental...I think I did sonething to satisfy the recertification Section A.
I cannot produce a shred of evidence for you..."
(Id. at p.41)
'Ihis statement is an insult to any reasonable intelligence.
Not even Miller suggested that on a makeup exan, W may have coincidentally scored precisely the same grade, 89.1%, that O scored when he was answered the section for W.
However, all question as to the existence of a seperate test it eliminated by a meno prepared in October of 1981 by Miller's assistant, Merrill (with infonnation received from Zechnan), which states that "Section A material was not retaken by W as directed by GM."
(Exhibit 25)
SPEAKER'S FAILURE 'IO ADDRESS WHETHER A SEPARATE TEST WAS AMINISTERED TO W ON SECTION A MATERIAL Speaker should have spoken directly to the issue of the separate test since the Board raised it.
He must also have seen its significance to the i
1
. question of whether or not W was ever retested on A.
We existence of a
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separate test is also important to the justification of the letter to Collins containing a score of 89.1% for Section A.
We score that was to go in the blank for this section shr 1 have been the score on the make-up, and according to Speaker, the 89.1%
a score obtained by cheating) was inserted by " mistake" (Speaker Report, pp.62-3)
However, if no test was retaken, nothing could have gone into this blank except the score credited te E-Zechuan clearly was aware of this, since he received a draft of the Collins letter.
He should (and may) hve brought it to the attention of his superiors.
He also should have infonned Miller that contrary to his request, W was not given another test.
We Board stated that "Mssrs.
Zechuan, Beers and Lawyer are involved only to the extent tnat Mr. Miller states that they knew and approved of his action" (PID, para.2316, p.128) tis shows that Zechuan's involvenent was more extensive. Miller may very well have known that W never took a seperate test on Section A.
But Speaker does nothing towards obtaining answers to these questions.
Instead, Speaker does not even disclose that this separate test on Section A was never taken.
He says "Zechuan sent such a message to W" (Speaker Ibport, p.55) and "W did not recall seeing this manorandum" (Id. at p.27), but he probes a further.
[For the former statenent he erroneously references " Exhibit G".
'he only Exhibit G incitxled in the materials sent to UCS is a Novenber 1979 letter from Miller to Collins confinning Miller's intention to continue the requalification progran.]
Indeed, Speaker actually prevented his witnesses from addressing this question.
When W stated that he did not recall seeing Zechuan's mano directing him to retake an exan on Section A, Speaker responds that "I
don't see any significance in that at the manent, I was just trying to get
. the record clear." (W interview, p.21)
During Zechuan's interview, Speaker's seous to intentionally avoid the issue.
Upon shrving Zechuan Exhibit 6 (Zechnan's meno to W of July 11, 1979, instructing him to retake the " attached" exam on Section A) Speaker changes the subject before Zechnan has the chance to respond. We total extent of the " interrogation" was as follows:
0 [ Speaker) :
Did you prepare that at Mr. Miller's direction?
A [Zechnan]:
'Ib the best of my recollection, I did.
Q:
Did you have a discussion with Mr. Miller about sending him that letter?,
A: Here I'm going to have to speculate.
I believe that that one went from Miller to Marshall Beers to me.
Q:
Marshall Beers reported, I mean you were superior to Marshall Beers?
A: tat is correct.
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Q: Did you in tL:n report to Mr. Lawyer?
A: tat is correct.
Q: And Mr. Lawyer was not here on the Island or here at this installation at that time?
A:
I just don' t recall, sir.
Q:
I want to refer back to Exhibi t 8.....
(Zechuan interview, Sept. 2,1982, pp.38-9)
WAS SECTION A COVERED? IF SO, WHO KNEW?
The heart of this controversy lies in the fact that Miller recertified W to the NRC based in part on the 89.1% score which was not W's score but O's, and this was a false material statement upon which the NRC relied in renewing W's license.
Speaker rebuts this repeatedly by pointing to the 99.8% overall score on the accelerated requalification exam, as the score the NRC relied upon. (Speaker Report, pp.52,57,64)
Speaker even states that the 89.1% score was a " gratuitous statenent" since it was not essential for W's recertification.
(Id_. at pp.62-3) mis latest rationale depends upon the prenise that all four categories were covered in the accelerated requalification program (6 assignnents incitding
.-..,,n.
. a written exan on assigrrnents 1-5) sent to W on July 6 (Exhibit 7), and
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taken by VV.
It is therefore crucial that this exam did, in fact, cover Section A material and that those involved with his recertification knew this at the time the recertification letter was sent.
