ML20079M310

Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1983

ML20079M310
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	12/31/1983
From:	Baran R, Fiedler P, Notigan D GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (ORM)
References
NUDOCS 8401270259
Download: ML20079M310 (9)

Text

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hKXmlLY OPERATIONS REPORT DECEMBER 1983 3roughout the report period, the Oyster Creek Station remained shutdown for the current Refueling / Maintenance Outage.

He cavity remained flooded throughout the report period with CRC replacement, CRD blade shuffle and reactor vessel debris removal as the major reactor vessel activity. At the end of the report period, two (2) gds were left to be replaced.

Rese last two diives will be replaced in January (1984) after the two cells used for vessel draining early in the outage are reassembled. Also, 14 CRD blades remain to be shuffled and/or replaced.

He Operations Department has experienced numerous systems problems directly related to cold weather conditions.

FEC has been asked to place a high priority in working with Operations checking into systems and areas of the plant requiring heat tracing or space heaters to prevent freezing.

Numerous repairs were required on ?.e plant's domestic water system due to pipe ruptures from frozen pipes.

Also, a fire system nozzle failed in the reactor recirculation pump hbtor-Generator Set Room and, due to freezing conditions, service water pressure indication in the Control Room has been lost intermittently.

Also, during this period, stean heating to the Reactor Building supply fan coils was re-er tablished.

Steam heating to one of the Turbine Building supply fan coils (SF-1-1) was also re-established.

He plant continued to have test results lower than acceptable on 24 volt instrument battery specific gravity.

Materials Management and Plant Engineering are presently addressing this item of concern.

Hydrolaser cleaning of both "A" and "B" fuel pool heat exchangers was completed.

"B" fuel pool pumps developed a seal leak during the report period.

He pump's seal is scheduled to be rebuilt in January 1984 in conjunction with discharge check valve repair.

Relief valve replacement on 1-1 fire diesel pump was completed.

The pump was delayed from being returned to an operable status due to problems with its overspeed trip relay and other minor deficiencies (loose fan belt, etc.).

Relief valve replacement on 1-2 fire diesel pump will be completed after a new fan belt, which is presently being purchased, is installed on 1-1 pump.

Installation of the new "HFA" relays on the Reactor Protection Systems was in progress at the end of the month.

Transfer and testing of the alarms to the new Control Room alarm panels was in progress.

Cable replacement on Eergency Diesel Generator No. I was in progress at the end of the report period.

We diesel generator is expected to be returned to an operable status in early January at which time the annual inspection of Diesel Generator No. 2 will be started.

Weld repair of 1-2 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCOV) heat exchangers was completed.

8401270259 e41231 DR ADOCK 05000 g

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Oper:tions Monthly Report Page 2 A pole : fire in front of the plant caused the R-144 line oil cooled

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breaker'(0.C.B.) to trip which resulted in a momentary loss of power for

.New Radwaste and the boiler house (December 26, 1983).

On December 26, 1983, the plant experienced a trip of "A" service water pump and "B" pump failed to start, resulting in a loss of service water for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 45 minutes.

"A" pump was restarted and 3" was tested satisfactorily.

Initially, the cause of the trip could not be determined.

Subsequent investigation revealed a problem with the trip latch on the motor supply breaker.

Also, on December 26,

1983, the plant experienced a three zone instantaneous trip on the J6 9361 line.

Two of the three disconnects were found to be open by pole No. JC 6642L and the Larabee dispatcher was notified.

The trip ' caused Reactor Building isolation, SGTS initiation,1P-4, Vital lighting Distribution Panel (VLDP) and Vital AC Power Panel (VACP) automatic bus transfer switch (ABT) swap over, and a fuel pool pump trip.

The trip was reset and all systems were returned to - normal.

Electrical Maintenance determined the cause to be faulty lighting arrestors and isolated them.

The Line Department replaced the fuses on the pole.

The lab drain tank overflowed and water spilled onto the floor (Reactor Building 23' Elev.).

The spill was contained and teminated.

The apparent cause was a stuck open check valve.

Fuel pool inventory and restorage of equipment is in progress to make room for the, installation of new spent fuel storage racks.

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Page 3 he following Licensee Event Reports were submitted during December 1983:

Reportable Occurrence Ib. 50-219/83-On November 14, 1983, Reactor Building Ventilation Isolation Valve V-28-22 failed to close upon initiation of an isolation signal during the surveillance of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS). Eis constitutes a degradation of secondary containment integrity as described in the %chnical Specifications.

