ML20078N489
| ML20078N489 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 10/07/1983 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20078N463 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8310250602 | |
| Download: ML20078N489 (4) | |
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 374dlS N R C P ;. :-i;,n ;
400 Chestnut Street Tower,II'L.'.N Tf, ;;cj;ggj, October 7,1983 83 0CT 11 P2* 35 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn:
.Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 1101 Marietta. Street, NW, Suite 2900
' Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear'Mr. O'Reilly:
-SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC-0IE REGION II INSPECTION REPORT
- 50-327/83-16 AND 50-328/83 RESPONSE TO VIOLATION c.
The subject OIE inspection report dated September '13,- 1983 from D. M. 'Verrelli to H, O. Parris cited;TVA with two Severity Level V Violations.
. Enclosed is our response to the subject inspection report.
If you have any questions, please get in touch' with R. H. Shell' at FTS 858-2688.
To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M. Mills, nager Nuclear Licensing
~ Enclosure oc:.Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Washington, D.C.
20555 Records Center (Enclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 J
8310250602 831019 PDR ADOCK 05000327 O
PDR 1983-TVA 5OrH ANNIVERSARY An Equal Opportunity Employer J
- - " ?!
RESPONSE - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS.
50-327/83-16 AND 50-328/83-16 D. M. VERRELLI'S LETTCR TO H. G. PARRIS DATED SEPTEMBER 13, 1983 Item A - (3?7, 328/83-16-01)
Technical specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures shall be implemented covering activities referenced in Appendix A of Regulatory.
Guide 1 33, Rev. 2, 1978, includir3 Atmosphere Cleanup System and Auxiliary Building Ventilation. System Operating Instruction SOI 30.6 " Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS)" requires that when the ABGTS rans are shutdown and required to be operable by technical specifications, the handswitches shall be placed in the "A-Auto"_ position.
Contrary to the above, SOI 30.6 was not properly implemented in that when the ABGTS was shutdown-prior to July 8,1983, the handewitches were placed in " Standby" rather than "A-Auto".
The inspector observed the switches in
" Standby" during a control room tour on July 8.
The inspector determined that having t.le switches in " Standby" may have degraded system operation somewhat tat did not make ABGTS inoperable.
This is a Severity Level,V Violation (Supplement I).
Thi, violation applies to u its 1 and 2.'
n 1.
Admission or Denial of the Alleged Violation TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.
l 2.
Reasons for the Viola
- ion if Admitted The cause of this violation has been determined as inadequato procedures. An auxiliary building isolation occurred on July 6,1983, due to the trip of an auxiliary building exhaust fan. During the recovery process, SOI-30.5D, " Recovery From Auxiliary Building Isolation," was followed. SOI-30.5D IV. A.4 required shutdown of the auxiliary building gas treatment system (ABGTS) using SOI-30.6C,
" Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System, Shutdown." SOI-30.6C shuts down the fans and places the switches in the " Standby" position.
Neither SOI-30.iD nor SOI-30.6C references SOI-30.6B, " Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System, Standby Conditions," which places the fan switches in the "A-Auto" position.
Review of the applicable logic diagrans revealed the fans were not inoperabla since each ran would have started from an automatic initiation signal if a low flow signal was present from the opposite train.
J
A
- 3 Correctivo Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved The ABGTS fan control switches woro placed in the "A-Auto" position upon discovery. SOI-30.5D has been revised to include all operations necessary to recover from auxiliary building isolations including placing the ABGTS ran control switches back to the "A-Auto" position after shutting down the fans.
4 Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken To Avoid Further Violations No additional corrective action is required.
5.
Date When Full Compliance Will De Achieved Full compliance was achieved on July 29, 1983 Item B - (328/83-16-02) 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria X requires inspection of activities affecting quality and tnat mandatory inspection holdpoints, beyond which work shall not proceed without consent of the designated representative, shall be indicated in the appropriate doeurent. This requirement is implemented by the licensee's approved Quality Assurance Program TVA-TR75-1 section 17.2.10 and the Operational Quality Assurance Manual, Part II, section 5.3 paragraph 5.0.
Contrary to the above, work proceeded beyond a mandatory inspection holdpoint without consent of the designated representative in that on August 2, 1983, the inspector noted that reassembly of the 2DB Centrifugal Charging pump outboard bearing per MI-64 had proceeded to step 5.4.17.4 without the QC holdpoint at step 5.4.3.1.6 being witnessed by a OC inspector. When the cognizant engineer was made aware of the missed holdpoint, the bearing was disassembled so that the bearing clearance could be verified by a QC inspector.
This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplenent I).
This violation applies to Unit 2 only.
1.
Admission or Denial-of the Alleged Vielution TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.
2.
Reasons for the Violation if Admitted The cause of the violation has been attributed to the cognizant engineer being highly familiar with the procedure and performing portions of D:e work without referring to the procedure. Having l
2
. prepared the procedure, the cognizant engineer was aware of and performed the step to check the thrust bearing clearance but failed to remember the step required QC verification and signoff.
3.
Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved The bearing was disassembled in order to al2cw the QC inspector to verify the clearance and sign off the step.
The cognizant engineer was instructed on the importance of following written procedures and the importance of QC holdpoints.
4.
Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations A craining class will be prepared and conducted by October 28, 1983 for all mechanical maintenance personnel on the importance of following written instructions and observing QC holdpoints.
5.
Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Full compliance was achieved on July 28, 1983.
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