If they did not know that the July 6 test was cunprehensive, then their recertification was fraudulent even if one accepts the dubious proposition that the only pertinent score was the 99.8% overall score.
Miller knew that the July 6 exan did not incitde Section A.
He looked at the exan and "couldn' t see...that they had picked it up." (Miller interview, p.24) All testimony from those that asserted to Speaker that it did cover Section A was retrospective. For exanple, Zechuan, who was most directly responsible for assuring that the material was covered, is at best equivocal:
I just recently looked at that to try to reflect back but again, it's very difficult trying to put everything in reference.
And in going back the section on theory, he was assigned the NET section in the book which was reactor theory on suberitical modification...in retrospect, it appears that all areas, all areas were covered. (Zechuan inteview, pp.34-5)
Boltz's testimony was unenlightening. He stated that he reviewed the exam after the fact to determine which questions were covered, and that Zechuan would have the results.
He claims to have no menory of the results.
(Boltz interview, p.12)
No exhibit was referenced showing any such results.
Merrill's meno, Exhibit 25, states that Section A was covered in questions 2,3,4,and 5, but this memo was not prepared until October of 1981, two years after the letter certifying W was sent to NRC.
'Ihe contenporaneous evidence provides no basis upon which Miller (who signed the letter to NRC), his superiors or subordinates could have concluded at
. the time that Section A was covered.
We test, Exhibit 7 was prepared prior to the meno which instructs that VV retake A (Exhibit 6) and was never changed. Zechuan should at a minimtm have been asked to identify who prepared the test and who decided which categories to include.
Zechnan signed the meno (Exhibit 7), so he should have this information.
Zechnan was not asked, although the answer is crucial.
Indeed, Speaker virtually ignores the question, accepting as sufficient the post hoc assessments that all necessary areas were covered.
terrill's belated claim that four of the six questions cover Section A is highly suspicious.
Miller testified earlier that "as a result of the
" oral" exanination of W, the Training Department determined that he had adequate knowledge of Section A."
(PID, para.2302, p.123)
An oral exan would have been insufficient; the Board notes that the day before Exhibit 6 was sent "Mr.
Zechuan had informed Mr. Miller that the FSR procedure requires written quizzes." (Id. at para.2301, p.122, original enphasis)
If there were evidence that a written test had been taken on this section, surely Miller would have so testified.
"Beactor teory" (the heading of Section A) is a sufficiently general topic that it would be possible to extract sane elenent of it from most questions. But if the July 6 exan did cover Section A, Miller should have known this at the time the recertification letter was sent.
If Miller had no basis for assurance that Section A was covered, then the statenent to NRC that W was properly rece r ified was a false statenent.
And if they did choose consciously to include Section A in the July 6 exan, they apparently wished to conceal this fact, as the instructions begin "You have received less than 80% on two (2) FSR Requalification Quizzes."
We 2 sections refered to were Sections H (also answered by O) and E.
We exam should have stated that W received less than 80% on three sections (since O's work was invalid leaving W wi th -- a score of 0 on Section A), or referred to the cheating as the cause of the third deficiency.
By making no reference to Section A, they were able to avoid mentioning the cheating.
mis was the see purpose the Special Master's saw in reporting the 89.1%
score for Section A in the letter to NRC:
Apparently, the intention behind the statment was not to certify smeone as competent on that section who was not-if one believes that W was in fact tested orally.
Instead, the decision to report this score as if W had earned it himself must have had some other purpose.
We only purpose which I can discern was to conceal the fact that W, who was a menber of Licensee's managenent, had been guilty of wrongdoing. (SMR, para.235, p.130)
Because until recently the asserted oral exan was the sole " proof" that W had ever been retested on Section A, the Board wanted evidence that an oral exan actually took place.
Although there is evidence
- that a part of the accelerated requalification assigrment included some discussion periods, this hardly rises to the level of the purported " oral exam" referred to in the hearings.
Indeed, the witnesses are now less clear that there ever was an oral exan.
Presunably this is because:
- 1) the Board determined that an oral exan would be insufficient (PID, para.2301, p.122), and 2) the latest version of events is that Section A was covered in the written exan. @us, in their interviews with Speaker, the witnesses
- Again, Speaker gives an incorrect reference.
In footnote 53 on p.56 of the Speaker report, Exhibit 10 is cited as evidence of the oral exan.
Exhibit 10 is irrelevant.
We only arguable reference is Exhibit 7, p.4.,
which lists W's accelerated requalification requirenents with blanks checked by the certifying instructor.
Boltz has signed three blanks for areas in which W was required to " Review the following with Instructor."
te strangely marked additional Exhibit 10 in the middle of Exhibit 7 also cannot be the docunent Speaker refers to as providing evidence of an oral exan.
