ML20079R835
| ML20079R835 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/07/1983 |
| From: | Varnado G SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20079R826 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8306240301 | |
| Download: ML20079R835 (4) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 4
In the Matter of CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY Docket Nos. 50-247-SP 0F NEW YORK (Indian Point, Unit 2) 50-286-SP
)
P0llER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Indian Point, Unit 3)
AFFIDAVIT OF G. BRUCE VARNADO CONCERNING SAB0TAGE I, G. Bruce Varnado, being duly sworn, state as follows:
1.
I am employed at Sandia National Laboratories as a supervisor of the Nuclear Facility Analysis Division. A statement of my professional qualifications is attached.
2.
My responsibilities in that position include the conduct of research on the question of sabotage at nuclear facilities.
c.
3.
I have been asked to provide a response to the recommendation of Mr. Paul J. Amico set forth in his report to the Board dated June 1, 1983, that expert testimony be provided concerning the risk signifi-cancr of sabotage.
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4.
Over the past decade a number of Nuclear Regulatory Commission studies have addressed the concerns about sabotage of nuclear power plants. These studies have dealt with potential vulnerabilities of 8306240301 830620 PDR ADDCK 05000247 0
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nuclear power plants to sabotage, assessment of the expected consequences of sabotage, the evaluation of effectiveness of physical protection systems at nuclear power plants, and the development of countermeasures and design features to reduce vulnirability to sabotage.
In none of these studies nor in any PRA completed to date has there been an attempt to develop quantitative estimates of the risk due to sabotage.
5.
The primary reason for not trying to estinate risk due to sab( ~ ige is the difficulty of estimating the probability of attempt of sabotage actions. This is a number that would be even more difficult to define than are the frequencies of external events such as seismic disturbances, external flooding, and the like.
There are methods available for estimating the probability of success of an external, armed attack given an attempt, but these methods rely heavily on models for human performance in armed engagements and are fraught with large uncertainties. There are really no good methods for estimating probability of success for attack by an insider. The prediction of the likelihood of attempts,-.
and the prediction of the likelihood of success given such an attempt are essential parts of any analysis to evaluate the risk of sabotage at any given facility, and we currentif*have no reliable ways of estimating either of these parameters. The methods that simulate adversary actions against a plant can provide important insights into what must be protected and how best to implement physical protection for a site, but we should not expect to produce
.ntitative estimates appropriate for risk assessment.
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6.
The work I have done does not provide me with a basis for comparing the significance of risk due to sabotage with other sources of risk at Indian Point or any other nuclear facility.
t I hereby certify that the information set forth above is true and correct to the best of my knowledge,.information and belief.
/
9 l
NM V
G. Bruce Varnado
- Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of June, 1983
& S. 0E t(
h Notary Public v,y Commission expires: July 1, 1986 9
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G. Bruce Varnade Summary of Professional Qualifications G.
Bruce Varnado is Supervisor of the Nuclear Facility Analysis Division of Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
In this position he has performed and managed a
variety of studies of nuclear fuel cycle facility safety and security concerns for the~ Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
These programs involve the development of analytical methods for probabilistic risk assessment (PRA),
the development of techniques for the identification of vital areas-in nuclear power plants, the evaluation of improved reac-tor safety system designs, the analysis of severe accidents in light ' water
- reactors, the assessment of design-features to reduce sabotage vulnerability, and the assessment of reactor vulnerability to external hazards.
Past and current. activities in the area of PRA include responsibility for the Methods for System. Modeling and Analysis Program, the methods development tasks in the Interim Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP),
development of advanced risk assessment modeling techniques to support the Risk Methodology Integration and Evaluation i
Program, and the development and maintenance of the Sandia com-puter codes used for fault tree analysis and accident sequence quantification.
In addition, he has managed a number.of pro-grams which have applied PRA. in engineering analyses including l*
the Filtered Vented Containment System Study, the Alternative Decay Heat Removal Systt:m S tu dy, - and the Unresolved Safety Issue on Decay Heat Removal (TAP A-45).
In the area of reactor sabotage analysis he has been' responsible for studies such as Reactor Safeguards System Assessment and Design, the vital area analysis work in the Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities Program, and Nuclear Power Plant Design Concepts for Sabotage t.
Protection.
He is -presently Chairman of the ANSI-chartered i
l writing group preparing a Guide for the Identification of Vital I
Areas in Nuclear Facilities (project number N15.48).
He is a member of the American Nuclear Society and the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management.
Mr. Varnado received his MS Degree from the University of New Mexico and BS Degree from Mississippi State University, both in Electrical Engineering.
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