ML20078C527
| ML20078C527 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 10/24/1994 |
| From: | Labruna S Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NLR-N94185, NUDOCS 9410310305 | |
| Download: ML20078C527 (23) | |
Text
-
1 Public Service Dectnc and Gas Company Stanley LaBruna Pubhc Seroce Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 609-339-1700 m.~
~. -..ano-.
- OCT 2 4 1994 NLR-N94185 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
PERMANENT HYDROGEN WATER CHEMISTRY SYSTEM NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
~
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-57 DOCKET NO. 50-354 The purpose of this letter is to provide Public Service Electric
& Gas Co.'s (PSE&G) response to the NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI) dated August 17, 1994.
The RAI resulted from the NRC review of PSE&G letter NLR-N93182 dated April 7, 1994 that submitted the evaluation in support of using the existing transportable hydrogen tube trailers for the Hydrogen. Storage Facility and the Liquid Oxygen (LOX) Tank utilized in the Hydrogen Water Chemistry System (HWCS) at Hope Creek.
The responses to the six (6) areas in which the NRC requested that PSE&G provide additional information are submitted in the attached.
Please contact us should you have any questions regarding this submittal.
Sincerely,
/
/
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Attachment 002[
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9410310305 941024 I
PDR ADOCK 05000354
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P PDR
OCT 2 41994 Document Control Desk 2
NLR-N94185 C
Mr.
T. T. Martin, Administrator - Region I U. S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr.
D. Moran, Licensing Project Manager U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Mr.
R. Summers (SO9)
Senior Resident Inspector Mr.
K. Tosch, Manager, IV NJ Department of Environmental Protection Division of Environmental Quality Bureau of Nuclear Engineering CN 415 Trenton, NJ 08625
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ATTACHMENT 1 RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-57 DOCKET NO. 50-354 i
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NLR-N94185 Question 1 In Attachment 1 to the referenced letter (NLR-N93182 dated April 7, 1994], the hydrogen storage facility (HSF) and the liquid oxygen tank (LOX) are described in Section I.1 and Section II.1, respectively.
To facilitate the review, provide a figure showing the locations of the HSF and LOX including the piping in relatior. to other nearby physical features which can be impacted by or can nave impact on the HSF and LOX in case of an accident.
Also provide a figure showing the configurations and dimensions of the trailer, the tube, and the LOX tank.
ResDonse The sketch provided in Attachment 2 shows the locations of the Hydrogen Storage Facility (HSF) and the Liquid Oxygen (LOX) Tank with respect to the safety-related structures of Hope Creek.
It also shows the layout of the hydrogen piping and oxygen piping.
The configurations and dimensions of the hydrogen tube trailer, the tube and the LOX tank are shown in the figures and data sheets provided in Attachment 2.
Page 1 of 13
o NLR-N94185 i
I Ouestion 2 l
In Section I.3, Design Basis Tornado, you have described how the storage vessels are designed to meet EPRI Guidelines which state that the distances between the storage vessels and safety-related structures, components, and systems (SCS) should be such that any accident of the former would not affect the latter.
In applying I
this approach, you made a number of assumptions and claimed that they are conservative.
You first calculated that the trailer with all the tubes attached would tumble and move 28 ft. whence the tubes separate from the trailer.
Then you studied the three cases:
(a) the trailer with one tube, (b) the trailer alone, and (c) the tube.
According to your calculations, all of them as tornado missiles would reach to distances beyond the minimum safe separation distance as required by the EPRI Guidelines for safety-related SCS.
The distances traveled for the three cases are respectively 125.5 ft.,
125.5 ft.,
and 65 ft.
In a tornado, light objects are generally carried to greater heights and also greater distance than heavy ones.
In view of this observation, an explanation should be provided why case (c) has the shortest distance and cases (a) and (b) have the same distances.
Resoonse It is true that lighter objects are carried to greater heights and also travel greater distances than heavy ones when subjected i
l-to a tornado wind field.
However, this is true when their I
projected surface areas are the same and only their weights differ.
For a given weight, the objects with greater projected l
surface areas will be carried to greater heights and travel greater distances.
This is so because the drag forces which are responsible for the height lifted and the distance travelled depend upon the projected surface area of the object thrown into the tornado wind field.
l For the above reason, the parameter A /W, where A is the j
projected ares of the missile and W is the weighd of the missile, p
is a reasonable indicator for judging the travel distance, D,,
of the missile.