Wis one is a sheet with W's overall score on the exan, signed by the training department and Miller.
. no longer assert that there-was.an oral exm.
Boltz stated to Speaker:
"...yes, there were sone, there were discussion periods.
I'm not sure if they were considered to be oral exminations anymore or not."
(Boltz interview, p.13)
Marshall Beers (Supervisor of Operator License Training) said "I don't believe that he was given an oral exan and I believe that to be justifiable.
%e oral exam was not at issue." (Beers interview, Sept.
2,1982, p.15) He also said that "'Ihere was a form that was required to be filled out for each oral exanination given.
As to the location of those records, I can' t answer that."
(Id. at p.16)
Speaker's exhibits did not contain any special fonus for oral exaninations.
Zechuan says "By the way, I want to clarify oral exan.
By oral exan, an oral verification that he did the things he was assigned to do, okay." (Zechnan interview, p.43)
If question 3 of the exan (Exhibit 7) was an ' oral exan' (given by Boltz) covering Section A, Zechuan seens to be uncertain of its sufficiency, for he explains how W took an oral-type exan on Section A with him:
In addition, there were infonnal and by infonnal, I mean nondocunented discussions I know in the area of theory.
Ebr exanple, I renenber, I renenber distinctly because the day I was extrenely busy, he came in my office and we got in a discussion of decay heat which was one of the subject areas in his F.S.R. assigrrnent [Section A].
And he was giving me a full dissertation on decay heat.
And it was unique because.....he was putting it in light of the accident and light that was pretty impressive to me because--but it was informal.
It certainly covered another area that he was, that was of some subject.
(Zechuan interview, p.42)
CONTENT OF 'IEE RECERTIFICATION LETTER 'IO NRC; THE 89.1% SCORE REPORTED FOR SECTION A IS CHARACTERIZED BY SPEAKER AS AN " OVERSIGHT" Speaker's report becanes increasingly untenable as it launches into a defense of the content of the August 3, 1979 recertification lettet to Paul Collins at the NRC. 'Ihe 89.1% score recorded for Section A is characterized as a " bureaucratic oversight." (Speaker Report, p.50) "He [ Miller] signed
. the letter as one act-of' thousands he was responsible for as the senior officer stationed at tree Mile Island." (Id. at p.51)
Speakerignorest5$e special nature of this letter, including a description of the operator's training history (something unprecedented in any other recertification letter) which went through three drafts, and was sent by Miller for the personal approval of the company's Vice-President, John Herbein and GPU'sattorney, Ernest Blake.
Beers, who prepared the letter (instead of an inferior member of the training department as was the usual practice) did so because, in his words, "it was such an unusual letter" (Beers interview, p.19) No witness ever claimed that the score was a " bureaucratic oversight" or that Miller's act signing the letter was "one act of thousands" and Speaker cites no testimony to support these assertions.
He has simply fabricated this rationale out of whole cloth.
Even if one makes the highly questionable asstanption that the exact score could have been overlooked, the space for it, "Section A:
, could not have been. Anyone looking at this form who knew that W had not taken a separate test on this section, knew that the false grade would have to be recorded in the. blank.
We do not know the precise state of Miller's knowledge on this matter; Speaker should have asked him.
But Zechuan did know that W had not taken a separate test on Section A, and upon seeing the draft of the Collins letter, must have been aware that a false material statenent was to be issued.
We letter should also not have reported that W received a score of 64% for Section H.
'Ihis was also a false statenent to the NRC, because this section was also canpleted by O.
Speaker attributes this " negligence" to."the mistake of someone who supplied the figure for Category A".
(Speaker Report, p.63)
Who is this "saneone" in the training department?
Whoever it was asstuned a great deal
. of responsibility in submitting a grade without a test to support it.
Incredibly, neither Miller nor Speaker ever attmpted to find out who this "smeone" was, yet we are expected to believe not only that s/he exists but also that s/he acted out of negligence rather than intent to deceive and that no superior ever detected the " error".
The entire story is preposterous.
Even weaker is Speaker's attempt to deny Miller and Herbein's knowledge of the cheating:
.c is not troe that Herbein and Miller knew that W had not attained the score of 89.1% in his exam on Category A...We found no evidence that they knew...'Ihere was testimony that they did not know.
Except for the following phrase: T=46.56 on the top of p. 7 of the exam answers, all of the examination answers that were marked by Frederick were in W's handwriting.
'Ihe existence of this phrase, prestmable written by 0,
crys out for attention now but could easily have been overlooked then.