2 e cause of this occurrence was the breaking off of a piece of the air operator piston which prohibited valve movement. Se air operator was removed, disassembled and inspected. W e damaged piston was repaired and the operator reassembled. Following reassembly, the air operator and valve were functionally tested for satisfactory valve operation as well as for closure upon isolation signal initiation. A replacement operating air cylinder will be installed after it is received from the manufacturer.

Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-24/OlP On December 20, 1983, during a review of the torque switch setpoints of the Limitorque motor operated valves at Oyster Creek, it was discovered that the setpoints on many motor operated valves had been set lower than the manufacturer's data. The apparent cause of this occurrence is attributed to lack of sufficient knowledge concerning setpoint design basis and how the setpoints affect safety system functioning.

Immediate corrective action was initiated to investigate the design basis of each valve operator in different systems. Wis investigation is continuing with General Electric Co., the valve manufacturers, and the valve operator manufacturer. Specific corrective action for each valve determir>ed to be affected w:.ll be initiated upon completion of this investigation.

Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-26/0lP Over the past several years the addition of lead, for the purpose of radiation shielding, on two of three fuel pool cooling heat exchangers has created a situation where the heat exchangers' foundation bolts would be overstressed during a seismic event.

In addition, while investigating this situation, it was discovered that the original portions of the fuel pool cooling piping system are supported only by dead weight supports and therefore, may not be a seismic Class I system as stated in the station's

" Facility Description and Safety Analysis Report" (FDSAR). We cause of the occurrence was attributed to lack of procedural controls in the past when applying lead shielding to piping systems. The exact cause of the discrepancy between the FDSAR and the installation specifications could not be determined but is believed to be due to lack of control of changes during the construction phase of the plant. W e following corrective actions have been initiated:

1.

A decontamination effort has been scheduled to reduce the levels of radiation in the vicinity of the heat exchangers and then all lead will be removed.

Page 4 2.

A walk-down of the plant will be conducted to ensure that similar situations do not exist which might interfere with the functioning of safety-related equipment.

3.

A seismic am]ysis has been conducted for the fuel pool cooling piping system in its present configuration and it was found that the original fuel pool cooling system is not seismic Class I; however, the augmented cooling system which was added as part of the fuel pool expansion is a seismic Class I system. Changes will be made to the outlet and return piping system to ensure a seismically qualified flow path can be established from the fuel pool to the seismically qualified portion of the cooling system. An assessment of the entire system will then be made to determine if further system upgrading is appropriate.

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~.80-219 UNITSilUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS Uysv.er ureek DATE 1-10-84 REPORTMONTil nocomber 1983 COMPT.ETED gy R.

Baran 371-4640 1

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k Cause & Corrective No.

Date g

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.c g oc Event r* 1 Action to g

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Prevent Recurrence S

31 2-11-83 S

7752 C

1 N/A ZZ ZZZZZZ Start of the 1983 Refueling /

Maintenance Outage.

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4 k

i I

2 3

4 F: Forced Reason:

Method:

Exhibit G-Instructions S: Scheduled A Equipment Failure (Explain)

1. Manual for Preparation of Data B Maintenance or Test 2-Manual Scram.

Entry Sheets for 1.icensee C-Refueling 3 Automatic Scram.

Event Repost (LER) File (NUREG-D-Regulatory Restriction 4 Other (Explain) 0161)

E-Operator Training & Ucense Exandnation F Adm nistrative 8

5 GOperational Errus (Explain)

Exhibh 1-Same Source (9/77) llother(Explain)

/

OPERATING DATA REPORT OPERATING STATUS j

1.

DOCKET:

50-219

/

2.

REPORTING PERIOD:

December, 1983 3.

UTILITY CONTACT:

JOSEPH R. MOLNAR 609-971-4699 4.

LICENSED THERMAL POWER (MWt):

1930 5.

NAMEPLATE RATING (GROSS MWe):

687.5 X 0.8 = 550 6.

DESIGN ELECTRICAL RATING (NET MWe):

650 7.

MAXIMUM DEPENDABLE CAPACITY (GROSS MWe):

650 8.

MAXIMUM DEPENDABLE CAPACITY (NET MWe):

620 9.

IF CHANGES OCCUR ABOVE SINCE LAST REPORT, GIVE REASONS:

NONE 10.

POWER LEVEL TO WHICH RESTRICTED, IF ANY (NET MWe): N/A 11.

REASON FOR RESTRICTION, IF ANY:

NONE MONTH YEAR CUMULATIVE 12.

