ML20078H384

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Amend 193 to License DPR-50,revising Action Requirements of TS 3.5.1 & Table 3.5.1 in Event of Inoperable Degraded Grid Voltage or Loss of Voltage Relay or Associated Timers
ML20078H384
Person / Time
Site: Crane Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/31/1995
From: Mckee P
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20078H387 List:
References
NUDOCS 9502060185
Download: ML20078H384 (5)


Text

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g M EIGO UNITED STATES g-1 g

g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 200sH001 49 n,,,,o ME.TROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY l

GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION i

DOCKET NO. 50-289 i

THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION. UNIT NO. I AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 193 License No. DPR-50 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by GPU Nuclear Corporation, et al'.

(the licensee), dated May 17, 1993, as supplemented on December 23, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

9502060185 950131 PDR ADOCK 05000289 p

PDR

D

. 1 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.c.(2) of Facility Operating License No.

DPR-50 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.193, are hereby incorporated in the license. GPU Nuclear Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION b

Phillip F. McKee, Director Project Directorate I-4 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attachent: Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

January 31, 1995

=_

ATTACHMENT T9 LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.193 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-50 i

DOCKET NO. 50-289 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Insert 3-28 3-28 3-32a 3-32a i

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The four reactor protection channels were provided with key operated bypass 0'.

switches to allow on-line testing or maintenance on only one channel at a time during power operation. Each channel'is provided alarm and lights to indicate when that channel is bypassed. There will be one reactor protection system bypass switch key permitted in the control room.

Each reactor protection channel key operated shutdown bypass switch is provided with alam and lights to indicate when the shutdown bypass switch is being used.

Power is normally supplied to the control rod drive mechanisms from two separate parallel 460 volt sources. Redundant trip devices are employed in each of these sources. The AC Trip Breaker is one means to trip a source.

The redundant means is a parallel configuration consisting of two DC Trip l

Breakers and five SCR power supplies. The SCRs are turned off by the

" electronic trip relays."

Diverse trip features are provided on each breaker. These are the undervoltage relay and shunt trip attachment.

Each trip feature is tested separately.

Failure of one breaker trip feature does not result in loss of redundancy and a reasonable time limit is provided for corrective action.

Failure in the untripped state of a breaker or SCR electronic trip results in loss of redundancy and prompt action is required. Failure of both trip features on one breaker is considered failure of the breaker.

Power may be restored through the failed breaker (SCRs) for a limited time to per'orm required testing.

The 4.16kv ES Bus Undervoltage Relays detect a degraded voltage or Loss of Voltage on the associated ES Bus. Detection of low voltage will separate the ES bus from the offsite power, initiate load shedding and start the associated diesel generator. The rilays do not function during design basis events where acceptable offsite voltage is available.

If the voltage relays on either train are not operable, the time permitted for repair is consistent with other safety related equipment.

If both trains are affected then shutdown is initiated in accordance with Specification 3.0.1 since automatic response of the diesel generator is required to assure completion i

of the safety function if offsite power is degraded or lost.

Automatic initiation of EFW is provided on loss of all reactor coolant pumps, loss of both main feedwater pumps, low OTSG 1evel, and high reactor

. building pressure. High reactor building pressure would be indicative of a loss of coolant accident, main steam line or feedwater line break inside the reactor building. Operability of these instruments is required in order to assure that the EFW system will actuate and control at the appropriate OTSG 1evel without operator action for those events where timely initiation of EFW is required.

Automatic isolation of main feedwater is provided on low OTSG pressure in order to maintain appropriate RCS cooling (minimize overcooling) following a loss of OTSG integrity and minimize the energy released to the Reactor Building atmosphere.

3-28 Amendment No. 75, M, m,193

TABLE 3.5-1 (Cont'd)

INSTRUNENTS OPERATING CONDITIONS

,2, C.

Engineered Safety Features (cont',dl i

g (a) Restore the conditions of Column (A) and Column (B) within one hour or place the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN i

within an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

l (b) The minimum degree of redundancy may be reduced to 0 up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing.

U (c) The Operability requirement is two out of three pressure switches in each train, with a minimum degree of redundancy of one, in each train.

~

E 1.

If the minimum conditions are not met on one train, restore the function to OPERABLE within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, or l

place the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

2.

If the minimum conditions are not met on either train, then place the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> l

and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

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(d) The Operability requirement is two out of three pressure switches in each train, with _a minimum degree of l

M redundancy of one, in each train.

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1.

If the minimum conditions are not met on one train, restore the function to OPERABLE within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or i

place the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

t i

2.

If the minimum conditions are not met on either train, then place the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the fol kwing 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

l (e) The operability requirement for the undervoltage relay, its associated auxiliary relays, and the timer l

1.

If one 4.16 kv ES Bus does not meet the minimum conditions, restore the function to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in hot shutdown within.an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

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2.

If both 4.16 kv Buses do not meet the minimum cond tions, then restore at least one 4.16 kv ES Bts to meet the minimum conditions within I hour or be in h9t shutdown within an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

(f) Discontinue Reactor Building purging and close AHV-1A, IF,,. IC, and ID within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

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