(Id. at pp.56-7)
'Ihis is patently absurd.
First, all of page 6 was in O's handwriting.
Secondly, everyone, including Miller, knew by July 2, and Herbein knew by July 3, that there were two different handwritings on Category A of W's test. (Id. at p.23)
And long before the letter to NRC was sent, Miller had directed that W retake Category A.
opt 4ISION OF THE CHEATING IN THE LETTER 'IO NRC Speaker defends Miller's failure to mention the " handwriting problen" (i.e. the cheating) in the letter to NRC.
He first asserts that Miller thotght the handwriting incident was a " supervisory problen", and had nothing to do with this letter, the sole purpose of which was to notify the NRC that VV was certified. (Id. at p.32)
But Speaker concedes that while he believes the first paragraph of the letter (Exhibit 1) would have been sufficient, in light of the elaborate history included in the letter, the
. " handwriting incident" should have been mentioned. (Id. at pp.52,65)
The
~
Special' Master felt that it had special relevance regardless:
"Mr. Miller knew that the handwriting incident was highly relevant to judging W's performance; Mr. Miller should have provided that infonnation so the NRC could consider it."
Mr. Crocker, the NRC witness at the hearings before the Special Master, reasoned that if W were to be renoved by GPU from licensed duties, the empany's attenpt to relicense him would have been in violation of the rule which requires there to be a continued need for a license.
If W were to renain in licensed duties "involvenent in the cheating incident certainly would cast sme doubt upon how competently W had discharged his duties." (SMR, para.234, p.130)
That would appear to be an understatenent.
In the next breath, the story is changed:
"We have found no evidence...that the failure to disclose to the NRC that W had used O's work in his answers was deliberate. We have concitried on the contrary that it was the result of negligence." (Speaker Feport, p.52) Negligence (or oversight) and a conscious decision to keep something an internal company matter are not the sane thing.
Speaker's follow up report contains the same internal contradiction.
Not more than one paragraph after it is asserted that " Miller did not feel it was a requirenent to notify the NRC of the handwriting incident...", he concitries that "the failure to refer specifically to the third deficiency [Section A] was because of a bureaucratic oversight." (Speaker Report #2, p.11)
The evidence is clear that the Section A " deficiency" was deliberately excitried. 'Ihis is plainly exhibited in the letter to NRC which reads "..he [W] received two scores less than 80%..." (Exhibit 1, enphasis added)
Regardless of the reason for reporting the incorrect 89.1% score, this phrase is itself a false material statenent to the NRC because W
. actually failed three, the third section having been written by O.
We Board observed that Miller violated the regulations by omnitting the third deficiency:
Putting aside for the monent the ethical considerations raised by O's assistance to W, the certification letter did not reveal the fact that, contrary to the requirement of AP # 1006, W had not been assigned to the accelerated requalification program on Section A.... His test results on Section A of the FSR, considering O's help, should have been deemed a failure requiring accelerated requalification training.
(PID, para.2307, p.125)
Speaker's investigation has contributed new evidence to support the conclusion that Miller felt uneasy about not mentioning the " handwriting incident" in the letter to NRC.
@e Board already knew this much:
" mere is no doubt that Mr. Miller and other officials knew that W's use of O's work was a matter of material relevance to his requalification and license renewal" (Id. at para.2305, p.124)
%e Board cited Miller's note to Herbein stating " tere will be problems" and "If the exan which is not in
, proper hardscript develops to a problen I will have an additional problen and will get to you" (Exhibit 8). We Board noted, in addition, that Miller circulated the Collin's letter to everyone on the distribution list, incltding Herbein (PID, para.2305, p.124).
However, Speaker's Exhibit IA is even more danning. At the bottom of a rough draft of the letter to NRC, Miller wrote:
" type note to Blake [GPU's attorney]-copy all to JGH
[Herbein].
Prior to my subnission please review... Note-I only reference 2 sections in the make-up - He actually studied 3 sections - Due to the Hand".
Miller, clearly anticipating legal problens, referred the issue to Herbein, who reconmended to Miller that the letter be cleared with their attorneys. tis surfaced during the GPU-B&W trial, on Jan. 19, 1983:
Q:
It was your suggestion that Mr. Miller check the contents of this letter with your attorneys?
A [Herbein]:
I believe I advised Mr. Miller that way,
- yes.
(G.P.U. Cbrp. et. al. V. Babcock and Wilcox Co. et.
al, No. 80 Civil T66T (RO),
U.S.
District CourE, S.D.N.Y., Tr. 7153)
Renarkably, Speaker makes no mention whatever of this note on Exhibit lA, nor does he even mention that GPU's attorney was asked to check the letter.
