ML20078D718
| ML20078D718 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 01/24/1995 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20078D717 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9501300195 | |
| Download: ML20078D718 (4) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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f SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION f
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.194 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77 I
AND AMENDMENT NO.185 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-7.2 I
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT. UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By application dated January 3,1995, the Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) proposed amendments to the Technical Specifications (TS) for i
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Units 1 and 2.
The requested changes would add a permissive statement to Surveillance Requirement 4.9.7.1 that will allow the auxiliary building bridge crane interlocks and physical stops to be defeated for activities associated with implementation of the spent fuel pit rerack project. As a result, the surveillance requirement that requires tests of these interlocks and stops would not be necessary during the spent fuel pool modification.
l 2.0 EVALUATION By letter dated April 28, 1993, the Commission issued Amendment Nos. 167 and 157 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 respectively. The amendments were in response to a submittal from the licensee dated March 27, 1992 (and supplements), which l
incorporated the technical specification changes and evaluation needed for expansion of the spent fuel storage capacity to 2316 fuel assemblies. The increase is accomplished by adding a fuel rack storage module to the cask pit and replacing the present spent fuel storage racks with new high density racks with Boral as a neutron absorber in the cell walls, thereby allowing for more l
j dense storage of spent fuel.
Subsequent to the processing of this amendment, the licensee has recognized the need to specifically address testing of the auxiliary building bridge I
crane interlocks and physical stops required by Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.9.7.1.
This SR requires that the " crane interlocks and physical stops which prevent crane hook travel over the storsge pool shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 7 days prior to crane use and at least once per 7 days thereafter during crane operation."
In order for the auxiliary building crane hook to be moved over the spent fuel pool to remove the old racks and install ENCLOSURE 3 l
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PDR ADOCK 05000327 P
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! l the new racks, these interlocks and stops must be defeated, a condition not j
specifically allowed by the TS. With these interlocks and stops bypassed, the l
surveillance test cannot be performed.
i In the submittals related to rerecking, the licensee addressed four load-handling accidents, developed a safe-load path for each rack, and determined i
that the operation will comply with the criteria of Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612 for the control of heavy loads in the spent fuel pool. Administrative i
controls to be employed will ensure that at no time will the old or new racks j
- be carried over fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool. This was found to be acceptable by the staff in the safety evaluation for the amendment.
Due to the physical design of the electrical interlocks and physical stops, i
crane movement in the spent fuel pool is prevented during the modification.
Therefore, in order to perform the spent fuel pool reracking evolutions, they must be defeated. The licensee has determined that administrative controls i
that are in place while the interlocks and stops are defeated prevent creation of accident scenarios that have not been previously addressed.
Based on this information, and the acceptability of the administrative controls established to control reracking in the spent fuel pool, the staff has determined that defeating the crane interlocks and physical stcps is acceptable while the spent fuel pool racks are being replaced. Consequently, i
the corresponding surveillance requirement for testing the interlocks and i
physical stops is not necessary while the spent fuel _ pool racks are being i
i replaced. Therefore, addition of the note referenced to Surveillance Requirement 4.9.7.1 that allows the crane interlocks and physical stops to be defeated for activities associated with the spent fuel pit rerack project is j
acceptable.
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3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
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In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.
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4.0 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
s The staff has reviewed the licensee's proposed amendments and finds j
(1) that exigent circumstances exist, as provided for in 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6),
in that the licensee and the Commission must act quickly and that time does i
not permit the Commission to publish a Federal Reaister notice allowing 1
30 days for prior public comment, and (2) that the licensee has net failed to use its best efforts to make a timely application and avoid creating the d
l exigent circumstance. The Commission noticed the licensee's January 3, 1995 application for amendments in the Federal Register on January 9,1995 (60 FR 2404), at which time the Commission made a proposed finding that the 4
amendments involved no significant hazards condition and there has been no j
public comment in response to the notice.
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5.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION
DETERMINATION The Commission' regulations in 10 CFR 50.92 provide that the Commission may make a final 4 termination that a license amendment involves no significant hazards cc:. tderations if operation of the facility in accordance with the amendment would not-1 a.
Involve a significant_ increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previouily evaluated.
The SQN TSs prohibit loads in excess of 2100 pounds from travel over fuel assemblies in the spent-fuel pool and require the associated crane interlocks and physical stops to be periodically demonstrated operable.
During the installation process, the crane interlocks and physical stops must be defeated to allow the removal and installation of racks and associated tools to be moved over the spent-fuel pool. Additionally, l
administrative controls are in place to return the crane interlocks and physical stops to an operable status after each phase of crane use.
It should be noted that movement over fuel in the spent-fuel pool is prohibited. Therefore, the defeat of the interlocks and physical stops does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
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Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.
A fuel movement and rack change-out sequence has been developed that illustrates that it will not be necessary to carry existing or new racks over fuel in the cask loading area or any region of the pool containing fuel. A lateral-free zone clearance from stored fuel shall be maintained.
Accordingly, it can be concluded that the bypassing of the interlocks and removal of the physical stops does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.
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Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The SQN rerack project will ensure maximum emphasis to mitigate the potential load-drop accident by implementing measures to eliminate shortcomitegs in all aspects of the operation.
Elimination of shortcomings will be accomplished by comprehensive training of the installation crew, redundancies built in lifting devices, procedures to address each phase of the project, and prohibitions of lifts over fuel assemblies in the. spent-fuel pool. Therefore, defeating the crane interlock and physical stops to perform the required lifts does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above, the Commission has made a final determination that the proposed amendments involve no significant hazards consideration.
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6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a
. facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding. Also, the staff has made a final no i
significant hazards consideration determination. Accordingly, the amendments i
meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
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7.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the y
public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such j
activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, 1
and (3) the issuance cf the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
I Principal Contributor: David E. LaBarge Date:
January 24, 1995 9
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4 Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT Tennessee Valley Authority cc Mr. O. J. Zeringue, Sr. Vice President TVA Representative Nucleer Operations Tennessee Valley Authority Tennessee Valley Authority 1i071 Rockville Pike 3B Lookout Place Suite 402 1101 Market Street Rockville, MD 20852 Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Regional Administrator Dr. Mark 0. Medford, Vice President U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Engineering & Technical Services Region II Tennessee Valley Authority 101 Marietta Street, NW., Suite 2900 3B Lookout Place Atlanta, GA 30323 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Mr. William E. Holland Senior Resident Inspector Mr. D. E. Nunn, Vica President Sequoyah Nuclear Plant New Plant Completion U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Tennessee Valley Authority 2600 Igou Ferry Road 3B Lookout Place Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Mr. Michael H. Hobley, Director Division of Radiological Health Site Vice President 3rd Floor, L and C Annex Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 401 Church Street Tennessee Valley Authority Nashville, TN 37243-1532 P.O. Box 2000 Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 County Judge Hamilton County Courthouse General Counsel Chattanooga, TN 37402 Tennessee Valley Authority ET 11H 400 West Summit Hill Drive Knoxville, TN 37902 l
Mr. P. P. Carier, Manager Corporate Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 4G Blue Ridge 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Mr. Ralph H. Shell Site Licensing Manager Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority P.O. Box 2000 Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 y
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