ML20078L807

Application for Amend to Licenses DPR-53 & DPR-69 Revising Surveillance Requirement 4.7.6.1 & Replacing Page 3/4 3-26 Incorporating Mod to Measurement Range for Gaseous & Particulate Activity monitors.Marked-up Tech Specs Encl

ML20078L807
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	10/12/1983
From:	Lundvall A BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	John Miller Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8310240072
Download: ML20078L807 (7)

Text

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BALTI M ORE GAS AND ELECTRIC CHARLES CEiJTER P. O. BOX 1475 BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203 October 12, 1983 ARTHUR E. LUNDVALL. JR.

Vict PRESIDENT sum-Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ATTENTION: Mr. James R. Miller, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3

SUBJECT:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos.1 & 2, Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Request for Amendment Gentlemen:

The Baltimore Gas and Electric Company hereby requests an Amendment to its Operating License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69 for Calvert Cliffs Unit Nos.1 & 2, respectively, with the submittal of the enclosed proposed changes to the Technical Specifications.

CHANGE NO.1 (BG&E FCR 82-135)

Change surveillance requirement 4.7.6.1 as shown cn the attached marked-up page 3/4 7-18 f or Unit 1 & 2 Technical Specifications.

DETERMINATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS The Control Room / Cable Spreading Room ventilatien system consists of a year round safety related air conditioning system serving both Unit Nos. I and 2. Air conditioning is required in these rooms to regulate the temperature under which safety related equipment must function. The ventilation system is a redundant system as required by Technical Specification 3.7.6.1.

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Mr. James R. Miller October 12,1983 Page 2 la order to provide better operating conditions for operators during the summer, the safety relatcd air conditioning system has been augmented with additional trains of non-safety related air conditioning equipment consisting of a chilled water coil system ,

installed in existing ventilation ductwork, two chill water pumps, and a 220-ton chiller l unit. All electrical and mechanical components of the safety related and non-safety l related systems are independent of each other witii the exception of the existing l ductwork ano fans. l Because the chiller unit is not safety grade, surveillance must be done on the safety grade units to ensure operability. The proposed Technical Specification would accomplish this by proving that the emergency air conditioners would maintain control room air temperature < 104 F for at least 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> every 62 days on a staggered test basis. This would be consistent with our existing frequency for surveillance requirements for the HEPA and charcoal filter adsorber trains (Technical Specification 4.7.6.1).

Amending the Technical Specifications as described above would allow normal operation with the non-safety grade units running and the emergency units on standby. During emergency or non-emergency conditions the safety grade units would automatically start with no operator action if the temperature in the control room rose above the thermostat setpoint. This would minimize run time on the safety grade units, further enhancing their availability during an emergency.

The proposed <-hange will not result in any change to the existing bases for Technical Specification 3/4 7.6. The temperature under which equipment and instrumentation are required to operate will not change and there will be no noticeable effect on control room habitability.

This modification will not result in any change in system function as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) section 9.8.2.3. This document will be updated to reflect the new system configuration. Section 14 of the Updated FSAR will not require updating because the Control Room / Cable Spreading Room air conditioning system is not specifically mentioned in any of the design bases accident analysis.

Neither the ability to maintain the control room temperature below siecified limits, nor the ability to protect the operators from airborne radioactivity, will be affected by this modification.

The proposed change to the Technical Specifications does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated by the FSAR. This change does not result in the possibility of a new or different kind of accident than previously evaluated. Finally, there will be no significant reduction in the margin of safety as a result of this change.

Mr. James R. Miller October 12,1983 Page 3 CHANGE NO. 2 (BG&E FCR 83-66) i Remove old page 3/4 3-26 and replace with marked up page 3/4 3-26 incorporating the change, which is. applicable to both Unit Nos. I and 2. The change modifies the measurement range shown on Table 3.3-6 for the containment gaseous and particulate activity monitors to conform with the actual ranges on installed equipment.

DETERMINATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS Recently, while reviewing the monitoring . instrumentation used for reactor coolant system leakage detection, it came to our attention that the actual measurement range provided on the installed containment atmosphere monitor (C.A.M.) as reflected in the C.A.M. technical manual, the Updated FSAR, and on the C.A.M. meter f ace, was one decade less than the range listed in Table 3.3-6 of the Technical Specifications. Furthe- i investigation has shown that the actual range (10 to 10 cpm vice 10 to 10 cpm per Table 3.3-6) is acceptable for performing its intended function. The containment atmosphere monitor gas detector provides monitoring and alarm capability for the predominant isotope, Xe-133, (expected to be) present in the containment atmosphere as a result of reactor coolant system (R.C.S.) leakage. The particulate detector provides monitoring and alarm capability for the various particulate isotopes expected to be present due to R.C.S. leakage. The C.A.M., whose sole purpose is R.C.S. leakage detection, is one of several detection systems and methods used for tnis function, including the containment sump level alarm, pressurizer pressure and level indication and alarm, containment humidity indicators, reactor coolant makeup water flow integrators, and R.C.S. inventory analysis.