Robert Arnold suggested this note as a topic for Speaker's follow-up report.
' Ibis time, Speaker says:
" Miller believed the letter should have referred to the 3 sections, but the significance wasn't great 'to him."
(Speaker Report #2, p.10)
'Ihis reasoning runs contrary to both Speaker's previous argunent, that Miller felt the handwriting incident "had nothing to do with this letter", and Miller's visible concern over its significance as seen in Exhibit 8 and his note at the bottom of Exhibit lA.
Speaker's follow up report states that Miller wrote a note calling the handwriting incident to the attention of Blake and Herbein.
It is not disclosed that Herbein instructed Miller to consult Blake, a fact that enlarges Herbein's role in the cover-up.
Speaker continues:
" men the letter cane back to 4
him with the assurance that it was alright.... Miller did not scrutinize the letter again for such details."
It would be very. interesting to know the grounds upon which the attorney gave his approval; Speaker did not ask.
I
'Ibe Special Master and the ASLB found that the cheating incident was highly relevant to W's recertification.
'Ihe Speaker material clearly denonstrates that GPU managenent was fully aware of its relevance, utterly refuting both Sreaker's claim of " negligence" as the reason of the annission of the che:iting in the letter to NRC, and his claim that Miller felt it was " irrelevant".
'Ihis is an extremely significant matter, for it implicates even higher levels of GPU managenent.
LICENSEE'S FAILURE TO RECERTIFY W ACCORDING TO PROPER PROCEDURE; ANOTHER MEANS 'IO CAMOUFIAGE 'INE CHEATING nv---r-wrr
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. We Board raised-the question as to whether or not-W, putting aside
. the question of cheating, was ever properly recertified to the NRC.
It noted that had notification of the satisfactory empletion by W of the accelerated retraining program been the sole purpose of the letter, "it would not then account for the two other section weaknesses [A and G] in W's FSR reexaminations.
Wat therefore would be a false certification as to his ceplete requalification." (PID, para.2304, p.124)
At some point, W should have been recertified according to the requirments of 10 CFR 55,.
but instead Miller concentrated solely on meeting Section 2.6 of khinistrative Procedure 1906, which deals strictly with the accelerated requalification program:
1 1
In Miller's mind the handwriting incident, a supervisory proble, had nothing to do with this letter.
We letter l
was written for one purpose, i.e., to notify the NRC that W was certified.
tis letter was subnitted to emply with the requirements of Section 2.6 of khinistrative Procedure 1996, not the 10 CFR biennial requirments.
(Speaker Report, p.32)
It is standard procedure in a license recertification to send a letter certifying to the NRC that the operator in question has " discharged his license responsibilities in a competent and safe manner" (Exhibits 19, i
20, 21).
No such letter was ever sent for W, possibly because such a statement would be difficult to make for an operator guilty-of cheating.
As Mr. Crocker suggested, the cheating would " cast some doubt upon how cepetently W had discharged his duties" (SMR, para.234, p.130). tis may explain why a certification letter resembling the standard format:
"W....is capable of operating safely and proficiently under the provisions of his license", (Exhibit 1A) was drafted but never sent. When asked why 4
this letter was not sent, Miller replied that he did not know, but repeated that it was not necessary to comply with khinistrative Procedure #1006 s--m,------
r 4
r-.-rc--,,...,-.
me.
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. (Speaker Report #2, p.8-9).
He also stated that "the letter I signed was not a renewal of his license..." (Miller interview, p.36)
Note that this is inconsistent with Speaker's assertion quoted above, that "The letter was written for one purpose, i.e., to notify the NRC that W was certified."
If this letter was not intended to be the basis for a renewal of W's license, the wording was sufficiently abiguous to mislead the NRC, for they recertified him.
To send a letter "to notify NRC that W was recertified", when Miller did not mean to renew his license, is ac. equally serious false representation to the NRC.
It appears that W's accelerated requalification program may even have fallen short of the Section 2.6 requirements. The section states that
"[d]uring the period of accelerated requalification, attendence at the OR lecture series is required." (Speaker Report, p.64) There is no indication that W attended lectures, nor did the instructions in his progran, Exhibit 7, instruct him to do so.
SPEAKER'S " INVESTIGATION" T MANAGEMEtir'S AGREEMEtfr TO MAKE A FALSE STATEMENT TO NRC The Board made the following request:
All of the persons who were consulted in advance by
, Mr. Miller about this August 3 letter should be interviewed.
These appear to be Messrs. Beers, Herbein, Lawyer, W, and Zechuan.
