ML20078G822

Proposed Tech Specs Re Required Vol of Trisodium Phosphate Dodecahydrate in Containment

ML20078G822
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	01/31/1995
From:	BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20078G820	List: ML20078G816 ML20078G822
References
NUDOCS 9502030281
Download: ML20078G822 (8)

Text

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ATTACHMENT (1)  :

P UNIT I ,

MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION  ;

PAGES 3/4 5-5 B 3/4 5-2 ,

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t 9502030281 950131 PDR ADDCK 05000317 P PDR l

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! 3/4.5- EMERGENCY C0RE C0OLING SYSTEMS ( CCS)

SURVEILUUICE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

e. At least once per REFUELING INTERVAL by:

1. Verifying the Shutdown Cooling System open-permissive interlock prevents the Shutdown Cooling System suction v '

isolation valves from being opened with a simulated or actual "

RCS pressure signal of 1309 psia.

2. A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.

139.3

3. Verifying that a minimum total of 400 cubic feet of solid I granular trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) is contained within the TSP storage baskets.

4. Verifying that when : reprc:ent:tive :rple of 4.010.1 gramsr-of TSP from TSP stcrege basket is submerged, without agitation, in 3.510.1 liters cf 77110 i berated water frvin the RWT, the pii of the inixed solsticr is reised tc E 5 wMhk 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. ._

f. At least once per REFUELING INTERVAL, during shutdown, by:

1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection Actuation test signal.

2. Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Test Signal:  ;

a. High-Pressure Safety Injection Pump. l

b. Low-Pressure Safety Injection Pump.

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Yes . .n a s o-o bom 4k tsp bukb f ro Ab .} cud <.yucpN c ushmenb oh wa b b o r a k k b e. q sw hee N ur o h 4-N p o sk LOC A s ump eunlikn .

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 192

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING 5Viipi5 (ECCS)

BASES i

pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

Portions of the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) System flowpath are common to both subsystems. This includes the LPSI flow control valve, CV-306, the flow orifice downstream of CV-306, and the four LPSI loop -

isolation valves. Although the portions of the flowpath are connon, the system design is adequate to ensure reliable ECCS operation due to the short period of LPSI System operation following a design basis Loss of Coolant Incident prior to recirculation. The LPSI System design is consistent with the assumptions in the safety analysis.

The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving baskets .

located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility

. of corrosion cracking of certain metal com)onents during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA. The TSP provides t;is protection by dissolving in

, the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised to t 7.0. The W W i requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of RWT I  ;

water provides assurance that the stored TS 11 olve in borated water '

at the postulated post LOCA temperatures. Lw A The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that as a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety I analyses are met and the subsystem 0PERABILITY is maintained. The surveillance requirement for flow balance testing provides assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance i of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each i injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow s)1it between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in tie ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acce) table level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or.above t1at assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses. Minimum HPSI i flow requirements for temperatures above 365 F are based upon small break LOCA' calculations which credit charging pump flow following an SIAS.

Surveillance testing includes allowances for instrumentation and system leakage uncertainties. The 470 gpm requirement for minimum HPSI flow from the three lowest flow legs includes instrument uncertainties but not system check valve leakage. The OPERABILITY of the charging pumps and the associated flow paths is assured by the Boration System Specification 3/4.1.2. Specification of safety injection pump total developed head ensures pump perfomance is consistent with safety analysis assumptions.

ThesurveillancerequirementfortheShutdownCooling(SDC)Systemopen-pemissive interlock provides assurance that the SDC suction isolation valves are prevented from being remotely opened when the RCS pressure is at or above the SDC System design suction pressure of 350 psia. The suction CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 192

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4 INSERT A Testing must be performed to ensure the solubility and buffering ability of the TSP after exposure to the containment environment. A representative sample of 3.43 i 0.05 grams of TSP from one of the baskets in containment is submerged in 1 i 0.01 liters of water at a boron concentration of 3106 i 50 ppm and at a standard temperature of 120 5 F. Without agitation, let the solution stand ibr four hours. The liquid is then decanted and mixed, the temperature adjusted to 77 i 2*F and the pH measured. At this point, the pH must be 2 6.0. The representative sample weight is based on the minimum required TSP amount of 14,371 pounds mass, which, at a manufactured density, corresponds to the minimum volume of 289.3 cubic feet, and a maximum possible sump amount following a LOCA of 4,503,500 pounds mass, normalized to buffer a 1 i 0.01 liter sample. The boron concentration of the test water is representative of the maximum possible concentration corresponding to the maximum possible sump volume following a LOCA.