The Final Safety Analysis Report contains a table depicting C.A.M. response times associated with various percentages of failed fuel. The minimum sensitivity described in the FSAR for the detection of Xe-133 is within the range of installed equipment. Review of the technical manual for the C.A.M. showed the measurement range of 10 to 10 to be correct. The correct range is also shown in the Updated FSAR for both the gaseous and particulate detectors.

Through an evaluation of the Updated FSAR, the technical manual and the Technical Specifications, we have determined that granting this change will nat involve a

, significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously evaluated, l nor-does it create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident. There is no reduction in the margin of safety used in the bases for the Technical Specifications.

i Based on these conclusions and the nature of the change requested, we have determined

! there is no significant hazards consideration associated with the proposed license amendment.

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l Mr. James R. Miller l October 12,1983 Page 4 FEE DETERMINATION For fee determination purposes only we request that you consider this request for amendment as a supplement to our submittal dated September 20,1983.

BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

.< MK AEL/3RS/3ET/sjb STATE OF MARYLANO :

TO WIT:

CITY OF BALTIMORE :

Arthur E. Lundvall, Jr., being duly sworn states that he is Vice President of the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, a corporation of the State of Maryland; that he provides the foregoing response for the purposes therein set forth; that the statements made are true and correct to the best of his knowledde, information, and belief; and that l he was authorized to provide the response on behalf of said Corporation.

WITNESS my Hand and Notarial Seal:

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ar7Publio/

My Commission Expires 7 /d,

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cc

3. A. Biddison, Esquire l

G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire D. H. Jaf f e, NRC R. E. Architzel, NRC R. E. Corcoran, DHMH l

l

, .. l PLAT;T SYSTEMS  :

SURVEILLAt?CE REOUIREMEtiTS 4.7.6.1 The control room emergency ventilation system shall Le demon-strated OPERABLE:

a At le h 6:0 re d ving that the control room f.b.

airh nure is < 120'F.

At least once per 31 days by initiating flow through each HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber train and verifying that=.

each train operates for at least 15 minutes.

c. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housing, or (2) followiog painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:

1. Verifying that the. charcoal adsorbers remove 1 99% of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in-place in accordance with At:SI N510-1975 whil'e operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 2000 cfm i 10%.

Verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove > 99% of the l

2. _

DOP when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the ventilation system at a '

flow rate of 2000 cfm i 10%.

3. Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory I analysis of a carbon sample from either at least one test canister or at least two carbon samples removed from one of the charcoal adsorbars demonstrates a removal efficiency of n 905 for radioactive methyl iodide when the sample is tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 (130*C, 95%

R.H.). The carbon samples not obtained from test canisters p shall be prepared by emptying a representative sample from d an adsorber test tray section, mixing the adsorbent thoroughly, and obtaining samples at least two inches in d diameter and with a length equal to the thickness of the P bed. Successive se;nples will be removed from different )d test tray sections. .

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CALVERT CLIFFS-UNIT 2 3/4 7-18

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hh 2 :o RADIATION MON!TORING INSTRUMENTATION _

• " MINIMUM EP CHANNELS APPLICABLE ALARM / TRIP MEASUREMENT 55 INSTRUMENT OPERABLE MODES SETPOINT RANGE ACTION dE ~

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1. AREA MONITORS '

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-- a. Containment

1. Purge & Exhaust

(( Isolation 3 6 < 220 mr/hr 10-j - 104 mr/hr 16

2. PROCESS MONITORS

a. Containment

1. Gaseous Activity i 6 R a) RCS Leakage lo - 10

= Detection 1 1, 2, 3 & 4 Not Applicabic 1 10 cpn 14 y 11. Particulate Activity 10,-10 6 g a) RCS Leakage Detection i 1, 2. 3 & 4 Not Applicable 1 106 cpm 14 h

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Mr. James R. Miller October 12,1983 Page 4 i

FEE DETERMINATION For fee determination purposes only we request that you consider this request for amendment as a supplement to our submittal dated September 20,1983.

BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY .

. / ,

r tu~ l' ^A*

AEL/JRS/ JET /sjb STATE OF MARYLAND :

TO WIT:

CITY OF BALTIMORE :

Arthur E. Lundvall, Jr., being duly sworn states that he is Vice President of the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, a corporation of the State of Maryland; that he provides the fotegoing response for the purposes therein set forth; that the statements made are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief; and that he was authorized to provide the response on behalf of said Corporation.

WITNESS my Hand and Notarial Seal:

/ [

ar7Publio/

My Commission Expires 7j[!/d '

//

cc: J. A. diddison, Esquire G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire D. H. Jaff e, NRC R. E. Architzel, NRC R. E. Corcoran, DHMH

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