Table 1 summarizes the maximum and minimum values of ratio A /W p
for the tube alone, and the trailer alone.
The ratios in the table clearly show that the tube alone is expected to travel less than the trailer alone.
Page 2 of 13
NLR-N94185 l
Resoonse (Cont'd)
This conclusion is consistent with the travel distances presented in Item I.3 of Attachment 1 of PSE&G letter NLR-N93182 dated
~ April 7, 1994.
No separate calculations were performed for the trailer-tube combination case.
It was conservatively assumed, based on above reasoning, that the travel distance of the trailer with one tube is the same as that for the trailer alone.
For this-reason, the reported value of 125.5 feet as the travel distance is the same for both cases.
Therefore, as discussed in Section I.3 of PSE&G letter NLR-N93182 dated April 7, 1994, the minimum safe separation distance of 82 ft. for one tube, as calculated in accordance with the EPRI Guidelines, is still.
maintained for the tube (210 ft. separation distance) and the tube-trailer combination (149 ft. separation distance).
b t
i Page 3 of 13
NLR-N94185 i
Table 1 Min.
Expected r
s Max.
Projected Dbiect Ap Travel Projected
- Area Weight, W max D' tame, a
(A iW) min' Object Type Dimensions Area, Ap (sf)
(sf)
(ib.)
D r
Tube alone 22' dia., 34'4" 63 2.6 4,846 1.3 x 10 2 5.5 x 10 less 4
long 1.7 x 10 2 11.6 x 10 more 4
Trailer alone 8' x 1.25' x 40' 143 10.0 8,650 j
- A,is the projected area of the equivalent cylindrical missile used in the simulations by TORMIS computer program (Reference 1) used for our analyses.
Page 4 of 13
._1
NLR-N94185 6
f Ouestion 3 In Section I.4, Tornado Missiles, you indicated that there are two limiting missiles, a 6-inch nominal diameter and a 12-inch nominal-diameter section of piping.
Provide the rationale for having these two missiles to be the most limiting, and why other larger missiles which can land on the tubes and destroy them are not the most damaging.
Responsg Tornado missiles, depending upon their shapes, weights, and deformability characteristics, can damage a target either locally (by causing perforation) or can produce an overall collapse of the target.
i The local damage occurs when the missile is relatively rigid and the missile impact area is small.
In this case, the missile kinetic energy is entirely absorbed in deforming the target material locally in the vicinity of the impact area.
A one inch i
diameter rod, and 6" and.12" diameter pipe missiles are considered to fall into this category.
For these three missiles, the penetration depths in the hydrogen
+
tube were calculated using the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) and Ballistic Research Laboratory (BRL) formulas recommended in t
Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 3.5.3, Rev. 1 (NUREG-0800).
Calculations showed that none of these three missiles could penetrate one tube and then also damage the next tube.
- However, the 6" and 12" diameter pipes could hit and damage two tubes simultaneously.
Based on these evaluations, the 6" and 12" diameter pipes were considered the limiting missiles.
The overall damage to the target occurs from large energetic missiles.
In this case, the missile kinetic energy is partly absorbed by' deformation of the missile itself and partly in deforming the target material beyond the elastic limit.
Evaluations have been performed for the wooden plank, 12" diameter pipe, utility pole, and automobile to determine the potential for overall damage to the hydrogen tubes.
Based on their weights and velocities, the kinetic energies of the wooden plank and 12" diameter pipe were determined to be 23%
and 49% of the utility pole, respectively.
For this reason, the 1
Page 5 of 13
NLR-N94185 Response (Cont'd) wooden plank and 12" diameter pipe were considered not critical compared to the utility pole and hence were excluded from further investigations.
The figure provided in Attachment 3 shows the schematic representation of the tubes with the bulkhead as target.
The figure shows three principal directions, i.e.,
X, Y,
and Z, along which the missile entry was considered.
The missile strike to the target in direction X, regardless of the missile orientation, is considered not critical because the missile impact is resisted by all the tubes, axially, due to the presence of the bulkheads.
The maximum force of impact by any of the two missiles, i.e.,
the pole and the automobile, striking the trailer-tube assembly from the Y direction is limited to the smaller of the forces at which the tube-trailer either overturns or starts sliding.