Agitation of the test solution is prohibited since an adequate standard for the agitation intensity cannot be specified. The test time of four hours is necessary to allow time for the dissolved TSP to naturally diffuse through the sample solution. In the containment sump following a LOCA, rapid mixing would occur, significantly decreasing the actual amount of time before the required pH is achieved. This would ensure compliance with the Standard Review Plan requirement of a  ;

pH 2 7.0 by the onset of recirculation following a LOCA.

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4 ATTACTIMENT (2j UNIT 2 MARKED-UP TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES 3/45-5 B 3/4 5-2

3/4.5 INERGENCY CORE C0OLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

e. At least c 1 per REFUELING INTERVAL by:

1. Verify the Shutdown Cooling System open-pennissive interi prevents the Shutdown Cooling System suction isolat, valves from being opened with a simulated or actual L pressure signal of 1309 psia.

2.

A visual irapection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.

3. 199.3 Verifying that a minimum total of 400 cubic feet of solid granular trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) is contained within the TSP storage baskets.

4. Verifying that when a representetive semple of 4.010.-1 grems ef TSP fren e TSP ste.ege besket is

/

submerged, withoutagMatica, in 3.510.1 liters of M-+-10'F-borated weter frein the R'J, the pll ef the inixed soGtion 1: rafted to 1 5 within A hgnyg.

f.

At least once per REFUELING INTERVAL, during shutdown, by:

1.

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection Actuation test signal.

2. Verifying that each of the following pumps start Test Signal: upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation automatically

a. High-Pressure Safety Injection Pump.

b. Low-Pressure Safety Injection Pump.

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 169

~

j -3/,4.5 EMERGENCY C0RE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

BASES Portions of the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) System flowpath are conson to both subsystems. This includes the LPSI flow control valve.

CV-306, the flow orifice downstream of CV-306, and the four LPSI loop isolation valves. Although the portions of the flowpath are conson, the system design is adequate to ensure reliable ECCS operation due to the short period of LPSI System operation following a design basis Loss of Coolant Incident prior to recirculation. The LPSI System design is consistent with the assumptions in the safety analysis.

The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving baskets .

located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility l

. of corrosion cracking of certain metal components during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA. The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised to t 7.0. The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample ofitWT water provides assurance that the stored T will solve in borated water at the postulated post LOCA temperatures. Inw( )

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY o'f each component ensure that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and the subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. The surveillance requirement for flow balance testing provides assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and  :

(3) provide an accestable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above t1at assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses. Minimum HPSI flow requirements for temperatures above 305 F are based upon small break LOCA calculations which credit charging pump flow following a SIAS.

Surveillance testing includes allowances for instrumentation and system leakage uncertainties. The 470 gpm requirement for minimum HPSI flow from the three lowest flow legs includes instrument uncertainties but not system check valve leakage. The OPERABILITY of the charging pumps and the

, associated flow paths is assured by the Boration System Specifications 3/4.1.2. Specification of safety injection pump total developed head ensures pump perfomance is consistent with safety analysis assumptions.

The surveillance requirement for the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System open- i permissive interlock provides assurance that the SDC suction isolation valves are prevented from being remotely opened when the RCS pressure is at or above the SDC System design suction pressure of 350 psia. The suction piping to the LPSI pumps is the SDC System component with the limiting design pressure rating. The interlock provides assurance that double

, isolation of the SDC System from the RCS is preserved whenever RCS pressure is at or above the SDC System design pressure. The 309 psia value i

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 169

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INSERT A Testing must be performed to ensure the solubility and buffering ability of the TSP after exposure to the containment environment. A representative sample of 3.43.i 0.05 grams of TSP from one of the baskets in containment is submerged in 1 i 0.01 liters of water at a boron concentration of 3106 50 ppm and at a standard temperature of 120 i 5'F. Without agitation, let the solution stand for four hours. The liquid is then decanted and mixed, the temperature adjusted to 77 i 2 F and the pH measured. At this point, the pH must be 2 6.0. The representar.ive sample weight is based on the minimum required TSP amount of 14,371 pounds mass, which, at a manufactured density, corresponds to the minimum volume of 289.3 cubic feet, and a maximum possible sump amount following a LOCA of 4,503,500 pounds mass, normalized to buffer a 1 i 0.01 liter sample. The boron concentration of the test water is representative of the maximum possible  :

concentration corresponding to the maximum possible sump volume following a LOCA.

Agitation of the test solution is prohibited since an adequate standard for the agitation intensity cannot be specified. The test time of four hours is necessary to allow time for the dissolved TSP to naturally diffuse through the sample solution. In the containment sump following a LOCA, rapid mixmg would occur, significantly decreasing the actual amount of time before the required pH is achieved. This would ensure compliance with the Standard Review Plan requirement of a pH 2 7.0 by the onset of recirculation following a LOCA.

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