REPORT PERIOD HRS 744.0 8760.0 122928.0 13.

HOURS RX CRITICAL 0.0 1009.6 84623.9 14.

RX RESERVE SHTDWN HRS 0.0 0.0 468.2 15.

HRS GENERATOR ON-LINE 0.0 1007.8 82693.8 16.

UT RESERVE SHTDWN HRS 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.

GROSS THERM ENER (MWH) 0.0 853300 136224729 18.

GROSS ELEC ENER (MWH) 0.0 244630 46056905 l

19.

NET ELEC ENER (MWR)

-1913 205155 44285683 20.

UT S:RVICE FACTOR 0.0 11.5 67.3 l

21.

UT AVAIL FACTOR 0.0 11.5 67.3 l

22.

UT CAP FACTOR (MDC NET) 0.0 3.8 58.1 23.

UT CAP FACTOR (DER NET) 0.0 3.6 55.4 24.

UT FORCED OUTAGE RATE 0.0 0.0 9.7 l

25.

FORCED OUTAGE HRS 0.0 0.0 8916.8 l

l 26.

SHUTDOWNS SCHEDULED OVER NEXT 6 MONTHS (TYPE, DATE, DURATION):

N/A 27.

IF CURRENTLY SHUTDOWN ESTIMATED STARTUP TIME:

4/29/84 i

AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL NET N e DOCKETT #........ 50-219 l

UNIT........... Oyster Creek #1 REPORP DATE....... JANUARY 5,1984 COMPILED BY.......DOtWD V. NOTIGAN TELEPIONE #...... 609-971-4695 Motml DECDEER,1983 DAY N

DAY N

1.

0 16.

0 2.

0 17.

0 3.

0 18.

0 4.

0 19.

0 5.

0 20.

0 6.

0 21.

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0 22.

0 8.

0 23.

0 9.

0 24.

0 10.

0 25.

0 11.

0 26.

0 12.

0 27.

0 13.

0 28.

0 14.

0 29.

0 15.

0 30.

0 31.

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Oyster Creek Stztion #1 Docket No.

50-219 REFUELING INFORMATION - December,1983 Nane of Facility: Oyster Creek Station #1 Scheduled date for next refueling shutdown:

Presently shutdown for Refueling Scheduled date for restart following refueling:

April 29, 1984 Will refueling or resumption of operation thereaf ter require a Technical Specification change or other license amendment?

Technical Specification Change Request No. 96 was submitted on August 31, 1982 for incorporation of GE assemblies into the Cycle 10 core.

Scheduled dace (s) for submitting proposed licensing action and supporting informa tion:

October 28, 1983 - The final supplement to the reinad analysis, delineating the specific core configuration for Cycle 10 operation, was submitted.

Important licensing considerations associated with refueling, e.g., new or different fuel design or supplier, unreviewed design or performance analysis methods, significant changes in fuel design, new operating procedures:

1.

General Electric Fuel Assemblies - fuel design and performance analysis methods have been approved by the NRC.

New operating procedures, if necessary, will be submitted at a later date.

2.

Exxon Fuel Assemblies - no major changes have been made nor are there any anticipated.

The number of fuel assemblies (a) in the core 0

=

(b) in the spent fuel storage pool = 1375 The present licensed spent fuel pool storage capacity and the size of any

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increase in licensed storage capacity that has been requested or is planned, in number of fuel assemblies:

Present:

1,800 Planned:

2,600 The projected date of the last refueling that can be discharged to the spent fuel pool assuming the present licensed capacity:

Full core offload capability will be lost after the 1985 outage.

Batch discharge capability will be lost af ter the 1987 outage.

Expanded spent fuel pool rack capacity (2,600) is scheduled for 1984.

.1 GPU Nuclear Corporation Nuclear

s;'=388 Forked River.New Jersey 08731-0388 609 971-4000 Writer's Direct Dial Number:

January 16, 1984 Director Office of Management Information U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555

Subject:

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Monthly Operating Report In accordance with the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Operating License No. DPR-16, Appendix A, Section 6.9.1.C, enclosed are two (2) copies of the Monthly Operating Data (gray book information) for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.

If you should have any questions, please contact Mr. Michael Laggart at (609) 971-4643.

Very truly yours, Peter B. Fiedler Vice President and Director Oyster Creek PBF:PFC: dam Enclosures cc: Director (10)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Regional Administrator (1)

Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 NRC Resident Inspector Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station k

Forked River, NJ 08731

1. V

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T GPU Nucleas Corporation is a subsidiary of the General Public Utilities Corporation

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