Based on the tube-trailer's total weight, and a coefficient of sliding friction conservatively assumed as y = 1.0 (the assembly is resting on stone and is not anchored), the maximum force of impact at which the tube-trailer will either overturn or start sliding was determined to be 62 kips.
Considering the tubes as simply supported beams between the bulkheads, and conservatively assuming the missile impact at the center, the capacity of a single tube was calculated to be 26.8 kips.
This capacity was based on plastic moment Mp which was calculated using plastic section modulus and 36 ksi yield stress with a 10% increase for strain-rate effect.
Comparing the maximum force of 62 kips, at which the tube-trailer starts sliding, with this 26.8 kip capacity of the single tube, it was concluded that no more than two tubes could be damaged by a missile striking horizontally, regardless of the missile orientation.
The vertical missile velocity is only 70% of the horizontal missile velocity per Hope Creek UFSAR, Table 3.5-12.
The damage velocity of the utility pole striking three tubes simultaneously was calculated to be 129 fps (Refer to the answer to Question 4 for the method used to calculate the damage velocity).
The calculations conservatively ignored the energy lost in crushing the pole.
The vertical missile velocity for the pole is 126 fps (0.7 x 180.4 fps) which is less than the damage velocity.
Hence Page 6 of 13
4 NLR-N94185 ResDonse (Cont'd) it was concluded that a maximum of two tubes could be damaged when struck by the utility pole in the vertical direction.
For the case of an automobile striking the tube-trailer from the vertical direction, i.e, Z axis, the impact force-time history of an automobile striking a rigid barrier, as given in Reference 3, was used as the impulse loading, and the ductility in the tubes was calculated for the case when an auto strikes three tubes.
This ductility was determined to be less than ten.
Therefore, it was concluded that three tubes could not be damaged simultaneously when struck by an automobile in the vertical direction.
From the above discussion, it is concluded that the overall conclusion derived from the local damage analysis, that no more than two tubes can be damaged simultaneously, is also valid based on an overall damage assessment for the case where a larger missile like a pole or an automobile impacts the tube-trailer.
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l Page 7 of 13
NLR-N94185 Ouestion 4 In the second paragraph on page 5, the probability of critical missile striking the tube trailer is given to be 8.4E-8 and that of missiles striking two tubes to be 4.6E-8.
Indicate how these probabilities are obtained.
Response
The probability 8.4 x 10'8 per year is for the event that the hydrogen tube trailer will be struck and at least one tube will be damaged by a tornado missile.
Also, it was determined by deterministic calculations that no more than two tubes can be damaged simultaneously by a tornado missile.
Therefore, this probability, i.e., 8.4 x 10~8 per year is for one or two tubes getting damaged by a missile.
The probability 4.6 x 10'8 per year is associated with the event that any two hydrogen tubes will be damaged simultaneously by a tornado missile.
In the calculation of these probabilities, the missile spectrum included in Hope Creek UFSAR Section 3.5.3 was used.
The following describes the procedure for calculating the probabilities.
The approach used in the calculation of probabilities is based on applying the theorem of total probability, i.e.,
P(E) =}
P(E/F ) P(F )
Eq. (A) i i
i =1 In which:
Probability of occurrence of event E; per year.
P(E)
=
Event that one or two hydrogen tubes will be E
=
damaged by tornado missile.
Conditional probability that Event E is realized P(E/F )
=
j given that a tornado with wind speed intensity of F, has struck the site.
Probability of strike of tornado of wind speed P(F )
=
i intensity F, per year.
j Number of tornado wind speed intensities.
N
=
Page 8 of 13
4 NLR-N94185 Response (Cont'dl References 1 and 2, prepared by EPRI, describe this approach in detail and provide procedures for the calculation of component probabilities P(E/F,) and P(F ).
These References document the historical data on tornado st,rike in the continental United States.
Utilizing this data, the probability of a tornado strike at the Hope Creek plant site was first calculated for each of the tornado wind speed intensities.
The conditional probabilities of a tornado missile strikina the hydrogen tube trailer were then calculated using the EPRI computer program TORMIS presented in Reference 1.
TORMIS utilizes the Monte Carlo method of simulation and requires the input of plant specific information such as plant structure description, the target description, and the missile distribution at the plant site.