A determination should be made whether there was agrement among sane or all of them to represent knowingly to the NRC that W had attained an 89.1% score on Section A, or to make any other inaccurate representation to the NRC." (PID, para.2314, p.127-8)
Speaker's method of determination is to ask his witnesses if they conspired to lie and uncritically accept their answers, rather than making use of the.
objective evidence:
. Q [ Speaker]:
c'Ihe key-question that - I'm getting at is whether or not you were involved in any effort by your or by someone else to construct what should be said to the NRC, wheth0/0/00... 5:27:42 er scrnebody said to you or whether you said to Mr. Beers: " Don't say anything about the handwriting, use these marks, was there any discussion?"
A [Zechuan] :
[et me make that clear..., there was no question about our knowing.
'Ihere was no question about our honesty and I
want that clear about the cheating...and as I under. stand from the follow-up that Gary made or that that was. not his handwriting, and he told me that was verified....
(Zechnan interview, p.44)
Zechuan's answer is incanprehensible, but Speaker's approach cannot expect much better.
Although Speaker concludes that " All of the individuals mentioned above were interrogated, and all denied any canplicity" (Speaker Report, p.58), the answers he received were at best vague. Zechuan later said that he does not remenber if the thotght crossed his mind that the letter to NRC should have reported the handwriting.
(Zechnan interview, p.46)
Beers, who drafted the letter to Collins and thus would be the most likely to renenber what was to be included, was i
asked "specifically, did anyone say: " Don't say anything about the handwriting incident?".
Beer's response: "I don' t recall". (Beers interview, p.20) "I don't recall" is scarcely a denial. But no confessions are necessary.
'Ihe fact that Miller solicited and obtained approval from Herbein and Blake to conceal the handwriting incident is proof that there was an agreenent to make a false representation.
In addition to the obvious ommission of the cheating incident, Miller, Herbein, Blake, Zechuan, Beers, and Iawyer all knew that the statenent "he scored less than 80% on two (2) FSR sections." was inaccurate (supra at p.22).
In addition, all of the above probably recognized that the 89.1% score entered for -
Section A
was the score obtained through cheating.
. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A CONCLUSION THAT W'S PUNISfNENT WAS MADE PUBLIC WITHIN THE COMPANY A remaining significant issue concerning the adequacy of GPU's response to the incident is the canpany's failure to make W's "punishnent" I
public within the organization.
We SMR concluded that there was no evidence that W knew his reassignnent was disciplinary, nor was it necessarily intended to be. (SMR, para.237, p.131-2)
Speaker retorts that i
there is evidence that W knew his reassignnent was disciplinary, and cites Parker's interview, and Exhibits 13,16,and 18. (Speaker Report, p.49) "None of these exhibits bear out Speaker's claim. Exhibit 13 is a letter to go in W's file, which scolds him for his actions; Exhibit 16 is a notification to W that he was to be suspended for his behavior (a notice he never received, because he changed positions instead); Exhibit 18 is a note between Miller and Parker, concerning relieving W of his duties, but says nothing of W's knowledge. Wese exhibits contain nothing to indicate tl.at W was aware of disciplinary actions against him, other than a letter of mild reprimand for his file.
We SMR also says that "W's fellow employees were unaware of any 4
denotion: (SMR, para.232, p.128).
Speaker singles out Boltz, Ross, and Zechuan who according to their interviews had heard W's reassignnent was disciplinary.
Wese three, who were all directly involved in the incident, are the only support for Speaker's claim that "[n]either can there be any doubt that other enployees knew of the fact that W had been disciplined."
(Speaker Report, p.66)
However, he overlooks 1) Frederick, who stated: "I wasn't aware that the two incidents ' (the cheating and W's reassignnent]
were connected until 2 months ago.
Even then it was just a runor."
(Frederick interview, Sept.
1, 1982, p.23); 2) Beers, who stated:
"Noone ever told me that's why his position had changed" (Beers interview, p.22);
..-.~y
- and 3) 0, who said:
"...so-many people were moving...it was just another move as far as we were concerned and stuff, you know...it wasn' t a promotion, it wasn't a demotion...It was just a move to utilize people that i
we had and put their expertise where we could possibly use then. " (O interview, Aug.27, 1982, p.9).
W's testimony " clearly denied that the company's motives in reassigning him was to provide an exanple to others."
(SMR, para.232, p.128)
%cse that knew of his "punishnent" were all upper-level training personnel and managenent who were intimately involved with this case.
It is renarkable that others as directly involved in the incident as Beers, Frederick, O and W did not know that W's reassignnent was disciplinary.
We evidence does not support the conclusion that an example was established for the rest of the canpany.