These probabilities were then modified to obtain the conditional probabilities of a tornado missile damacina the hydrogen tube (s).
This was achieved as follows.
The missile damage velocities were first calculated by equating the missile kinetic energy with the tube strain energy.
Missile types 1" diameter rod, 6"
diameter pipe and 12" diameter pipe were considered for damaging the tubes locally.
Therefore, the strain energy calculations were based on the perforation depth.
Missile types utility pole and automobile were considered damaging the tube in bending as a beam.
The strain energy in this case was calculated using steel beam bending with an allowable ductility of 10 permitted by SRP Section 3.5.3, Revision 1.
The wooden plank was considered to be crushable, hence it was ignored.
From the conditional probabilities of a tornado missile strike, those missile hits were eliminated which had their simulated missile strike velocities less than the corresponding damage velocities.
The remaining missile hits were used to calculate the conditional probabilities of tornado missile damaae to the hydrogen tube (s).
Finally, the total probability of tornado missile damage to the hydrogen tube (s) was calculated using Equation A.
This value was calculated to be 8.4 x 10-8 per year.
To calculate the tornado missile damage probability of two hydrogen tubes simultaneously, the above probability was multiplied by a reduction factor calculated based on how the tubes are arranged on the trailer.
Considering the total perimeter of the boundary on each side, P and the portion of this boundary through which a missile coul,d damage two tubes Page 9 of 13
. _ ~.._. -... - -....
NLR-N94185 l
Resoonse (Cont'd) simultaneously, P, the reduction factor was calculated as p
R=
P Py The maximum value of this ratio, i..e.,
0.545, was used as the reduction factor.
This yielded the probability of tornado 4
missile damage to two tubes as 8.4 = x 10-s x 0.545 = 4.6 x-10~8 per
~
year.
i k
1
)
Page 10 of 13 j
A I
f NLR-N94185 I
Ouestion 5 In Section II.2, Design Basis Tornado, you indicated that the LOX tank will travel a maximum distance of approximately 52 ft.
Provide the calculation for this distance.
Response
The travel distance of the-LOX tank was determined in the following manner.
First, it was determined that the anchors of the tank would fail under the tornado winds.
The tank is surrounded by fencing and bollards.
It was assumed the tank could move to this perimeter before becoming airborne.
Forty feet was used for this distance.
Note that the actual distance is less.
4 Then, the TORMIS computer code (Reference 1) was used to obtain the travel distance for the airborne tank.
As stated in response to Question 4, TORMIS utilizes the Monte Carlo method of simulations.
Travel distances for a large number of simulations were obtained from TORMIS.
The largest travel distance thus obtained for any of the 1,000 simulations used by TORMIS was 12 ft.
The following data was used in the TORMIS model:
Wind speed range 330-360 mph
=
Missile (tank) diameter 8 ft.
=
Missile length (height) 15.5 ft.
=
Missile weight 1,630 lb/ft (based on tank
=
being % full of oxygen) 1,000 No. of simulations
=
Combining the distance rolled and the air travel distance J
obtained from TORMIS, the total travel distance of the tank was determined to be 52 ft.
Page 11 of 13
NLR-N94185 Question G In Section I you indicate concerns about the tubes being struck by tornado missiles.
However, in Section II, it appears that there is no such concern for the LOX tank.
Provide an explanation for the difference in your position.
Response
Further engineering evaluation of the impact of tornado missiles on the LOX tank was not performed since it was conservatively assumed that a tornado missile strike would result in tank failure, but the minimum safe separation distance to safety related air intakes would be maintained.
As stated in Section II.2 of PSE&G letter NLR-N93182 dated April 7, 1994, the separation distance of the LOX tank from the safety-related air intakes was estimated to be 148 feet after a travel of 52 feet under the tornado wind conditions.
This separation distance is well beyond the minimum separation distance (100 feet) required by the EPRI Guidelines, and ensures that oxygen-enriched air will not reach safety-related air intakes in the event the LOX tank failed under tornado wind or was struck by a tornado missile.
Page 12 of 13
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NLR-N94185 i
References 1.
EPRI Report No. NP-2005-CCM, " Tornado Missile Simulation and i
Design Methodology -- Computer Code Manual," August 1981.
2.