On the contrary, knowledge that W was " disciplined" was limited to a tiny group of persons.
Wis is particularly important since even Speaker finds that "had the Company made the 1979 W/O incident public...the 1981 cheating incidents may not have occurred." (Speaker Report, p.99)
ARNOLD'S INVOLVDiENT Although the Speaker Report conspicuously fails to address the adequacy of Robert Arnold's response to the cheating incident (Speaker merely repeats Arnold's story in his chronology), we agree with the Special Master that Arnold's decision to transfer W to another position which was not unanbiguously a demotion nor related to his cheating, was wholly inadequate. (SMR, paras.231-2, 236-7, pps.127-9, 130-2)
In the face of all evidence to the contrary, Arnold testified that
...there is no question in my mind that the assignnent represented a denotion and I would certainly think there is no question in Mr. W's mind or in the rest of the organization's mind that that was denotion.
(SMR, para.
. 231, p. 128)
The Special Master concluded that Arnold's testimony was " unsupported by doctmentation, and was refuted by the testimony of W and other operators."
(W, W,
U, and V all testified that they had no knowledge that W was denoted (Id. at para. 232, p.128)).
It is highly dubious that Arnold was as distant from this episode as he has tried to appear throughout this proceeding.
In an effort to distance Arnold from the letter to NRC, Speaker claims that Arnold was not even " aware that it was requalification time for W and of the need for the letter to the NRC" (Speaker Report, p.33)
This is difficult to believe.
Why did Arnold think W was taking tests in the first place? He was aware that W had done something wrong, and claims that he was disciplined, yet also did not feel it necessary to notify the NRC.
In fact, " Arnold had no reluctance in, and endorsed, W maintaining his licensed position."
(Speaker Report, p.34)
Arnold's role in this episode points to a lack of integrity in the highest level of GPU managenent.
SPEAKER'S RELIANCE ON W'S PERSONAL FEELINGS IN ASSESSING HIS GUILT Speaker's exoneration of W consists to a large degree of a subjective assesment of the circtmstances surrounding W's vacation plans.
We need devote little attention to these 1me excuses.
W waited until literally the last hour and then resorted to cheating to complete his exan.
'Ihe fact that he had vacation plans with his family hardly constiteces a reason for failing to take the exam sonetime during the preceding weeks, nor does it excuse W's cheating.
Speaker also implies that W's cheating was not important because he was known to be a highly canpetent operator.
Therefore, reasons Speaker, the letter to NRC was legitimate because it was " certifying the competence
. of W which was unquestioned." (Id. at p.64)
Of course, this was not the purpose of the letter.
It was meant to certify that W had (properly) passed the tests required to assure that he was qualified for a license renewal. Managenent's views of W's empetence have no bearing on his test scores.
We cannot believe that anyone would suggest that an operator's scores could be " adjusted" to bring the into 1ine with what GPU believed his level of empetence to be, yet this is the logic of the Speaker rationale.
mreover, the fact that he had failed his tests three times between 1977 and 1979, and cheated on one of thm, certainly calls his empetence into question.
Speaker also offers the explanation that many operators felt they were trained for two separate and distinct purposes:
One was to learn how to operate the controls empetently and safely; the other to pass an exam testing the operator's understanding of the facility design. (Id. at p.60)
Speaker pleads for cmpassion for those operators who felt only the former was important.
However the latter is also important, especially in the event of an unusual accident (like that at 'IMI 2).
'Ihese two purposes are also not separate and distinct.
Finally, tests are given to assure retention.
It does not matter how much potential an operator has if he fails to renenber material during an accident.
W's actions also speak to his integrity, an equally important elenent in carrying out his job.
Itre importantly, W's disdain for the training ard testing program do not mitigate his cheating; indeed, considering his relatively high position, it aggravates the wrong cmmitted.
If a person comnits a robbery, s/he is guilty regardless of whether the thief feels there is nothing wrong with stealing.
CONCLUSION
4 r We Speaker " investigation" is a transparent effort to exculpate GPU and its enplc.yees.
It is at ' best a piece of advocacy - and hardly a convincing one - with none of the-qualities of independenc., critical thought, skepticism and rigor wMeh are the hallmarks of an investigation.
As such, it falls into the pattern which has characterized GPU's response to all the issues relating to management competence and integrity throughout this proceeding.
It is impossible not to note the ranarkable parallel between this
" investigation" and the earlier Wilson investigation" undertaken by GPU in-the wake of the discovery of cheating on operator examinations.
Wilson's-conclusions were presented to the Special Master as the result of an
" impartial" investigation (SMR, para. 213, p.ll6). Mr. Wilson was a la yer for GPU. (Id. at para.28, p.17)
Both the Special tester and the ASLB concluded that the Wilson investigation was far from impartial.
(SMR, paras. 196-219, 334, pp.106-20, 189-90; PID. paras. 2247-2269, pp.98-108)
Like this latest Speaker effort, the Wilson " investigation" was a tissue of implausibility.
/
to Special Master recounted in detail the critical instances where Wilson simply accepted denials of' guilt with no basis (SMR, paras. 201, 207, 218, pp.100, 110-1, 119), misrepresented interviews (M. at para.210, pp.ll2-3),
ignored evidence of culpability (Id. at paras.203, 206, 208, 214, 218, 219, pp.109-ll, 116-7, 119-20) and fabricated implausible rationales to avoid concluding that cheating had occured.
-(Id. at paras.212, 215, pp.ll5-6, 117).
%e Special Master concluded that, based upon its unquestioning acceptance of the Wilson " investigation", GPU's response to the cheating on the weekly quuizzes was inadequate and its testimony "very poor".
(Id. at para.334, pp.189-90)
Even the ASLB, which was much more forgiving towards GPU, concluded:
1
. " Licensee was culpable in its uncritical acceptance of Mr. Wilson's work when there are so many indications of its inadequacy."
(PID, para. 2266, p.106)
With this history in mind, GPU's sponsorship of the Speaker report and its subnittal of this docunent to NRC without qualification is inexcusable.
It is clear evidence that GPU has failed to learn the most basic lesson, that it continues today to react to probleus within its organization by denying their existence rather than correcting then.
In UCS's view, the Speaker report constitutes a powerful indictment of GPU managenent.
.4 d
Respectfully Suhnitted,
/G 12 gf Ellyn R. Weiss General Counsel Union of (bncerned Scientists Harmon and Weiss 1725 I St. NW Suite 506 Washington, D.C. 20006 dated: July 21, 1983 i
e I
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORT COHHISSION BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- 1. the Hatter of
)
)
HETROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-289
)
(Restart)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
Station. Unit No. 1)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS' COMMENTS ON " INVESTIGATION OF VV AND O INCIDENT" have been served on the following persons by deposit in the United States mail, first class postage or as indicated by asterisk, this 21st day of July, 1983.i
- Nunzio Palladino, Chairman Dr. Linda V. Little U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, D.C. 20555 Doard Panel 5000 Hermitage Drive
- John Ahearne, Commissioner Raleigh. North Carolina 27612 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Professor Gary L. Hilhollin 4412 Greenuich Parkuay
- James Asselst.ine, Commissioner Washington. D.C. 20007 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C. 20555
- Judge Gary.J. Edles. Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing
- Victor Gilinsky, comissioner Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington. D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 i
- Thomas Roberts. Commissioner
- Judge John H. Duck U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Atomic Safety and Licensing Wa shing ton. D.C. 20555 Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comreission i
F Ivan W. Semith, Chairman Washington D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
- Judge Reginald L. Cotchy U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington. D.C. 20555 Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. Walter H. Jordan Washington D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panet
- Judge Christine N.
Kohl 881 West Outer Drive Atomic Safety and Licensing Oak Ridge. Tennessee 37830 Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nucicar Regulatory Commission Vashington, D.C.
20555
- Mrs. Harjorte AamodL Ms. Call U. Phelps 245 We st Philadelphia Street R. D.
- 5 Coatsville, Pennsylvania 19320 York, Pennsylvania 17404 Steven C. Sholly Robert Adler, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General Union of Concerned Scientists 505 Executive House 1346 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
P.O. Dox 2357 Suite 1101 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Washington, D.C. 20036 Louise Deadford Joseph R. Gray Orrice of Executive Legal Director Three Nile Island Alert U.S. Nucicar Regulatory Commission 325 Perrer Street Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17102 Washington, D.C. 20555 Thomas Baxter Es Jordan D. Cunningham, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Polts $. Trowbridge Fox, Farr & Cunningham 2320 North Second Street 1800 H Street, N.W.
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17110 Wa-hington, D.C. 20036 Docketing and Service Section Dr. Judith H. Johnsrud Dr. Chauncey Keptord Orrice of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Environmental Coalition on Vashington, D.C. 20555 Nuclear Power 8133 Orlando Avenue State College, PA 16801 William S. Jordan. III Harmon & Weiss me'a~ " "-
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Washington, D.C. 20006 John A. Levin. Esq.
Assistant Counsel
- !{and Delivered to indicated Pennsylvania Public Utility Address.
Commission P.O. Box 3265 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120
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