EPRI Report No. NP-2005 Volume 2, " Tornado Missile Simulation and Design Methodology - Volume 2:
Model Verification and Database Updates," August 1981.
3.
ASCE Report, " Report of the ASCE Committee on Impactive and i
Impulsive Loads," Vol. V, September 1980.
I P
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Page 13 of 13 J
NLR-N94185 i
i ATTACHMENT 2 HYDROGEN TUBE TRAILER & LOX TANK FIGURES AND DATA SIIEETS QUESTION 1 RESPONSE
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HYDROGEN TUBE TRAILER CONFIGURATION 1
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DOI Specification Pressure Vessels Typical DOT Trailer Pressure Vessel NOTICE Always check the latest DOT regulations j:
34_c w-for commodities which may be shipped wan en c Aness j
in authcrized cylinders.
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DOT 3AAX Pressure Vessels are not authorized for shipment of Natural Gas see page 5
,Y unless the shipper obtains an exemption from the DOT.
Dim:nsions and Data for Typical Vessel Sizes Min.
in.
Weight vol. cu ft.
scf scft scf t scft a
scf 0
DOT-3A 1800 24 558 6
11 1 116 15 7 635 g
Not DOT 3AX 1800 24 559 30 0
4.791 60 5 3 260 Approved (15 17 F
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4.822 77 6 11.567 14.865 13.477 12.905 3 142 16.570 l l 22
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6 091 48 5 10 913 14.278 12.382 12.346 15 005 18 705 36 0
5 337 50 9 11 543 14.985 12.995 12 957 15.747 IB 705 40 0
5.928 56 8 13 280 16,722 14.501 14 458 17 572 DOT-3T 2400 22 415 18 6
2.070 41 5 Not 7 944 7.206 6 897 1 681 Not Approved Approved 22 415 34 4
3 890 79 6 Not 15 276 13 850 13 263 3 223 Not App'end Approved 22 415 36 0
4 045 83 7 Noi 16.023 14.527 13.911 2.389 Not Approved Approved 22 415 40 0
4 440 93 3 Not 17 899 16 228 15 540 3 778 Not Approved Approved v.
DOT 3T 2850 22 49?
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2 395 40 8 Not 9 229 8.218 7 931 1 652 Not Approved Approved 22 492 34 4
4 433 78 4 Not 17.735 15 792 15.239 3 175 Not Approved Approved 22 492 36 0
4 633 B2 3 Not 18 617 16 577 15 997 3 333 Not j
Approved Approved 22 492 38 6
4 969 88 3 Not 19 974 17 786 17 164 3 576 Not l
Approved Approved j
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5 162 91 8 NOI 20 766 16 491 17 844 37.,7 Not Approved Approved
- t ength can be var'ed to meet spec.
reaug ernent s WARNING f includes 10% overf m DOT 3T Pressure Vessels must not be
" inciuaes end f.tt.ngs used in Hydrogen or Natural Gas Service.
DATA SHEET FOR HYDROGEN TUBE DIMENSIONS
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3 GASEOUS EQUIVALENT AT i
0 PSIG & 70 F*: OXYGEN _ _ _340,700 SCF NITROGEN _ _ _275,600 SCF ARGON - _ _333,000 SCF M. A.W.P. _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ __ _ 25 0 PSIG MATERIAL: INNER TANK _ __ _
_._ STAINLESS STEEL QUTER TANK _ _ _ _ ___ __ CARBON STEEL WEIGHT: EMPTY _ __ _ __ __
18,000 LBS FULL OXYGEN __ __ __ _ __ _ __ 43,800 LBS NITRCGEN _ _ _ __ _ __
35,700 LBS ARGON._ __ _. __._. _._ 50,000 LBS DA~iE TITLE TYPICAL 4/86 LOX / LIN / LAR AJR 3,000 GL. VERTICAL PRO N OXYGEN TANK SEMICONOUCTOR GRADE ALLENTOWN.PENNSYLVANI I
P-5-3 TANK OUTLINE DRAWING igd SK 7028A A "e ntE D*G " -
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ATTACHMENT 3 i
HYDROGEN TUBE TRAILER TARGET SCHEMATIC QUESTION 3 RESPONSE 9
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Trailer-Tube
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Configuration of Missile Hitting Tube-Trailer l